CAP and the Battle of the Atlantic

[RiverAux]

In another thread my good friend Kach made these statements:

Hap Arnold is as much a part of OUR heritage as he is part of the Air Force's.  Hap Arnold's decision to arm CAP planes was the key command decision in winning the battle on the coasts, and also was the decision that brought us into the Air Force as an auxiliary. Were it not for that decision, we probably would not exist as an organization today.

As it was, CAP planes simply overwhelmed the U-Boats, and forced them to withdraw beyond our range.  That meant they could not attack at heavy ship traffic points near our ports, and made the convoy tactics succesful.

CAP won the battle along the Atlantic and Gulf casts, and helped win the Battle of the Atlantic.

Actually, CAP is the force that turned the battle along the coasts.

We did not fly armed patrols until, I think, April of 1943.  By July the U-Boats were not anywhere along the coasts.  They had moved out to sea, and CAP planes were re-directed to other missions.

CAP attacked 57 subs, and sank two.  This is impressive only of one considers that we only were in the battle as an armed participant for about 3 months, the last month of which we had basicly no enemy contact, since they had already pulled out of range.  That means there were 57 attacks and 2 sinkings (known) in about 2 months.  That's an attack on a U-Boat, somewhere, every day, on average.

That is a tempo of operations that the U-Boat commanders had not eperienced.  The reason for this success was simply numbers.  We had hundreds of little planes, but only a handful of big warbirds.  When the little planes could succesfully attack, the U-Boats had to withdraw out of range.

In order to avoid thread drift, I thought I'd respond here.

I don't dispute that CAP probably did some serious harrassment of the uboats but to say we won it does a great disservice to quite a few other folks and I don't think is really supported by the facts. 

To say that because CAP was conducting patrols and that attacks diminished does not mean that CAP's patrols caused that change.  One might just as easily point out that the CG Aux had hundreds of small boats out on patrol during this period so obviously they were the ones responsible for the decline in u-boat attacks. 

This was an effort involving all the military services and CAP and the CG Aux.  I've read a few histories of the Atlantic battle and have at least checked the indexes of just about every other one I've ever seen.   And except for a few of the official histories done right after the war, CAP hardly receives more than passing notice and I'm not aware of any that go anywhere near as far as Kach in claiming credit for CAP. 

As to the specifics in regards to number of actual attacks made, I tentatively accept them but as someone who has done a lot of historical research and writing, I'd really like to see some original documentation to back that figure up, but this is probably no longer easily done.  Of couse, there has been quite a lot of discussion over the years about the subs sunk claims.  I'm not sure anyone has yet matched up a specific attack by a CAP plane on a specific date with a specific (meaning we know the name/number of that sub) sub that was sunk.

[JohnKachenmeister]

My research is all from secondary sources.

And, I did not intend to diminish the participation of any force in the Battle of the Atlantic.  I did want to emphasize that the Germans were forced to abandon coastal raids soon after Arnold applied the new tactic of using the CAP planes as combat assets.  That decision is what appears to have turned the battle in our favor.

Consider:

Prior to CAP being an armed asset of the Army Air Corps, we were an unarmed asset of Civil Defense, limited to observing and reporting enemy activity.

There were several incidents of U-Boats being spotted, but no combat forces were available to attack the enemy.  One of those incidents took place off Cape Canaveral, Florida.  This incident is of note because the CAP pilot was a former Army aviator, who personally knew Hap Arnold.  The CAP pilot was angry and frustrated enough to invest in a then-costly long distance phone call to vent to General Arnold.

Arnold ordered CAP armed.  This entailed designing weapons racks for the little planes, and designing a uniform for the CAP.  As an asset of Civil Defense, CAP did not wear uniforms.  As a combat asset, a uniform would be required, or a shot-down aircrewman could be declared an "Unlawful Combatant."  The Germans did not send such people to a tropical paradise.  They shot them as partisans on the spot.

The bomb racks and uniforms were ready in April, 1943.  CAP became an Air Corps Auxiliary then, and began flying armed patrols.

