FAA and Air Force slammed for missing aircraft search activation lapses

[RiverAux]

The NTSB made some pretty serious charges against the FAA and Air Force for 5 cases where they did a poor job of dealing with missing airplanes searches according to this piece:
http://www.sanduskyregister.com/articles/2010/04/01/front/1989022.txt

Problems being the use of different terminology and problems getting radar data to the AF. 

Below is a link to the NTSB's letter outlining these problems:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/2010/A10_1_9.pdf

CAP is mentioned numerous times (no criticisms).

One of the identified weaknesses was the FAA's lack of people qualified to get the radar data needed to help in searches.  Maybe htis would be something CAP could help with.  We've most likely got units anplace there is an ATC facility and possibly could train up multiple people to help in this area. 

[Eclipse]

The NTSB made some pretty serious charges against the FAA and Air Force for 5 cases where they did a poor job of dealing with missing airplanes searches according to this piece:
http://www.sanduskyregister.com/articles/2010/04/01/front/1989022.txt

This is an article about militias...

[lordmonar]

Intresting article.

I'm surprised the FAA already does not have a SAR Action Team.

[RiverAux]

Sorry about that.  Got my tabs mixed up.  Here it is:
http://www.wlwt.com/news/23027005/detail.html

[heliodoc]

CAP helping out the FAA and AFRCC with standardizing terminology?

What? ... With an online course?

[sardak]

The NRAT - National Radar Analysis Team - went operational recently. It's made up of CAP members (including Guy Loughridge, who's been written about in the Volunteer), USAF and FAA radar analysts. AFRCC alerts all team members simultaneously so that the RCC controllers don't have to figure out which analyst is on duty at any given time. The available team members then start pooling their analytical resources.

The referenced report, A10_1_9.pdf contains recommendations 1 through 9 and is directed to the FAA.  NTSB also issued one recommendation to AFRCC and the letter, which is more or less identical to the one sent to the FAA is at http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/2010/A10_35.pdf . Normally the recommendations on the same problem but to different parties are sequential, but somehow a report on another problem was issued between these with recommendations 10 through 34 (I checked, these aren't related to the radar problems).

NTSB's recommendations to use radar data for looking for missing aircraft go back a long ways. Recommendations 77-45, -46 and -47 were sent to the FAA on June 24, 1977 recommending that FAA personnel understand the importance of sending to SAR as soon as possible all available information on the last known position of an aircraft, that the FAA send the location of the LKP obtained from radar to the National Rescue Coordination Center and that the NRCC develop procedures for requesting this radar information.

In 1992, the NTSB issued recommendations to the FAA (A92-90 to 98), AFRCC (A92-100 and 101) and the Coast Guard (which owned the National SAR Manual, A92-99) for reasons very similar to the current 2010 report - that different terminology caused delays and misunderstandings between the FAA and AFRCC (hmm - one of the principles of ICS is common terminology)  and that the FAA needs to have personnel available at all times who have the capability of developing and correctly interpreting radar data for SAR purposes. There were a number of other recommendations telling the FAA to improve its missing aircraft notification and alerting process. The recommendation to the Coast Guard was to update the National SAR Manual to explain the importance of searching around the last point on the radar track. The recommendation to AFRCC (A92-101 and 101) was to use aeronautical charts showing ARTCC boundaries to determine the proper FAA facilities from which to request radar data.

Col Jim Bigelow of CAWG/PACR pushed for radar analysis (and other technologies for SAR use). This was originally called the Interim Track Analysis Program (ITAP) but it became the National Track Analysis Program (NTAP) once the idea was accepted and refined. Radar ViewPoint was developed in the early 1990's by CAP member Lance Robinson to analyze radar data. The website is still up  http://www.airwaystech.com/rvp/index.htm  He had another program called SAR ViewPoint (same website) which was designed for CAP searches but didn't read radar data.

Guy Loughridge came into the radar analysis picture about 1996. He already had "tactical mapping software" and saw a new use for it. http://www.tacticalmapping.com/radardataanalysis.html

Mike

[heliodoc]

Thanks sardak

That IS some good info on the CAP folk.   I personally never seriously knew of NTAP and its origins..

But you also make a good point of the ICS system and common terminology...obviously maybe the FAA needs a little brush up on the ICS "stuff."

Kinda like the folks fighting the ICS training at its height  2001 thru 2005 to even some cases...now.

But all this may or may not cost extra money........if it does be expecting the the public to beller about overpaid Gov workers or contractors lining up at the Gov trough to improve the system.

Once again proving, education and improvements come with a cost....FREE is not one of them....

[AirDX]

Pretty disgusting.

