For Safety Sake @ Work and CAP

I'm a safety officer, and was a safety nco while I was in the army.  I like to consider myself a pretty safe guy, and I practice what I teach in safety.  I am the guy who looks for what can go wrong

That does not mean that I am always safe nor incident free.  I am human.

Last Friday, I had to move an engine underneath a pickup on a hoist.  Prior to moving the engine past the pickup, I looked all around, and didn't see anything in the road that I was going to smack.  I went and grabbed the engine with the pallet jack, and pulled it towards the exit of the bay.  Next thing I know, there is a huge pain behind my left ear, and my head slams forward right onto the handle of the pallet jack just above my right eye.

I had completely missed seeing the receiver hitch on the back of the truck, and backed into it.

Other than a nasty headache and a couple of bumps, there was no serious injury.

The takeaway from this, as I see it, is: that even those of us that take safety into consideration for everything we do, we can and will make mistakes, and that we need to keep safety in perspective of what we are doing.  This includes owning up to when we have mishaps.

So, how do we motivate people to (a) accept and then recognize a 'hazard' might exist; and (b) accept and therefore behave in a way that the hazard poses a risk of an accident?

I believe this is one of the hardest questions and points to address in any safety situation or culture. You cannot use a blanket approach to a safety problem when you are dealing with an individual. Each person has their own personality, characteristics, and background. Trying to get everyone to understand the same material or situation in the same method simply does not work. I am not referring to individual methods such as visual, tactile, or auditory, but more of relational, situational, or correlation.

I'm a safety officer, and was a safety nco while I was in the army.  I like to consider myself a pretty safe guy, and I practice what I teach in safety.  I am the guy who looks for what can go wrong

That does not mean that I am always safe nor incident free.  I am human.

Last Friday, I had to move an engine underneath a pickup on a hoist.  Prior to moving the engine past the pickup, I looked all around, and didn't see anything in the road that I was going to smack.  I went and grabbed the engine with the pallet jack, and pulled it towards the exit of the bay.  Next thing I know, there is a huge pain behind my left ear, and my head slams forward right onto the handle of the pallet jack just above my right eye.

I had completely missed seeing the receiver hitch on the back of the truck, and backed into it.

Other than a nasty headache and a couple of bumps, there was no serious injury.

The takeaway from this, as I see it, is: that even those of us that take safety into consideration for everything we do, we can and will make mistakes, and that we need to keep safety in perspective of what we are doing.  This includes owning up to when we have mishaps.

I try to tell folks the same thing. I have a couple of examples myself.

I had just finished contractor training for about 30 new contractors for a large project at work. Telling them about wearing proper PPE on the site. When I went to the site later that day I forgot to put my safety glasses on when I entered the site. One of the people I had just trained pointed it out to me.

Several years ago I was heading back to my plant after lunch and saw a guy on top of a billboard without a harness about 30 feet in the air. I started to take a picture with my cell phone while driving. One of my coworkers looked at me and asked me what the heck I was doing, he took the picture for me.

Just because you are a Safety Officer doesn't mean you are perfect and that is something that people must understand as well.

Here's a good example of complacency or "assumption blindness" or something.



I went back and forth in the basement, garage, and office a dozen times looking for that bag.
Apparently there were places in my mind that I simply "knew" it couldn't be, so even though
I "saw" it a bunch of times, I didn't "see" it until the light was just different enough to cause
the one side to light up a bit when I opened the rear door.

When I've got my work lights on, but not the regular ones, that area is in a bit of shadow,
and I presume the black case blended into the relatively black screw drawers and
created a blind spot there which my mind had decided could not be the hiding place, even though
it's literally at my eye level.  Logically, why would I ever put my headset bag on top of my drill press?

A good example of something hiding in plain site which could just as well be a hazard I'd had decided wasn't there.

If I had taken the time to really "search" instead of "looking" (meaning discarding pre-conceived notions
about where "it must be" and actively scanning the whole garage), I probably would have found it quickly.

I don't think this is a case where a lecture on the subject would make any difference, however a practical
with examples, might.  We used something similar in cycle training - "Rider Radar" exercises where
short examples are shown that may, or may not contain hazards, and then you stop to hear what the students saw,
and what their approach would be to mitigate risk - there are no "right" answers, only options.