The CAP pilots attacked 57 submarines and sank two, at least.  By July, 1943, it was realized by the lack of enemy contact (no subs spotted, no ships attacked) that the Germans were now operating farther off shore, beyond the range of the CAP planes.  CAP stood down, and was re-directed to other missions.  The Germans did not return to the coasts.

By forcing the U-Boats farther out to sea, the Allied ships had time to form escorted convoys.  The tactic of sinking a ship as it left port was quite productive for the Germans.  Escorted convoys eventually resulted in the defeat of the U-Boat campaign.  In fact, U-Boat crews suffered about 80 percent casualties overall.  This is the highest casualty rate for any class of combatant in World War II.

It took a few months of having hundreds (instead of scores) of armed planes hunting down U-Boats before Admiral Doenitz pulled them off the coast.  He would have been aware of the increased tempo of attacks, and realized that the danger to his force was now unacceptably high.

It is absolutely NOT hyperbole to say that CAP was the first American irregular force to drive a foreign enemy from our shores since the War of 1812. 

[RiverAux]

I'm not sure where this myth of us not having uniforms until we were taken over by the War Dept came from.  We had military ranks from the very beginning of our organization and according to Flying Minute Men had the uniform issue sorted out within the first 6 months of our existence. 

As too the uboat attacks they had fallen off significantly by the time CAP had bombs to drop on them.   

You've got to remember that the worst of the uboat attacks were occurring during the early part of the war in part due to the fact that we hadn't really implemented a lot of defensive tactics for merchant shipping.  Coastal blackouts weren't in place everywhere so it would have been very easy pickings near shore early on whether or not CAP was around. 

[♠SARKID♠]

Has everyone forgotten the the conviction of the German Admiral Doenitz, commander of the German navy?  He was quoted as saying that he would have won "had it not been for those [darn]ed little red and yellow planes."

[JohnKachenmeister]

Has everyone forgotten the the conviction of the German Admiral Doenitz, commander of the German navy?  He was quoted as saying that he would have won "had it not been for those [darn]ed little red and yellow planes."

Was that Doenitz?  The books on CAP attribute it to a "German Submarine Commander," but do not name Adm. Doenitz.  That's why I didn't include that quote in my brief explanation, since I don't know if it is true or some kind of "Urban legend."

[RiverAux]

I think we're in agreement on this one Kach.  I had held back for the same reason.  I'd like to see the original documentation for that quote as well. 

[JohnKachenmeister]

From  "Jeeps In the Sky, The Story of the Light Plane"  by Lt. Col. Andrew TenEyck, published in 1946:

"Although the victory against the submarine was a joint operation of the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and Civil Air Patrol, it is a fact that U-Boats disappeared in direct proportion to the spread of CAP operations."

Later, same source:

"The Berlin radio, commenting on the dwindling effectiveness of its undersea campaign, complained of the unexpected appearance of armed civilian aircraft as the MAIN HAZARD WHICH FORCES THE U-BOATS OUT OF THE COASTAL WATERS"  (Empasis mine)

In his memoirs, "Global Missions," Hap Arnold recalled his conversation with Gill Robb Wilson after the Cape Canaveral submarine incident  (which occurred in mid-May, 1942) and Arnold asked Wilson if "Pilots having no military status and in civilian clothes would object to carrying bombs?"

This recollection would seem to indicate that as of May, 1942, no uniforms had been issued or obtained by CAP.  We know that subsequent to this conversation a decision was made to place CAP under the Air Corps as an auxiliary, and to have them wear a modified Air Corps uniform.

History is fun.  I can't figure out why kids hate it in school!

[pixelwonk]

Has everyone forgotten the the conviction of the German Admiral Doenitz, commander of the German navy?  He was quoted as saying that he would have won "had it not been for those [darn]ed little red and yellow planes."

