wondering about pearl harbor

Started by starshippe, March 01, 2011, 03:50:49 AM

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starshippe

. . i've been sitting here watching some pearl harbor history on the military channel, and i continue to wonder why yamamoto attacked pearl harbor at a time when the carriers were not in port.
. . anyone have any facts?

thanks,
bill


shorning

#1
They were more concerned about getting the max number of battleships possible. 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor

Eclipse

I believe the story goes that spies in Hawaii had told the Imperial Navy that the carriers were there, but on the day of the attack they were all out to sea.

From Navy.milhttp://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq66-1.htm

Nagumo's fleet assembled in the remote anchorage of Tankan Bay in the Kurile Islands and departed in strictest secrecy for Hawaii on 26 November 1941. The ships' route crossed the North Pacific and avoided normal shipping lanes. At dawn 7 December 1941, the Japanese task force had approached undetected to a point slightly more than 200 miles north of Oahu. At this time the U.S. carriers were not at Pearl Harbor.

On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel sent USS Enterprise under Rear Admiral Willliam Halsey to deliver Marine Corps fighter planes to Wake Island. On 4 December Enterprise delivered the aircraft and on December 7 the task force was on its way back to Pearl Harbor. On 5 December, Admiral Kimmel sent the USS Lexington with a task force under Rear Admiral Newton to deliver 25 scout bombers to Midway Island. The last Pacific carrier, USS Saratoga, had left Pearl Harbor for upkeep and repairs on the West Coast.


More detail about status and location here: http://bluejacket.com/ww2_12-07-41_carriers.html

"That Others May Zoom"

Smithsonia

#3
Battle ships were the great prize. As of Dec. 7th 1941, no Carrier to Carrier battles had ever occurred. Aircraft carriers were thought to be raiders mostly and not decisive power projectors. Sinking the Bismark for instance was done as a stand off raider and not as a coordinated task force. Meaning carrier attack upon disputed land/island, port facilities, and ship convoy attack. Within in months  - at first the Battle of Coral Sea and then Midway in May/June '41... the Carrier and task force concepts were proved out.
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/coralsea/coralsea.htm

As of Pearl Harbor Battleships were kings of the sea. Before December '41 Carriers were an afterthought or perhaps "lesser" thought is the best word. As of the Doolittle Raid, Coral Sea and Midway, Carriers reigned supreme. By Spring '42 and after Midway, no major Naval Battle was ever again decided by a Battle Ship, in the Pacific Theater.

What Navy accounts for this amazing transformational change in sea power tactics? Mostly the Japanese Navy which attacked Pearl Harbor from Aircraft Carriers.
With regards;
ED OBRIEN

PHall

Quote from: Smithsonia on March 01, 2011, 04:15:52 AM
Battle ships were the great prize. As of Dec. 7th 1941, no Carrier to Carrier battles had ever occurred. Aircraft carriers were thought to be raiders mostly and not decisive power projectors. Sinking the Bismark for instance was done as a stand off raider and not as a coordinated task force. Meaning carrier attack upon disputed land/island, port facilities, and ship convoy attack. Within in months  - at first the Battle of Coral Sea and then Midway in May/June '41... the Carrier and task force concepts were proved out.
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/coralsea/coralsea.htm

As of Pearl Harbor Battleships were kings of the sea. Before December '41 Carriers were an afterthought or perhaps "lesser" thought is the best word. As of the Doolittle Raid, Coral Sea and Midway, Carriers reigned supreme. By Spring '42 and after Midway, no major Naval Battle was ever again decided by a Battle Ship, in the Pacific Theater. What Navy accounts for this amazing transformational change in sea power tactics? Mostly the Japanese Navy which attacked Pearl Harbor from Aircraft Carriers.

Not even the Battle Leyte Gulf?

Smithsonia

#5
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
PHall;
The Battle of Leyte Gulf featuring the Battle Ship Yamato was not a win for the Japanese.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Leyte_Gulf

The Yamato did plenty of damage but retreated under fire... some of that fire coming from my dear departed father-in-law who bombed it in 7 different sorties over 3 days from land based SB2Cs that were left behind by Halsey's task force. As he once stated to me regarding the Yamato; "I shot and bombed that thing for 3 days and never felt more frustrated in my life."

So while you can argue that the big gun battle ship made a dent, they didn't win the battle. Battle of San Bernardino Straights, Guadal Canal, Battle off Samar and several more - included BattleShips against other ships. None of those Battleship engagements changed either the specific battles or the war in general. If the truth be told... in both WW1 and 2 Battleships were
attention getting, fear mongering, saber rattlers and little else... except effective shore bombardment platforms.

Japanese losses in this action were twice that of the Allied loses and they also lost 2 Battleships: Yamashiro and Fusō
The invasion of the Phillipines continued unimpeded.
With regards;
ED OBRIEN

JohnKachenmeister

Ed:

While I agree that after the Doolittle Raid, the Carrier was King, I want to mildly disagree on your assessment of the role of the battleship before Pearl Harbor.

Your view that the battleship was the prize is a rather ethnocentric statement.  It is true that the US considered the battleship to be the prime ship of the line, and relegated the carrier to a secondary role, the Japanese view was entirely different.

The Japanese came out on the short end of the Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty, and were forbidden to have more than a couple of battlewagons.  They adopted a carrier-based strategy in the 1930's out of necessity.  To the Japanese, the battleship was the secondary ship and the carrier the keystone of the fleet.

The Japanese fully intended to destroy the American carriers at Pearl Harbor, but Admiral Kimmel had sent them out with planes to reinforce Midway and Wake.  He took this action in response to the vague "War Warnings" from Washington that were sent after the Japanese diplomatic code was broken.   He believed that he would have time to sortie his battle fleet and meet the Japanese on the open sea, but wanted to keep them in the "Safety" of Pearl until the location of the Jap. fleet was known.