1989-1992 I was a QA specialist at Minneapolis ARTCC.  There were 4 of us in the office that were highly proficient at extracting, analyzing and plotting radar data.  One or the other of us had the on-call duty at all times.  We carried a beeper that we passed to whoever had the duty for the week.  I personally provided data that led to the location of 3 missing aircraft: one graveyard spiral in northern Michigan that I provided an LKP within a coupe hundred yards; one scudrunner that I was able to at least get to the correct county in the correct state (left Minneapolis and disappeared, I tracked him to the Sand Hills in Nebraska and the Nebraska State Patrol put that together with a couple of vague reports to find the airplane in the side of a hill); and one overdue that I tracked to a farm field airport.

Sad that things seem to have slid backwards, but not surprising.

[Robborsari]

There is a lot of good information in those NTSB letters.  I read over a few:

http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2010/a-10-001-009.pdf
Shows several crashes right near airports. 

http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2010/a-10-035.pdf
Radar transponder code confused with elt by afrcc

http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/1992/a92_100_101.pdf
Cap did not follow up on radar data on the ground.
AFRCC did not request data from both centers involved

http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2007/a07_51.pdf
Crash 4 miles from airport.  Good discussion of 406 vs 121.5

http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/1992/a92_90_98.pdf
Older info.  Crashes close to the airport.  AFRCC not notified of elt by
center after center notified by airport controller.

I see several good lessons for CAP in them. 

1) Airplanes often crash near airports.  Many of the examples they use in the letters are airplanes that went down within 10 miles of an airport.  Since that is well within the error ellipse of the 121.5 satelite fixes it underscores the need to treat every elt as a distress signal until someone has eyes on it.  Too many times I have heard a search described as a "ramp check" because the signal seems to be coming from an airport.

2) Good communication is essential to accomplishing our mission.  If the controller had said "7700 emergency code on the radar transponder" instead of emergency beacon the outcome might have been different.  When reporting information or issuing directives from mission base we need to be very clear about specifics of the information and understand that what we say may not mean the same thing to the person hearing us.

3) Many people in the ATC system do not fully understand their responsibility in reporting signals to AFRCC.  I will now always follow up with a phone call to my wing ES officer if I hear an ELT that the controller informs me has already been reported to a center.  In the past I have assumed that the elt is being worked by AFRCC and they have just not notified us yet.  Having our Wing ESO call AFRCC to insure they have been notified seems to me like a reasonable compromise between not flooding AFRCC with calls and just trusting that everything is on track.

[RADIOMAN015]

I see several good lessons for CAP in them. 

2) Good communication is essential to accomplishing our mission.  If the controller had said "7700 emergency code on the radar transponder" instead of emergency beacon the outcome might have been different.  When reporting information or issuing directives from mission base we need to be very clear about specifics of the information and understand that what we say may not mean the same thing to the person hearing us.

3) Many people in the ATC system do not fully understand their responsibility in reporting signals to AFRCC.  I will now always follow up with a phone call to my wing ES officer if I hear an ELT that the controller informs me has already been reported to a center.  In the past I have assumed that the elt is being worked by AFRCC and they have just not notified us yet.  Having our Wing ESO call AFRCC to insure they have been notified seems to me like a reasonable compromise between not flooding AFRCC with calls and just trusting that everything is on track.

Well frankly the AFRCC response and even the FAA followup inaction is inexcusable.  The FAA should have a procedure in place that specifically tracks any potential tasking to AFRCC and the AFRCC should have a requirement to report back to FAA ATC (most likely the FAA national control center) what is being planned/implemented.  This way nothing slips through the cracks.  This whole procedure seems to be more about covering one's organizational/personal butt rather than insuring the mission gets done.

As far as CAP goes, most days (about 15 hours worth -- home, work, & mobile) I'm listening to all the local, regional ATC comms with my radio scanner, and always pay attention to any airliners calling in ELT transmitters.  (HOWEVER, when they are flying at FL 18 to 25K, it's a very wide area to be concerned with. 

At the unit level, there really hasn't been much information on our responsiblity IF we don't get tasked BUT are aware of a beacon activation based upon aircraft reports to ATC.  Of course we could also hear an activation directly on a radio scanner but would have to very close to pick the signal up.  Generally the rule is we take no action until notified by AFRCC that we have a mission.

I still get the impression that most crashes the ELT doesn't operate, and we are depending upon other electronics (radar data, and even cellphone) to get a better fix.
RM
       

[billford1]

How much of a big deal is this going to be to the AF unless a lawsuit happens? Does the AF have a mission that happens in the USA except perhaps some DHS assistance and operating a taxi service for Govt leaders?

[RiverAux]

Uh, this is one of their missions....