Unit Continuity of Operations Plan

[O-Rex]

Our units have been tasked to draft a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)

Basically it's a worst-case scenario: Commander & Deputy have been abducted by aliens, and someone out of the loop or further down the succession of command is taking over.

Usually includes rosters, points of contact, etc.

We'd rather not reinvent the wheel, or at least incorporate some "best practices," does anyone out there have one for their unit?

[jeders]

Nope.

Although I am in the process of writing up a number of memo's and OI's for the cadet side of my current squadron as I'll be stepping down as DCC and leaving soon, and no one here knows ALL of the ins and outs but me. However, the best plan to have is to train as many replacements as possible, in my opinion anyway.

[O-Rex]

Nope.

Although I am in the process of writing up a number of memo's and OI's for the cadet side of my current squadron as I'll be stepping down as DCC and leaving soon, and no one here knows ALL of the ins and outs but me. However, the best plan to have is to train as many replacements as possible, in my opinion anyway.

A common malady in the organization is that the leadership "bench" is not that deep, if you know what I mean.  In the military, officers spend their time & energies preparing for and seeking command-our orgainzational culture is a bit different.

Alot of the ''A/B players' have work/family and other committments, and then there are the 'C players' that you cringe when thinking about potentially giving them the reins....

Talking to commanders and old-timers, the challenge is to minimize the gap between the CAP you want, and the CAP you've got.

[Eclipse]

There is no line of succession below deputy commander, so if  the commander and any deputies are "disappeared" the next higher echelon has the responsibility to appoint a new commander, they are not appointed by the unit itself.  There is no reason that sitting staff officers should be expected to expand their roles or authority (in fact they can't) in the absence of a commander at the unit level.

(unless Al Haig is the ESO)   

There is also very little risk to operations in the absence of a commander - if its an extended situation then the responsibilities for approvals, etc., fall to the Wing (or Group) until such time as a new commander is appointed, but in most units ES and cadet activities could continue on their schedule.

I'm not saying that a plan to reduce chaos is a bad idea, as long as the expectations are set correctly.

[O-Rex]

if  the commander and any deputies are "disappeared" the next higher echelon has the responsibility to appoint a new commander, they are not appointed bu the unit itself. 

Funny you should mention it: it's the next higher echelon that's asking for this......

This is being done along with alert/recall rosters and a few other housekeeping issues.

The issue is that storm season is approaching (with the potential of members, commanders included, being isolated and out of the loop) and we have a unit where there is a mass exodus to the north in the summer, with the potential of the unit historian in the succession for command 

(no offense to any unit historians out there. . .  :angel:)

[fireplug]

It's kind of like your family emergency plan, but for the unit.
1- No CC? Notify next higher HQ. Is our radio network in place?
2- HQ unavailable? Where is our rallying point? We don't self-deploy, so how do we get word to our members?
3- Currnet rosters revised as needed, and in hard copy, and in hand of all staff members.
4- etc

[RiverAux]

I think what is really needed is a specific plan for CAP to check on CAP members in an area hit by a major disaster.  Specfic procedures to follow to contact members, check airplanes, CAP building, etc. and just what CAP will do once they determine that certain members have not been reachable through phone, electronic, or other means.  Should we send teams to their homes to try to verify their situation?  Personally, I think yes.  I see the above as CAP taking care of CAP. 

However, it does make some sense to me to have some sort of plan to account for initial actions in a situation where a disaster may take out the leadership.  Those who "take over" obviously wouldn't have any real authority, but there has to be at least someone in charge of making sure CAP equipment is ok at all times.   

[lordmonar]

There is no line of succession below deputy commander, so if  the commander and any deputies are "disappeared" the next higher echelon has the responsibility to appoint a new commander, they are not appointed by the unit itself.  There is no reason that sitting staff officers should be expected to expand their roles or authority (in fact they can't) in the absence of a commander at the unit level.

I disagree....we do not have a formal line of succession...like say the POTUS...but someone always successeds.

Even on Active Duty if only those on Command Orders (Q Order IIRC) are "commanders" yet in an emergency the highest ranking individual automatically takes over.

A COOP for a CAP unit should first just spell out by name or position the expected line of succession. 
Maybe a quick check list of what that person needs to do to formalise the change if necessary.

i.e.  Notify Wing/Group to produce the 2a for appointment.
Inventory accountable property/comm gear/real property/vechicles and sign the appropriate S reports
Sign new TCO signature verification cards
Review and sign financial statment from Wing Banking Program

[RiverAux]

I don't think its about automatic assumption of command authority, but more about ensuring short-term responsibility until command can be transferred.  If we're talking about a major disaster situation where higher HQ has no ability to contact the squadron and the squadron's offiical leadership is MIA or worse, don't we want some plan for who is going to at least temporarily be responsible for trying to ensure safety for squadron members and physical assets? 

