Structural Change

[bosshawk]

Gentlemen: I was online and on the phone for about 20 minutes: then, had to close out due to family stuff.

I would like to congratulate those who put the webinar together and who made the presentations.  I was duly impressed with the thought that went into everything, the civility with which it was carried out and the great ideas presented.  As some are prone to say:  "y'all done good".

Now, my fondest hope is that someone from CAP-USAF or National or some Region CCs were listening and watching.  I doubt that we will get much feedback from any of those levels, but lets hope that they took notes.

Can't wait to have another one: that I can attend for full length.

[DNall]

Thx on behalf... loved doing it.
The paper we produce will get full exposure... not overbearing force change kind of stuff, but a little "hey what if..." & " think about this right quick..." It'll get seen at high level sources, I promise you. Hell, i might see if we can run something into AF Times, maybe even Airman Mag how'd that be.

[DNall]

Direct paper collaberation to this specialized thread: http://captalk.net/index.php?topic=1312.0

[JohnKachenmeister]

This might be a little involved for Airman, but right up the alley of Air Force, the AFA's journal.  We might try a "Lite" version for Airman.

[Nick Critelli]

Webinar Report.  

Thank to all who participated and attended.  It was a very interesting conference. I apologize to ZigZab911 for my techo screw up that prohibited him from participating in the conference as presentor. That mistake cost us to miss out on a very well thought out and presented paper.  While we went through it in his absence it did not do the paper justice.  ZZ please consider posting it so we can carry on the discussion with the benefit of your comments.

After much discussion by the presentors and written comments by those in attendance, we came to consensus on the following:

1.  CAP's organizational structure is flawed.  The flaw manifests itself by creating a conflict conundrum between the National Command, the NEC and the NB which results in either controversy or complacency. Either severly limits the ability of a National Commander to be effective and efficient.  A Task Force on Organizational Re-structure should be created by the highest appropriate authority within CAP.  It should be populated by individuals from from within and without CAP who are from various disciplines and interest groups who are knowledgeable in corporate and governmental organizational structure.  The Task Force should be charged with studying CAP's existing organizational structure, the organizational structure of similiar public and private organizations and make a recommendation as to an appropriate organizational structure for CAP.  

2.  CAP needs a strategic mission partner  who will assist it in the effective and efficient performance of CAP's Title 10 and Title 36 mission. CAP enjoys a military based  heritage rooted in the Army Air Corps and now the USAF. CAP also enjoys a Title 10 military and Title 36 state dual status structure which is symmetrical to the National Guard's dual Title 10 military and Title 32 state mission status.  A strategic mission partner should share the same military-style cultural heritage and be a knowledgeable partner in performing both Title 10 and Title 36 missions.  Of the various possibilities two emerge as credible partners:  USAF and the Air National Guard. There was no consensus reached as to which of the two would be the better fit. CAP leadership should conduct a  professional and objective re-evaluation of CAP's current relationship with USAF with a view to expanding the parameters of the relationship.  However as a matter of due diligence other potential strategic mission partners should be identified and an objective assessment made as to their  ability and suitability to assist CAP in discharging its Title 10 and Title 36 missions.  

Comments anyone?


NICK CRITELLI

[DNall]

This might be a little involved for Airman, but right up the alley of Air Force, the AFA's journal.  We might try a "Lite" version for Airman.

I was thinking "for public consumption" versions tailored to the more open sources like that, then a nice cross-ref'd academic piece  with the deep thoughts moments for AWC (and ask for response papers), same w/ summary for Air Staff.

[JohnKachenmeister]

Nick:

My "Take" on the discussion was:

1.  Yes, our current organization is broken.

2.  What is needed is application of basic management principles in establishing a "Vertical" line of authority, versus the current "Circular" and sometimes "Orbital" patterns of management we have now.

3.  Specifically this means that the following recomendations regarding "Echelons above reality" are appropriate:

    a)  The BoG should hire and fire the Natl. CC and Natl. CV as a minimum.  

    b)  Consider giving the BoG authority to appoint and terminate all colonel-command positions.

    c.)  Either the NB or the NEC should go away.  The NEC could be replaced by a "Command Committee" from the NB membership to advise the Natl. CC.  But the two of them duplicate efforts, and unnecessarily complicate command of CAP.

    d)  If the NB goes away, some advisory body should replace it to provide the Natl. CC with input from the field.

