Opinion on Unit Strength

[NIN]

We've had this discussion here once or twice, but I thought I'd update it a little.

Presently, CAPR 20-3 (Charters & Organizational Actions) states that CAP squadrons and flights must have a minimum of 15 members (squadrons) or 8 members (flights), with at least 3 senior members in each instance.

Consider that these numbers have been in use for probably 40 years, before the advent of the Cadet Protection Policy, among other requirements, and when there were many, many more CAP units in existence (not a "unit on every street corner" but surely units were much closer together and generally covered less geographic area and population than units today do).   So are these numbers realistic in today's organizational environment?

What got me to thinking about this is that a unit that I know of has 7 seniors on their books, but only 3 showing up regularly for whatever reason.  Their commander freely admitted that of the other two active seniors, they're never both at the same meeting at the same time.  I actually went to one of this unit's meetings one night, and had I not shown up, there would not have been a second senior member present.  Bad news indeed, when you think about it.

Apart from the CPP implications, what does this do for things like leadership development, unit management, volunteer management and workload?

while we hear frequently "the administrative requirements are too darn high!" (not disagreeing), I also think trying to run a CAP squadron with three people (or 5 people, or even 7 people) is just not realistic, no matter how much the admin requirements might be reduced.   

[Spam]

I've run Groups a couple of times now, and have seen this several times.

Once, I had one subordinate unit which had lost all but the bare minimum (on paper), and which had approx. 2 - 3 cadets and one to two officers showing to weekly meetings. Talk about exposure to risk, let alone lack of leadership training opportunity (who is there to practice leading)?  I tried to visit several times, but twice sat in an empty lot to find out they'd cancelled the meeting because one of the two cadets planning to attend was unable. My phone calls and emails went unreturned, and I heard they'd complained to Wing about me, having never spoken to me once. When I finally made the recommendation to close the unit (partly also based on repeated, utter lack of safety currency, which was mandated at the time, but also for evasiveness and for falsehoods of representation to me), nothing happened. They later flunked an inspection. Nothing happened, and the last I heard of them, they were cycling 2 - 4 new cadets in every year, who hung around one year then quit after encampment, once they'd seen how piss poor their home unit was by comparison.


When a unit falls below "critical mass" for too long, the difficulty of a restart multiplies asymptotically, as you really need to inject existing officers from the outside to break the "failing business as usual" model to snap a string of failure. If Wing or local management resist that needed change, citing the fallacy of Tradition, or equivalent excuses, then the battle is lost. (See Plato: Allegory of the Cave, or if you like, Dr. "Hows That Workin For Ya" Phil).


In my opinion, CAP is just as addicted to force structure as the active duty and Guard/Reserves are (point to: the BRAC wars, the vast swelling growth of field grade and flag rank billets in the past decade, the bloat such as JIEDDO). You'll only rarely, if ever, see a CAP Wing willingly close a marginal unit which might have huge ORM exposure, if only in the ever-unfulfilled hope that this small dysfunctional unit would miraculously heal itself somehow... somehow... somehow...


It takes a rare leader to step back, take a perspective view and listen to inputs from outside his/her blind spot, and then hoist the black flag and begin slitting throats (with a Form 27), but as you point out, the risks of avoiding those steps are huge.


V/R
Spam

[NIN]

Some years ago, when I took over a composite squadron that had.. "issues" (3 active seniors, 12 active cadets), I said to the wing commander "How about we re-designate the unit as a cadet squadron  so I can cut down my manning structure for a bit?"  (the unit was, primarily, a cadet-focused composite squadron anyway).

The wing commander said to me "I don't think the wing is in a position to lose a composite squadron right now..."

Er, what did you mean there, boss?  Its not like we had "thou shalt have x # of composite squadrons and y # of cadet squadrons" requirements.  Changing a cadet focused composite squadron into a cadet squadron is literally the stroke of a pen on a CAPF 27.  (to be fair, this wing commander had only pinned on a Red Service Ribbon a few months after being made wing commander.. to say he didn't know much about CAP was really an understatement)

Took that unit from those numbers to Region Sq of Distinction in 4 years.  It was work, but it was worth it.

At a certain point, however, we started to hit something you hit on Spam: critical mass.  A certain number of members, and I'm not exactly sure what the exact number was, and things started to become more self-sustaining.  I think it happened about the time my deputies and I were able to divest ourselves of doing 3-5 jobs each and start to concentrate on actually running the unit.  That took staffing, training, a lot of mentoring and hand-holding, but ultimately it paid off.