That is the tragedy of Pearl... Kimmel was not incompetent, he made decisions for good, sound, tactical reasons.  He just made the wrong decision.  We can point out those bad decisions now, because hindsight is always 20/20.

And... at Leyte Gulf the carrier was the dominant force.  Halsey could not have been diverted by a force of battlewagons, but he did find it imperative to chase the Japanese carriers.  Turns out they did not have enough pilots left to be a credible force, but were still useful as a diversionary force.  The world waits.
Another former CAP officer

lordmonar

I have to disagree.

While the Japanese were forced by the New York treaty to rely more on Aircraft Carries and smaller ships......Yamamoto was still of the old Battleship School.  The battle of Midway was planned with the main purpose of drawing what was left of the U.S. Battleships out of port and into a fleet engagment with the Imperial Navy.

But we ambushed them with our carrier task group instead.
PATRICK M. HARRIS, SMSgt, CAP

Smithsonia

#8
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Kach/Lordmar;
I don't have any major disagreement with your posts. However, the Japanese AND Americans were both Battleship-centric in the beginning of the War. Both built roughly twice the number of Battleships versus Carriers through 42. In '43 the US started cannibalizing hulls of various ships from Liberty ships to Battle Wagons for use as CVNs, CVAs (carriers and jeep carriers) The Japanese squandered their pilots, didn't keep up with carrier pilot training,  and post Midway - couldn't field an effective carrier born force. Meaning when the Battle of Leyte Gulf happened... they had not much left to shoot other than to than climb aboard the Battle-wagon band-wagon for a few last duels. So the problem with the Japanese Navy in WW2... they did more teaching than learning.

1. Protect Logistics. The US Oil Embargo of Japan for taking over Indonesian Oil fields was the Japanese Navy's reason for the Pearl Harbor attack. Battle ships control 4,000 square miles of sea. Aircraft Carriers control 40,000-60,000 square miles of open ocean. Japanese supply line couldn't be defended with Battleships. Problem: The Japanese didn't learn this lesson.

2. Forward Power Projection built on Maneuver. The Japanese start holding up in fortified islands - solution: spend less on these castles in the sand and more on carriers.

3. American Aviation Innovation versus Japanese. Once the Hellcat succeeds the Wildcat - the Zero becomes prey only. Result: The Corsair, Hellcat, and (Army) P-51 all were innovation with wings during a period that the once superior Zero remained static.

Meaning, the Japanese taught Carrier strike force tactics, but couldn't use these to their advantage as the industrial, technological, and natural resources of the US pulled us ahead. Don't forget that the US fought the Pacific war with one hand tied behind our back. We wanted to defeat Germany first. As originally planned the Pacific wasn't to be addressed until early '45. None of these determining factors of the WW2 Pacific action had anything to do with the Battleship. Meaning the Battleship was superfluous to winning the war. The greatest single task undertaken by a Battleship in WW2 - Japanese surrender onboard the Missouri - Meaning to the end a Battleship was a poseur. Meaning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor taking out our battleships, while a terrifying first salvo in the larger picture... was a multitude of blessings coated in a deadly and smoking disguise.
With regards;
ED OBRIEN

JohnKachenmeister

Yamamoto was of the old battleship school, but readily endorsed carriers as the new wave of naval warfare.  He was much quicker to do so than the American admirals with the one exception being Halsey.

And, Ed, you are right about the production of battlewagons after the war began.  The Japs., no longer contrained by treaty, did begin to build some giants.  The Americans fielded the smaller Iowa class in larger numbers, but as you have already noted, the ship-to-ship battle envisioned by the Navy did not materialize.  The battleship was used for shore bombardment primarily.

For those short-bus riding special education students who did not learn the lesson taught by Professer Billy Mitchell in the sinking of the Ostfriesland, the make up test was the sinking of the Repulse and Prince of Wales.  As impressive as they look underway, and as intimidating as they look sailing into a conquered Tokyo Bay, the zenith of the battlewagon was reached at the Battle of Jutland in the world war immediately preceeding World War II.

The airplane doomed the battleship, and the Japanese were doomed by their own racism and arrogance.

Another former CAP officer

Smithsonia

#10
I once was in the perfect place to bomb the USS Missouri. South of Bainbridge Island west of Seattle - It was maneuvering through the south pass.

I was coming out of Bellingham in a Twin Commander. I was in the soup and low enough not to interfere with the instrument pattern into Boeing Field... I think I was under 2000 ft. There was a sucker hole in the soup and I looked down.

Holy Mother of all that is Historian Nerdy.... there she was. THE USS MISSOURI!!!! I screamed with surprise and laughed until I coughed. Nothing looks like a Battleship. She was long, lean, balanced, and beautiful. Her wake was miles long and she was under full steam.

I knew that I'd never see a Battle ship under way ever again. I knew the Missouri was going to Hawaii for permanent display at Pearl Harbor. I knew I was the luckiest of pilots. Perhaps the last of the luckiest of pilots. I knew this was the fleeting last seconds of an age gone for bye. If I'd had passengers on my plane they'd have died of heart attacks, hearing my shouts of joy. If I'd accidentally clicked my mic I'd have lit-up the Norwest with epithets of unabashed glee... and I'd be in FCC prison to this day. Instead I had the pleasure alone and remember it like yesterday. The year was '97 or '98. But it was also 1942 or '43.

