Looking Glass

Does the USAF still maintain Looking Glass aircraft on air or ground alert?

The Navy run the TACMO bird for several years now.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Looking_Glass

The Looking Glass and the rest of the PACCS (Post Attack Command and Control System) were grounded in 1992 when the SAC Alert Force came off alert.

The PACCS consisted of the SAC Airborne Command Post (Looking Glass), the East Auxiliary Airborne Command Post, the West Auxiliary Command Post, the CINCSAC Support Aircraft, all EC-135C's. Radio Relay 1 and 2, both EC-135L's and Airborne Launch Control Center Aircraft 1, 2 and 3, all EC-135G's.

Only the Looking Glass flew continuously, the rest were on Ground Alert at Offutt AFB, NE, Ellsworth AFB,SD, Grissom AFB, IN and Rickenbacker AFB, OH.

When the entire fleet was airborne there was continuous contact between the Minute Man and Peacekeeper Missile Launch Facilities and the NEACP/Air Force 1 orbiting off the east coast.

The idea was if Cheyenne Mountain, the SAC Underground Command Post and the Pentagon were destroyed we would still be able to strike back.

I flew as a Boom Operator on the EC-135C Looking Glass with the 2nd Airborne Command and Control Squadron at Offutt AFB from April 1983 to September 1989.

Did you boom operators ever joke with pilots taking fuel about payment of fuel taken?

Jokes like "I only have a credit card" or "only accept cash?"

Did you boom operators ever joke with pilots taking fuel about payment of fuel taken?

Jokes like "I only have a credit card" or "only accept cash?"

No, we were too busy trying to not bend metal.

I've provide security for TACAMO. 

Did you boom operators ever joke with pilots taking fuel about payment of fuel taken?

Jokes like "I only have a credit card" or "only accept cash?"

No, we were too busy trying to not bend metal.

You have two aircraft flying in very close formation. One is getting heavier and one is getting lighter. So there are constant throttle adjustments to maintain a constant speed.
You're a bit too busy to be making jokes. Air Refueling is a dangerous operation and quicker you can finish, the better.

In addition there was the 9 ACCS and Hickam AFB in Hawaii and the 10 ACCS at RAF Mildenhall in the UK. I was in the 9 ACCS from 1980 to 1984 and it was gone not very long after I left. It was disbanded because of the end of the Polaris subs and the Navy taking over the mission with TACAMO.

One of the EC-135C survivors is sitting about 40 feet away from me at the moment.  63-8049 is currently under restoration at the SAC Museum in Nebraska.

http://sacmuseum.org/ec-135-looking-glass-restoration/

 We've been at it for about a year now.  All equipment inside has been removed and corrosion issues are currently being repaired.  All gear will be fully restored and reinstalled in the aircraft.  I'm guessing it'll be at least a 5 year project.

One of the EC-135C survivors is sitting about 40 feet away from me at the moment.  63-8049 is currently under restoration at the SAC Museum in Nebraska.

http://sacmuseum.org/ec-135-looking-glass-restoration/

 We've been at it for about a year now.  All equipment inside has been removed and corrosion issues are currently being repaired.  All gear will be fully restored and reinstalled in the aircraft.  I'm guessing it'll be at least a 5 year project.

Are they restoring it to the "original" configuration or to the "common" configuration?  The newer Common Configuration had the electronic interphone system and the Aux Cooling System was moved to where Cells 0 and 1 of the Forward Body Tank used to be located. The exhaust vents were on the right side about 10 feet aft of the nose gear.

edit - looking at the picture from the museum 8049 is in the original configuration. The Aux Cooling System is still in the front left corner of the equipment compartment occupying the former crew toilet location. The exhaust vents on the left side of the aircraft give it away.

Is there a particular reason why you keep asking questions about nuclear weapon storage, C3, and supporting infrastructure on this forum?

Are they restoring it to the "original" configuration or to the "common" configuration?  The newer Common Configuration had the electronic interphone system and the Aux Cooling System was moved to where Cells 0 and 1 of the Forward Body Tank used to be located. The exhaust vents were on the right side about 10 feet aft of the nose gear.

edit - looking at the picture from the museum 8049 is in the original configuration. The Aux Cooling System is still in the front left corner of the equipment compartment occupying the former crew toilet location. The exhaust vents on the left side of the aircraft give it away.