It engages the brain activity, while stressing that there are usually no set answers for safety issues, only possible
avenues for mitigation or remediation.

It might be interesting to put together something like that for safety briefings.

Heh SWEET!

Here's a good example of complacency or "assumption blindness" or something.



I went back and forth in the basement, garage, and office a dozen times looking for that bag.
Apparently there were places in my mind that I simply "knew" it couldn't be, so even though
I "saw" it a bunch of times, I didn't "see" it until the light was just different enough to cause
the one side to light up a bit when I opened the rear door.

When I've got my work lights on, but not the regular ones, that area is in a bit of shadow,
and I presume the black case blended into the relatively black screw drawers and
created a blind spot there which my mind had decided could not be the hiding place, even though
it's literally at my eye level.  Logically, why would I ever put my headset bag on top of my drill press?

A good example of something hiding in plain site which could just as well be a hazard I'd had decided wasn't there.

If I had taken the time to really "search" instead of "looking" (meaning discarding pre-conceived notions
about where "it must be" and actively scanning the whole garage), I probably would have found it quickly.

I don't think this is a case where a lecture on the subject would make any difference, however a practical
with examples, might.  We used something similar in cycle training - "Rider Radar" exercises where
short examples are shown that may, or may not contain hazards, and then you stop to hear what the students saw,
and what their approach would be to mitigate risk - there are no "right" answers, only options.

It engages the brain activity, while stressing that there are usually no set answers for safety issues, only possible
avenues for mitigation or remediation.

It might be interesting to put together something like that for safety briefings.

My main facility is 374,000 square feet with many different ways in and out. The facility was built in different stages and this has been very beneficial as far as passageways is concerned. To try and keep myself from getting complacent about each area i go in a defferent door to each part when I do my "management by walking around tours" it helps me get a different perspective and look at the area when i go in.

i have only been with this company for 6 months and have been able to establish some great working relationships with my staff and the hourly employees. One of my personal approaches is "One Committment at a Time". The better i follow up on the smaller stuff with the hourly employees and Union Rep's the higher the chance they come to me with a real need. The approach has worked very well for me.

My first full year with my former employer in 2012 our TIR went from 5.86 in 2011 to a 1.2 for 2012. Many things went into making that happen but the best part was our "safety interactions" increased 10 fold.

The examples would be great as you noted. Sounds like a great National Safety Officer College project.

I tend to agree with those that said that safety is primarily about learning to do "things" the "right" way.  I'm not sure that formal generic "safety" education is really necessary or does all that much for the average person.  Those with specific safety responsibilities should have more formal training in this area so as to provide effective oversight. 

The problem CAP has and which probably isn't that different from that faced by most employers is that there are a very small, specific set of actions that we have a high degree of responsibility for ensuring that the persons engaging in them perform the "right" way, however this is just a subset of all the actions performed. 

For example, in my real world work most people have college degrees in the field, but are often expected to engage in some manual labor type tasks.  So, a lot of the workplace injuries have nothing to do with what the person actually has formal training in.  In this case injuries often involve things like basic woodworking or use of other small power tools.  I have some responsibility in this area and am struggling to balance out when we need to provide formal training for some of these things and when we shouldn't. 

The equivalent in CAP may be something like the task of driving a CAP vehicle.  We don't provide drivers training and don't evaluate people's abilities to drive other than making sure that they have a license.  This is an area where there is a decent probability of a significant accident that could involve loss of life.  Should we evaluate the abilities of drivers like we do pilots before letting them drive our vehicles?  Provide specific supplemental training (perhaps a defensive driving course)?  Or just depend on random inclusion of driving-related topic in local safety talks of unknown accuracy or usefulness? 

I tend to agree with those that said that safety is primarily about learning to do "things" the "right" way.  I'm not sure that formal generic "safety" education is really necessary or does all that much for the average person.  Those with specific safety responsibilities should have more formal training in this area so as to provide effective oversight. 

The problem CAP has and which probably isn't that different from that faced by most employers is that there are a very small, specific set of actions that we have a high degree of responsibility for ensuring that the persons engaging in them perform the "right" way, however this is just a subset of all the actions performed. 