The sucker hole was a mile or two wide - the era passed from view in 20 or 30 seconds. I smile wider than the a human mouth can -  every time I think of that moment.
With regards;
ED OBRIEN

ol'fido

I believe that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor without the carriers present for the same reason we raided the POW camp at Son Tay, assaulted an island after the crew of the Mayaguez had already been released, and air assualted into the Shah-i-kat(forgive the spelling)Valley when we knew the Taliban controlled the high ground...The Tyranny of the Plan. When a major military operation like this is undertaken, many different and far flung pieces have to move and come together for the plan to be carried out. When the Japanese fleet sailed it was acting on the intelligence it had at the time which was that all the major ships of the Pacific fleet would be at Pearl Harbor.

After the fleet sailed, conditions changed. In 1941, a fleet movement of that size was not something you did on a whim. You can't turn a major strategic plan on and off like a water faucet. Perhaps, if the battle wagons had also sailed there would have been some major rethinking but we don't and will never know. Many military operations go forward simply because so much planning and work has gone into them that operational momentum takes over and the brakes can't be put on it without a game changing turn of events of monumental proportion.
Lt. Col. Randy L. Mitchell
Historian, Group 1, IL-006

starshippe

#12
. . thanks, all, for some very good discussion.
. . well it seems to me that he believed in air power over battleship power, because thats just what he did, used aircraft to attack battleships, quite successfully. and, the "third wave" of air strikes never happened because he was concerned about.... aircraft from the carriers.
. . in addition, it just doesnt seem that the attack accomplished much, militarily, as several of the ships that were "sunk," in forty feet of water, were refloated, refurbished, and rejoined the war. if these ships had been drawn out of the harbor to meet a battleship threat, and then also attacked with aircraft, those ships that were sunk would probably have stayed sunk.

thanks again, i enjoyed the discussions,
bill

Chief2009

#13
Quote from: Smithsonia on March 01, 2011, 03:35:12 PM3. American Aviation Innovation versus Japanese. Once the Hellcat succeeds the Wildcat - the Zero becomes prey only. Result: The Corsair, Hellcat, and (Army) P-51 all were innovation with wings during a period that the once superior Zero remained static.

Disagree that Japanese aircraft development remained static. The Ki-84 Hayate, Ki-100, and N1K2-J Shiden were in service, but a combination of shortage of good engines, lack of experienced pilots, and a lack of factories from B-29 raids kept them from really making an impact. but when they did encounter Hellcats and Corsairs they were solidly matched. Imagine good quantities of these fighters matched with experienced pilots. *shudder*

DN
"To some the sky is the limit. To others it is home" — Unknown
Dan Nelson, 1st Lt, CAP
Deputy Commander for Cadets
Illinois Valley Composite Squadron GLR-IL-284

Smithsonia

#14
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Chief2009;
I'll take that bet - See here: http://japaneseaircraft.devhub.com/
Developments that are non-fielded or sub-fielded mean little in warfare. Otherwise the German's with deployed jets AND rocket fighters would have ruled the skies over Europe. In this case the Japanese waited too long see the need to innovate and then to implement and deploy their innovation. Like the German rocket program - It just means your adversary during the war runs off with your innovation as war booty, after the war. In this manner you make your conqueror stronger. To this point - the percentage of US kills for each of our WW2 Navy aircraft only went up as the Pacific war progressed.

This was likely due to more experienced pilots for the Americans, a lot more planes, and the fact kamikazes aren't good for statistics or defense. In the case of the planes that you site... this wasn't a war settled by a demonstration flight. It was a fight to the death.

The A6M Zero was just a target at the end of the war. The pilots inside were canon fodder. The newly developed but un-deployed Japanese planes were as irrelevant as vanished dreams.  In life as well as combat timing is everything.

I've lectured about the end of the Pacific War for many years. The Q and A always comes down to "Why" did we use the A-Bomb. Wouldn't a demonstration in Tokyo harbor done just as much? The sad truth is no and for the reasons stated above. Only when Hirohito realized that there may be no subjects left to worship his throne did he throw in the towel. So it wasn't Hiroshima that caused the end of the war. It wasn't Nagasaki either. Amazingly enough it wasn't the Last 800 plane Tokyo raid of B-29s with incendiaries killing 50,000 - It was all of these events together - unending horrors night after night - and the signal that the emperor wouldn't be touched that made the unconditional surrender. It was the certainty of annihilation for an entire population. That is the unvarnished nasty but relevant final fact. The vision of a man alone and undefended on a throne without a surviving subject to call him Lord. War is hell... absolute unadulterated hell. AND tyrants are petty creatures with no hearts but the one in their puny chests.

So back to the advanced demonstration planes of the Japanese Navy. If the Hiroshima attack wasn't impressive to them... how impressive was Hayate or the Shiden to any of us?
With regards;
ED OBRIEN

JohnKachenmeister

#15
Ed:

I agree with you.  Japanese R&D came too little and too late in the war to make a difference.  That's why I accused them of racism and arrogance.  They thought that the weapons that defeated the Chinese were easily adequate against the jitterbug-dancing, zoot-suit-wearing American trash.

This pertained not only to aircraft, but to rifles, machine guns, and all other war materiel.  The US was able to field increasingly technically superior weapons (the M-1 Garand rifle being a good example).  The Jap. was stuck with weapons that were state-of-the-art in 1935.

Another point of departure in philosophy was in the area of pilot training.  Hap Arnold spent a lot on pilot training, starting even before the war began.  He drafted flight instructors, pulled experienced combat pilots out of action to assign them as instructors (a controversial decision that frustrated field commanders that ultimately proved to be a war-winning idea), and (here comes the assertion that the CAP-haters will argue with) directed the CAP to initiate a cadet program to prepare high school students for military life.

CAP did good on the coastal patrol, but even if you grant the claim of 57 attacks and 2 sinkings, CAP's principal contribution to victory in WWII was the cadet program that reduced the alarming washout rate at Randolph Field.  The US was the only nation that ended WWII with a SURPLUS of pilots, who then formed the backbone of the postwar airline boom.