[RRLE]

Should we send teams to their homes to try to verify their situation?  Personally, I think yes.  I see the above as CAP taking care of CAP.

The USCG Aux faced this problem in FL during the 2004 Hurricane Season (Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne) and 2005 Hurricane Season (Wilma).

A few warnings.

1. In the event of a real disaster, do not plan on being able to go to a member's house to check on them. The roads may be and probably will be filled with debris. If you are not an official emergency response vehicle you may be barred from going on the roads at certain times or at any time. A plan that is based on a physical check of member's is almost doomed to fail. If a curfew is in effect you had better be home or in-doors before it goes into effect.

2. If you insist on a physical check in your plan, then have the GPS coordiantes of all the member's houses stored on a computer and printed in hard copy. A real disaster may and probably will obliterate street signs and landmarks. Even if you can get on the road you might not be able to find the house.

3. Most of the members who could not be contacted did not have any method other then a phone to contact them. The Aux does have some ability to use Marine VHF on land but most members do not avail themselves of this. Nor would most of them try and implement alternative like CB radio, FRS etc. The Aux now has its own VHF radios but many districts are not even implementing that. Ask yourself very thoughtfully if it is right to expect one member to possibly risk injury to go check on another member who refused to even provide an alternative communication method for himself.

4. After group 3 above the second largest group of non-contactees were those who left town without informing anyone. Again you are putting members at risk to check on members who aren't even home.

Because of 3 and 4 above you really have to think hard about the risk of possibly injury (or worse) to the checkers and the very low probability that anyone will require assistance.

[Ricochet13]

Discussed this very eventuality at last night's squadron meeting with the new Deputy Commander.  Have scheduled this topic as a training subject in two weeks.

To address this issue of "who's in charge?" and capabilities to conduct basic operations, we'll address two issues.   

1) Establish a clear chain through all squadron members based on rank.  This is not to imply that rank indicates expertise, but simply who the next "go to" person will be.  That will be supplemented by standard operating procedures on which all squadron members have trained and certified.

2) Continue training in depth with regards to UDF, MRO, MSA, and MS/MO or MP, in other words, basic ES skills which all members of the squadron are expected to be proficient.

I've oversimplified what we're doing in the squadron, but so far it seems to be working.

[Gunner C]

There shouldn't be a COOP plan per se.  You should have a wing plan for contingencies such as terrorist attack, natural disaster, man-made disaster, etc.  Then each group should write their plan based on the wing plan.  Each squadron then writes theirs based on the group plan.

The plan is written and published.  When event hits, the operations plan becomes an operations ORDER. The 5th paragraph (Command and Signal) is where you address reconstituting the unit.  Paragraph 5a (Command) establishes the chain of command.  If the commander is incapacitated, dead, or abducted by aliens, the person next in the chain takes over.  BTW, this isn't an army thing, this format is used across the entire military - it is joint doctrine.

Unfortunately, CAP doesn't (normally) publish OPLANs/OPORDs in any recognizable format that is particularly useable. This is one of those things that we need to train our folks on across the board.

GC

[Tubacap]

^Having no real mil experience, can you post the proper, or acceptable format for these?

[Eclipse]

If the commander is incapacitated, dead, or abducted by aliens, the person next in the chain takes over. 

The above assumes a great number of things that are not relevant to CAP:

Consistency and competency of officers and enlisted (i.e. a baseline of training for all, respectively).

Grade which not only confers, but requires, lawful authority.

A reason for unit continuity.  This is not Lord of the Flies - CAP members do not find themselves in life-or-death situations where continuity of unit command is necessary - your rocketry day and cadet testing can wait until someone finds the building and the commander.

The only thing close is a Katrina/Rita scenario, and then the ES rules and regs apply, where GTL's, Branch Directors and above take over.  In a situation where you have no GTL's or Branch directors, your unit is likely not capable of independent operations and should stand down to self are until you receive orders from higher HQ, or things settle down.

Wings, groups, & units >should< have call-back rosters and plans for ES contingencies to execute out missions, which has nothing to do with unit command succession.