For example, in my real world work most people have college degrees in the field, but are often expected to engage in some manual labor type tasks.  So, a lot of the workplace injuries have nothing to do with what the person actually has formal training in.  In this case injuries often involve things like basic woodworking or use of other small power tools.  I have some responsibility in this area and am struggling to balance out when we need to provide formal training for some of these things and when we shouldn't. 

The equivalent in CAP may be something like the task of driving a CAP vehicle.  We don't provide drivers training and don't evaluate people's abilities to drive other than making sure that they have a license.  This is an area where there is a decent probability of a significant accident that could involve loss of life.  Should we evaluate the abilities of drivers like we do pilots before letting them drive our vehicles?  Provide specific supplemental training (perhaps a defensive driving course)?  Or just depend on random inclusion of driving-related topic in local safety talks of unknown accuracy or usefulness?

I will say that when CAP decided to do away with the monthly safety requirement I was initially against it. I guess it was because I am use to having to do it at work every month as a basic expectation for myself and other employees. I did however change over time when it came to the focus for CAP. I have not seen a drop in the focus itself within my Wing or Region in which I have been involved. Honestly I think that when the subject of safety comes up people may actually listen more because it is not an “automatic subject”. The ORM’s and briefings are still great and the discussions are still there.

I am glad you pointed it out that volunteers have other parts of the work to do and that safety is important in that aspect but may not be a familiar part of that specific situation. That is something that could be done better. From my perspective it is a challenge for me in CAP. Though I have a BS in Safety and an MS in Emergency Management I am not a pilot, when I try to have those “safety conversations” in general and they ask if I am a pilot and I say no there has been an automatic assumption that I won’t understand what they are talking about. That doesn’t always happen, but it does occasionally, in the private sector as well after giving some of my lectures.

If you’re not an engineer you won’t understand.
If you’re not a commercial driver you won’t understand.
If you’re not an electrician you won’t understand.

I am a member of several other S&R related groups and have not faced that scrutiny as of yet.

I am glad you pointed it out that volunteers have other parts of the work to do and that safety is important in that aspect but may not be a familiar part of that specific situation. That is something that could be done better. From my perspective it is a challenge for me in CAP. Though I have a BS in Safety and an MS in Emergency Management I am not a pilot, when I try to have those “safety conversations” in general and they ask if I am a pilot and I say no there has been an automatic assumption that I won’t understand what they are talking about.

There's a couple ways this could be happening.

The first is on you. I'm not a pilot, but I do have a responsibility to ensure the safe conduct of operations, both air and ground. Tone is important when you discuss safety issues with groups where you may not have as deep of a background as them (i.e. pilots, of which I am not one). I prefer to ask questions to elicit a verbal conversation on the flight safety, which both acknowledges their experience and requires them to think about the safety issues since we're talking about them. So, tone is important. I only bring this up because I've seen safety people, commanders, and a whole bunch of other people be on varying parts of the "correct tone spectrum", so I don't want to make any assumptions.

The second is on them. If your tone is right and they literally don't want to have a conversation on the safety of an operation, then that's on them. A pilot like that would probably not remain a CAP pilot for very long in my AOR, but YMMV. "You're not a pilot so you don't understand" wouldn't fly for very long around here. "You're right, I'm not a pilot, and maybe I don't understand. Help me understand so I can keep you safe."

I am glad you pointed it out that volunteers have other parts of the work to do and that safety is important in that aspect but may not be a familiar part of that specific situation. That is something that could be done better. From my perspective it is a challenge for me in CAP. Though I have a BS in Safety and an MS in Emergency Management I am not a pilot, when I try to have those “safety conversations” in general and they ask if I am a pilot and I say no there has been an automatic assumption that I won’t understand what they are talking about.

There's a couple ways this could be happening.

The first is on you. I'm not a pilot, but I do have a responsibility to ensure the safe conduct of operations, both air and ground. Tone is important when you discuss safety issues with groups where you may not have as deep of a background as them (i.e. pilots, of which I am not one). I prefer to ask questions to elicit a verbal conversation on the flight safety, which both acknowledges their experience and requires them to think about the safety issues since we're talking about them. So, tone is important. I only bring this up because I've seen safety people, commanders, and a whole bunch of other people be on varying parts of the "correct tone spectrum", so I don't want to make any assumptions.