Was that Doenitz?  The books on CAP attribute it to a "German Submarine Commander," but do not name Adm. Doenitz.  That's why I didn't include that quote in my brief explanation, since I don't know if it is true or some kind of "Urban legend."

It was Unterseebootkrieghapsturmkommanderung Donutz.  Everybody knows that.  Gosh!

Seriously though, in looking for a record of subs known to be sunk by American Forces off the Atlantic Coast, I found this site, which seems to be pretty comprehensive: http://uboat.net/fates/losses/
Haven't gone through them all yet, but it does break it down by year and type of sinking. (aircraft, vessel or both)

[RiverAux]

I wonder why you think CAP members were using military ranks and titles from the very beginning of the organization and were not wearing uniforms? 

We had been flying coastal patrols for almost a year before we were armed and transferred over to the Army.  To quote again from Flying Minute Men, p. 77 "The uniform remained the same..." after the changeover. 

[RiverAux]

On a related issue, a fellow over on the CG Aux board at military.com says that he has evidence that CG Aux members flew anti-submarine patrols during WWII as well.  I've never seen any evidence of this and given the severe restrictions on private flying (other than CAP) during most of the war, don't see how it would have been possible.

Has anyone here come across anything that indicates this took place?

[Skyray]

River,

George Datz just posted a humorous account of a CAP plane that mistook a marsh in Calcasieu Parish for a grass field and crashed.  The Coast Guard responded, and the Coast Guard Auxiliary apprehended them.  It was messed up, even way back there at the beginning.

[JohnKachenmeister]

I wonder why you think CAP members were using military ranks and titles from the very beginning of the organization and were not wearing uniforms? 

We had been flying coastal patrols for almost a year before we were armed and transferred over to the Army.  To quote again from Flying Minute Men, p. 77 "The uniform remained the same..." after the changeover. 

Other than the quote from Arnold's memoirs, and the fact that MOST Civil Defense volunteers were identified only by a brassard, I have no evidence that CAP was flying in civilian clothes as of May, 1942.

There are a couple of possibilities to consider:

1.  Uniforms are easier to design and issue than bomb racks for light aircraft.  It is possible that, once the decision was made to issue the modified Air Corps uniform to CAP members, that wear of the uniform was either required or authorized prior to the transfer of CAP to the Army Air Corps.

2.  There still was a Civil Defense in the 1960's.  I recall that during a radiological monitoring exercise  when I was a cadet that the CD volunetters wore a modified Army uniform.  This practice may have started in WWII.

[James Shaw]

I have a great book that explains some of this. It is called the History of the United States Naval Operations in WWII Vol 1 The Battle of the Atlantic. It has 5 pages of good info in our part of this battle. I was written by a Retired Navy Captain Samuel E. Morrison who was a Professor at Harvard University and appointed by Roosevelt to wrote this history. I will scan the pages and include.

My scanner is not cooperating but here is a partail quote!

"There was nothing temporary or token about the CAP in the Eastern and Gulf Frontiers, the CAP flew 64,000 plane hours during the first five months of 1943 as compared with 27,000 plane hours by the Army Air Force, and 72,000 plane hours by the Navy. If comparative statistics were available for 1942, they would show an even greater relative contribution by the amateurs"

Capt. Samuel Morrison USN

[JohnKachenmeister]

I have a great book that explains some of this. It is called the History of the United States Naval Operations in WWII Vol 1 The Battle of the Atlantic. It has 5 pages of good info in our part of this battle. I was written by a Retired Navy Captain Samuel E. Morrison who was a Professor at Harvard University and appointed by Roosevelt to wrote this history. I will scan the pages and include.

My scanner is not cooperating but here is a partail quote!

"There was nothing temporary or token about the CAP in the Eastern and Gulf Frontiers, the CAP flew 64,000 plane hours during the first five months of 1943 as compared with 27,000 plane hours by the Army Air Force, and 72,000 plane hours by the Navy. If comparative statistics were available for 1942, they would show an even greater relative contribution by the amateurs"

Capt. Samuel Morrison USN

Jim:

While we all understand that in terms of hours flown CAP made a significant contribution, the discussion is centered on whether or not CAP operations, especially CAP's armed operations, were decisive.  I contend that, given the time frame between CAP assuming armed patrol duties, and the withdrawal of the U-Boats from the coasts, that CAP was, in fact the deciding factor. 