[lordmonar]

Ah....now you are beginning  to go down the road I've always wonder about.

Okay........Unit Strength should be determined by some objective mission driven requirement.


I.e.   Your unit has been assigned an aircraft......you need to have on the books and "actively participating"  10 mission pilots, 10 observers and 10 Scanners/Aerial Photographers. (that's 30 people).   You need to have an least three qualified AOBD (that's 33 people).   That's your base line.  You fill your admin/PD/Logistics/ES etc from either these people or you add to that.

If you had something like that for each and every unit....then you could have a day to day snap shot of where your unit is in readiness and what help you need to get up to snuff.

On the cadet side we do the same thing.   Unit X is in town Y with a target cadet population of 3000.  We want a market penetration of, say 1%, that means we need 30 cadets.   A good senior to cadet ratio is at least 1:5 so that means at least six seniors just to run the cadet program.  Add to that PD/admin/logistics.

Again....it gives us an objective measure of how we are doing and meeting objective mission driven requirements.

The other question we have to ask....is what is the optimal unit size.

I'm a big proponent of that the base line operating unit should be the element of 30-50 people max.  Elements should be specialized to a very narrow aspect of one of CAP's three missions.

So a Air SAR element, a Ground SAR element, a North Town Cadet element and a South Town Cadet Element, a Comm element.   The elements are organized into flights either geographically or functionally.    and the flights all report to a county level Squadron.  One squadron per county.  10 or so counties per group.

Once you get beyond 30-50 people....it starts to become really hard to manage as a volunteer organization.
As you increase in size the overhead work load builds up tremendously.

[Storm Chaser]

Regardless of what the regulation says, if you have 15 members you're operating like a flight, not a squadron. I, for one, would like this number to be revised. But more that changing the number for what constitutes a squadron, I would like to change some of the requirements to what constitute a flight. As it stands today, a flight is not much different than a squadron when it comes to requirements. Considering that many units start out as flights, I think the requirements for a flight should be reduced and delegated to the parent unit. That would allow the flight some breathing room to grow into a proper squadron. I also think that reduced requirements may allow flights to continue operating as such under a squadron, group, or wing, with the parent unit able to meet some of those staffing or functional needs.

[RiverAux]

I don't think that a senior or composite squadron can really function without at least 25-30 senior members.  Cadet squadrons can get by with many fewer senior members, but I think they probably need at least 20 cadets to make it worthwhile. 

[killion1506]

I know, I am new to the current CAP, but I was heavily involved when I was active, and look to do the same again. The squadron I am joining has fluctuated greatly over the years and has about seven cadets that regularly attend meetings and about the same for seniors. From what I understand, there are many more on the roster, they just don't attend. I am looking for ways to get into recruiting and retention methods that work today. The world has changed a lot in the last couple of years, and an organization like CAP is not popular in my area by any means, and I want to find the best routes to start rebuilding as well as motivating cadets to advance in the program. It is a great squadron with amazing members and I want to see them really grow.

[lordmonar]

That is another question that needs to be asked on the cadet side.....how many cadets do you really need to make the program work?

There currently is no minimum number of cadets in a squadron.

You could in theory do the cadet program with a single cadet.

So....the question is.......it that what we really want?  How many cadets do you need to make the program "work" as intended?

And on the other side....how big is too big...that is the logistics and admin get too great to be done efficiently.

[NCRblues]

Another question to add to this.

When is it time to call it quits on a unit?

I know most Group and Wing CC's hate to even think about disbanding a unit, but sometimes it may be the best option.

I have watched a unit over the years slowly bleed out. it once was strong with 25-30 Senior 40-50 Cadets with most active. Over time the unit has descended into 3 active Senior and 4 active Cadets, with 15 total on the roster currently. Recruiting event after recruiting event yields only minimal help for this unit, and those that do sign up only stay a little past level 1/Encampment. IMHO it is time to shutter the unit, as it is on year 5 of this agonizing cycle, but it seems no one even wants to think of this option.

(I also believe that this units supply and logistical property could be better utilized in other units. I.E. the Van, radios ext ext)

How does a Group or Wing CC bite that bullet and make a hard choice? What is the magic number? Or is it a time thing? For instance, 2 years of flat line? 3 years? 5 years?