The Japanese, on the other hand, had virtually no pilot training base.  By 1944, at Leyte Gulf, the Jap. carriers had planes, but not enough pilots.  They were useful only as a diversion.  One of the weaknesses of the kamikaze program was that while they had plenty of suicidal volunteers, they did not have enough flight instructors to even give rudimentary training to them in meaningful numbers.

Another former CAP officer

Sleepwalker

Ed,

  You are right as usual.  The Japanese Navy still did not regard the Carriers as important as Battleships as late as June 1942, in spite of having recently fought Carrier engagements at Pearl Harbor and in the Coral Sea.  The  evidence for this is how the Carriers were used as a screening force for the Battleships which were steaming many miles behind toward Midway Island.  They clearly thought Carriers should be used to protect the Battleships, and not the reverse.  We will probably never know why they thought this way, but it took losing their entire Carrier force at Midway to realize how much they needed them.               
A Thiarna, déan trócaire

Sleepwalker


  With this mindset, it is likely that Japanese Naval command cosidered the American Battleships to be the prime targets.  Although they would probably have liked to have struck the Carriers as well, that must not have been their top priority.  Their concern for the whereabouts of our Carriers probably had more to with worry over a stray American Carrier-based scout plane discovering their large task force and ruining the 'surprise' attack on Pearl, rather than considering the Carriers a real threat.

All of this is, of course, debatable and only my personal theories.     
A Thiarna, déan trócaire

BillB

The "scout planes" were PBY's out of Hawaii, not carrier based aircraft. The two U.S. carriers were enrouter or Guam or Midway and the decks were loaded with tracraft being transferred to those Islands. Nevermind the aircraft were in great part old Brewster Buffolos and a few wildcats, the carriers didn't launch any scout aircraft.
Gil Robb Wilson # 19
Gil Robb Wilson # 104

Sleepwalker

(Respectfully, you should re-read my post. I don't think you understand what I am saying)
A Thiarna, déan trócaire

JohnKachenmeister

The small PBY force was deployed to the south and west, not to the north where a storm was masking the approach of the Jap. fleet.

I want to differentiate between the Jap. Naval staff and Yamamoto personally.  Yamamoto was an ardent advocate of carrier power and naval aviation, and used his junior and mid-grade officers as key staffers.  His primary battle staff were still of the battle line, and did not think in terms of carrier warfare.  It was a time of transition for both navies.

But, as to sleepwalker's point, Japan did not lose its entire carrier force at Midway.  They attacked Pearl with 6 carriers, and lost 4 at Midway.  One was in port during the Doolittle raid and was slightly damaged.  There still was a substantial carrier force in 1944 to lure Halsey away from the Philippines.  By 1944, however, they lacked pilots, so the carrier's effectiveness, to say the least, was compromised.
Another former CAP officer

JohnKachenmeister

Of course, all of you know we have lost the attention of any cadets by this point in the discussion.  Between the dumbing-down of the cadet program and the dumbing-down of the schools, their knowledge of history is that Rosie the Riveter won World War II with the help of the Benevolent Communists of the Soviet Union and the Tuskeegee Airmen.  Halsey and LeMay only fought Japan because they were racists, and the primary reason for World War II is that the Jews were blamed for the Great Depression when it was actually the fault of greedy capitalists on Wall Street.
Another former CAP officer

Sleepwalker

Verification: I didn't mean that the Japanese lost their entire Carrier force at Midway, but meant that the entire Carrier force that was deployed to Midway was lost - I should have worded that part more clearly.   
A Thiarna, déan trócaire

Smithsonia

#23
The definitive work on this subject are NOT the movies "Tora, Tora, Tora," or "Pearl Harbor" both of which are historical foolishness - However the Book by Gordon Prange "At Dawn We Slept" is big and full of facts. Professor Prange argued that the Japanese failed at Pearl.
1. By not attacking the American Carriers even at sea - as they were not ready for battle because the US carriers were being used as Aircraft resupply ships and not offensive power projection.
2. The Oilers and in port refueling facilities remained largely untouched.
3. The Submarine fleet was left intact.
4. Almost all of the the stricken Battleships were re-floated and later fought in the war.
5. The large harbor repair facilities were left in tact.
6. A sleeping giant was indeed awakened.
7. A third wave of Japanese attacking aircraft was called off because the first two waves were considered completely and absolutely successful.

Pearl Harbor is therefore not considered (by Prange) a successful disabling attack and only a big raid. The Philipines, Wake Island, Singapore, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and several smaller targets were the real prizes for the Japanese. Pearl was always a delaying action at least and an opening bargaining position to sue for a quick peace at most. The crippling of the forward deployed American fleet simply didn't occur. Within 6 months America was on the offensive in the Pacific. And, that this quick response to the attacks meant that Japan could never consolidate their successes. So tactically and strategically the Attack on Pearl Harbor was a failure for the Japanese.

With regards;
ED OBRIEN

Sleepwalker


   Prange's other book "Miracle at Midway" is also another 'must read' for those interested in that battle.  Both books are the best I have read on both subjects.   
A Thiarna, déan trócaire

JohnKachenmeister

I also read "At Dawn...", and I agree with the fact that the raid was a failure.  It was a stunning tactical success, but its failure was in that it did not produce the desired outcome of forcing the US to sue for peace.  Again, the failure can be traced to Japanese racism, and their view that the US was full of weaklings incapable of the sacrifice demanded by total war.