[Ricochet13]

The plan is written and published.  When event hits, the operations plan becomes an operations ORDER. The 5th paragraph (Command and Signal) is where you address reconstituting the unit.  Paragraph 5a (Command) establishes the chain of command.  If the commander is incapacitated, dead, or abducted by aliens, the person next in the chain takes over.  BTW, this isn't an army thing, this format is used across the entire military - it is joint doctrine.

Unfortunately, CAP doesn't (normally) publish OPLANs/OPORDs in any recognizable format that is particularly useable. This is one of those things that we need to train our folks on across the board.

GC

While this may seem like a minor issue to some, I wholeheartedly support what Gunner C has stated.  One systemic change which should be endorsed in CAP is standardization of OPLAN/OPORDs into a standard "Five Paragraph" format. 

Additionally, CAP needs to move away from over reliance on what, at times, seems an overwhelming number of emails to outline and direct operations.  This is not true in all wings I'm sure, but it is in mine

[Ranger75]

Maryland Wing has moved forward in disseminating wing-wide operational directives utilizing the five-paragraph field order format.  The Wing maintains a library of standing plans providing the operational framework for a range of potential missions.  Recently, Maryland Wing conducted a joint SAREX with West Virginia Wing.  MDWG ground team assets were transported to West Virginia by rotary wing airlift support provided by the MDARNG.  Drawing from a standing operation plan addressing how the Wing would provide mutual ES support to a neighboring wing, an implementing operation order and accompanying annexes were prepared.  I have attached copies of both  the plan and order to serve as one example of the direction that Gunner is suggesting we should be heading. 

[Ranger75]

A second attempt at attaching the referenced documents

[Ranger75]

Final attachment

[Ranger75]

OK, it's late at night and I'm having difficulty keeping my attachments straight.  Hopefully, this time I've attached the OPLAN.

[Gunner C]

OK, it's late at night and I'm having difficulty keeping my attachments straight.  Hopefully, this time I've attached the OPLAN.

That's the best I've seen in CAP.  You've still got a ways to go, but it is MILES ahead of the rest of the force.

GC

[Ranger75]

Hawkeye  --  In your post you mention "a ways to go."  In implementing this order process, I have come across resistance from those unfamiliar with the format, stating a preference for a more informal e-mail dissemination of information.  I would welcome constructive comment on how to adapt the format to a volunteer organization, one where a significant percentage of the membership lacks exposure to the format and terminology from prior military experience.  A reply or PM, as you deem appropriate, would be welcomed.  --  Jim

[ZigZag911]

Since this is likely to occur only in a disaster (natural or man made), wouldn't it make sense to establish, within CAP across the board, that once "command echelon" personnel are unavailable (commander, vice or deputy/deputies, chief of staff), command logically should devolve to ops officer, followed by ES officer.

Beyond that (and realize in most units you'll have run through 4 or 5 people by this point), the next recourse should be 'senior officer present for duty and otherwise eligible for command" (i.e., can't be a chaplain)

[Eclipse]

Since this is likely to occur only in a disaster (natural or man made), wouldn't it make sense to establish, within CAP across the board, that once "command echelon" personnel are unavailable (commander, vice or deputy/deputies, chief of staff), command logically should devolve to ops officer, followed by ES officer.

Beyond that (and realize in most units you'll have run through 4 or 5 people by this point), the next recourse should be 'senior officer present for duty and otherwise eligible for command" (i.e., can't be a chaplain)

Define "senior officer".

This devolves quickly into a fist fight between the 1st Lt recent military GBD and the 20-year Lt. Col. who doesn't do ES.

No continuity is required for the unit activities and ES has its own, seperate chain and command structure.

[Ricochet13]

No continuity is required for the unit activities and ES has its own, seperate chain and command structure.

As I see it, one of the problems of CAP.  Everyone seems to want to do their own thing.  In my unit I command.  There is not a "separate chain and command structure".  ES activities are part of unit activities.

[Eclipse]

As I see it, one of the problems of CAP.  Everyone seems to want to do their own thing.  In my unit I command.  There is not a "separate chain and command structure".  ES activities are part of unit activities.

This is a common misconception with unit CC's and one that causes plenty of arguments.

A unit CC has no special mojo regarding ES operations.  You may well be the "Person In Charge" of local training activities (i.e. setup the hots, cots, and bathrooms), but unless you, by coincidence, happen to be a branch director or higher, will have no authority over an ES operation even if its using your building, resources, and people.

When they are in the mission, they report to whomever they report to, not you.  This specific issue was cited as a problem during Katrina operations - members who didn't like the taskings and directions they were being given calling home to their Wing CC who in turn was trying to influence and direct operations remotely.  They were sent home.