[Spam]

How about this:

With the collective wisdom here, could we draft a generic "emergency get well plan", to offer to the Wings for such units?  The KISS principle would really need to apply, of course. "Do this, this, and this, with the following ____ assumptions of committed support from Group and Wing, and reevaluate against ____ objective (not subjective) metrics, as expressed by progress checks at 1 month, 3 months, and 6 months".

The first step "as they say" is to admit that the unit has a problem (so, entry criteria to the get well plan needs to be defined). It would be helpful to have an early trigger to the plan BEFORE the unit falls to only 5 people... so, a set of plan initiation triggers might be: "red" metrics in eServices on the dashboard for retention, or yellow for > x months. Additional metrics I've used included test completion rates, average test scores, milestones, safety meeting currency (when that was mandatory, it provided an index of who was truly active).

Next, the unit and Group/Wing must commit that the unit will accept, and the Wing will provide, outside help. That means recruiting volunteers from the IG team and many other specialties who commit to come in as a crisis team to both augment the staff through modeling effective behavior, to help examine the root causes of the admitted problem, to set realistic and S/M/A/R/T goals, and to assist the local folks to recruit new help against realistic goals. I'm not proposing a cast of thousands, just perhaps a team of four volunteers.

Signing such a get well plan could seal a commitment to fixing the situation - just as an employee with a problem commits to a get well corrective action plan in a paid position. If the unit refuses help, or the support falls through, regardless of finger pointing, the unit should be shuttered if it fails to meet the agreed upon, realistic, ORM based goals.

Any thoughts? Pipe dream?


On the end strength question Lordmonar raises (good point):
Strongly concur that end strength goals need to be set based on desired mission performance. If the unit has an aircraft, it needs for example to meet a minimum of 200 hours annually on the aircraft; therefore, a per pilot average could be determined from existing records to help size the optimum and minimum pilot goals. A remote unit with a small number of guys flying wont meet the requirement, so the unit will (SHOULD!) lose the aircraft.

The same sort of analysis for cadet recruiting targets could be done not with percentages of population, but from expected outcomes:  with cadet progress expectations, use existing, observed ratios of Mitchell and Wright completions to set a total strength goal aimed at producing a minimum of at least 1 Mitchell every year, within 2 years from start. That, to me, would be a minimal healthy level (ratio of cadet officers to C/NCOs to total head count). This is basically a TLC case study problem...

V/R
Spam

[NIN]

I think thats certainly a given

Many units that are "unwell" (to borrow a term) aren't given a course to "get well."

Its like leadership counseling: ""OK, we've identified this issue. here's what you need to do to fix it."

Units that are failing/not meeting the grade need to be identified and "put on a plan" to subsequently meet the minimum standards.

So every year, say, during Charter Review, a wing commander/group commander should be casting a critical eye on his or her units and their heath, and saying "OK, what unit needs the most help?"

If a unit is identified as "needing assistance," then the unit (and the commander) need to be put on notice that they are failing to meet the grade in this area, and heres what they need to do in the next 6 months, 8 months, 12 months... Or else this happens...

[Eclipse]

The reality is that it is impossible to run a squadron "properly" and to the expectations of the brochures, with the charter minimums,
probably impossible even at a factor of two.

Anyone dual-hatted (or worse), is now doing a full-time job at 1/2 speed (or less).  The three major directorates AE, ES, and CP are all full-time CAP
jobs, as is Commander, the CDs, and most of the primary staff roles.  That's 6-10 senior members right there.

"but we don't have enough work for those people to only have one job"

That's because you don't have enough people, or a plan, or a program, or are not doing personnel development.  CAP has gotten so used to running
below minimums that it seems "normal" for members in a squadron to have 12 hats.  The other reason for this is NHQ continuing to
push unfunded mandates of required roles where there is no person, or perhaps need to fill that job.

A few years ago NHQ decided CAP's issue was not enough PR.  Did it launch a national marketing campaign with canned resources for
local use?  No.  It mandated a PAO be appointed at every unit.  In many cases that just became another hat for the CC to get past the SUI.
Result - zero to negative effect.

On the cadet side, it's a similar, more pressing issue do the perishable nature of cadets.  For the proper experience as a cadet, you
first need other cadets to follow, then you need cadets to work with (peers), and finally cadets to lead.

