Started by Nikos, March 15, 2016, 08:32:07 PM
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Quote from: PHall on March 19, 2016, 10:46:28 PMQuote from: Garibaldi on March 19, 2016, 10:44:26 PMI had quite a discussion with my unit historian on the way to a joint SAREX, at about 0615 this morning. Turns out that there were several tests done with RATO on C-130s during the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980. Not sure how classified the info is, but apparently, one other option besides the Desert One fiasco was to outfit a Hercules with some rockets, to facilitate a very short landing and takeoff in a soccer field. Lockheed did some testing, and due to the nature of the rockets, culled from various sources, had several arranged for landing, some for vertical, and some rear facing. The test was less than successful, but the idea carried over somewhat. Some of the older model Hercules still have the wiring but not the hardpoints for the rockets, apparently.There's a video of that on You Tube. Search C-130 and should find it.
Quote from: Garibaldi on March 19, 2016, 10:44:26 PMI had quite a discussion with my unit historian on the way to a joint SAREX, at about 0615 this morning. Turns out that there were several tests done with RATO on C-130s during the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980. Not sure how classified the info is, but apparently, one other option besides the Desert One fiasco was to outfit a Hercules with some rockets, to facilitate a very short landing and takeoff in a soccer field. Lockheed did some testing, and due to the nature of the rockets, culled from various sources, had several arranged for landing, some for vertical, and some rear facing. The test was less than successful, but the idea carried over somewhat. Some of the older model Hercules still have the wiring but not the hardpoints for the rockets, apparently.
Quote from: Spam on March 19, 2016, 11:20:15 PMWow, you guys really do ignore my posts, don't you. See number 50, above...V/RSpam
Quote from: Luis R. Ramos on March 18, 2016, 01:53:04 PMDoes anyone know whether the C-130 could use RATO at this time? Was use of the RATO ever contemplated for this type of event? If so, use at the carrier would have been dangerous?
Quote from: Garibaldi on March 18, 2016, 01:04:20 PMWell, he died a while back. He is known to several members of my unit, and 2 of his sons were in the program. He actually was GAWG CC in 1968. Ted Limmer, his name was. Here is a link to an article, complete with pictures, of the actual test: http://www.navsource.org/archives/02/025982d.pdf
Quote from: David BrownGeorgia Wing has had many outstanding members over the years, but did any of you know that one of our former Georgia Wing Commanders was also a Lockheed-Georgia test pilot who was a pilot on a on a record setting test flight of a C-130 onto and off of an AIRCRAFT CARRIER? Col Theodore Limmer, a CAP member since 1954, and test pilot of Lockheed's P-80, T-33, F-94, F-104, U-2, C-130, C-140, C-141 and C-5A, served as Georgia Wing Commander from 3 March 1965 to 18 October 1968, and as Southeast Region Commander from 1968 to 1971. In 1963, he was the Lockheed check pilot and safety pilot during the famous C-130 Aircraft Carrier evaluation possiblility tests aboard the U.S.S. Forrestal. Not only was it possible, it was done in moderately rough seas 500 miles out in the North Atlantic off the coast of Boston. In so doing, the airplane became the largest and heaviest aircraft to ever land on an aircraft carrier, a record that stands to this day. When Lt. James H. Flatley III was told about his new assignment, he thought somebody was pulling his leg. "Operate a C-130 off an aircraft carrier? Somebody's got to be kidding," he said. But they weren't kidding. In fact, the Chief of Naval Operations himself had ordered a feasibility study on operating the big propjet aboard the Norfolk-based U.S.S. Forrestal (CVA-59). The Navy was trying to find out whether they could use the Hercules as a "Super Carrier Onboard Delivery" aircraft. The airplane then used for such tasks at the time was the Grumman C-1 Trader, a twin piston-engine craft with a small payload capacity and 300-mile range. If an aircraft carrier is operating in mid-ocean, it has no "onboard delivery" system to fall back on and must come nearer land before taking aboard even urgently needed items. The Hercules was stable and reliable, with a long cruising range and capable of carrying larger payloads. The aircraft, a KC-130F refueler transport, on loan from the U.S. Marines, was delivered on 8 October. Lockheed's only modifications to this production aircraft included installing a smaller nose-landing gear orifice, an improved anti-skid braking system, and removal of the refueling pods. "The big worry was whether we could meet the maximum sink rate of nine feet per second," Flatley said. As it turned out, the Navy was suprised to find they were able to better this mark by a substantial margin. In addition to Col Ted H. Limmer, Jr. and PIC Lt Flatley, the crew consisted of Lt.Cmdr. W.W. Stovall, copilot; and ADR-1 E.F. Brennan, flight engineer. The initial sea-born landings on 30 October 1963 were made into a 40-knot wind. Altogether, the crew successfully negotiated 29 touch-and-go landings, 21 unarrested full-stop landings, and 21 unassisted takeoffs at gross weights of 85,000 pounds up to 121,000 pounds. At 85,000 pounds, the KC-130F came to a complete stop within 267 feet, about twice the aircraft's wing span! The Navy was delighted to discover that even with a maximum payload, the plane used only 745 feet for takeoff and 460 feet for landing roll. It was a very interesting test to say the least! In Col Limmer's own words: "The last landing I participated in, we touched down about 150 feet from the end, stopped in 270 feet more and launched from that position, using what was left of the deck. We still had a couple hundred feet left when we lifted off. Admiral Brown was flabbergasted." Even though the test was successful, the Navy still had some concerns about flight deck space, as the C-130 would not fit belowdecks, and might make the upper deck a bit too crowded for safe operations with a full complement of carrier-based fighters. Still, the test did prove, that if an emergency situation required delivery of urgent cargo in wartime, that a Lockheed C-130 could do the job.
