Flying Safety briefings -- Are we at the point of diminishing returns?

[RiverAux]

Overall, I very much like CAP's emphasis on flying safety and I think that it is obvious that all the varioius requirements we have for safety (annual form 5s, briefings, inspections), etc. have had an impact. 

The overall general aviation accident rate has been hovering at 6-7 accidents per 100,000 flying hours for about a decade while CAP's accident rate was 3.87 in FY07 and 2.84 in FY08, which is typical of what we've been seeing over about that same period (I do wish CAP had our safety statistics available online). 

However, while our accident rate is only about half that of general aviation (which we should trumpet like we do), don't you think that with all our empahsis on safety and all the various programs that have been implemented, it should be much, much better if what we were doing was really that effective? 

I think its clear that adding more requirements related to safety briefings are unlikely to make any dramatic difference to the program.   Does anyone think that more safety briefings will cut our accident rate significantly?

In looking at the Sentinel over the years, most of the aircraft accidents are minor and look to be the result of simple carelessness that aren't really going to be addressed by general safety briefings.  That being said, I think the ground handling video is probably worthwhile as so many of our incidents and accidents come from careless ground handling.  So, if we have a specific trend that has become apparent, we should develop some specific training to address it and make sure it gets implemented.

But, adding safety briefings in every single CAP activity that seem to have devolved into briefings about all sorts of safety issues that aren't really relevant to your CAP life very much is heading in the wrong direction -- increasing requirements with little return. 

[NIN]

You can only be so safe.

I jump out of planes for a hobby.  As thrilling as that sounds, at its core its really about risk analysis & mitigation.  (yeah, hit the snooze button now, right?)  But we don't wrap it like that.  We look out for one another ("everybody is a safety officer"), we coach and mentor the folks who are in a place to make poor decisions ("a training program for low-timers"), and we implement risk controls to ensure that the folks who are potentially in a position to make "more poor decisions" are presented with appropriate safety measures to make them "old" skydivers instead of "bold" skydivers, and they can then go on to make "more informed poor decisions." 

We do a "safety day" once a year.  Its suggested by the USPA, but in no way mandated.  Every USPA group member DZ is encouraged to run one.   This year at ours, I did a presentation on spotting, exit order and freefall separation.  I printed off 70 copies of my presentation as handouts, knowing that if I made my presentation too long, it would be total snoozer. (I was also limited to 10-15 minutes, so I knew that the majority of the learning would occur based on the hand out and that my talk would only serve to pique their interest and encourage further examination and learning) 

I should have printed 100 or more copies instead of 70.  The community center was jammed.  Strictly voluntary, too.  We had at LEAST 100 people in the room. Hell, I didn't know we had that many people who jumped at this DZ.  It was *great*.  But we made safety interesting and fun, kept it short, and drove the hell on.

Now, the accident rates in skydiving have declined, mostly, for the last 10 years.  USPA's safety day has been around for about the last 10 years.  Coincidence?  I think not.   But we're now to the point, or pretty close to it, where additional "safety talk" is not going to bring the accident rate down much further, especially as the annual estimated number of jumps and participants increases.   

At my DZ, we mandate certain safety things for certain people. If you have an A-license (you're a new jumper), you have to jump a rig with a reserve static line, an automatic activation device on the reserve, and a hard helmet.  We've mitigated some of the risk factors for low-timers there.   The USPA already mandates RSLs, AADs and hard helmets for students, along with some other things, due to risk factors.    If you're a wingsuiter (and genetically pre-disposed to landing someplace other than on the DZ), you carry your cell phone so we can find your happy butt.   The wingsuit guys won't train anybody in wingsuiting until they get to 200 jumps.  We keep an eye on the low time guys and help them buy gear that's appropriate to their skill level, and we ground the guys who do stupid things until they get some retraining or they figure out what the hell they're doing.  We don't call it "risk analysis and mitigation," we call it "survival skills," or at the very least, we couch it in those terms so people's eyes don't glaze over.

Remember: There is just a certain percentage of people who are predisposed to do stupid things, and there is just a certain percentage of "fecal matter happens".  So you do what you can to reduce their risk and move on. Otherwise, you wrap people in bubble wrap and foam and never go anywhere, never do anything,  never take your planes out of the chocks and never drive your vans.

An actuary or someone with experience in that area could probably explain the "stuff happens" factors much better than I.

EDIT: Speaking toward the Sentinel's data, I would tend to agree: most of our incidents are minor.  I mean this as no offense to the memory of Ed Lewis and Dion De Camp, but two highly experienced aviators clipping a mountain in the dark with an airplane that is supposedly equipped to give a maximum amount of situational awareness probably falls into the "there was not much risk mitigation could have done there" category. (ie. the "stuff happens" area).  You can be doing everything right, even, and something utterly out of anybody's control just fails.  Not much you can do about that.

[Gunner C]

I see a couple of things here.  I like NIN's skydiving comparison.  I was a freefaller, too, back in the 70s-90s.  I've seen operations that were incredibly safe and those that weren't so much.  I've had friends who were HALO instructors who frapped and I've seen students with <100 jumps get hurt.

The first thing that has changed is the equipment.  It is incredibly safe, since the community is using ram air parachutes rather than primarily rounds.  They have a low malfunction rate.  Throw in ram air reserves, and the malfunction rate goes down exponentially.  The more you use the equipment, the safer is becomes.  We used to fly relative work formations and tried to do it with the same folks as much as possible.  When a new person would fly a formation with us, we'd back off the complexity a bit to let them get up to speed.  It took a few jumps, but it was worth it - fewer freefall collisions, fewer busted formations, fewer canopies opening dangerously close to each other.

The second part is the safety awareness.  Most everyone is much more conscious of safety, minimums, etc.  Heck, I saw Bill Daws, the highest jump total in the western hemisphere, cut away from a canopy collision under 200' AGL.  He was so low, we heard his rings disengage and the stowing bands snap as his reserve deployed.  He had about 5 seconds under canopy.  I don't think people do that any more.

How does this relate to CAP?  I think that the safety culture is getting into everything we do.  We don't take unnecessary chances, we follow the rules, everyone looks out for everyone else.  Folks aren't reluctant to tell the pilot to land the airplane if things don't look right or if there's a safety hazard.  I've done it and I'm sure that most of you would do it, too.  Just because someone is old and crusty, it doesn't mean that they're going to be old, crusty, and safe.

I don't think the key to reducing accidents is having more safety meetings.  We're probably about right.  The missing link is more training.  The more you fly, the more you fly with the same crew, the more you fly with the same crew doing the same search patterns, the safer CAP will be.

[RiverAux]

The missing link is more training.  The more you fly, the more you fly with the same crew, the more you fly with the same crew doing the same search patterns, the safer CAP will be.

That is so very true.   

The thing is, adding more safety meeting costs CAP and/or the AF no dollars (but perhaps more disgruntled members), while actual training costs money.