Units at charter minimums can't offer this, so you wind up with 4-year cadet CC's, or Flight Sgts who are wearing one stripe, etc.  Or, the
occasional random recruiting success or large family brings in a group of cadets all at the same level who move up (and out) together, with no
models for their performance, nor anyone to model for.

Broken on both sides.

Getting back to the seniors, you also need a pool of "members" - pilots, ground resources, base staff people, and general ad hoc resources
who are either the wrench turners or FNGs who are working towards become a useful resource.

A new CAP member is pretty much useless for the first 3 months, and barely a resource in the first 6, by the first year they should be
up to speed enough to be looking at a staff job or assistant role, if they are interested.  Yet we bring people in with wet ID cards
and announce how they are going to "save the ES program" before they know what those letters stand for, provide no mentoring,
and are shocked when they bolt in 2 quarters.

The fix for this is to re-assign strong, graduated commanders with a track record of success to struggling units as "commodores"
for the sitting CC with a limited time to adjust attitudes and mentor the unit's leadership.  This is a function the Group CC's were intended
to fill, and is abdicated in many cases to the determent of the whole.

The tools to identify the problem already exist, things like QCUA and the SUI are treated with disdain, because they have been improperly
utilized as "final exams" instead of "snapshots".  A unit should be able to be called on a meeting night for a quick SUI, have it done in an
hour, and everyone moves on with life.  Instead they are 8-hour root canals with documents post-dated the night before, and the the discrepancies
are ignored until the last day, because again, no one actually cares. And the reason they don't care, is that the manpower to care evaporated
ten years ago.

I would say that to function properly, a unit needs at least 50 members, 50/50 cadets to seniors (not empty shirts, active members), with most coming to
most activities, and the cadets being an evolutionary group that is progressing on both ends.

[Storm Chaser]

I was deputy commander in a fairly successful composite squadron, quite active in all three CAP missions. We had about 100 members (60 seniors and 40 cadets), where maybe 2/3 of the members were truly active. That's still a significant number compared to the typical CAP squadron.

We were able to satisfactorily meet all requirements, participate in all missions, run most programs, submit all reports on time, score highly successful in SUIs, and be self sufficient in ES (meaning we had most specialties covered and personnel available), and many members were rewarded with wing officer of the year awards, meritorious services awards, commander commendations, etc. But even then, we still had many members who were dual (or, triple, quadruple, etc.) hatted. Even with the additional personnel (not counting empty shirts), we still faced many similar staffing challenges to other squadrons with less personnel.

I just don't see how a unit can fully participate in all CAP missions, run all programs, and meet all requirements with less that 50 members. I guess it's not impossible (I'm sure there are plenty of successful units out there), but it's certainly challenging.

[Holding Pattern]

I'm trying to imagine a squadron of 3 cadets and 2 SMs. The only thing I can think of them doing is basic D&C along with basic AEX. The 2 SMs would be there for mentoring, cadet protection, and recruiting. The only plan the squadron that size should have would be to double in size every month with a goal of hitting 12 cadets/8 senior members. If they can't make that happen, then it is time for a deactivation.

At that squadron size (3 and 2) admin work isn't the problem. A strong recruiting initiative is ardently necessary at that point. If 90-120 days go by and you still have 3 and 2, stick a fork in it, it's done.

[Garibaldi]

I'm trying to imagine a squadron of 3 cadets and 2 SMs. The only thing I can think of them doing is basic D&C along with basic AEX. The 2 SMs would be there for mentoring, cadet protection, and recruiting. The only plan the squadron that size should have would be to double in size every month with a goal of hitting 12 cadets/8 senior members. If they can't make that happen, then it is time for a deactivation.

At that squadron size (3 and 2) admin work isn't the problem. A strong recruiting initiative is ardently necessary at that point. If 90-120 days go by and you still have 3 and 2, stick a fork in it, it's done.

There's a little more to the story, IIRC. The unit, from what I heard, was a colossal FAIL across the board, but still was allowed to be active. Spam obviously has the whole story, if he wants to relate it.

[Eclipse]

Another issue, which calls to manpower / strength is where units are.

Wings aren't doing demographic studies and interest surveys, units are either...

     Where they have always been (for good or bad, usually because of some specific resource like an airport, military base, etc.)

     Where the CC lives.

     Where they can randomly find the first place to meet.