The only surprising part was the failure of the Japanese to attack the submarines.  The Jap. navy considered the sub a less-than-adequate weapon, and did not consider submarines a serious threat.  Their allies, the Germans, however, were busy bringing another island nation nearly to its knees through submarine warfare.  You would think they would chat from time to time, being allies and all that.
Another former CAP officer

Smithsonia

Here's the Score Card:
AMERICANS Confirm 28 Japanese planes shot down. 2 midget submarines sunk. 1 more probable kill on unknown sub. (later another midget was found sunk)
America claims following losses
Casualties
USA : 218 KIA, 364 WIA.
USN: 2,008 KIA, 710 WIA.
USMC: 109 KIA, 69 WIA.
Civilians: 68 KIA, 35 WIA.

  TOTAL: 2,403 KIA, 1,178 WIA.
-------------------------------------------------
Battleships
USS Arizona (BB-39) - total loss when a bomb hit her magazine.
USS Oklahoma (BB-37) - Total loss when she capsized and sunk in the harbor.
USS California (BB-44) - Sunk at her berth. Later raised and repaired.
USS West Virginia (BB-48) - Sunk at her berth. Later raised and repaired.
USS Nevada - (BB-36) Beached to prevent sinking. Later repaired.
USS Pennsylvania (BB-38) - Light damage.
USS Maryland (BB-46) - Light damage.
USS Tennessee (BB-43) Light damage.
USS Utah (AG-16) - (former battleship used as a target) - Sunk.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cruisers
USS New Orleans (CA-32) - Light Damage..
USS San Francisco (CA38) - Light Damage.
USS Detroit (CL-8) - Light Damage.
USS Raleigh (CL-7) - Heavily damaged but repaired.
USS Helena (CL-50) - Light Damage.
USS Honolulu (CL-48) - Light Damage..
-------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------
Destroyers
USS Downes (DD-375) - Destroyed. Parts salvaged.
USS Cassin - (DD-37 2) Destroyed. Parts salvaged.
USS Shaw (DD-373) - Very heavy damage.
USS Helm (DD-388) - Light Damage.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minelayer
USS Ogala (CM-4) - Sunk but later raised and repaired.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seaplane Tender
USS Curtiss (AV-4) - Severely damaged but later repaired.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Repair Ship
USS Vestal (AR-4) - Severely damaged but later repaired.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Harbor Tug
USS Sotoyomo (YT-9) - Sunk but later raised and repaired.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aircraft
188 Aircraft destroyed (92 USN and 92 U.S. Army Air Corps.)
With regards;
ED OBRIEN

AirDX

Wait... is this CAPTalk?  I'm learning things and enjoying reading this!

A minor quibble - up topic the US carriers are referred to as CVNs and the auxiliary "jeep" carriers as CVAs.  CVNs are nuclear powered carriers, CVAs are attack carriers - full sized units.

IIRC:

Carriers were initially designated as CVs.  The pre-war 8 were Langley, Ranger, Yorktown, Enterprise, Hornet, Lexington, Saratoga and Wasp.

The two classes built during the war were the Essex class (called CVB - Aircraft Carrier, Large) and the Independence class (CVL: Aircraft Carrier - Light).  The Escort carriers were initially called ACV (Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers) then later CVE (escort).

Sometime during the war the Navy re-designated all the big carriers as CVA (Aircraft Carrier - Attack).  The 2nd USS Enterprise was initially designated CVAN-65.  In recent times the Navy has reverted to CV (Multipurpose Aircraft Carrier) and CVN (their nuclear powered sisters).
Believe in fate, but lean forward where fate can see you.

SarDragon

Close. The only CVBs were the three Midway-class boats. The Essex-class boats were a bit smaller. At one point, they were designated as CVS (ASW).
Dave Bowles
Maj, CAP
AT1, USN Retired
50 Year Member
Mitchell Award (unnumbered)
C/WO, CAP, Ret

AirDX

Quote from: Smithsonia on March 02, 2011, 05:29:11 PM
2. The Oilers and in port refueling facilities remained largely untouched.
Here is one of those inexplicable things of history.  Maybe there was a reason I don't know, maybe it has been lost in the fog of war.  Why the Japanese didn't destroy the oil storage tanks along the NE side of Pearl Harbor is a good question.  They are very plainly visible in the upper right of this photo:

(Behind the tanks is a small lake (long since filled in) and a hill; I live on the left slope of that hill)

Admiral Nimitz himself noted that "We had about 4.5 million barrels of oil out there and all of it was vulnerable to .50-caliber bullets. Had the Japanese destroyed the oil, it would have prolonged the war another two years..."

It wasn't that the US Navy lacked awareness of this vulnerability; the Red Hill oil storage facility (beneath one of the mountain slopes in the background of the photo above), a stupendous facility consisting of 20 250 foot tall x 100 foot diameter POL storage tanks had been under construction since 1940.  It was completed in 1943 and it's still in use today, one of the civil engineering wonders of the world.  In fact, some of the lots in the subdivision where I live have easements for "secret" military tunnels underneath - where the pipelines pass to the harbor.

Maybe the 3rd wave that the Japanese canceled that day would have been directed at the logistics elements of Pearl Harbor.  I'm glad they failed in that aspect that day.
Believe in fate, but lean forward where fate can see you.

AirDX

Quote from: SarDragon on March 26, 2011, 07:05:27 AM
Close. The only CVBs were the three Midway-class boats. The Essex-class boats were a bit smaller. At one point, they were designated as CVS (ASW).

Aha - looked it up on hazegray.org, you are quite correct sir!
Believe in fate, but lean forward where fate can see you.

davidsinn

Quote from: AirDX on March 26, 2011, 06:25:47 AM
Wait... is this CAPTalk?  I'm learning things and enjoying reading this!

A minor quibble - up topic the US carriers are referred to as CVNs and the auxiliary "jeep" carriers as CVAs.  CVNs are nuclear powered carriers, CVAs are attack carriers - full sized units.

IIRC:

Carriers were initially designated as CVs.  The pre-war 8 were Langley, Ranger, Yorktown, Enterprise, Hornet, Lexington, Saratoga and Wasp.