Quote from: Luis R. Ramos on March 20, 2016, 02:08:38 AMThe other effort also involved a C-130, the Youtube link that Spam posted.
Quote from: RRLE on March 21, 2016, 01:09:57 AMQuote from: Luis R. Ramos on March 20, 2016, 02:08:38 AMThe other effort also involved a C-130, the Youtube link that Spam posted.According to Wikipedia, that was Operation Credible Sport. The article gives the history of what happened to the aircraft.Wikipedia's main article on the subject can be found under JATO. It states that the JATO/RATO assisted car is an urban legend.
Quote from: Spam on March 20, 2016, 03:22:59 AMMy opinions on the Operation Eagle Claw mission:It arguably failed due to a confluence of a number of factors: systematically poor maintenance of the RH-53 minesweeper variants used (multiple aircraft aborts), overly complex planning and unclear chains of command among multiple participating services (dithering at the FARP, Desert One, after maintenance failures had reduced the number of helos below the plan minimum of six), selection of the wrong H-53 variant (the RH version instead of the USMCs air-refuelable CH-53s, which would haven't required a desert refuel)... etc. etc. A brand new Delta Force (founded 1977), unrealistic training for the op (daylight, good wx only?!?), the list goes on.The meta-level contributors to that Iranian mishap included the Carter administrations directive to avoid shooting Iranians, which tied the hands of the operators, and the general budgetary hamstringing of the military by the President and Congress in those post-Vietnam days of the hollow military. Thus, when they realized they were marginal, they had to wait (with engines burning fuel) for over two hours for Carter to make a remote control decision from the other side of the planet. From my POV, whenever you see this sort of environment from the top, expect to see these sort of catastrophes result. For example, first hand comments I get tell me that with almost no pressure being put on the bad guys after our pull out in the Rockpile, and our hands tied with stupid ROEs in the Levant, Bad Things are starting to happen again, with a resultant increased risk to our remaining operators there due to lack of support. Post Eagle Claw, the country saw an AAR which led to specifics such as the standup of better organized, trained, and equipped SOF aviation assets and doctrine aimed at a broader range of well conceived, planned, rehearsed, and audacious capabilities (along with a commitment to better funding, at least for those assets). It concerns me that we've forgotten so many lessons, apparently, as a nation.For CAP, I've considered using this as a good teaching lesson on ops planning and the use of the KISS principle, especially when we do SAR/DR with other agencies. Today, Garibaldi, LTC Berry, 3 cadets and I took part in a multi service SAREX here in Georgia with two other agencies where the overall IC/battle staff had completely overthought the rather simple target laydown, had imposed a rigid comm doctrine and ROE on their troops, etc. Good experience, and worth building on, and as I'm putting together my contributory AAR for them, this discussion is probably helping me frame my thoughts.Backing away from opinions and sticking to the empirical:The specific operational level problems which led to the mishap at D1 were related to what we call DVE (Degraded Visual Environment) disorientation and poor cueing, when after finally receiving a cancel order, one of the helos hover translated in the dust right into the tail of one of the tanker C-130s, killing and injuring a bunch of men. That we still, today, lose expensive aircraft and irreplaceable men due to DVE related mishaps has led to programs such as DVEPS, "DVE Pilotage System" for the 160th SOAR(A) which is aimed at fielding a combo of mmw radar and lidar sensors coupled to innovative pilot vehicle interface (PVI) design (that's my end of it) to enable our aircrew to not just "Own the Night", but also own the brownout dust clouds and whiteout snow/ice environment as well. I take it as a personal challenge as an engineer to attack this problem to not let our guys down by letting them have mishaps like Desert One, which was fresh in our minds when I was a cadet.See: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-03/army-commandos-first-to-get-bad-weather-vision-for-u-s-coptersCircling back to the original thread (grin) - the 160th also has a number of exchange officers, including one guy who resigned his USMC commission to fly with them as a CW4, and they can operate off of all types of USN assets.V/RSpam
Quote from: AirAux on March 22, 2016, 01:01:44 PMLet me just say, that I salute anyone that takes off and/or lands on a carrier. I think anyone that does so with a B-25 or a C-130 is not only a superb pilot, but a brave soul on top of it!
Quote from: Spam on March 22, 2016, 04:57:24 PMAll my traps and cats were manual/back seat... I understand ACLS helps, these days! V/RSpam
Quote from: stillamarine on March 23, 2016, 02:53:04 AMQuote from: Spam on March 22, 2016, 04:57:24 PMAll my traps and cats were manual/back seat... I understand ACLS helps, these days! V/RSpamPrior to going ashore for the Kosovo invasion I had the "pleasure" of going aboard the big deck on the COD. Yeah. I'm just glad I couldn't see outside. I may have peed myself a little.
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