My positon is supported, I believe, by the fact that a 1946 Berlin radio broadcast gave credit to CAP (although not by name, we were the best-kept secret even then) and by the statistics of 57 attacks and two sinkings in a relatively short time period just prior to the enemy's withdrawal. 

By the way, I cannot find where I learned this fact, but at some point I came to know that the US Coast Guard, in ALL of World War II, sank 3 U-Boats.  For two to be lost in a short period of time, and attacks coming from small aircraft with a suddenly-increasing frequency, I think makes it obvious that CAP was the force that caused Adm. Doenitz to withdraw to the open sea and switch tactics.

[ZigZag911]

On a related issue, a fellow over on the CG Aux board at military.com says that he has evidence that CG Aux members flew anti-submarine patrols during WWII as well.  I've never seen any evidence of this and given the severe restrictions on private flying (other than CAP) during most of the war, don't see how it would have been possible.

Has anyone here come across anything that indicates this took place?

I have not seen it....but since it was a very simple matter for Auxiliarists to be turned into USCG Temporary Reservists, I wonder if we're talking about members of the Auxiliary holding that status?

Would aircraft on such missions have been viewed as 'private'?

Come to think of it, were CAP aircraft considered private when flying coastal patrols?

Isn't that some kind of legal problem if the aircrew were captured?

[RiverAux]

Kach, there are at least two references to CAP wearing uniforms before being turned over to the Army in Flying Minute Men.  I gave you the page number on one of them.  I don't have the book where I am now or would give you the citation for the other.  Additionally, I've got dozens and dozens of references to CAP members being referred to in local newspaper articles by rank starting early in 1942 and I'm sure I could find quite a few others relating to the period before Army control in more accessible outlets.   
I didn't have time to check through From Maine to Mexico, but I am fairly sure there are more than a few accounts of uniform wear that would be traced  to the period before Army control. 

As to the CG Aux flying patrols, I proposed on the other board that it might have been a mix-up with Temporary Reservists doing that job.  The TRs and the Aux were very tightly knit together and confusion between the organizations seem to have been extremely common, even at the time. 

Private flying was prohibited very early on in the war and an exception was given for CAP missions. Maybe there was another exception for CGAux, but I doubt it.   

[JohnKachenmeister]

River:

May, 1942 appears to be the seminal date.

Do you have any examples of CAP members wearing uniforms prior to Arnold making the decision to arm CAP aircraft?

I ask this because I have seen photos of CAP pilots in civilian clothes, which were included in a video "CAP Subchasers in World War II" produced by Drew Stetekee (spelling uncertain). And, in Arnold's memoir, he expressed concern about captured CAP flyers in civilian clothing and without military status if CAP planes carried bombs.

We know that Arnold's conversation with Gill Robb Wilson was shortly after he had learned that a CAP plane had spotted a German submarine off Cape Canaveral, and the sub escaped because no forces could be brought to the scene to attack it.  That incident occurred in mid-May, 1942.

Apparently, the decision to arm CAP with bombs was made by Arnold in May, 1942.  Development of the bomb racks, supplying bombs and depth charges to CAP bases, and administratively transfering CAP to the Army Air Corps as an Auxiliary did not all take place until late April, 1943.

It is likely that a uniform was designed and approved quickly, and CAP pilots began wearing the uniform prior to the date of actual transfer, and prior to the actual arming of the airplanes.  It was a time when everybody wanted to be in uniform.

I did not know that the Coast Guard Auxiliary used any aircraft at all during the Second World War.  I have not looked into that.

