Did you boom operators ever joke with pilots taking fuel about payment of fuel taken?Jokes like "I only have a credit card" or "only accept cash?"
Quote from: Luis R. Ramos on November 10, 2016, 10:02:56 PMDid you boom operators ever joke with pilots taking fuel about payment of fuel taken?Jokes like "I only have a credit card" or "only accept cash?"No, we were too busy trying to not bend metal.
One of the EC-135C survivors is sitting about 40 feet away from me at the moment. 63-8049 is currently under restoration at the SAC Museum in Nebraska.http://sacmuseum.org/ec-135-looking-glass-restoration/ We've been at it for about a year now. All equipment inside has been removed and corrosion issues are currently being repaired. All gear will be fully restored and reinstalled in the aircraft. I'm guessing it'll be at least a 5 year project.
Are they restoring it to the "original" configuration or to the "common" configuration? The newer Common Configuration had the electronic interphone system and the Aux Cooling System was moved to where Cells 0 and 1 of the Forward Body Tank used to be located. The exhaust vents were on the right side about 10 feet aft of the nose gear.edit - looking at the picture from the museum 8049 is in the original configuration. The Aux Cooling System is still in the front left corner of the equipment compartment occupying the former crew toilet location. The exhaust vents on the left side of the aircraft give it away.
Quote from: PHall on November 12, 2016, 08:54:32 PMAre they restoring it to the "original" configuration or to the "common" configuration? The newer Common Configuration had the electronic interphone system and the Aux Cooling System was moved to where Cells 0 and 1 of the Forward Body Tank used to be located. The exhaust vents were on the right side about 10 feet aft of the nose gear.edit - looking at the picture from the museum 8049 is in the original configuration. The Aux Cooling System is still in the front left corner of the equipment compartment occupying the former crew toilet location. The exhaust vents on the left side of the aircraft give it away.Good thing you were able to figure that out on your own, I would have no clue. I was a boom on the "regular" KC-135Rs at the ANG unit down in Lincoln, so my planes were (mostly) empty inside. I did get to refuel the Glass a few times before they were grounded for good. Those guys were darned good at A/R.
Slightly off topic but related to the basic airframe and the KC-135 in specific: Among many projects, my shop at work is designing a KC-135 Quick Reaction Handbook (QRH) app on the issued iPads to rehost all the flight pubs. The goal is to field something to enable the crew to quickly diagnose multiple failure combos without flipping through the 400 lbs of paperwork. Our MAJCOM customer initiated this after the Shell 77 Kyrgyzstan crash as one of the corrective actions. I'm working on it to help validate the revised, simplified procedures and ensure the linkages are correct.http://aviationweek.com/awin/six-factors-named-manas-kc-135-crash:"Emergency manuals for the KC-135R contain no fewer than 21 emergency procedures discussing rudder control difficulties, but they are spread out over 177 pages, the report points out". Great, proven airframes, fantastic crew... and we're working to keep them flying safely for years to come with a "poor mans ICAWS" that can quickly provide validated, updated EPs. AMC is interested in eventually doing this for a number of platforms, as well.V/rSpamPS, back in the day (90s) I did some of the testing on the E-6, at Pax River, with some updates to the reel operators station (on topic content, grin). We were briefed never to wave or talk to the Marines guarding it!!!
Quote from: Spam on November 13, 2016, 05:30:03 PMSlightly off topic but related to the basic airframe and the KC-135 in specific: Among many projects, my shop at work is designing a KC-135 Quick Reaction Handbook (QRH) app on the issued iPads to rehost all the flight pubs. The goal is to field something to enable the crew to quickly diagnose multiple failure combos without flipping through the 400 lbs of paperwork. Our MAJCOM customer initiated this after the Shell 77 Kyrgyzstan crash as one of the corrective actions. I'm working on it to help validate the revised, simplified procedures and ensure the linkages are correct.http://aviationweek.com/awin/six-factors-named-manas-kc-135-crash:"Emergency manuals for the KC-135R contain no fewer than 21 emergency procedures discussing rudder control difficulties, but they are spread out over 177 pages, the report points out". Great, proven airframes, fantastic crew... and we're working to keep them flying safely for years to come with a "poor mans ICAWS" that can quickly provide validated, updated EPs. AMC is interested in eventually doing this for a number of platforms, as well.V/rSpamPS, back in the day (90s) I did some of the testing on the E-6, at Pax River, with some updates to the reel operators station (on topic content, grin). We were briefed never to wave or talk to the Marines guarding it!!!It wasn't fact that there were 21 different Rudder malfunctions in the book. It's the fact that the crew did diagnose the problem correctly, the Series Yaw Damper (SYD) but then did not follow the checklist by not turning it OFF.It wasn't Chapter III that killed them. It was a deliberate failure to follow the guidance given.I'm a former Evaluator Boom Operator and this kind of stuff is just not acceptable. There was a totally different mindset in the crews when they belonged to SAC.
