wondering about pearl harbor

Started by starshippe, March 01, 2011, 03:50:49 AM

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JohnKachenmeister

The small PBY force was deployed to the south and west, not to the north where a storm was masking the approach of the Jap. fleet.

I want to differentiate between the Jap. Naval staff and Yamamoto personally.  Yamamoto was an ardent advocate of carrier power and naval aviation, and used his junior and mid-grade officers as key staffers.  His primary battle staff were still of the battle line, and did not think in terms of carrier warfare.  It was a time of transition for both navies.

But, as to sleepwalker's point, Japan did not lose its entire carrier force at Midway.  They attacked Pearl with 6 carriers, and lost 4 at Midway.  One was in port during the Doolittle raid and was slightly damaged.  There still was a substantial carrier force in 1944 to lure Halsey away from the Philippines.  By 1944, however, they lacked pilots, so the carrier's effectiveness, to say the least, was compromised.
Another former CAP officer

JohnKachenmeister

Of course, all of you know we have lost the attention of any cadets by this point in the discussion.  Between the dumbing-down of the cadet program and the dumbing-down of the schools, their knowledge of history is that Rosie the Riveter won World War II with the help of the Benevolent Communists of the Soviet Union and the Tuskeegee Airmen.  Halsey and LeMay only fought Japan because they were racists, and the primary reason for World War II is that the Jews were blamed for the Great Depression when it was actually the fault of greedy capitalists on Wall Street.
Another former CAP officer

Sleepwalker

Verification: I didn't mean that the Japanese lost their entire Carrier force at Midway, but meant that the entire Carrier force that was deployed to Midway was lost - I should have worded that part more clearly.   
A Thiarna, déan trócaire

Smithsonia

#23
The definitive work on this subject are NOT the movies "Tora, Tora, Tora," or "Pearl Harbor" both of which are historical foolishness - However the Book by Gordon Prange "At Dawn We Slept" is big and full of facts. Professor Prange argued that the Japanese failed at Pearl.
1. By not attacking the American Carriers even at sea - as they were not ready for battle because the US carriers were being used as Aircraft resupply ships and not offensive power projection.
2. The Oilers and in port refueling facilities remained largely untouched.
3. The Submarine fleet was left intact.
4. Almost all of the the stricken Battleships were re-floated and later fought in the war.
5. The large harbor repair facilities were left in tact.
6. A sleeping giant was indeed awakened.
7. A third wave of Japanese attacking aircraft was called off because the first two waves were considered completely and absolutely successful.

Pearl Harbor is therefore not considered (by Prange) a successful disabling attack and only a big raid. The Philipines, Wake Island, Singapore, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and several smaller targets were the real prizes for the Japanese. Pearl was always a delaying action at least and an opening bargaining position to sue for a quick peace at most. The crippling of the forward deployed American fleet simply didn't occur. Within 6 months America was on the offensive in the Pacific. And, that this quick response to the attacks meant that Japan could never consolidate their successes. So tactically and strategically the Attack on Pearl Harbor was a failure for the Japanese.

With regards;
ED OBRIEN

Sleepwalker


   Prange's other book "Miracle at Midway" is also another 'must read' for those interested in that battle.  Both books are the best I have read on both subjects.   
A Thiarna, déan trócaire

JohnKachenmeister

I also read "At Dawn...", and I agree with the fact that the raid was a failure.  It was a stunning tactical success, but its failure was in that it did not produce the desired outcome of forcing the US to sue for peace.  Again, the failure can be traced to Japanese racism, and their view that the US was full of weaklings incapable of the sacrifice demanded by total war.

The only surprising part was the failure of the Japanese to attack the submarines.  The Jap. navy considered the sub a less-than-adequate weapon, and did not consider submarines a serious threat.  Their allies, the Germans, however, were busy bringing another island nation nearly to its knees through submarine warfare.  You would think they would chat from time to time, being allies and all that.
Another former CAP officer

Smithsonia

Here's the Score Card:
AMERICANS Confirm 28 Japanese planes shot down. 2 midget submarines sunk. 1 more probable kill on unknown sub. (later another midget was found sunk)
America claims following losses
Casualties
USA : 218 KIA, 364 WIA.
USN: 2,008 KIA, 710 WIA.
USMC: 109 KIA, 69 WIA.
Civilians: 68 KIA, 35 WIA.

