CAP and the Battle of the Atlantic

[RiverAux]

In another thread my good friend Kach made these statements:

Hap Arnold is as much a part of OUR heritage as he is part of the Air Force's.  Hap Arnold's decision to arm CAP planes was the key command decision in winning the battle on the coasts, and also was the decision that brought us into the Air Force as an auxiliary. Were it not for that decision, we probably would not exist as an organization today.

As it was, CAP planes simply overwhelmed the U-Boats, and forced them to withdraw beyond our range.  That meant they could not attack at heavy ship traffic points near our ports, and made the convoy tactics succesful.

CAP won the battle along the Atlantic and Gulf casts, and helped win the Battle of the Atlantic.

Actually, CAP is the force that turned the battle along the coasts.

We did not fly armed patrols until, I think, April of 1943.  By July the U-Boats were not anywhere along the coasts.  They had moved out to sea, and CAP planes were re-directed to other missions.

CAP attacked 57 subs, and sank two.  This is impressive only of one considers that we only were in the battle as an armed participant for about 3 months, the last month of which we had basicly no enemy contact, since they had already pulled out of range.  That means there were 57 attacks and 2 sinkings (known) in about 2 months.  That's an attack on a U-Boat, somewhere, every day, on average.

That is a tempo of operations that the U-Boat commanders had not eperienced.  The reason for this success was simply numbers.  We had hundreds of little planes, but only a handful of big warbirds.  When the little planes could succesfully attack, the U-Boats had to withdraw out of range.

In order to avoid thread drift, I thought I'd respond here.

I don't dispute that CAP probably did some serious harrassment of the uboats but to say we won it does a great disservice to quite a few other folks and I don't think is really supported by the facts. 

To say that because CAP was conducting patrols and that attacks diminished does not mean that CAP's patrols caused that change.  One might just as easily point out that the CG Aux had hundreds of small boats out on patrol during this period so obviously they were the ones responsible for the decline in u-boat attacks. 

This was an effort involving all the military services and CAP and the CG Aux.  I've read a few histories of the Atlantic battle and have at least checked the indexes of just about every other one I've ever seen.   And except for a few of the official histories done right after the war, CAP hardly receives more than passing notice and I'm not aware of any that go anywhere near as far as Kach in claiming credit for CAP. 

As to the specifics in regards to number of actual attacks made, I tentatively accept them but as someone who has done a lot of historical research and writing, I'd really like to see some original documentation to back that figure up, but this is probably no longer easily done.  Of couse, there has been quite a lot of discussion over the years about the subs sunk claims.  I'm not sure anyone has yet matched up a specific attack by a CAP plane on a specific date with a specific (meaning we know the name/number of that sub) sub that was sunk.

[JohnKachenmeister]

My research is all from secondary sources.

And, I did not intend to diminish the participation of any force in the Battle of the Atlantic.  I did want to emphasize that the Germans were forced to abandon coastal raids soon after Arnold applied the new tactic of using the CAP planes as combat assets.  That decision is what appears to have turned the battle in our favor.

Consider:

Prior to CAP being an armed asset of the Army Air Corps, we were an unarmed asset of Civil Defense, limited to observing and reporting enemy activity.

There were several incidents of U-Boats being spotted, but no combat forces were available to attack the enemy.  One of those incidents took place off Cape Canaveral, Florida.  This incident is of note because the CAP pilot was a former Army aviator, who personally knew Hap Arnold.  The CAP pilot was angry and frustrated enough to invest in a then-costly long distance phone call to vent to General Arnold.

Arnold ordered CAP armed.  This entailed designing weapons racks for the little planes, and designing a uniform for the CAP.  As an asset of Civil Defense, CAP did not wear uniforms.  As a combat asset, a uniform would be required, or a shot-down aircrewman could be declared an "Unlawful Combatant."  The Germans did not send such people to a tropical paradise.  They shot them as partisans on the spot.

The bomb racks and uniforms were ready in April, 1943.  CAP became an Air Corps Auxiliary then, and began flying armed patrols.

The CAP pilots attacked 57 submarines and sank two, at least.  By July, 1943, it was realized by the lack of enemy contact (no subs spotted, no ships attacked) that the Germans were now operating farther off shore, beyond the range of the CAP planes.  CAP stood down, and was re-directed to other missions.  The Germans did not return to the coasts.

By forcing the U-Boats farther out to sea, the Allied ships had time to form escorted convoys.  The tactic of sinking a ship as it left port was quite productive for the Germans.  Escorted convoys eventually resulted in the defeat of the U-Boat campaign.  In fact, U-Boat crews suffered about 80 percent casualties overall.  This is the highest casualty rate for any class of combatant in World War II.