Units trying to meet in the downtown areas of major cites fall victim to commuter problems in that "no one lives here after 5"

Rural areas have driving distance issues.

Being on a military base seems like a "great idea", but can actually be a detriment, because you can't run open houses,
the local population is both transient and many times "not interested in being in uniform on my off time" and / or the kids have had "enough of the military".

Units should be seeded / moved to areas with demographics that support membership, especially if they are withering, that takes strategic planning
on a scale few wings / regions engage in, and the fortitude to enact 3-4 year plans.

Having a place to meet without limitations is critical to growing a unit.  I know mine could not sustain the numbers NIN is showing in our current meeting
location - even PT is starting to be an issue due to our size.

There was a brick-and-mortar initiative about 6 years ago, whatever happened to that?

[Spaceman3750]

Another issue, which calls to manpower / strength is where units are.

Wings aren't doing demographic studies and interest surveys, units are either...

     Where they have always been (for good or bad, usually because of some specific resource like an airport, military base, etc.)

     Where the CC lives.

     Where they can randomly find the first place to meet.

Units trying to meet in the downtown areas of major cites fall victim to commuter problems in that "no one lives here after 5"

Rural areas have driving distance issues.

Being on a military base seems like a "great idea", but can actually be a detriment, because you can't run open houses,
the local population is both transient and many times "not interested in being in uniform on my off time" and / or the kids have had "enough of the military".

Units should be seeded / moved to areas with demographics that support membership, especially if they are withering, that takes strategic planning
on a scale few wings / regions engage in, and the fortitude to enact 3-4 year plans.

Having a place to meet without limitations is critical to growing a unit.  I know mine could not sustain the numbers NIN is showing in our current meeting
location - even PT is starting to be an issue due to our size.

There was a brick-and-mortar initiative about 6 years ago, whatever happened to that?

At least from what I've seen myself, running a meaningful program and successfully engaging with the community seem to be a bigger issue than area demographics. Most communities over 50k can probably support a CAP squadron just fine, it comes down to actually executing a program worth joining.

And as for meeting place issues, all I can say is something along the lines of what I said on a phone call last week - "It's amazing that CAP even exists on the community level. Nationally, we do lots of awesome things and are well funded in many areas, but when it comes to simply finding a roof to put over your squadron, you're completely at the mercy of the benevolence of building owners in the area, plus dumb luck."

[lordmonar]

I get what Eclipse is say......that unit location should be determine by population.

I kind of agree with that to a point.

My basic idea would that each and every county in your state would have a CAP unit assigned to it. (let's call it a squadron).

What that squadron is actually tasked to do is based upon need of the overall WING OPLAN.
Not every squadron is going to need to do Air OPS or Ground OPS.  Some squadrons may have to have 300 cadets, and some may only need 30 based on student population.   Not every squadron needs to full on ES operations and training.   Some squadrons existance is just to have a presence at the county level ES meetings and to make contacts with the local airport to keep and maintain plans if CAP ever needs to deploy out of the local air port.

Some squadrons with an Aircraft will have to do the same thing...but also keep 30 aircrew members on staff and flying regularly (like every month).  They will have to train and keep trained mission base staff.

Now....what unit gets those taskings will most certainly be driven by population size.  But the end goal would be for CAP to have a "squadron" in each and every county doing the three missions of CAP.   Some of those squadrons will be just 30-40 guys in a single unit.  Some of those squadrons will be 300-400 guys in several units doing specialized tasks.

The point being.....we know at the wing level of where and how big units should be....before we stand them up.   We can get effective snap shots on a day to day/Month to month basis and we can see well in advance before a unit gets sick and send in help to get it well.

[Eclipse]

"One per county." Put that on a t-shirt, seriously.

That is an excellent idea. My wing would more then triple with 102 units, and even if you could only
hit that mark by 50% it would still more then double.

Some counties are huge, buy 1PC is a great place to start.

[lordmonar]

"One per county." Put that on a t-shirt, seriously.

That is an excellent idea. My wing would more then triple with 102 units, and even if you could only
hit that mark by 50% it would still more then double.

Some counties are huge, buy 1PC is a great place to start.

That was my basic idea.
Some small counties would just be the one squadron much like we got today.  20 or so cadets and 20 adult members doing the mission on a small scale.