  TOTAL: 2,403 KIA, 1,178 WIA.
-------------------------------------------------
Battleships
USS Arizona (BB-39) - total loss when a bomb hit her magazine.
USS Oklahoma (BB-37) - Total loss when she capsized and sunk in the harbor.
USS California (BB-44) - Sunk at her berth. Later raised and repaired.
USS West Virginia (BB-48) - Sunk at her berth. Later raised and repaired.
USS Nevada - (BB-36) Beached to prevent sinking. Later repaired.
USS Pennsylvania (BB-38) - Light damage.
USS Maryland (BB-46) - Light damage.
USS Tennessee (BB-43) Light damage.
USS Utah (AG-16) - (former battleship used as a target) - Sunk.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cruisers
USS New Orleans (CA-32) - Light Damage..
USS San Francisco (CA38) - Light Damage.
USS Detroit (CL-8) - Light Damage.
USS Raleigh (CL-7) - Heavily damaged but repaired.
USS Helena (CL-50) - Light Damage.
USS Honolulu (CL-48) - Light Damage..
-------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------
Destroyers
USS Downes (DD-375) - Destroyed. Parts salvaged.
USS Cassin - (DD-37 2) Destroyed. Parts salvaged.
USS Shaw (DD-373) - Very heavy damage.
USS Helm (DD-388) - Light Damage.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minelayer
USS Ogala (CM-4) - Sunk but later raised and repaired.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seaplane Tender
USS Curtiss (AV-4) - Severely damaged but later repaired.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Repair Ship
USS Vestal (AR-4) - Severely damaged but later repaired.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Harbor Tug
USS Sotoyomo (YT-9) - Sunk but later raised and repaired.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aircraft
188 Aircraft destroyed (92 USN and 92 U.S. Army Air Corps.)
With regards;
ED OBRIEN

AirDX

Wait... is this CAPTalk?  I'm learning things and enjoying reading this!

A minor quibble - up topic the US carriers are referred to as CVNs and the auxiliary "jeep" carriers as CVAs.  CVNs are nuclear powered carriers, CVAs are attack carriers - full sized units.

IIRC:

Carriers were initially designated as CVs.  The pre-war 8 were Langley, Ranger, Yorktown, Enterprise, Hornet, Lexington, Saratoga and Wasp.

The two classes built during the war were the Essex class (called CVB - Aircraft Carrier, Large) and the Independence class (CVL: Aircraft Carrier - Light).  The Escort carriers were initially called ACV (Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers) then later CVE (escort).

Sometime during the war the Navy re-designated all the big carriers as CVA (Aircraft Carrier - Attack).  The 2nd USS Enterprise was initially designated CVAN-65.  In recent times the Navy has reverted to CV (Multipurpose Aircraft Carrier) and CVN (their nuclear powered sisters).
Believe in fate, but lean forward where fate can see you.

SarDragon

Close. The only CVBs were the three Midway-class boats. The Essex-class boats were a bit smaller. At one point, they were designated as CVS (ASW).
Dave Bowles
Maj, CAP
AT1, USN Retired
50 Year Member
Mitchell Award (unnumbered)
C/WO, CAP, Ret

AirDX

Quote from: Smithsonia on March 02, 2011, 05:29:11 PM
2. The Oilers and in port refueling facilities remained largely untouched.
Here is one of those inexplicable things of history.  Maybe there was a reason I don't know, maybe it has been lost in the fog of war.  Why the Japanese didn't destroy the oil storage tanks along the NE side of Pearl Harbor is a good question.  They are very plainly visible in the upper right of this photo:

(Behind the tanks is a small lake (long since filled in) and a hill; I live on the left slope of that hill)

Admiral Nimitz himself noted that "We had about 4.5 million barrels of oil out there and all of it was vulnerable to .50-caliber bullets. Had the Japanese destroyed the oil, it would have prolonged the war another two years..."

It wasn't that the US Navy lacked awareness of this vulnerability; the Red Hill oil storage facility (beneath one of the mountain slopes in the background of the photo above), a stupendous facility consisting of 20 250 foot tall x 100 foot diameter POL storage tanks had been under construction since 1940.  It was completed in 1943 and it's still in use today, one of the civil engineering wonders of the world.  In fact, some of the lots in the subdivision where I live have easements for "secret" military tunnels underneath - where the pipelines pass to the harbor.