Good thing you were able to figure that out on  your own, I would have no clue.  I was a boom on the "regular" KC-135Rs at the ANG unit down in Lincoln, so my planes were (mostly) empty inside.  I did get to refuel the Glass a few times before they were grounded for good.  Those guys were darned good at A/R.

Are they restoring it to the "original" configuration or to the "common" configuration?  The newer Common Configuration had the electronic interphone system and the Aux Cooling System was moved to where Cells 0 and 1 of the Forward Body Tank used to be located. The exhaust vents were on the right side about 10 feet aft of the nose gear.

edit - looking at the picture from the museum 8049 is in the original configuration. The Aux Cooling System is still in the front left corner of the equipment compartment occupying the former crew toilet location. The exhaust vents on the left side of the aircraft give it away.

Good thing you were able to figure that out on  your own, I would have no clue.  I was a boom on the "regular" KC-135Rs at the ANG unit down in Lincoln, so my planes were (mostly) empty inside.  I did get to refuel the Glass a few times before they were grounded for good.  Those guys were darned good at A/R.

Practice, lots and lots of practice.  Aircraft Commander's check ride included Receiver A/R. 15 minutes of "Toggles Engaged" time with no more then 3 unplanned Disconnects. When the Glass had to refuel "for real" it was usually a 120k on-load.

Slightly off topic but related to the basic airframe and the KC-135 in specific:


Among many projects, my shop at work is designing a KC-135 Quick Reaction Handbook (QRH) app on the issued iPads to rehost all the flight pubs. The goal is to field something to enable the crew to quickly diagnose multiple failure combos without flipping through the 400 lbs of paperwork. Our MAJCOM customer initiated this after the Shell 77 Kyrgyzstan crash as one of the corrective actions. I'm working on it to help validate the revised, simplified procedures and ensure the linkages are correct.


http://aviationweek.com/awin/six-factors-named-manas-kc-135-crash:
"Emergency manuals for the KC-135R contain no fewer than 21 emergency procedures discussing rudder control difficulties, but they are spread out over 177 pages, the report points out".


Great, proven airframes, fantastic crew... and we're working to keep them flying safely for years to come with a "poor mans ICAWS" that can quickly provide validated, updated EPs. AMC is interested in eventually doing this for a number of platforms, as well.


V/r
Spam

PS, back in the day (90s) I did some of the testing on the E-6, at Pax River, with some updates to the reel operators station (on topic content, grin).  We were briefed never to wave or talk to the Marines guarding it!!!

Slightly off topic but related to the basic airframe and the KC-135 in specific:


Among many projects, my shop at work is designing a KC-135 Quick Reaction Handbook (QRH) app on the issued iPads to rehost all the flight pubs. The goal is to field something to enable the crew to quickly diagnose multiple failure combos without flipping through the 400 lbs of paperwork. Our MAJCOM customer initiated this after the Shell 77 Kyrgyzstan crash as one of the corrective actions. I'm working on it to help validate the revised, simplified procedures and ensure the linkages are correct.


http://aviationweek.com/awin/six-factors-named-manas-kc-135-crash:
"Emergency manuals for the KC-135R contain no fewer than 21 emergency procedures discussing rudder control difficulties, but they are spread out over 177 pages, the report points out".


Great, proven airframes, fantastic crew... and we're working to keep them flying safely for years to come with a "poor mans ICAWS" that can quickly provide validated, updated EPs. AMC is interested in eventually doing this for a number of platforms, as well.


V/r
Spam

PS, back in the day (90s) I did some of the testing on the E-6, at Pax River, with some updates to the reel operators station (on topic content, grin).  We were briefed never to wave or talk to the Marines guarding it!!!

It wasn't fact that there were 21 different Rudder malfunctions in the book. It's the fact that the crew did diagnose the problem correctly, the Series Yaw Damper (SYD) but then did not follow the checklist by not turning it OFF.
It wasn't Chapter III that killed them. It was a deliberate failure to follow the guidance given.