4.  With respect to operational control, there are three schools of thought:

    a)  CAP should be OPCON to 1st AF, responding under Title 10 to SAR, and federally-declared disasters.  Each wing would be free to establish MOU with state agencies under Title 36 for local and state level disasters and emergencies.   (Lt Col Nall's plan)

    b)  CAP should be OPCON to NGB, with wings OPCON to TAG.   Essentially, CAP would be an element of the Air National Guard.  As such, 1AF could task CAP via TAG's for title 10 missions, AFRCC could task for Title 10 SAR missions directly (not thru TAG), and TAG could call the CAP into state service on the order of the governor.  State service would fall under Title 36, and be paid out of state funds.  (Maj Kachenmeister's plan)

    c)  Make major modifications in the CAP command structure, but keep the OPCON under Air University.  (ZigZag911's plan)

All of us agree on two peripheral issues:

1.  Officer quality must by improved through a more demanding and comprehensive PD program.

2.  Cadet recruitment age should be raised to 13 or 14.

[JohnKachenmeister]

This might be a little involved for Airman, but right up the alley of Air Force, the AFA's journal.  We might try a "Lite" version for Airman.

I was thinking "for public consumption" versions tailored to the more open sources like that, then a nice cross-ref'd academic piece  with the deep thoughts moments for AWC (and ask for response papers), same w/ summary for Air Staff.

Right.  The "Target audience" is the key consideration.  Remember... I'm a DINFOS "Trained killer!"

[ZigZag911]

Webinar Report. 

Thank to all who participated and attended.  It was a very interesting conference. I apologize to ZigZab911 for my techo screw up that prohibited him from participating in the conference as presentor. That mistake cost us to miss out on a very well thought out and presented paper.  While we went through it in his absence it did not do the paper justice.  ZZ please consider posting it so we can carry on the discussion with the benefit of your comments.

After much discussion by the presentors and written comments by those in attendance, we came to consensus on the following:

1.  CAP's organizational structure is flawed.  The flaw manifests itself by creating a conflict conundrum between the National Command, the NEC and the NB which results in either controversy or complacency. Either severly limits the ability of a National Commander to be effective and efficient.  A Task Force on Organizational Re-structure should be created by the highest appropriate authority within CAP.  It should be populated by individuals from from within and without CAP who are from various disciplines and interest groups who are knowledgeable in corporate and governmental organizational structure.  The Task Force should be charged with studying CAP's existing organizational structure, the organizational structure of similiar public and private organizations and make a recommendation as to an appropriate organizational structure for CAP. 

2.  CAP needs a strategic mission partner  who will assist it in the effective and efficient performance of CAP's Title 10 and Title 36 mission. CAP enjoys a military based  heritage rooted in the Army Air Corps and now the USAF. CAP also enjoys a Title 10 military and Title 36 state dual status structure which is symmetrical to the National Guard's dual Title 10 military and Title 32 state mission status.  A strategic mission partner should share the same military-style cultural heritage and be a knowledgeable partner in performing both Title 10 and Title 36 missions.  Of the various possibilities two emerge as credible partners:  USAF and the Air National Guard. There was no consensus reached as to which of the two would be the better fit. CAP leadership should conduct a  professional and objective re-evaluation of CAP's current relationship with USAF with a view to expanding the parameters of the relationship.  However as a matter of due diligence other potential strategic mission partners should be identified and an objective assessment made as to their  ability and suitability to assist CAP in discharging its Title 10 and Title 36 missions. 

Comments anyone?


NICK CRITELLI

One of the wonders of technology is that sometimes you sit and wonder why it won't work!

Still, I appreciate the effort you made in putting this seminar together, as well as the contributions of the two gentlemen who presented.

I can see CAP staying with AETC, but I am equally persuaded by DNall's (Dennis?) view that 1AF would make a good parent organization for CAP within USAF.

I am not opposed to John's idea (supported, I believe, by Nick) that we operate under NGB.....but I'm not persuaded of the wisdom of each wing coming under OPCON of state TAG....might be a good idea, I need more convincing.....I think John's proposal was a bit complex, probably further discussion will clarify it.

It was frustrating to hear so much and get no chance to reply! I must say that I think too much time was devoted to the strategic partner issue....believe it or not, I really feel that is the leser concern....CAP's biggest problems now are internal.....and, while Nick is correct that any human institution will always have politics, I think our major hurdle right now is to develop checks and balances to  minimize egregious politicking & cronyism, and to mitigate the damage it has done to CAP.

In brief, if we put our house in order, I believe we'll find out strategic partner/parent organization will be quite willing to work with us.

I am posting my original pre-seminar document here for folks to look through, looking forward to further exchanges about it....these are simply ideas, certainly in need of modification and improvement....and it is quite possible others have better ideas.....but perhaps this can help stir up discussion.

Have we asked for input from AF personnel?? Specifically those who work with/have worked with CAP...state directors, CAP RAP, and others? We need the benefit of their insights.