Maybe the 3rd wave that the Japanese canceled that day would have been directed at the logistics elements of Pearl Harbor.  I'm glad they failed in that aspect that day.
Believe in fate, but lean forward where fate can see you.

AirDX

Quote from: SarDragon on March 26, 2011, 07:05:27 AM
Close. The only CVBs were the three Midway-class boats. The Essex-class boats were a bit smaller. At one point, they were designated as CVS (ASW).

Aha - looked it up on hazegray.org, you are quite correct sir!
Believe in fate, but lean forward where fate can see you.

davidsinn

Quote from: AirDX on March 26, 2011, 06:25:47 AM
Wait... is this CAPTalk?  I'm learning things and enjoying reading this!

A minor quibble - up topic the US carriers are referred to as CVNs and the auxiliary "jeep" carriers as CVAs.  CVNs are nuclear powered carriers, CVAs are attack carriers - full sized units.

IIRC:

Carriers were initially designated as CVs.  The pre-war 8 were Langley, Ranger, Yorktown, Enterprise, Hornet, Lexington, Saratoga and Wasp.

The two classes built during the war were the Essex class (called CVB - Aircraft Carrier, Large) and the Independence class (CVL: Aircraft Carrier - Light).  The Escort carriers were initially called ACV (Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers) then later CVE (escort).

Sometime during the war the Navy re-designated all the big carriers as CVA (Aircraft Carrier - Attack).  The 2nd USS Enterprise was initially designated CVAN-65.  In recent times the Navy has reverted to CV (Multipurpose Aircraft Carrier) and CVN (their nuclear powered sisters).

A minor quibble to your minor quibble: During a portion of the '30s Enterprise was classified as CV(N)-6, the N meaning night ops qualified. It was the only ship to carry that designation.
Former CAP Captain
David Sinn

MSG Mac

Quote from: AirDX on March 26, 2011, 07:32:55 AM
Quote from: Smithsonia on March 02, 2011, 05:29:11 PM
2. The Oilers and in port refueling facilities remained largely untouched.
Here is one of those inexplicable things of history.  Maybe there was a reason I don't know, maybe it has been lost in the fog of war.  Why the Japanese didn't destroy the oil storage tanks along the NE side of Pearl Harbor is a good question.  They are very plainly visible in the upper right of this photo:

(Behind the tanks is a small lake (long since filled in) and a hill; I live on the left slope of that hill)

Admiral Nimitz himself noted that "We had about 4.5 million barrels of oil out there and all of it was vulnerable to .50-caliber bullets. Had the Japanese destroyed the oil, it would have prolonged the war another two years..."

It wasn't that the US Navy lacked awareness of this vulnerability; the Red Hill oil storage facility (beneath one of the mountain slopes in the background of the photo above), a stupendous facility consisting of 20 250 foot tall x 100 foot diameter POL storage tanks had been under construction since 1940.  It was completed in 1943 and it's still in use today, one of the civil engineering wonders of the world.  In fact, some of the lots in the subdivision where I live have easements for "secret" military tunnels underneath - where the pipelines pass to the harbor.

Maybe the 3rd wave that the Japanese canceled that day would have been directed at the logistics elements of Pearl Harbor.  I'm glad they failed in that aspect that day.

From what I've read the oil tanks were to be hit durring the 3rd strike, which was canceled by VADM Nagumo because he wasn't sure when the american carriers would be returning and he felt that the fleet was so thoroughly trashed they could never be a threat to the IJN. 
Michael P. McEleney
Lt Col CAP
MSG USA (Retired)
50 Year Member

Smithsonia

#33
Leaving port oil and constructing facilities at Pearl in tact is a big deal. Prange in At Dawn We Slept was rather definite about that. What has never been answered is why the Japanese of all Navy's failed to consider this issue.

Being that the Pearl Harbor attack was a response to our embargo of Indonesian oil to Japan... this remains almost inexplicable. It is this case and several follow on mistakes by the Japanese post Pearl Harbor - Japan's losses at sea... seem unavoidable.
The list of mistakes is long.

1. The Japanese assumed that their naval and diplomatic codes were safe. We broke them over and over and knew what they were up to most of the war. As such we were inside their decision cycle for a good deal of WW2. Besides helping win many naval battles we also got queues as to when and how to move to the offensive post Pearl Harbor.