I'm a former Evaluator Boom Operator and this kind of stuff is just not acceptable. There was a totally different mindset in the crews when they belonged to SAC.

Slightly off topic but related to the basic airframe and the KC-135 in specific:


Among many projects, my shop at work is designing a KC-135 Quick Reaction Handbook (QRH) app on the issued iPads to rehost all the flight pubs. The goal is to field something to enable the crew to quickly diagnose multiple failure combos without flipping through the 400 lbs of paperwork. Our MAJCOM customer initiated this after the Shell 77 Kyrgyzstan crash as one of the corrective actions. I'm working on it to help validate the revised, simplified procedures and ensure the linkages are correct.


http://aviationweek.com/awin/six-factors-named-manas-kc-135-crash:
"Emergency manuals for the KC-135R contain no fewer than 21 emergency procedures discussing rudder control difficulties, but they are spread out over 177 pages, the report points out".


Great, proven airframes, fantastic crew... and we're working to keep them flying safely for years to come with a "poor mans ICAWS" that can quickly provide validated, updated EPs. AMC is interested in eventually doing this for a number of platforms, as well.


V/r
Spam

PS, back in the day (90s) I did some of the testing on the E-6, at Pax River, with some updates to the reel operators station (on topic content, grin).  We were briefed never to wave or talk to the Marines guarding it!!!

It wasn't fact that there were 21 different Rudder malfunctions in the book. It's the fact that the crew did diagnose the problem correctly, the Series Yaw Damper (SYD) but then did not follow the checklist by not turning it OFF.
It wasn't Chapter III that killed them. It was a deliberate failure to follow the guidance given.

I'm a former Evaluator Boom Operator and this kind of stuff is just not acceptable. There was a totally different mindset in the crews when they belonged to SAC.

Current -135 IP here.

I'm not sure what report you are referencing, but using the words deliberate failure to describe the crew's actions doesn't accurately represent what happened.

I don't want to get into a forum argument here and I'm not sure of the last time you were in the jet but you phrased it as such that they consciously opted to not follow procedure, which wasn't the case.

Slightly off topic but related to the basic airframe and the KC-135 in specific:


Among many projects, my shop at work is designing a KC-135 Quick Reaction Handbook (QRH) app on the issued iPads to rehost all the flight pubs. The goal is to field something to enable the crew to quickly diagnose multiple failure combos without flipping through the 400 lbs of paperwork. Our MAJCOM customer initiated this after the Shell 77 Kyrgyzstan crash as one of the corrective actions. I'm working on it to help validate the revised, simplified procedures and ensure the linkages are correct.


http://aviationweek.com/awin/six-factors-named-manas-kc-135-crash:
"Emergency manuals for the KC-135R contain no fewer than 21 emergency procedures discussing rudder control difficulties, but they are spread out over 177 pages, the report points out".


Great, proven airframes, fantastic crew... and we're working to keep them flying safely for years to come with a "poor mans ICAWS" that can quickly provide validated, updated EPs. AMC is interested in eventually doing this for a number of platforms, as well.


V/r
Spam

PS, back in the day (90s) I did some of the testing on the E-6, at Pax River, with some updates to the reel operators station (on topic content, grin).  We were briefed never to wave or talk to the Marines guarding it!!!

I would love to pick your brain on the QRH development. Chapter III is a black hole of despair that isn't easy to use after 60 years of "updates"

PM me!  We've apparently just signed an agreement to team with Boeing, who concurs with the MAJCOM that a house cleaning is in order (grin).

Some of us might be coming out to the schoolhouse soon for task validation of our baseline design; if that's where you are, perhaps we'll meet up.

Having read the, lets say "obtuse" language of the procedures which appear to have been revised in increments by successive generations of engineers over the decades, I gotta wonder how many older airframes might benefit from this (not just 707 based jets). We've been applying a systems engineering human factors approach to redesign (functionally flow/functionally group/affiliate related topics/logically group by response) the procedures, and not just to slap it into an iPad app. The initial cut is a PDF (which limits the cross linkage ability), but we've prototyped a standalone app for the next phase.