In an ES capacity, a Wing CC may well take directives from a 1st Lt who is an IC. 

[mikeylikey]

As I see it, one of the problems of CAP.  Everyone seems to want to do their own thing.  In my unit I command.  There is not a "separate chain and command structure".  ES activities are part of unit activities.

This is a common misconception with unit CC's and one that causes plenty of arguments.

A unit CC has no special mojo regarding ES operations.  You may well be the "Person In Charge" of local training activities (i.e. setup the hots, cots, and bathrooms), but unless you, by coincidence, happen to be a branch director or higher, will have no authority over an ES operation even if its using your building, resources, and people.

When they are in the mission, they report to whomever they report to, not you.  This specific issue was cited as a problem during Katrina operations - members who didn't like the taskings and directions they were being given calling home to their Wing CC who in turn was trying to influence and direct operations remotely.  They were sent home.

In an ES capacity, a Wing CC may well take directives from a 1st Lt who is an IC. 

PAWG Rangers......but I digress.....

[Gunner C]

Hawkeye  --  In your post you mention "a ways to go."  In implementing this order process, I have come across resistance from those unfamiliar with the format, stating a preference for a more informal e-mail dissemination of information.  I would welcome constructive comment on how to adapt the format to a volunteer organization, one where a significant percentage of the membership lacks exposure to the format and terminology from prior military experience.  A reply or PM, as you deem appropriate, would be welcomed.  --  Jim

I'd be happy to.

Gunner

[Ricochet13]

I knew this would get responses! 

First off, we're not PAWG (reference to Hawk Mtn).  We are training all members of the squadron to "deploy" to a mission as a "resource" which has a more formally trained working relationship and depth of skills sets.

Second, why would CAP want to deploy as individuals when a trained cadre of personnel was available?  The squadron is ready to be tasked by the wing CC or anyone else for a mission and provide more than "one-sies and two-sies" to work a mission.  When we report to a mission we have both an understanding and expectation that members of the squadron are working for the IC, no matter what their rank.  We are "supporting" to "supported".

Third, I would agree there are "common misconceptions" as stated:  "This is a common misconception with unit CC's and one that causes plenty of arguments."  It causes plenty of arguments because staff doesn't always understand they don't command, they only carry out the direction (orders?) of the wing CC.  Just because "we've always done it this way" in CAP (and I'm not sure it has always been done this way) doesn't mean it's the best method.  The only person who does "command" at a mission is the IC.

Fourth, this is the process we've been operating on for almost 9 months now.  The squadron has successfully participated in 1 actual, 1 ELT, and three multi-squadron practice missions in that time.  The last one two days ago with a 75% participation rate.   The squadron will be deploying in support of the wing DC in three weeks for a mission being supported by communications.  Members of the squadron are involved, they're sensing a spirit of camaraderie, and certainly aren't feeling like "cash cows" paying dues so others get to play.

Finally, we're instilling a way of thinking that says "give us a mission", we'll carry it out.  Would never expect or even consider "calling home to Daddy" to get a more favorable mission assignment.  It's astonishing to think anyone would have done that, given the reference to Katrina!   

[mikeylikey]

First off, we're not PAWG (reference to Hawk Mtn).  We are training all members of the squadron to "deploy" to a mission as a "resource" which has a more formally trained working relationship and depth of skills sets.

You misunderstood my post, thats my fault. Sorry.  I was making reference to who "called home to Daddy" to get better assignments.  I was there when the calls came and went from PAWG Ranger teams to get better assignments.  It can all be read about in the After Actions published after Katrina.

Heck, PAWG couldn't even send properly uniformed members.......and we won't even get into what the Rangers "took home" from their deployment.  Cause taking 150 cases of MRE's to replace the 15 you took down is shameful not only to the Rangers but to every member of PAWG.   

[Gunner C]

Hawkeye  --  In your post you mention "a ways to go."  In implementing this order process, I have come across resistance from those unfamiliar with the format, stating a preference for a more informal e-mail dissemination of information.  I would welcome constructive comment on how to adapt the format to a volunteer organization, one where a significant percentage of the membership lacks exposure to the format and terminology from prior military experience.  A reply or PM, as you deem appropriate, would be welcomed.  --  Jim

I worked on the rewrite of the OPORD for about 4 hours today.  I'm about done but won't be able to work on it again until Friday.  I could see the direction that the A-5 was going, but things weren't always in the right place.  I haven't done too many of these lately, but I did lots of them while on active duty (I was an ops officer and SF has one of the best operations schools in the military so it was beaten into my poor little brain).