The second is on them. If your tone is right and they literally don't want to have a conversation on the safety of an operation, then that's on them. A pilot like that would probably not remain a CAP pilot for very long in my AOR, but YMMV. "You're not a pilot so you don't understand" wouldn't fly for very long around here. "You're right, I'm not a pilot, and maybe I don't understand. Help me understand so I can keep you safe."

I agree with you on both approaches. I am a very inquisitive person and like to ask a lot of questions to try and formulate the best response or answer. There are a few ways I think about my response when I talk to folks about safety issues.

1) Make sure not to come across as pompous or arrogant.
2) Make sure they know I value their opinion and respect their expertise.
3) Maintain a professional demeanor no matter their tone or approach.
4) I am interested in facts and subjective opinions create problems.

As noted I have had similar conversations with other professionals in different fields. Strangely enough often the most difficult ones to deal with have been fellow safety professionals I have audited. I have felt similar feelings when I was audited myself because you often feel "attacked" and "defensive" about your responses.

I was recently asked to clarify a comment on the video published by Mike Rowe by one of the plant employees about the Safety 3rd Approach and mentality. To be honest I had to think about it for a while and told the young lady I would get back to her. I didn’t want to give her a quick answer and set the wrong tone for other plant personnel. I have 2000 people to consider and a safety culture to be concerned with, so a quick response is not the best approach. I figured I would add my response to CAPTalk because I had made some comments on here as well.

The bottom line is that the intent behind any safety program is and always should be the safety of the people that are involved. Hands down that is the most important element of any and all safety programs.
 
Each business and even safety manager may have a different approach in the way in which they approach this. But I do believe that both still understand the number one priority is human life.

My individual belief is that Safety has three parts and no matter if I am involved in CAP, work, or other activities I still look at it in the same manner.

People – People are number one. The life of an individual has the highest priority over business, money, and virtually anything else you can think of.
 
Process – The process in which we make or operate safely should be as easy and direct as possible and still get the job done.

Environment – This is harder to define but one of the more difficult ones to narrow down. This is where the rubber meets the road. The edge of the knife and any other metaphor you can think of. This is where the true work is done. This for me is why I say Safety is 3rd. Without the first two you do not have the 3rd. You cannot have a priority unless you have Goal (people) and Method (process to get there).

Safety is 3rd to me because People are the number one priority to me, getting them to understand why they need to be safe is number two.

When I teach Safety Culture classes I start many of them off by stating the point that Safety is not the number one priority and see how it goes from there. Many times I get laughed at and then have to explain myself, other times people will wait and see. It is always an interesting conversation.

People / Life #1
Process / Method #2
Safety / Success #3

Eclipse's comment way back on 19 Feb 2017 was on point:  It's necessary to engage the brain!

The March 2017 issue446  of the ASRS Callback - https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback/cb_446.html - is on point for this one.  No amount of safety education, good safety habits, etc. will help if the brain is disengaged!  Eclipse's image of the hat on the drill press captures the source of a whole lot of error (and potential mishaps).    How does a "safety culture" overcome the empty stares we substitute for seeing among complacent pilots, complacent drivers, etc. etc. etc.?

I will say that when CAP decided to do away with the monthly safety requirement I was initially against it. I guess it was because I am use to having to do it at work every month as a basic expectation for myself and other employees. I did however change over time when it came to the focus for CAP. I have not seen a drop in the focus itself within my Wing or Region in which I have been involved. Honestly I think that when the subject of safety comes up people may actually listen more because it is not an “automatic subject”. The ORM’s and briefings are still great and the discussions are still there.

To your first sentence there; CAP has not done away with the requirement for a monthly safety brief for all hands. What was discontinued was the prohibition on participation for members who had not logged a meeting in the system. We're still required to hold and document (in eservices) the monthly brief.