Some squadrons would have multiple flights with multiple elements of 20-40 members doing specific tasks (cadet program, comm, Air Ops, GSAR, AE, etc).

One squadron per county is a goal.  It is measurable.  It is reasonable (assuming you scale their missions).
It clearly identifies lines of responsibilities (i.e. in a county with multiple squadrons who's job is it to meet with the county ES guys to coordinate missions and make MOUs?).

[NIN]

That actually makes a lot of sense.

It used to be that we had "one group per county" (well, sort of) in MI Wing.

Southeastern Michigan had, as I remember, 4 groups:

Group III was Macomb County with 6 squadrons (One was a unit in St. Clair County, and later, one way up in Sanilac County, too)
Group II was Oakland County with (off the top of my head) 6 or 8 squadrons
Group XVI was Wayne County, but it might have just been western Wayne County, with 5-6 squadrons, etc..

The "less populous" areas of the state like out toward Lansing and such had a group to cover multiple counties and not every one had a squadron, even.

But certainly, one squadron per county with subordinate flights in populated areas *might* be a good alternative *especially* with decentralized things like testing.

I could use my county as an example:  Merrimack County has ~147,000 people.  That is ostensibly our "recruiting area" (although we pull a tiny bit from Hillsborough County). 

With the current size of our unit, we have 1 member for every 1250 residents in our county. Thats pretty good penetration, considering that the Wing as a whole is 1/2400 and Nationally we sit at 1/5800-ish.

Could my squadron stand to be smaller? Sure could. We're starting to bust at the seams in the Armory (not administratively.. physically).  So if we had, say, a cadet flight at the Boys & Girl Club right here in town with 4 or 5 officers managing the ops there on a Tuesday with 20 cadets, we could progbably support a cadet flight up the road in the town of Warner (about 20 minutes west northwest) with 5-10 cadets to start, and a third to the east in Chichester with another 10-15 cadets and 2-3 officers, each centering on easy transportation networks and population centers, and a school flight up in the city of Franklin at the north end of the county.

The idea would be to possibly expand each unit to the point where it could become its own squadron..  That might actually be helpful in the long run

[Garibaldi]

We meet in the basement of a church, have since 1962 or so. Historically, the unit has been small, goldfish syndrome and all. Spam and I would love to have the problem of finding enough space to accommodate a ton of new members, busting at the seams every Wednesday. Of course, that would mean having to move, finding new meeting space, etc. But with an active membership of around 15 cadets and 7 seniors we could stand to expand.

[Storm Chaser]

I think that's the typical size of many squadrons. One of the problems I see in the cadet side is that with 15 cadets, there's really only one flight. The cadet commander in most squadrons this size is really a flight commander. The more cadets in the squadron, the more opportunities for advancement and leadership.

[Spam]

Correction: as of this weeks calldown report, our unit has 31 active, out of 40 cadets on the books.  11 in A (Advanced) Flight, 12 in B (Basic Training) Flight, a 3 person cadet command element, and several cadet staff officers.

The nine inactive include cadets who have gone away to college, etc. as well as a few on academic or family leave. My consistent message is: CAP is third priority after your obligations to your higher priorities - your faith, your family, and your schoolwork. So, one of our C/CMSGTs for example is on leave due to his math grades.


V/R
Spam

[NIN]

I think that's the typical size of many squadrons. One of the problems I see in the cadet side is that with 15 cadets, there's really only one flight. The cadet commander in most squadrons this size is really a flight commander. The more cadets in the squadron, the more opportunities for advancement and leadership.

"Average" unit cadet strength is ~24 cadets.  Average unit senior strength is ~18 seniors.

[lordmonar]

Now the question is.....is 24 cadets good enough to provide a leadership lab that produces a Spaatz cadet?

Because that is the TARGET unit size for cadets.

[Eclipse]

Now the question is.....is 24 cadets good enough to provide a leadership lab that produces a Spaatz cadet?

I would say "yes", on the minimum, but it's not optimum, and the quality discussions would hing on
where in the progression chain those 24 are.

With Cadet Exe staff & line staff, that would be about two flights running at minimums.  All the important jobs would be available and
workable, but with no depth at position (which is an ongoing CAP issue), and it doesn't take much to collapse that plan down to one flight.

It should go without saying that it would require those 24 all be active.

[NC Hokie]

Now the question is.....is 24 cadets good enough to provide a leadership lab that produces a Spaatz cadet?