[DNall]

I can agree with most of that. I think AETC is an appropriate place to be in our day-to-day administration (ADCON). First cause that's along side JROTC, but also cause that's the home of officer taining & professional development that we're in desperate need of. I think we need to get real tight with them. They're best to deal with the CP & AE aspects of the org, & tyo fix our biggest problems. I don't think anyone cares which command deals with our contracting or which MAJCOM uniform board we have to work thru.

OPCON - the gaining command for missions - I think has to be 1AF. I have great respect for John & Nick's positions on the guard. I have nothing against the guard, I like them just fine, & I appreciate the opportunity to help the varrious states when they need it, but the feds don't pay 25mil a year for that to be our focus... meaning they won't continue paying that if we make it our focus. I really really have to emphasize also that while Guard sounds great & shorten the stack of paperwork for immediate disaster response (a position I still say we can duplicate w/ MOUs & maybe even streamline the process to come w/ fed funds also), it seems to me to lengthen the stack and/or cut off certain aspects of Homeland defense - the big picture big mission stuff we should be doing. Overall, I think you have to look at the points in these processes where federal commands take charge of varrious aspects (I posted a lil on that earlier). I think you have to understand that they'll use the stuff in their bag of tricks before they reach outside to state resources. I want to stay as centered to the action as possible... I don't have a problem though working closely w/ NGB & TAGs to set/meet/monitor training objectives & readiness/preparedness standards to be ready to go for them. I'd also make one little point in there that some states just don't need us. They already have a lot of the same capabilites in house w/ state police & guard for example.

[JohnKachenmeister]

Your last point is probably the principal weakness of my proposal, Dennis.  Texas and Florida could probably use CAP resources a lot as an element of their Air National Guards, but Rhode Island and the National Capital might not even bother to put the wing king's number on their Rolodex.

I addressed the requirement for the wing commanders to make contact with TAG's in terms of training and operational deployments, but it would also serve to determine exactly what support, if any, that CAP can provide to the ANG.

Your plan would resolve that through the process of creating the MOU.  I just think that establishing 52 MOU's is unnecessarily cumbersome. 

[JohnKachenmeister]

ZZ:

After reading carefully your proposals, I wish we had not had a techno-failure last night.

Officer qualification and development is a sore point in CAP, and contributes substantially to the deterioration in our CAP-USAF relationship.  When I first joined CAP, and through the 70's, most CAP officers came from the military.  Even if they had been enlisted or NCO's, they had an appreciation for the military lifestyle and values, and could adapt to the CAP military culture.  In the last 20 years, however, we have had a substantial shift in demographics, and the majority of CAP officers have no military background at all. If you don't believe me, check out the ribbon racks of CAP guys at the next semi-formal get-together, and se how few have the National Defense Service Medal or the Basic Training Ribbon.

For that reason, we need to improve officer accession training.  Once that's done, we can look again at command requirements.  Level 2 is good for now, but I would want to expand level 1 to include a lot of the elements of level 2.     

[DrJbdm]

DNall, you made a comment last night on the Webinar about our Wing Commander here in Texas. I believe you said he was a retired USAF Colonel and had served as an AF wing commander? Are we talking about Col. Eldridge? Or his replacement? From my understanding and from talking to Col. Eldridge he's a recently retired AF CMSgt not a Colonel and he's been in CAP a very long time, He was my Squadron Commander when I joined as a Cadet back in '83. I have to assume then you must be talking about his replacement?? Thanks for clarifying up any of my misunderstandings.

[DrJbdm]

John, you are right. We do need to focus very heavily on improving officer accession training to include standards for even getting 2Lt. In my opinion we need to develop an OCS that is structured and comprehensive and we need some minimum standards for even getting into our OCS program.

Our Officer standard should not be: have a pulse, not a be a sex predador, do a short online course for an hour or two and wait 6 months. What kind of standard is that? you join because your kid joins and we make you a 2Lt in 6 months and maybe even a Squadron CC if no one else wants the job.

  My last CC at my old Squadron joined because her son joined, she was a SM w/o grade and when we couldn't find a CC she volunteered to do the job, total time in CAP till she became a CC? around 2 months...maybe even less.

[A.Member]

I must say that I think too much time was devoted to the strategic partner issue....believe it or not, I really feel that is the leser concern....CAP's biggest problems now are internal.....and, while Nick is correct that any human institution will always have politics, I think our major hurdle right now is to develop checks and balances to  minimize egregious politicking & cronyism, and to mitigate the damage it has done to CAP.

In brief, if we put our house in order, I believe we'll find out strategic partner/parent organization will be quite willing to work with us.