I suspect, from the context (i.e. your last sentence above) this is what you meant to say, but I thought I'd inquire if that's so since we have so many readers who might take that out of context and believe that we've discontinued safety briefs (stranger things have happened)!

R/s, Respectfully submitted,
Spam

Eclipse's comment way back on 19 Feb 2017 was on point:  It's necessary to engage the brain!

The March 2017 issue446  of the ASRS Callback - https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback/cb_446.html - is on point for this one.  No amount of safety education, good safety habits, etc. will help if the brain is disengaged!  Eclipse's image of the hat on the drill press captures the source of a whole lot of error (and potential mishaps).    How does a "safety culture" overcome the empty stares we substitute for seeing among complacent pilots, complacent drivers, etc. etc. etc.?

Essentially what I am saying is engagement and interaction. Culture does not necessarily mean as a group but more an individual situation or occurrence in which people are interacting.

I will say that when CAP decided to do away with the monthly safety requirement I was initially against it. I guess it was because I am use to having to do it at work every month as a basic expectation for myself and other employees. I did however change over time when it came to the focus for CAP. I have not seen a drop in the focus itself within my Wing or Region in which I have been involved. Honestly I think that when the subject of safety comes up people may actually listen more because it is not an “automatic subject”. The ORM’s and briefings are still great and the discussions are still there.

To your first sentence there; CAP has not done away with the requirement for a monthly safety brief for all hands. What was discontinued was the prohibition on participation for members who had not logged a meeting in the system. We're still required to hold and document (in eservices) the monthly brief.

I suspect, from the context (i.e. your last sentence above) this is what you meant to say, but I thought I'd inquire if that's so since we have so many readers who might take that out of context and believe that we've discontinued safety briefs (stranger things have happened)!

R/s, Respectfully submitted,
Spam

Yes that is what I meant! Thanks for clarification on my behalf.

Eclipse's comment way back on 19 Feb 2017 was on point:  It's necessary to engage the brain!

The March 2017 issue446  of the ASRS Callback - https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback/cb_446.html - is on point for this one.  No amount of safety education, good safety habits, etc. will help if the brain is disengaged!  Eclipse's image of the hat on the drill press captures the source of a whole lot of error (and potential mishaps).    How does a "safety culture" overcome the empty stares we substitute for seeing among complacent pilots, complacent drivers, etc. etc. etc.?

Essentially what I am saying is engagement and interaction. Culture does not necessarily mean as a group but more an individual situation or occurrence in which people are interacting.

Can you clarify how "engagement and interaction" can eliminate 'looking but not seeing' or engaging the human 'auto pilot' so we raise the flaps instead of the wheels (see the Boeing 767-300 co-pilot account in ASRS issue 446, above)?  From my understanding of human attention that's a very tough nut to crack.  Yet, it IS a behavior that falls within the great umbrella of a 'safety culture'.  The Aviation Instructor's HB (FAA-H-8083-9A) defines the problem "... as overconfidence from repeated experience on a specific activity, complacency has been implicated as a contributing factor in numerous aviation accidents and incidents. Like fatigue, complacency reduces the pilot’s effectiveness in the flight deck. However, complacency is harder to recognize than fatigue, since everything is perceived to be progressing smoothly...” and 'safely'.  Most of us (I hope) can recognize when we're seriously fatigued.  No so easy or obvious when we're complacent (and distracted).

Eclipse's comment way back on 19 Feb 2017 was on point:  It's necessary to engage the brain!

The March 2017 issue446  of the ASRS Callback - https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback/cb_446.html - is on point for this one.  No amount of safety education, good safety habits, etc. will help if the brain is disengaged!  Eclipse's image of the hat on the drill press captures the source of a whole lot of error (and potential mishaps).    How does a "safety culture" overcome the empty stares we substitute for seeing among complacent pilots, complacent drivers, etc. etc. etc.?

Essentially what I am saying is engagement and interaction. Culture does not necessarily mean as a group but more an individual situation or occurrence in which people are interacting.