Quote from: PHall on November 13, 2016, 05:43:51 PMQuote from: Spam on November 13, 2016, 05:30:03 PMSlightly off topic but related to the basic airframe and the KC-135 in specific: Among many projects, my shop at work is designing a KC-135 Quick Reaction Handbook (QRH) app on the issued iPads to rehost all the flight pubs. The goal is to field something to enable the crew to quickly diagnose multiple failure combos without flipping through the 400 lbs of paperwork. Our MAJCOM customer initiated this after the Shell 77 Kyrgyzstan crash as one of the corrective actions. I'm working on it to help validate the revised, simplified procedures and ensure the linkages are correct.http://aviationweek.com/awin/six-factors-named-manas-kc-135-crash:"Emergency manuals for the KC-135R contain no fewer than 21 emergency procedures discussing rudder control difficulties, but they are spread out over 177 pages, the report points out". Great, proven airframes, fantastic crew... and we're working to keep them flying safely for years to come with a "poor mans ICAWS" that can quickly provide validated, updated EPs. AMC is interested in eventually doing this for a number of platforms, as well.V/rSpamPS, back in the day (90s) I did some of the testing on the E-6, at Pax River, with some updates to the reel operators station (on topic content, grin). We were briefed never to wave or talk to the Marines guarding it!!!It wasn't fact that there were 21 different Rudder malfunctions in the book. It's the fact that the crew did diagnose the problem correctly, the Series Yaw Damper (SYD) but then did not follow the checklist by not turning it OFF.It wasn't Chapter III that killed them. It was a deliberate failure to follow the guidance given.I'm a former Evaluator Boom Operator and this kind of stuff is just not acceptable. There was a totally different mindset in the crews when they belonged to SAC.Current -135 IP here. I'm not sure what report you are referencing, but using the words deliberate failure to describe the crew's actions doesn't accurately represent what happened. I don't want to get into a forum argument here and I'm not sure of the last time you were in the jet but you phrased it as such that they consciously opted to not follow procedure, which wasn't the case.
Quote from: goblin on November 15, 2016, 08:10:47 AMQuote from: PHall on November 13, 2016, 05:43:51 PMQuote from: Spam on November 13, 2016, 05:30:03 PMSlightly off topic but related to the basic airframe and the KC-135 in specific: Among many projects, my shop at work is designing a KC-135 Quick Reaction Handbook (QRH) app on the issued iPads to rehost all the flight pubs. The goal is to field something to enable the crew to quickly diagnose multiple failure combos without flipping through the 400 lbs of paperwork. Our MAJCOM customer initiated this after the Shell 77 Kyrgyzstan crash as one of the corrective actions. I'm working on it to help validate the revised, simplified procedures and ensure the linkages are correct.http://aviationweek.com/awin/six-factors-named-manas-kc-135-crash:"Emergency manuals for the KC-135R contain no fewer than 21 emergency procedures discussing rudder control difficulties, but they are spread out over 177 pages, the report points out". Great, proven airframes, fantastic crew... and we're working to keep them flying safely for years to come with a "poor mans ICAWS" that can quickly provide validated, updated EPs. AMC is interested in eventually doing this for a number of platforms, as well.V/rSpamPS, back in the day (90s) I did some of the testing on the E-6, at Pax River, with some updates to the reel operators station (on topic content, grin). We were briefed never to wave or talk to the Marines guarding it!!!It wasn't fact that there were 21 different Rudder malfunctions in the book. It's the fact that the crew did diagnose the problem correctly, the Series Yaw Damper (SYD) but then did not follow the checklist by not turning it OFF.It wasn't Chapter III that killed them. It was a deliberate failure to follow the guidance given.I'm a former Evaluator Boom Operator and this kind of stuff is just not acceptable. There was a totally different mindset in the crews when they belonged to SAC.Current -135 IP here. I'm not sure what report you are referencing, but using the words deliberate failure to describe the crew's actions doesn't accurately represent what happened. I don't want to get into a forum argument here and I'm not sure of the last time you were in the jet but you phrased it as such that they consciously opted to not follow procedure, which wasn't the case.I was referring to the Rudder Malfunction Analysis on page 3-82. Step 2d in particular. Seems pretty clear to me. You turn the Yaw Damper on and the malfunction returns. Turn the Yaw Damper off.