Because that is the TARGET unit size for cadets.

The QCUA metrics give additional credit to units with 35 or more cadets, so this may be NHQ's true target size.

FYI, only 15% of cadet units met this standard in the 2014/15 QCUA cycle.

[lordmonar]

I'm suggesting that NHQ may not really have a cohesive concept of optimum unit size. 

Don't get me wrong the QCUA is a good program.   

I'm just asking the questions here.   What is the right sized unit?  What is the bench mark before some one has to step in and bail them out?   What is the bench mark when we should split a unit into smaller units.   

Is it a fixed number. Is is a situational number?   How does that number fit into the cadet program as written in 52-16?   

Does the Quality unit award and squadron of merit and squadron of distinction support these aims and goals?   Does TLC and UCC training reflect these goals?  Does the SUI program reflect these goals?

[Spaceman3750]

[...]
I'm just asking the questions here.   What is the right sized unit?  What is the bench mark before some one has to step in and bail them out?   What is the bench mark when we should split a unit into smaller units.   

Is it a fixed number. Is is a situational number?   How does that number fit into the cadet program as written in 52-16? 
[...]

There's probably not a good answer that fits every community in every wing nationwide. This is where good commanders are supposed to help.

[lordmonar]

How is a good commander supposed to know, if we don't even have good guide lines of what the notional cadet program is supposed to look like. 

This is what NIN is asking about.  How does the wing recruiting officer know when a unit is struggling?

[NCRblues]

How does the wing recruiting officer know when a unit is struggling?

It helps if the Wing has one that is engadged at all, or a CC that is willing to have a realistic conversation about the units in question.

[Garibaldi]

How is a good commander supposed to know, if we don't even have good guide lines of what the notional cadet program is supposed to look like. 

This is what NIN is asking about.  How does the wing recruiting officer know when a unit is struggling?

Just my .02, but if he notices something along the lines of loss of members, lack of progress, units staying at the same strength year after year, varying membership rates when new CC's come and go, lack of higher milestone awards, lack of PD advancement, lack of recruiting, general malaise...things like Spam mentioned earlier with regards to the unit with 3 cadets and 2 senior officers. I've been to units with a large cadet population that weren't doing anything but AE, because their CDC and AE officer were the same person. I've been to units smaller in size that were accomplishing all 3 missions and churning out quality cadets. It runs the gamut, but it starts being an issue when the unit crosses someone's radar. There have been units here in GAWG shut down or combined with another because of lack of progress or churn or whatever. If the wing officer (recruiting/retention, group commander, cadet programs officer) isn't visiting his subordinate units then that's a serious problem. S/he should be in the field, not just flying a desk once a month, churning out "let's do this thing and it'll be epic" emails without follow up. I'm not saying go visit every unit every week, but make an effort and show that you are invested in the lives of the units.

You can't see the problems unless you get out of the office.

[Eclipse]

How is a good commander supposed to know, if we don't even have good guide lines of what the notional cadet program is supposed to look like.

We have >excellent< guidelines, just no one pays them any mind, including most CC's.  QCUA = 35, my experience says 50.
Some would argue 25, but we all know charter minimums are laughable and unworkable, and when a unit hits those, they are probably dead,
especially if they pass an FY that way.

Anyone with the experience and chops to actually >be< a CC, knows this answer, anything else is an excuse, however
we don't pick CC's based on experience and program knowledge, we pick them based on presence and respiration.

And as discussed in the OE thread, we aren't even discussing how to grow them on a national level, primarily because when
you're spending all your time on patching holes below the water line, what color the deck chairs are painted is fairly irrelevant.
(Except that in CAP, there's a LOT of time spent on the deck chairs, too, especially the colors).

How does the wing recruiting officer know when a unit is struggling?

Anything other then "recruiting", isn't the RRO's job, that's what the Commanders are for.
There's little they can do for "retention", either, beyond reporting - but that >is< what they are supposed to do.

Report trends, color statistics, and perhaps make some calls into the whys a unit's number are dropping precipitously,
then report that to the CC.  However if the CC is actually learning anything from the RRO as first-hand info, he's baked.

And this is another reason term limits are "good", there's a Venti on the bar that says nearly every wing has at least one unit
with a term-limit+ CC sitting at minimums or below, that everyone in the wing knows has been dead for years that no one end "because".
Terms limits force those issues, or at least they are supposed to.