It took a few months of having hundreds (instead of scores) of armed planes hunting down U-Boats before Admiral Doenitz pulled them off the coast.  He would have been aware of the increased tempo of attacks, and realized that the danger to his force was now unacceptably high.

It is absolutely NOT hyperbole to say that CAP was the first American irregular force to drive a foreign enemy from our shores since the War of 1812. 

[RiverAux]

I'm not sure where this myth of us not having uniforms until we were taken over by the War Dept came from.  We had military ranks from the very beginning of our organization and according to Flying Minute Men had the uniform issue sorted out within the first 6 months of our existence. 

As too the uboat attacks they had fallen off significantly by the time CAP had bombs to drop on them.   

You've got to remember that the worst of the uboat attacks were occurring during the early part of the war in part due to the fact that we hadn't really implemented a lot of defensive tactics for merchant shipping.  Coastal blackouts weren't in place everywhere so it would have been very easy pickings near shore early on whether or not CAP was around. 

[♠SARKID♠]

Has everyone forgotten the the conviction of the German Admiral Doenitz, commander of the German navy?  He was quoted as saying that he would have won "had it not been for those [darn]ed little red and yellow planes."

[JohnKachenmeister]

Has everyone forgotten the the conviction of the German Admiral Doenitz, commander of the German navy?  He was quoted as saying that he would have won "had it not been for those [darn]ed little red and yellow planes."

Was that Doenitz?  The books on CAP attribute it to a "German Submarine Commander," but do not name Adm. Doenitz.  That's why I didn't include that quote in my brief explanation, since I don't know if it is true or some kind of "Urban legend."

[RiverAux]

I think we're in agreement on this one Kach.  I had held back for the same reason.  I'd like to see the original documentation for that quote as well. 

[JohnKachenmeister]

From  "Jeeps In the Sky, The Story of the Light Plane"  by Lt. Col. Andrew TenEyck, published in 1946:

"Although the victory against the submarine was a joint operation of the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and Civil Air Patrol, it is a fact that U-Boats disappeared in direct proportion to the spread of CAP operations."

Later, same source:

"The Berlin radio, commenting on the dwindling effectiveness of its undersea campaign, complained of the unexpected appearance of armed civilian aircraft as the MAIN HAZARD WHICH FORCES THE U-BOATS OUT OF THE COASTAL WATERS"  (Empasis mine)

In his memoirs, "Global Missions," Hap Arnold recalled his conversation with Gill Robb Wilson after the Cape Canaveral submarine incident  (which occurred in mid-May, 1942) and Arnold asked Wilson if "Pilots having no military status and in civilian clothes would object to carrying bombs?"

This recollection would seem to indicate that as of May, 1942, no uniforms had been issued or obtained by CAP.  We know that subsequent to this conversation a decision was made to place CAP under the Air Corps as an auxiliary, and to have them wear a modified Air Corps uniform.

History is fun.  I can't figure out why kids hate it in school!

[pixelwonk]

Has everyone forgotten the the conviction of the German Admiral Doenitz, commander of the German navy?  He was quoted as saying that he would have won "had it not been for those [darn]ed little red and yellow planes."

Was that Doenitz?  The books on CAP attribute it to a "German Submarine Commander," but do not name Adm. Doenitz.  That's why I didn't include that quote in my brief explanation, since I don't know if it is true or some kind of "Urban legend."

It was Unterseebootkrieghapsturmkommanderung Donutz.  Everybody knows that.  Gosh!

Seriously though, in looking for a record of subs known to be sunk by American Forces off the Atlantic Coast, I found this site, which seems to be pretty comprehensive: http://uboat.net/fates/losses/
Haven't gone through them all yet, but it does break it down by year and type of sinking. (aircraft, vessel or both)

[RiverAux]

I wonder why you think CAP members were using military ranks and titles from the very beginning of the organization and were not wearing uniforms? 

We had been flying coastal patrols for almost a year before we were armed and transferred over to the Army.  To quote again from Flying Minute Men, p. 77 "The uniform remained the same..." after the changeover. 

[RiverAux]

On a related issue, a fellow over on the CG Aux board at military.com says that he has evidence that CG Aux members flew anti-submarine patrols during WWII as well.  I've never seen any evidence of this and given the severe restrictions on private flying (other than CAP) during most of the war, don't see how it would have been possible.

Has anyone here come across anything that indicates this took place?

[Skyray]

River,

George Datz just posted a humorous account of a CAP plane that mistook a marsh in Calcasieu Parish for a grass field and crashed.  The Coast Guard responded, and the Coast Guard Auxiliary apprehended them.  It was messed up, even way back there at the beginning.