I agree 100%!  I stated as much in a separate thread as well.  There is plenty of opportunity for improvement within the organization.  Before looking for other changes, let's get that in order. 

I also fully concur with the need for a much higher standard to obtain the rank of 2d Lt. 

[lordmonar]

I also fully concur with the need for a much higher standard to obtain the rank of 2d Lt. 

What exactly would those standards be?

[isuhawkeye]

I would recomend that you guys look at what Iowa's Officer program is doing

[JohnKachenmeister]

Iowa has a comprehensive six month OTS.  I am trying to work out a 3-month OTS here in FL. 

We need to stop worrying about numbers and start worrying about quality.  I am very familiar with the "Soccer Mom" member.

To me, I would like to approach this from two fronts:

1.  Improve the quality of officer, and

2.  Lighten the administrative burden on unit commanders.

I laugh when I hear about how "CAP has reduced paperwork."  They haven't reduced anything.  They just took all the paper and made them electronic filings.  The admin. workload is still there.

To do this, I think we need to restructure the units.  Having three types of "Generalist" units is a non-starter.  All units actually do focus on one or two missions to the exclusions of others.  I think we should structure our units  based on the missions.

Try this:

1.  Cadet Squadrons.  Exclusive focus on the cadet program.  No internal ES, AE is only that which is incorporated into the cadet program.  Cadets with a few officers (or NCO's) serving as cadre and trainers.

2. Emergency Services Squadrons.  This squadron is made up of all officers/NCO's with the duty to be the focus of ES operations.  The unit will have the gear, tentage, field desks, grid maps, L-pers, radios, vans, etc. and will provide training and support to all other CAP personnel and units in their assigned area.  Maintains all ES qualification records.

3.  Aircraft Support Squadrons.  Home for the pilots, IP's Check pilots, maintenance officers, and all pilot records for those who use the assigned airplane(s).  Provides pilot training and checkout, provides O-flights on request, assigns a pilot to teach AE in cadet squadrons.  All officers, no cadets assigned.

4.  Educational Services Flights.  All officers usually, but can also accept assignment of cadet officers.  This unit will provide both the external AE mission, and will provide the "Schoolhouse" for OTS and advanced officer training (SLS and CLC).

The units will have to be mutually supporting, and organized under a group HQ, except for the very small wings.  All support (Admin, PA, SJA, Chaplain, Finance, etc.) would be a function of Group.   

Ideas?  Comments?  This paper is getting longer!

[RiverAux]

Dnall and others interested in 1AF control over CAP, have you looked at the MOU between CAP, CAP-USAF, and 1AF at http://level2.cap.gov/documents/CAP1AFMOUpdf.pdf?  What you'd need to think about is how different the procedures would be if CAP was under 1AF full time.  Note that AETC isn't even involved in this MOU at all and that 1AF is given tactical control over CAP forces for 1AF missions. 

[arajca]

To do this, I think we need to restructure the units.  Having three types of "Generalist" units is a non-starter.  All units actually do focus on one or two missions to the exclusions of others.  I think we should structure our units  based on the missions.

Try this:

1.  Cadet Squadrons.  Exclusive focus on the cadet program.  No internal ES, AE is only that which is incorporated into the cadet program.  Cadets with a few officers (or NCO's) serving as cadre and trainers.

2. Emergency Services Squadrons.  This squadron is made up of all officers/NCO's with the duty to be the focus of ES operations.  The unit will have the gear, tentage, field desks, grid maps, L-pers, radios, vans, etc. and will provide training and support to all other CAP personnel and units in their assigned area.  Maintains all ES qualification records.

3.  Aircraft Support Squadrons.  Home for the pilots, IP's Check pilots, maintenance officers, and all pilot records for those who use the assigned airplane(s).  Provides pilot training and checkout, provides O-flights on request, assigns a pilot to teach AE in cadet squadrons.  All officers, no cadets assigned.

4.  Educational Services Flights.  All officers usually, but can also accept assignment of cadet officers.  This unit will provide both the external AE mission, and will provide the "Schoolhouse" for OTS and advanced officer training (SLS and CLC).

The units will have to be mutually supporting, and organized under a group HQ, except for the very small wings.  All support (Admin, PA, SJA, Chaplain, Finance, etc.) would be a function of Group.   

Ideas?  Comments?  This paper is getting longer!

Probably would work well in metropolitan areas and areas with lots of people and units. Get away from the cities and you'd have no units because there wouldn't be people to support three or four units or you'd have one doing everything - kind of like now.

As an aside, there was a proposal before the NB/NEC to reduce the unit level staff requirements due to the typical unit size, but CAP-USAF had serious reservations about it. So, the idea was dropped.