You can't see the problems unless you get out of the office.

Absolutely.  Having made that mistake myself, this is 100% true.

[lordmonar]

I think that what's I'm getting.

I don't see 52-16 guidelines on unit size is very clear at all.

There is certainly not any sort of cohesive understanding of what the numbers should be.

I agree that a really viable program would be around 50 active cadets.  But that's not written down anywhere.

And once again we are back to argument of what the heck WING and GROUP leadership is supposed to be doing for the squadrons.

If Wing is not there to help out squadrons....then why do we have them?

Sure....sure....it's the squadron commander's job.   But if/when a commander is getting burned out, over his/her head, not performing to standards....it is wing/group's job to step in, re-educate, assist and other wise "fix" the problem.

So I go back to my question......where are the bench marks to show that a squadron is Failing, Marginal, Satisfactory, Outstanding?
What tools do we have for the squadron commander to know when he needs to shift his focus on one area of the program vs another area?

And this is not about the deck chairs.....these are in fact fundamental questions.

What objective criteria does a squadron commander have to gauge if he is doing his job?
Not the SUI I dotting/T crossing....but really running an effective program.

I know it is not taught anywhere in the 52-16.
The QCUA gives us some sort of guidelines....but they are sort of just arbitrary as far as I can tell.....good ideas, but no regulatory backing and to a point not backed by any of the supporting training or publications. 
No where is our Emergency Services manning levels clear stated.  And there are no metrics to gauge how you are doing except the NHQ stated goal of getting 200 hours on each air frame.

My point to of this toward the Recruiting and Retention aspect is that we FIRST need clear mission taskings at the unit level (what you are going to do, how often and how much) and that drives the manning and equipment needs of the unit.

Once those are in place......all the rest fall into place.   If your unit is tasked to provide CP to 50 students then you know that they are successful when they got 50 cadets.   When they drop to 30 then that is when the commander and higher head quarters knows that they need to step in and help out.   If once that happens it drops below 20 we know that the program is no longer viable and drastic action is needed.

Same sort of thing needs to be done on the ES and AE and any other aspect we can think of.

Right now....we got little guidance.  We got pick and choose missions.  We got little to no wing/group involvement in squadron activities.

This is not to say that NHQ or other higher headquarters are screwing up by the numbers.  It just means we that we (all of us) get caught up in the weeds that we can't see beyond next quarter let alone next year.

[/rant]

[Spaceman3750]

Emergency services manning levels will be dictated by the operations tempo of your wing and the needs of the agencies you support, which should inform the wing's emergency services [training] plan, into which all subordinate plans should feed. In other words - there's no national minimum, and there's no need for a national minimum - it CAN and SHOULD be driven by local leaders.

[RiverAux]

My rule of thumb is that you have a decent chance of maintaining 1 CAP member per 1,000 residents in most towns of 10-50K.  That ratio can be beat, at least in the short run, with a super-active person doing the recruiting, but probably isn't sustainable for very long. 

Once you get into larger cities of 50K+ I think the potential to have multiple units is certainly possible, but it doesn't seem to happen very often in practice.  Things get thrown out of whack when you start talking about major metropolitan areas where there is more than enough population to support a whole lot of units, and perhaps they did in WWII, but now they mostly seem to have just a few. 

[lordmonar]

yes....I agree.  But who dictates to the units what their portion of that manning and training is supposed to be?

[Eclipse]

To Lord's points, I would argue that the SUI is / was intended for the purpose of unit temperatures, but poor implementation,
poor execution, and poor training and understanding, have come together to make it literally the opposite of its intended purpose.

A quarterly "dipstick check" (take that term any way you like), coupled with an annual self-eval, plus the formal inspections should be more then
enough to keep a unit on track, but no one reads the second page, nor do upstream commanders take that information and turn it into
marching orders.

Start with manning.  Run a wing level report into Excel and find every CC who's got more then one job.
find out why and fix most of them (sometimes there are legit reasons, those are the exceptions).

Rinse, repeat.  But that never gets done.

So I have to agree, this situation, like every other problem in CAP, returns to the lack of management from above.
Not "leadership", that's an entirely different conversation, management.

CAP commanders are held to a full-time pseudo-military / pseudo-governmental execution standard for promotions and awards, but
the organization is run like a part-time social club.   Experience shows this isn't working.