[JohnKachenmeister]

I wonder why you think CAP members were using military ranks and titles from the very beginning of the organization and were not wearing uniforms? 

We had been flying coastal patrols for almost a year before we were armed and transferred over to the Army.  To quote again from Flying Minute Men, p. 77 "The uniform remained the same..." after the changeover. 

Other than the quote from Arnold's memoirs, and the fact that MOST Civil Defense volunteers were identified only by a brassard, I have no evidence that CAP was flying in civilian clothes as of May, 1942.

There are a couple of possibilities to consider:

1.  Uniforms are easier to design and issue than bomb racks for light aircraft.  It is possible that, once the decision was made to issue the modified Air Corps uniform to CAP members, that wear of the uniform was either required or authorized prior to the transfer of CAP to the Army Air Corps.

2.  There still was a Civil Defense in the 1960's.  I recall that during a radiological monitoring exercise  when I was a cadet that the CD volunetters wore a modified Army uniform.  This practice may have started in WWII.

[James Shaw]

I have a great book that explains some of this. It is called the History of the United States Naval Operations in WWII Vol 1 The Battle of the Atlantic. It has 5 pages of good info in our part of this battle. I was written by a Retired Navy Captain Samuel E. Morrison who was a Professor at Harvard University and appointed by Roosevelt to wrote this history. I will scan the pages and include.

My scanner is not cooperating but here is a partail quote!

"There was nothing temporary or token about the CAP in the Eastern and Gulf Frontiers, the CAP flew 64,000 plane hours during the first five months of 1943 as compared with 27,000 plane hours by the Army Air Force, and 72,000 plane hours by the Navy. If comparative statistics were available for 1942, they would show an even greater relative contribution by the amateurs"

Capt. Samuel Morrison USN

[JohnKachenmeister]

I have a great book that explains some of this. It is called the History of the United States Naval Operations in WWII Vol 1 The Battle of the Atlantic. It has 5 pages of good info in our part of this battle. I was written by a Retired Navy Captain Samuel E. Morrison who was a Professor at Harvard University and appointed by Roosevelt to wrote this history. I will scan the pages and include.

My scanner is not cooperating but here is a partail quote!

"There was nothing temporary or token about the CAP in the Eastern and Gulf Frontiers, the CAP flew 64,000 plane hours during the first five months of 1943 as compared with 27,000 plane hours by the Army Air Force, and 72,000 plane hours by the Navy. If comparative statistics were available for 1942, they would show an even greater relative contribution by the amateurs"

Capt. Samuel Morrison USN

Jim:

While we all understand that in terms of hours flown CAP made a significant contribution, the discussion is centered on whether or not CAP operations, especially CAP's armed operations, were decisive.  I contend that, given the time frame between CAP assuming armed patrol duties, and the withdrawal of the U-Boats from the coasts, that CAP was, in fact the deciding factor. 

My positon is supported, I believe, by the fact that a 1946 Berlin radio broadcast gave credit to CAP (although not by name, we were the best-kept secret even then) and by the statistics of 57 attacks and two sinkings in a relatively short time period just prior to the enemy's withdrawal. 

By the way, I cannot find where I learned this fact, but at some point I came to know that the US Coast Guard, in ALL of World War II, sank 3 U-Boats.  For two to be lost in a short period of time, and attacks coming from small aircraft with a suddenly-increasing frequency, I think makes it obvious that CAP was the force that caused Adm. Doenitz to withdraw to the open sea and switch tactics.

[ZigZag911]

On a related issue, a fellow over on the CG Aux board at military.com says that he has evidence that CG Aux members flew anti-submarine patrols during WWII as well.  I've never seen any evidence of this and given the severe restrictions on private flying (other than CAP) during most of the war, don't see how it would have been possible.

Has anyone here come across anything that indicates this took place?

I have not seen it....but since it was a very simple matter for Auxiliarists to be turned into USCG Temporary Reservists, I wonder if we're talking about members of the Auxiliary holding that status?

Would aircraft on such missions have been viewed as 'private'?

Come to think of it, were CAP aircraft considered private when flying coastal patrols?

Isn't that some kind of legal problem if the aircrew were captured?

[RiverAux]

Kach, there are at least two references to CAP wearing uniforms before being turned over to the Army in Flying Minute Men.  I gave you the page number on one of them.  I don't have the book where I am now or would give you the citation for the other.  Additionally, I've got dozens and dozens of references to CAP members being referred to in local newspaper articles by rank starting early in 1942 and I'm sure I could find quite a few others relating to the period before Army control in more accessible outlets.   
I didn't have time to check through From Maine to Mexico, but I am fairly sure there are more than a few accounts of uniform wear that would be traced  to the period before Army control. 