The two classes built during the war were the Essex class (called CVB - Aircraft Carrier, Large) and the Independence class (CVL: Aircraft Carrier - Light).  The Escort carriers were initially called ACV (Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers) then later CVE (escort).

Sometime during the war the Navy re-designated all the big carriers as CVA (Aircraft Carrier - Attack).  The 2nd USS Enterprise was initially designated CVAN-65.  In recent times the Navy has reverted to CV (Multipurpose Aircraft Carrier) and CVN (their nuclear powered sisters).

A minor quibble to your minor quibble: During a portion of the '30s Enterprise was classified as CV(N)-6, the N meaning night ops qualified. It was the only ship to carry that designation.
Former CAP Captain
David Sinn

MSG Mac

Quote from: AirDX on March 26, 2011, 07:32:55 AM
Quote from: Smithsonia on March 02, 2011, 05:29:11 PM
2. The Oilers and in port refueling facilities remained largely untouched.
Here is one of those inexplicable things of history.  Maybe there was a reason I don't know, maybe it has been lost in the fog of war.  Why the Japanese didn't destroy the oil storage tanks along the NE side of Pearl Harbor is a good question.  They are very plainly visible in the upper right of this photo:

(Behind the tanks is a small lake (long since filled in) and a hill; I live on the left slope of that hill)

Admiral Nimitz himself noted that "We had about 4.5 million barrels of oil out there and all of it was vulnerable to .50-caliber bullets. Had the Japanese destroyed the oil, it would have prolonged the war another two years..."

It wasn't that the US Navy lacked awareness of this vulnerability; the Red Hill oil storage facility (beneath one of the mountain slopes in the background of the photo above), a stupendous facility consisting of 20 250 foot tall x 100 foot diameter POL storage tanks had been under construction since 1940.  It was completed in 1943 and it's still in use today, one of the civil engineering wonders of the world.  In fact, some of the lots in the subdivision where I live have easements for "secret" military tunnels underneath - where the pipelines pass to the harbor.

Maybe the 3rd wave that the Japanese canceled that day would have been directed at the logistics elements of Pearl Harbor.  I'm glad they failed in that aspect that day.

From what I've read the oil tanks were to be hit durring the 3rd strike, which was canceled by VADM Nagumo because he wasn't sure when the american carriers would be returning and he felt that the fleet was so thoroughly trashed they could never be a threat to the IJN. 
Michael P. McEleney
Lt Col CAP
MSG USA (Retired)
50 Year Member

Smithsonia

#33
Leaving port oil and constructing facilities at Pearl in tact is a big deal. Prange in At Dawn We Slept was rather definite about that. What has never been answered is why the Japanese of all Navy's failed to consider this issue.

Being that the Pearl Harbor attack was a response to our embargo of Indonesian oil to Japan... this remains almost inexplicable. It is this case and several follow on mistakes by the Japanese post Pearl Harbor - Japan's losses at sea... seem unavoidable.
The list of mistakes is long.

1. The Japanese assumed that their naval and diplomatic codes were safe. We broke them over and over and knew what they were up to most of the war. As such we were inside their decision cycle for a good deal of WW2. Besides helping win many naval battles we also got queues as to when and how to move to the offensive post Pearl Harbor.

2. The Japanese expected that the US Carrier fleet would defend the Corregidor or Wake in an uncoordinated fashion. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corregidor_Island

Therefore, the Japanese Navy would have a chance soon to sink the US Carriers in a helter skelter reprisal raid near Manila. Instead we held our breath and surrendered time after time until we could husband our resources and go on the attack. This must've driven Nimitz and Halsey nuts... but by keeping their powder dry... absorbing the first hits... they preserved the American Pacific Navy for the real war. The real war wasn't defending these smaller posts it was defeating Japan. I can't imagine the pressure that the US Navy was under from Dec. 7th 1941 until Midway. For that 6 months it likely would have been massively depressing for lesser men. Sometimes waiting for resources and absorbing deaths and destruction pays off. This is something we should keep in mind in our missions too.

3. The Japanese likely never considered that we were out for blood from Pearl Harbor and peace could be had at the bargaining table. Our position hardened over time as our death toll mounted. By the end of the war - we were fiercer than anything they could have imagined in December '41. To this day I honestly believe that at the end of the war we were not only willing to use the A-Bombs but our entire bomber force to punish the population of Japan day after day and night after night until there was nothing left standing and no one left alive in the home lslands. That said, this punishment which might have gone on with impunity for a year or more as we held off on invasion of the home Islands -
A bloody invasion was not only averted and American casualties mitigated but the Japanese population was preserved too. Of course this is speculation but Bomber Commander Curtis LeMay had convinced Truman to a 2 year aerial campaign, reassignment of 8000 European based planes to be added to the 15,000 American aircraft already in theater, and production 12 more A-bombs (which would take nearly a year to produce after the first 2 were spent). So in reality no matter if the Japanese surrender in Aug. '45 or Aug. '47 they would have surrendered. The difference? About 10-20 million Japanese lives that would be taken to bring down the Emperor. Meaning - we had calculated that - in the mind of the Civilian Japanese Government - One Emperor is worth 20 million of his people - AND perhaps 1/2 million American lives too. When taken in its full context - the A-Bomb attacks were merciful to both sides. These are arguable points of course... I've debated this a couple of times... but when all the facts are known... the  conclusions seem evident.

LeMay - who enjoyed occasional over statement once said - "I was willing to turn Japan into nothing but craters and then bomb those craters every night to make sure no one hid in the craters". You can dismiss this as hyperbole of course, what you can't dismiss is the next 2 A-bombs would have been used on Yokohama and Tokyo. Ground Zero was to be the Emperor's Palace. At that point we'd have likely paused for another week or two and then come back and bombed en mass, with impunity, and without halt until there was nothing left but rubble in these and all other Japanese cities of any size.