V/r
Spam

Slightly off topic but related to the basic airframe and the KC-135 in specific:


Among many projects, my shop at work is designing a KC-135 Quick Reaction Handbook (QRH) app on the issued iPads to rehost all the flight pubs. The goal is to field something to enable the crew to quickly diagnose multiple failure combos without flipping through the 400 lbs of paperwork. Our MAJCOM customer initiated this after the Shell 77 Kyrgyzstan crash as one of the corrective actions. I'm working on it to help validate the revised, simplified procedures and ensure the linkages are correct.


http://aviationweek.com/awin/six-factors-named-manas-kc-135-crash:
"Emergency manuals for the KC-135R contain no fewer than 21 emergency procedures discussing rudder control difficulties, but they are spread out over 177 pages, the report points out".


Great, proven airframes, fantastic crew... and we're working to keep them flying safely for years to come with a "poor mans ICAWS" that can quickly provide validated, updated EPs. AMC is interested in eventually doing this for a number of platforms, as well.


V/r
Spam

PS, back in the day (90s) I did some of the testing on the E-6, at Pax River, with some updates to the reel operators station (on topic content, grin).  We were briefed never to wave or talk to the Marines guarding it!!!

It wasn't fact that there were 21 different Rudder malfunctions in the book. It's the fact that the crew did diagnose the problem correctly, the Series Yaw Damper (SYD) but then did not follow the checklist by not turning it OFF.
It wasn't Chapter III that killed them. It was a deliberate failure to follow the guidance given.

I'm a former Evaluator Boom Operator and this kind of stuff is just not acceptable. There was a totally different mindset in the crews when they belonged to SAC.

Current -135 IP here.

I'm not sure what report you are referencing, but using the words deliberate failure to describe the crew's actions doesn't accurately represent what happened.

I don't want to get into a forum argument here and I'm not sure of the last time you were in the jet but you phrased it as such that they consciously opted to not follow procedure, which wasn't the case.

I was referring to the Rudder Malfunction Analysis on page 3-82. Step 2d in particular. Seems pretty clear to me. You turn the Yaw Damper on and the malfunction returns. Turn the Yaw Damper off.

Slightly off topic but related to the basic airframe and the KC-135 in specific:


Among many projects, my shop at work is designing a KC-135 Quick Reaction Handbook (QRH) app on the issued iPads to rehost all the flight pubs. The goal is to field something to enable the crew to quickly diagnose multiple failure combos without flipping through the 400 lbs of paperwork. Our MAJCOM customer initiated this after the Shell 77 Kyrgyzstan crash as one of the corrective actions. I'm working on it to help validate the revised, simplified procedures and ensure the linkages are correct.


http://aviationweek.com/awin/six-factors-named-manas-kc-135-crash:
"Emergency manuals for the KC-135R contain no fewer than 21 emergency procedures discussing rudder control difficulties, but they are spread out over 177 pages, the report points out".


Great, proven airframes, fantastic crew... and we're working to keep them flying safely for years to come with a "poor mans ICAWS" that can quickly provide validated, updated EPs. AMC is interested in eventually doing this for a number of platforms, as well.


V/r
Spam

PS, back in the day (90s) I did some of the testing on the E-6, at Pax River, with some updates to the reel operators station (on topic content, grin).  We were briefed never to wave or talk to the Marines guarding it!!!

It wasn't fact that there were 21 different Rudder malfunctions in the book. It's the fact that the crew did diagnose the problem correctly, the Series Yaw Damper (SYD) but then did not follow the checklist by not turning it OFF.
It wasn't Chapter III that killed them. It was a deliberate failure to follow the guidance given.

I'm a former Evaluator Boom Operator and this kind of stuff is just not acceptable. There was a totally different mindset in the crews when they belonged to SAC.

Current -135 IP here.

I'm not sure what report you are referencing, but using the words deliberate failure to describe the crew's actions doesn't accurately represent what happened.

I don't want to get into a forum argument here and I'm not sure of the last time you were in the jet but you phrased it as such that they consciously opted to not follow procedure, which wasn't the case.

I was referring to the Rudder Malfunction Analysis on page 3-82. Step 2d in particular. Seems pretty clear to me. You turn the Yaw Damper on and the malfunction returns. Turn the Yaw Damper off.

Have you read the AIB/SIB?