I think that with most of the changes I've made, I've made it easier to see the general direction of the order with the meat in annexes and appendices.  That's always a balancing act.  So when I'm finished, see what you think of it.  YMMV

GC

[Ricochet13]

First off, we're not PAWG (reference to Hawk Mtn).  We are training all members of the squadron to "deploy" to a mission as a "resource" which has a more formally trained working relationship and depth of skills sets.

You misunderstood my post, thats my fault. Sorry.  I was making reference to who "called home to Daddy" to get better assignments.  I was there when the calls came and went from PAWG Ranger teams to get better assignments.  It can all be read about in the After Actions published after Katrina.

No problem Mikey.  I looked back and made an over generalization myself.  I am convinced that the approach we've taken with the squadron is a positive one in terms of what can be considered two basic principles:  1) Accomplish your assigned mission, and 2) Take care of your people who are accomplishing your assigned mission.  In another 9 months time the new members who join and the retention of present members will indicate if our approach is valid. 

That having been said, I welcome constructive criticism.  It helps me enunciate the overall concept much better, and there have already been "discussions" with more established elements in the wing regarding this concept.  Don't get me wrong, everyone is trying hard no matter what their approach.  I am fortunate to have met many fine people in CAP, even if we don't always agree on how to proceed.

I might add, along the lines of the military "Five Paragraph Field Order" format being discussed here, this is exactly what we use, supplemented by FRAGORDERS as necessary.  I'm a little rusty at writing them, but it's all coming back to me.

[Ranger75]

Gunner  --  PM sent  --  Jim

[SAR-EMT1]

Interesting thread...

Two things
1) Request a PM of a CAP- OPORD/ OPPLAN format

2) Request PM of Katrina AAR detailing aforementioned belly-aching

Danke

[Ranger75]

--  There is no specific CAP order format.  Rather, units and individuals have adopted the five paragraph order format that serves as the standard among the U.S. armed forces.  In the chain above, you'll find where this format was utilized in the production on a wing-level operation plan and implementing operation order.  Also, I have attached an annotated operation order distributed to the group headquarters in Maryland Wing to serve as a template for a typical group SAREX.  Perhaps the best reference for those unfamiliar with the order development process is the U.S. Army's Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production.  The manual can be found on the web. 

--  The Katrina AAR can be found in the archives at http://capblog.typepad.com/capblog/emergency_services/index.html

[ZigZag911]

In major mission situations -- large natural disasters, REDCAP, etc -- it is not uncommon to mobilize one or more squadrons to report with specific ES resources (personnel, vehicles, comm gear)

"Continuity of operations" in this instance would seem to refer to who takes charge of that squadron...who is the officer alerted, who issues intructions to staff and members.

When I said "senior officer present" I meant the ranking officer -- it is my firm conviction that all officers should complete GES as part of level 1, and that to hold major or above one should be briefed on what to do in the sort of situation we're discussing here....and should be ready and willing to do it (we're talking about activating assets, not leading a hazardous mission for Special Forces!)

[Eclipse]

I'd be curious as to where "units" are being deployed as a unit - that may have been the SOP BITD, but it certainly isn't anymore.

There is no such thing as "ranking officer" in CAP when you are talking about ES operations - the command chain is based on qualifications and ratings, not grade.

[Smithsonia]

In the military you tell your boss who should handle things if everything goes awry. If you're a commander in the field in Harms Way... Your boss is going to ask you for a list. Your boss is going to want to know why you think this person or tha person is next in line. In a certain way this is a test: Your character (jealous?) the unit operation/performance (has the unit been trained to know what to do when everybody goes down) and the bosses tribal or social knowledge (is there a commander that he didn't know about and wasn't being mentored but is a natural?)

Somebody, in an earlier message said it could get down to the Squadron Historian. Historians that were commanders include Winston Churchill. He wrote the History of the British (People or Empire) I can't remember which, right now. BUT, at least we historians got one good shot at it.
With regards;
ED OBRIEN

[ZigZag911]

Once personnel are instructed to report to a mission, the ICS chain of command.

In an ordinary ELT mission, SAREX/SAREVAL, IC or PSC will undoubtedly identify and mobilize desired personnel.

I thought, however, we are talking about a major catastrophe -- in this case, IC/designee is almost certainly going to activate categories of personnel ("get 6 MROs for day shift tomorrow, 2 aircrews, and at least 3 GTs to do house to house checks; also, round up as many shelter management trained people as we can find in to respond to ARC support request").

I guarantee you in a scenario like that PSC and planning team are going to start calling units, not person by person.