2. The Japanese expected that the US Carrier fleet would defend the Corregidor or Wake in an uncoordinated fashion. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corregidor_Island

Therefore, the Japanese Navy would have a chance soon to sink the US Carriers in a helter skelter reprisal raid near Manila. Instead we held our breath and surrendered time after time until we could husband our resources and go on the attack. This must've driven Nimitz and Halsey nuts... but by keeping their powder dry... absorbing the first hits... they preserved the American Pacific Navy for the real war. The real war wasn't defending these smaller posts it was defeating Japan. I can't imagine the pressure that the US Navy was under from Dec. 7th 1941 until Midway. For that 6 months it likely would have been massively depressing for lesser men. Sometimes waiting for resources and absorbing deaths and destruction pays off. This is something we should keep in mind in our missions too.

3. The Japanese likely never considered that we were out for blood from Pearl Harbor and peace could be had at the bargaining table. Our position hardened over time as our death toll mounted. By the end of the war - we were fiercer than anything they could have imagined in December '41. To this day I honestly believe that at the end of the war we were not only willing to use the A-Bombs but our entire bomber force to punish the population of Japan day after day and night after night until there was nothing left standing and no one left alive in the home lslands. That said, this punishment which might have gone on with impunity for a year or more as we held off on invasion of the home Islands -
A bloody invasion was not only averted and American casualties mitigated but the Japanese population was preserved too. Of course this is speculation but Bomber Commander Curtis LeMay had convinced Truman to a 2 year aerial campaign, reassignment of 8000 European based planes to be added to the 15,000 American aircraft already in theater, and production 12 more A-bombs (which would take nearly a year to produce after the first 2 were spent). So in reality no matter if the Japanese surrender in Aug. '45 or Aug. '47 they would have surrendered. The difference? About 10-20 million Japanese lives that would be taken to bring down the Emperor. Meaning - we had calculated that - in the mind of the Civilian Japanese Government - One Emperor is worth 20 million of his people - AND perhaps 1/2 million American lives too. When taken in its full context - the A-Bomb attacks were merciful to both sides. These are arguable points of course... I've debated this a couple of times... but when all the facts are known... the  conclusions seem evident.

LeMay - who enjoyed occasional over statement once said - "I was willing to turn Japan into nothing but craters and then bomb those craters every night to make sure no one hid in the craters". You can dismiss this as hyperbole of course, what you can't dismiss is the next 2 A-bombs would have been used on Yokohama and Tokyo. Ground Zero was to be the Emperor's Palace. At that point we'd have likely paused for another week or two and then come back and bombed en mass, with impunity, and without halt until there was nothing left but rubble in these and all other Japanese cities of any size.

I think this dark scenario should be remembered when we consider:
1) What terrible things might have been.
2) In the light of the destruction on the coast of Japan from earthquake and Tsunamis today... how much better we feel to be of the service of human kind and out of the business of annihilation. 
With regards;
ED OBRIEN

JohnKachenmeister

Ed:

As always, your analysis is incisive.  But I would like to add one more observation.  Something I have always found puzzling.

The Japanese ARMY was suicidal in its fanatic, if pointless attacks, and defense to the death of islands.  The Japanese NAVY on the other hand, was not so much.  Almost any deviation or interruption of the plan would cause them to retreat.  At Pearl, they withdrew without launching the third wave of attacks becuse of the absence of American carriers.  They did not want the carriers to catch their fleet at sea, even though they knew that their fleet had both numerical and technical superiority.

At Savo Strait, the Japanese withdrew after sinking 4 Allied cruisers, with the Guadalcanal invasion fleet a sitting duck.

At Leyte Gulf, a small force of escort carriers and destroyers drove back a battle fleet.

There are several other examples where the Jap. Navy failed to exploit initial success because the initial resistance was not figured into the plan.  I just find that odd when compared to the fanatical resistance of the Army.

Can you shed some light on this?
Another former CAP officer

Spaceman3750

Quote from: JohnKachenmeister on March 29, 2011, 11:59:32 AM
Ed:

As always, your analysis is incisive.  But I would like to add one more observation.  Something I have always found puzzling.

The Japanese ARMY was suicidal in its fanatic, if pointless attacks, and defense to the death of islands.  The Japanese NAVY on the other hand, was not so much.  Almost any deviation or interruption of the plan would cause them to retreat.  At Pearl, they withdrew without launching the third wave of attacks becuse of the absence of American carriers.  They did not want the carriers to catch their fleet at sea, even though they knew that their fleet had both numerical and technical superiority.