I think this dark scenario should be remembered when we consider:
1) What terrible things might have been.
2) In the light of the destruction on the coast of Japan from earthquake and Tsunamis today... how much better we feel to be of the service of human kind and out of the business of annihilation. 
With regards;
ED OBRIEN

JohnKachenmeister

Ed:

As always, your analysis is incisive.  But I would like to add one more observation.  Something I have always found puzzling.

The Japanese ARMY was suicidal in its fanatic, if pointless attacks, and defense to the death of islands.  The Japanese NAVY on the other hand, was not so much.  Almost any deviation or interruption of the plan would cause them to retreat.  At Pearl, they withdrew without launching the third wave of attacks becuse of the absence of American carriers.  They did not want the carriers to catch their fleet at sea, even though they knew that their fleet had both numerical and technical superiority.

At Savo Strait, the Japanese withdrew after sinking 4 Allied cruisers, with the Guadalcanal invasion fleet a sitting duck.

At Leyte Gulf, a small force of escort carriers and destroyers drove back a battle fleet.

There are several other examples where the Jap. Navy failed to exploit initial success because the initial resistance was not figured into the plan.  I just find that odd when compared to the fanatical resistance of the Army.

Can you shed some light on this?
Another former CAP officer

Spaceman3750

Quote from: JohnKachenmeister on March 29, 2011, 11:59:32 AM
Ed:

As always, your analysis is incisive.  But I would like to add one more observation.  Something I have always found puzzling.

The Japanese ARMY was suicidal in its fanatic, if pointless attacks, and defense to the death of islands.  The Japanese NAVY on the other hand, was not so much.  Almost any deviation or interruption of the plan would cause them to retreat.  At Pearl, they withdrew without launching the third wave of attacks becuse of the absence of American carriers.  They did not want the carriers to catch their fleet at sea, even though they knew that their fleet had both numerical and technical superiority.

At Savo Strait, the Japanese withdrew after sinking 4 Allied cruisers, with the Guadalcanal invasion fleet a sitting duck.

At Leyte Gulf, a small force of escort carriers and destroyers drove back a battle fleet.

There are several other examples where the Jap. Navy failed to exploit initial success because the initial resistance was not figured into the plan.  I just find that odd when compared to the fanatical resistance of the Army.

Can you shed some light on this?

This is just a guess because I'm not as intimately familiar with the situation as you guys are, but I would imagine that the issue at play here was that ships are more expensive than people. While there was more infantry waiting in the wings ready to carry out suicidal missions, ships take months or years to build.

Smithsonia

#36
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I'll take a stab at this although it is more opinion than pure research.

When you are down to your last ships... you go through the analysis of finality. When you are down to your last bullet, your last canteen of water, your last chance - there comes a calm. As we pilots say you are out of airspeed, altitude, and ideas - In this state comes a last stand/last charge mentality. It is not just part of the Bushido code - it is also satisfyingly human. To go out in a blaze of glory.

Short of that when you are coming to the conclusion that there are no more resources and when there are no more remaining rationing protocols or saving what is left for what may come there is the feast - use what is left on yourself, give what you can't use away to others (or destroy it), and go out in a blaze of glory. This goes for depressed men with guns looking for death by cop and the Japanese Navy, Army, Marines, and Air Force as the Pacific war went on.

Survival techniques attempt to stave off this moment though information and skills. The Army wants this moment postponed and therefore spends much time and effort in their history education to forestall this last stand moment. For instance, don't save the last bullet for yourself, the way your luck is going your pistol will jam at your temple. So shoot the enemy with your last round and... use your knife on yourself. The Japanese Army has long been disrespected for jumping to the last fatal charge way too early at Edson Ridge on Guadalcanal. There are a number of similar events through history.

Sorry for the long set up - BUT, after Midway the Japanese Navy bottled up their Ships in the mode of rationing their hope. In the end they spent their Army as they spent their Air Force and Navy in suicidal missions. Kamikaze means the end, not the middle, or the beginning. 

This is one of the ways that historians look at the suicide vest bombers in Israel for instance. In this analysis - you invite the desperate to end it by offering them no hope and no way out. (This analogy isn't perfect of course because often the Marines for instance invited surrender by the Japanese opposing force) However, the fanatics will sacrifice themselves, the despondent will surrender, and the war will end sooner when the end is not near... but INEVITABLE. Lawyers use this tactic everyday.

The more inevitable you can make a thing the faster will come the capitulation of the opposition. We are using this tactic right now in Libya. We are hoping some one will kill Gaddafi so we don't have to. We are building pressure for those around him to excuse this action. In this case - We are making inevitable before we make an end. We are using human imagination in its destructive form.
With regards;
ED OBRIEN

JohnKachenmeister

#37
Ed:

That doesn't quite explain the IJN's behavior during the war when compared to the Army.  Let me illustrate it another way:

Pearl Harbor.  The Jap. Navy withdrew before launching a 3rd attack wave because they did not know the location of the carriers.  Having hit Pearl, and discovering that the carriers were not in port, they assumed that the carriers were at sea looking for them.  Because of the chance that American carriers would find their fleet, they fled.  Now, since destruction of the American carriers was a primary goal of the attack, an aggressive commander having 6 carriers under his command compared to two American carriers, would stay and HOPE the American carriers would engage.  That way, they could be destroyed at sea instead of in port.