Can you clarify how "engagement and interaction" can eliminate 'looking but not seeing' or engaging the human 'auto pilot' so we raise the flaps instead of the wheels (see the Boeing 767-300 co-pilot account in ASRS issue 446, above)?  From my understanding of human attention that's a very tough nut to crack.  Yet, it IS a behavior that falls within the great umbrella of a 'safety culture'.  The Aviation Instructor's HB (FAA-H-8083-9A) defines the problem "... as overconfidence from repeated experience on a specific activity, complacency has been implicated as a contributing factor in numerous aviation accidents and incidents. Like fatigue, complacency reduces the pilot’s effectiveness in the flight deck. However, complacency is harder to recognize than fatigue, since everything is perceived to be progressing smoothly...” and 'safely'.  Most of us (I hope) can recognize when we're seriously fatigued.  No so easy or obvious when we're complacent (and distracted).

I am not saying that it only takes "engagement and interaction" to eliminate all hazards or correct behaviors. What I am saying is the engagement and interaction portion of a "safety culture" is the most important part of the work because this is where the real work is done. You have to have the people and a process in order to work towards a safe environment. Working towards that safe environment is paramount. I wish there was a simple way of getting anyone or everyone to get beyond the "looking but not seeing" or the "auto pilot" we all suffer from. I believe it would be like curing the common cold.

The strength and importance behind the "culture" is going to be defined in an instant given the first interaction and any interactions thereafter.

For example: You have a new employee that just finished new employee orientation with his new company as a production operator in a car manufacturing facility that makes the front quarter panels for the hottest new truck on the market. They cant make the truck fast enough and working around the clock. The employee has been through machine operator training and safety training with the plant safety trainer and safety manager. He has also gone through safety Lockout / Tagout training and understand he is not supposed to break the line of the guard without a lockout.

His first day on the production machine his supervisor comes out to him and pairs him with another employee. After a few hours the employee and the new hire are behind the rest of the group. The trainer shows him how to bypass one of the safe guards to make the machine go faster and produce faster. The supervisor sees this and allows it to happen.

The supervisor, the trainer, and that new employee have all just negated the intent of the training and any future safety considerations are going to be "questionable" and "optional" as long as they don't get caught because the supervisor make it ok.

To address how I would approach complacency, looking but not seeing, or auto pilot I believe it would depend on the situation. I can give a few examples of how I did things as an operator and how I do things as a manager now.

As a machine operator I would look at my machine and listen to how it was running. I would look at each section of the machine piece by piece and listen to the interactions between the motors, belts, pulleys, and the like so as to hear the "normal" sounds. If it didn't sound normal then I would investigate the sound. I initially used the technical manuals to understand the layout so I could find out if the pieces that were their were supposed to be their. After a while I knew what belonged and what didn't. When I would go into work and relieve the previous shift if they had left a tool on or in the machine I should notice it out of place when I did my daily walk around. It worked for me overall. Not all the time but most of the time.

In my current role as a Safety Manager I have to do safety audits in a facility that covers 400,000 square feet and 2000 people with lots of doors and pathways. I try never to enter the same door twice in the same week so that I can get a different perspective when I do my inspections. I do inspections and walk around daily. Changing my approach helps me a lot because I may miss something coming in one door all the time that I may notice coming in the door on the opposite side. I also do something that none of my predecessors did, I take an hourly employee with me at least once a week to do an inspection with me. They see things as well and point them out to me so we can get them taken care of. I may be focusing on exits being blocked and they may be looking at potential trip hazards.

We had a safety meeting at work the other day and the Boss asked me what steps I would take if the shop was on fire.  Obviously "[darn] big ones" was not the answer he wanted....   

We had a safety meeting at work the other day and the Boss asked me what steps I would take if the shop was on fire.  Obviously "[darn] big ones" was not the answer he wanted....

Ok I just spit coffee on my screen with that one.....I needed that!!

Or this?

https://generalaviationnews.com/2017/03/15/taking-things-literally/?utm_source=The+Pulse+Subscribers&utm_campaign=68e38d93f7-TPOA_20170316&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_62525a9780-68e38d93f7-37397

Or this?

https://generalaviationnews.com/2017/03/15/taking-things-literally/?utm_source=The+Pulse+Subscribers&utm_campaign=68e38d93f7-TPOA_20170316&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_62525a9780-68e38d93f7-37397

That is pretty dang funny and had to be intentional!