At Savo Strait, the Japanese withdrew after sinking 4 Allied cruisers, with the Guadalcanal invasion fleet a sitting duck.

At Leyte Gulf, a small force of escort carriers and destroyers drove back a battle fleet.

There are several other examples where the Jap. Navy failed to exploit initial success because the initial resistance was not figured into the plan.  I just find that odd when compared to the fanatical resistance of the Army.

Can you shed some light on this?

This is just a guess because I'm not as intimately familiar with the situation as you guys are, but I would imagine that the issue at play here was that ships are more expensive than people. While there was more infantry waiting in the wings ready to carry out suicidal missions, ships take months or years to build.

Smithsonia

#36
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
I'll take a stab at this although it is more opinion than pure research.

When you are down to your last ships... you go through the analysis of finality. When you are down to your last bullet, your last canteen of water, your last chance - there comes a calm. As we pilots say you are out of airspeed, altitude, and ideas - In this state comes a last stand/last charge mentality. It is not just part of the Bushido code - it is also satisfyingly human. To go out in a blaze of glory.

Short of that when you are coming to the conclusion that there are no more resources and when there are no more remaining rationing protocols or saving what is left for what may come there is the feast - use what is left on yourself, give what you can't use away to others (or destroy it), and go out in a blaze of glory. This goes for depressed men with guns looking for death by cop and the Japanese Navy, Army, Marines, and Air Force as the Pacific war went on.

Survival techniques attempt to stave off this moment though information and skills. The Army wants this moment postponed and therefore spends much time and effort in their history education to forestall this last stand moment. For instance, don't save the last bullet for yourself, the way your luck is going your pistol will jam at your temple. So shoot the enemy with your last round and... use your knife on yourself. The Japanese Army has long been disrespected for jumping to the last fatal charge way too early at Edson Ridge on Guadalcanal. There are a number of similar events through history.

Sorry for the long set up - BUT, after Midway the Japanese Navy bottled up their Ships in the mode of rationing their hope. In the end they spent their Army as they spent their Air Force and Navy in suicidal missions. Kamikaze means the end, not the middle, or the beginning. 

This is one of the ways that historians look at the suicide vest bombers in Israel for instance. In this analysis - you invite the desperate to end it by offering them no hope and no way out. (This analogy isn't perfect of course because often the Marines for instance invited surrender by the Japanese opposing force) However, the fanatics will sacrifice themselves, the despondent will surrender, and the war will end sooner when the end is not near... but INEVITABLE. Lawyers use this tactic everyday.

The more inevitable you can make a thing the faster will come the capitulation of the opposition. We are using this tactic right now in Libya. We are hoping some one will kill Gaddafi so we don't have to. We are building pressure for those around him to excuse this action. In this case - We are making inevitable before we make an end. We are using human imagination in its destructive form.
With regards;
ED OBRIEN

JohnKachenmeister

#37
Ed:

That doesn't quite explain the IJN's behavior during the war when compared to the Army.  Let me illustrate it another way:

Pearl Harbor.  The Jap. Navy withdrew before launching a 3rd attack wave because they did not know the location of the carriers.  Having hit Pearl, and discovering that the carriers were not in port, they assumed that the carriers were at sea looking for them.  Because of the chance that American carriers would find their fleet, they fled.  Now, since destruction of the American carriers was a primary goal of the attack, an aggressive commander having 6 carriers under his command compared to two American carriers, would stay and HOPE the American carriers would engage.  That way, they could be destroyed at sea instead of in port.

Guadalcanal:  The IJN sent a force into the Savo Strait with the mission of attacking and destroying the invasion fleet.  Had the Japanese been successful, most of the invasion supplies and a lot of Marines would have been sunk offshore.  The battle for Guadalcanal would have been lost at great cost to the US.  The IJN engaged a blocking force of 4 Allied cruisers (3 American and 1 Australian) in a night action, and sunk all 4.  There were no forces between the Jap. fleet and the US invasion ships.  But the Japanese withdrew after the engagement with the cruisers because of some light losses.  As I recall, the Jap. lost 1 destroyer and some cruisers suffered damage, but the fleet was still intact and clearly able to attack the lightly-armed transports.  The analogy would be a boxer with a bloody nose throwing in the towel while his opponent was on the mat being counted out by the ref.