Guadalcanal:  The IJN sent a force into the Savo Strait with the mission of attacking and destroying the invasion fleet.  Had the Japanese been successful, most of the invasion supplies and a lot of Marines would have been sunk offshore.  The battle for Guadalcanal would have been lost at great cost to the US.  The IJN engaged a blocking force of 4 Allied cruisers (3 American and 1 Australian) in a night action, and sunk all 4.  There were no forces between the Jap. fleet and the US invasion ships.  But the Japanese withdrew after the engagement with the cruisers because of some light losses.  As I recall, the Jap. lost 1 destroyer and some cruisers suffered damage, but the fleet was still intact and clearly able to attack the lightly-armed transports.  The analogy would be a boxer with a bloody nose throwing in the towel while his opponent was on the mat being counted out by the ref.

Leyte Gulf:  The Japanese brilliantly drew off Halsey's carriers with a diversion, and slipped a huge battle fleet centered around the super-dreadnaught Yamato through the Philippine Islands.  Guarding the Leyte invasion fleet was a force of destroyers, escort destroyers, and "Jeep" carriers.  Showing enormous courage, the captain of the USS Johnston, a DE, turned and attacked the IJN battleship-cruiser force.  Other DD's and DE's joined the fight, and the jeep carriers launched their few planes to join the fight.  The resistance was unexpected by the Japanese, and the mighty Yamato and her fleet withdrew.  The Yamato was never deployed in battle again.  The image of a big tomcat fleeing from a mouse comes to mind.

All the while the Jap. Army was fanatic and suicidal in its resistance, never countenancing retreat, and prefering suicide to capture.

There could be a difference in their training, since the Army was not only suicidal but stupid, opting for frontal assaults to the exclusion of other forms of maneuver.  I'm sure the Bushido Code does not prohibit flanking attacks.

But... I don't know why there was such a profound difference in philospohy. 
Another former CAP officer

Smithsonia

#38
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Kach;
The true Bushido and the perverted propaganda-ized version of the Japanese high command are different by a long shot. The Germans did the same with the myth of Aryan supremacy. Acknowledgment and unmasking of false idols is very much in the HISTORIANS CODE. It is one of the things we are most proud of in our historical analysis.

So lets get back to your questions. The reason all of those moments occurred and Midway too, were - We had their Cipher Codes and they didn't have ours. They were in the dark. We were in rising light. They had to assume the risks were greater than they actually were. We could assume that the risks were worth taking. Hence the saying - Good Intel will beat bigger Armies. Bad intel makes any Army weak. No intel makes every Army subject to rumor. Rumors are always worse than truth. Truth is always ultimately good. BUT THEN - He who wins owns the truth.

This menacing and circular logic is to be remembered by every and all of us, everyday. Never forget the Rumors can defeat Armies and Navies. It did in WW2 and again during the Thet Offensive.

Rumor and rumor control is my job. I have been practicing this job for 45 years. I like my job. I am good at my job. It is quite interesting to watch defeat precede inevitability which also precedes the last straw.

To this point - Al Qeda can not win anything long term because these are lessons they have neither learned nor practiced. These are conclusions that are inevitable and historically true. Suicide is not just morally wrong, it is worthless when provoked by your opposition.

The Japanese Navy shot themselves over and over because they thought bravery was better than smart. They made a bad choice. Plus eventually they also believed their own propaganda.
I wish some times I could go and tell any number of people - "Gosh we made up that propaganda and hoped our enemy would buy it... Now we are really surprised that our own team is buying into it too."

We are going to change some facts that you have been told about CAP history soon. The facts that have been used for 70 years aren't supported by research. The new research isn't finished. However, I trust that when I lay out the new facts all those that will think me wrong because they were told different might pay attention to this thread. Truth is always better than rumor.
With regards;
ED OBRIEN

JohnKachenmeister

Ed:

I don't think the reasons for the IJN withdrawals at critical points in battles is as deep as you suggest.  I think it speaks to the training and leadership of the IJN as opposed to any acceptance of propaganda.

On 6 Dec 1941, the Jap. Navy had not been in battle action since the Russo-Japanese War of 1902.  Additionally, Yamamoto was relying on his younger staff officers to plan engagements, since the older staff officers were wedded to the idea of battleship engagements.  The younger ones had accepted and embraced the concepts of carrier warfare.

The key lesson that had not been learned was: "No plan survives first contact with the enemy."  Once contact was made with US or Allied forces, and the result was a disruption of the carefully-staffed battle plan, nobody seemed able to think on his feet and continue with the intent of the commander.  This may be the result of too-centralized command and control, or an institutionalized fear of decision-making, or simply a staff organization that was too cumbersome to adapt quickly to a changing battlefield situation.

On the other hand, the Army had been engaged in land battles in China, albeit against an unsophisticated Chinese Army.  They had learned that a frontal assault would break a line of resistance through sheer intimidation.  There was need for officers to learn tactics other than the bayonet charge.  When the charge was against a defensive line of United States Marines, the Japanese found, to their chagrin, that a trained and disciplined force is not easily intimidated.  Especially a force armed with an ample number of Browning machine guns.

Just some thoughts.  I don't have the definitive answer.
Another former CAP officer

JohnKachenmeister

Ed:

Thanks for the teaser about changing CAP history.  I'm not a part of CAP anymore, but history still fascinates me.  If you can see your way clear to raising the curtain a little on your findings, drop me a PM.  Consider me sworn to secrecy until you release your findings publicly.
Another former CAP officer

Smithsonia

#41
Kach;
Good thoughts from you and for you too. I have PMed you.

Regarding the Japanese Navy of WW2 - I wouldn't contest anything you have stated only the prominence of the points you argued... which is hardly worth arguing.

History changes - Wright Vermilya/Zack Mosley and Florida deserve more credit than they are usually given in the founding of CAP. EXAMPLE - CAP wore basically the same uniform as the Florida Defense Force (later incorporated into CAP and well before our founding date of Dec. 1 '41) all of WW2. All the best.
With regards;
ED OBRIEN