None of this changes my central thesis that the decision to arm CAP planes, and the increased attack activity of hundreds of light planes armed with bombs, was the key decision that forced the Germans to withdraw their submarines from the coast.  When the uniform was adopted does not change the fact that CAP entry into the battle as a full combatant changed the outcome of that battle within a few months.

[baronet68]

Homer Hickam, Jr. (of October Skies fame) wrote a book recently about America's U-Boat war in 1942 titled TORPEDO JUNCTION.

I read the entire book and CAP was only mentioned once, on page 167:

In the same volunteer vein, Admiral Andrews made use of the civil air patrol (CAP) for reconnaissance, fire patrol, rescue work and carrier and freighting service.  At first, these light planes flown by private, volunteer pilots were only equipped with two-way radios, but later they would be armed with bombs.  The were to become, in effect, an airforce without "red tape," a group of men and women with boundless energy and enthusiasm who were willing to fly even in weather that kept the military grounded and, while doing so, pay for their own gas, equipment, and repairs.  Their contribution to the U-boat war was to eventually be significant because the U-boat commanders were all deathly afraid of airplanes.  The British, with their secret airborne radar, had managed to surprise many U-boats.  As a result, it was a standing rule throughout the U-boat fleet to dive at the mere sight of an airplane.  With the numbers of planes that CAP was able to put into the air daily, they almost surely disrupted many a U-boat commander's careful plans.

[SStradley]

Homer Hickam, Jr. (of October Skies fame) wrote a book recently about America's U-Boat war in 1942 titled TORPEDO JUNCTION.

I read the entire book and CAP was only mentioned once, on page 167:

In the same volunteer vein, Admiral Andrews made use of the civil air patrol (CAP) for reconnaissance, fire patrol, rescue work and carrier and freighting service.  At first, these light planes flown by private, volunteer pilots were only equipped with two-way radios, but later they would be armed with bombs.  The were to become, in effect, an airforce without "red tape," a group of men and women with boundless energy and enthusiasm who were willing to fly even in weather that kept the military grounded and, while doing so, pay for their own gas, equipment, and repairs.  Their contribution to the U-boat war was to eventually be significant because the U-boat commanders were all deathly afraid of airplanes.  The British, with their secret airborne radar, had managed to surprise many U-boats.  As a result, it was a standing rule throughout the U-boat fleet to dive at the mere sight of an airplane.  With the numbers of planes that CAP was able to put into the air daily, they almost surely disrupted many a U-boat commander's careful plans.

One thing to remember is that the German U-Boat did not operate like we see the US Subs fighting in the WWII movies.  (Sneaking around deep under the sea and popping up to periscope depth to fire a torpedo.) The U-Boat fought from the surfice.  When they submerged they were out of the fight.  If by just flying in the area with a radio to call for backup we could cause the U-Boat to submerge, then we broke their operational tempo.  Once our little plans had their own little stingers, then the risk to the U-Boat commander was to great.  Not only could that little plane report there was a U-Boat operating in this area, but it could drop a couple of bombs and could even sink the sub.  While I would not want to face off with a U-Boat with an 88 AA gun armed with two small bombs at 70 knots, the U-Boat's mission was not to shoot down the CAP's little Gnat of a plane, but to sink ships.  Therefore, the risk reward of fighting with CAP was not there.  So the German commander submerged, and therefore CAP took him out of the fight.

[JohnKachenmeister]

Scott:

Welcome!

You are right.  DE-fensively, CAP planes, even unarmed, were a significant force multiplier.  They not only disrupted attacks, but forced the Germans to stay underwater longer, placing a strain on their batteries, and their crews. 

Once CAP was armed, however, the tactical situation changed.  Now there were suddenly hundreds of aircraft searching for U-Boats which were capable of initiating an attack.  Think about how we would be discussing the battle if, instead of arming CAP, the Navy had brought up a few hundred Dauntless dive bombers and spread them around to coastal bases.  Then over the next few months stepped up attacks on submarines, sinking two.

The Navy didn't have a few hundred Dauntlesses, but CAP was able to have the same effect.