Leyte Gulf:  The Japanese brilliantly drew off Halsey's carriers with a diversion, and slipped a huge battle fleet centered around the super-dreadnaught Yamato through the Philippine Islands.  Guarding the Leyte invasion fleet was a force of destroyers, escort destroyers, and "Jeep" carriers.  Showing enormous courage, the captain of the USS Johnston, a DE, turned and attacked the IJN battleship-cruiser force.  Other DD's and DE's joined the fight, and the jeep carriers launched their few planes to join the fight.  The resistance was unexpected by the Japanese, and the mighty Yamato and her fleet withdrew.  The Yamato was never deployed in battle again.  The image of a big tomcat fleeing from a mouse comes to mind.

All the while the Jap. Army was fanatic and suicidal in its resistance, never countenancing retreat, and prefering suicide to capture.

There could be a difference in their training, since the Army was not only suicidal but stupid, opting for frontal assaults to the exclusion of other forms of maneuver.  I'm sure the Bushido Code does not prohibit flanking attacks.

But... I don't know why there was such a profound difference in philospohy. 
Another former CAP officer

Smithsonia

#38
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Kach;
The true Bushido and the perverted propaganda-ized version of the Japanese high command are different by a long shot. The Germans did the same with the myth of Aryan supremacy. Acknowledgment and unmasking of false idols is very much in the HISTORIANS CODE. It is one of the things we are most proud of in our historical analysis.

So lets get back to your questions. The reason all of those moments occurred and Midway too, were - We had their Cipher Codes and they didn't have ours. They were in the dark. We were in rising light. They had to assume the risks were greater than they actually were. We could assume that the risks were worth taking. Hence the saying - Good Intel will beat bigger Armies. Bad intel makes any Army weak. No intel makes every Army subject to rumor. Rumors are always worse than truth. Truth is always ultimately good. BUT THEN - He who wins owns the truth.

This menacing and circular logic is to be remembered by every and all of us, everyday. Never forget the Rumors can defeat Armies and Navies. It did in WW2 and again during the Thet Offensive.

Rumor and rumor control is my job. I have been practicing this job for 45 years. I like my job. I am good at my job. It is quite interesting to watch defeat precede inevitability which also precedes the last straw.

To this point - Al Qeda can not win anything long term because these are lessons they have neither learned nor practiced. These are conclusions that are inevitable and historically true. Suicide is not just morally wrong, it is worthless when provoked by your opposition.

The Japanese Navy shot themselves over and over because they thought bravery was better than smart. They made a bad choice. Plus eventually they also believed their own propaganda.
I wish some times I could go and tell any number of people - "Gosh we made up that propaganda and hoped our enemy would buy it... Now we are really surprised that our own team is buying into it too."

We are going to change some facts that you have been told about CAP history soon. The facts that have been used for 70 years aren't supported by research. The new research isn't finished. However, I trust that when I lay out the new facts all those that will think me wrong because they were told different might pay attention to this thread. Truth is always better than rumor.
With regards;
ED OBRIEN

JohnKachenmeister

Ed:

I don't think the reasons for the IJN withdrawals at critical points in battles is as deep as you suggest.  I think it speaks to the training and leadership of the IJN as opposed to any acceptance of propaganda.

On 6 Dec 1941, the Jap. Navy had not been in battle action since the Russo-Japanese War of 1902.  Additionally, Yamamoto was relying on his younger staff officers to plan engagements, since the older staff officers were wedded to the idea of battleship engagements.  The younger ones had accepted and embraced the concepts of carrier warfare.

The key lesson that had not been learned was: "No plan survives first contact with the enemy."  Once contact was made with US or Allied forces, and the result was a disruption of the carefully-staffed battle plan, nobody seemed able to think on his feet and continue with the intent of the commander.  This may be the result of too-centralized command and control, or an institutionalized fear of decision-making, or simply a staff organization that was too cumbersome to adapt quickly to a changing battlefield situation.

On the other hand, the Army had been engaged in land battles in China, albeit against an unsophisticated Chinese Army.  They had learned that a frontal assault would break a line of resistance through sheer intimidation.  There was need for officers to learn tactics other than the bayonet charge.  When the charge was against a defensive line of United States Marines, the Japanese found, to their chagrin, that a trained and disciplined force is not easily intimidated.  Especially a force armed with an ample number of Browning machine guns.

Just some thoughts.  I don't have the definitive answer.
Another former CAP officer