As to the CG Aux flying patrols, I proposed on the other board that it might have been a mix-up with Temporary Reservists doing that job.  The TRs and the Aux were very tightly knit together and confusion between the organizations seem to have been extremely common, even at the time. 

Private flying was prohibited very early on in the war and an exception was given for CAP missions. Maybe there was another exception for CGAux, but I doubt it.   

[JohnKachenmeister]

River:

May, 1942 appears to be the seminal date.

Do you have any examples of CAP members wearing uniforms prior to Arnold making the decision to arm CAP aircraft?

I ask this because I have seen photos of CAP pilots in civilian clothes, which were included in a video "CAP Subchasers in World War II" produced by Drew Stetekee (spelling uncertain). And, in Arnold's memoir, he expressed concern about captured CAP flyers in civilian clothing and without military status if CAP planes carried bombs.

We know that Arnold's conversation with Gill Robb Wilson was shortly after he had learned that a CAP plane had spotted a German submarine off Cape Canaveral, and the sub escaped because no forces could be brought to the scene to attack it.  That incident occurred in mid-May, 1942.

Apparently, the decision to arm CAP with bombs was made by Arnold in May, 1942.  Development of the bomb racks, supplying bombs and depth charges to CAP bases, and administratively transfering CAP to the Army Air Corps as an Auxiliary did not all take place until late April, 1943.

It is likely that a uniform was designed and approved quickly, and CAP pilots began wearing the uniform prior to the date of actual transfer, and prior to the actual arming of the airplanes.  It was a time when everybody wanted to be in uniform.

I did not know that the Coast Guard Auxiliary used any aircraft at all during the Second World War.  I have not looked into that.

None of this changes my central thesis that the decision to arm CAP planes, and the increased attack activity of hundreds of light planes armed with bombs, was the key decision that forced the Germans to withdraw their submarines from the coast.  When the uniform was adopted does not change the fact that CAP entry into the battle as a full combatant changed the outcome of that battle within a few months.

[baronet68]

Homer Hickam, Jr. (of October Skies fame) wrote a book recently about America's U-Boat war in 1942 titled TORPEDO JUNCTION.

I read the entire book and CAP was only mentioned once, on page 167:

In the same volunteer vein, Admiral Andrews made use of the civil air patrol (CAP) for reconnaissance, fire patrol, rescue work and carrier and freighting service.  At first, these light planes flown by private, volunteer pilots were only equipped with two-way radios, but later they would be armed with bombs.  The were to become, in effect, an airforce without "red tape," a group of men and women with boundless energy and enthusiasm who were willing to fly even in weather that kept the military grounded and, while doing so, pay for their own gas, equipment, and repairs.  Their contribution to the U-boat war was to eventually be significant because the U-boat commanders were all deathly afraid of airplanes.  The British, with their secret airborne radar, had managed to surprise many U-boats.  As a result, it was a standing rule throughout the U-boat fleet to dive at the mere sight of an airplane.  With the numbers of planes that CAP was able to put into the air daily, they almost surely disrupted many a U-boat commander's careful plans.

[SStradley]

Homer Hickam, Jr. (of October Skies fame) wrote a book recently about America's U-Boat war in 1942 titled TORPEDO JUNCTION.

I read the entire book and CAP was only mentioned once, on page 167:

In the same volunteer vein, Admiral Andrews made use of the civil air patrol (CAP) for reconnaissance, fire patrol, rescue work and carrier and freighting service.  At first, these light planes flown by private, volunteer pilots were only equipped with two-way radios, but later they would be armed with bombs.  The were to become, in effect, an airforce without "red tape," a group of men and women with boundless energy and enthusiasm who were willing to fly even in weather that kept the military grounded and, while doing so, pay for their own gas, equipment, and repairs.  Their contribution to the U-boat war was to eventually be significant because the U-boat commanders were all deathly afraid of airplanes.  The British, with their secret airborne radar, had managed to surprise many U-boats.  As a result, it was a standing rule throughout the U-boat fleet to dive at the mere sight of an airplane.  With the numbers of planes that CAP was able to put into the air daily, they almost surely disrupted many a U-boat commander's careful plans.

One thing to remember is that the German U-Boat did not operate like we see the US Subs fighting in the WWII movies.  (Sneaking around deep under the sea and popping up to periscope depth to fire a torpedo.) The U-Boat fought from the surfice.  When they submerged they were out of the fight.  If by just flying in the area with a radio to call for backup we could cause the U-Boat to submerge, then we broke their operational tempo.  Once our little plans had their own little stingers, then the risk to the U-Boat commander was to great.  Not only could that little plane report there was a U-Boat operating in this area, but it could drop a couple of bombs and could even sink the sub.  While I would not want to face off with a U-Boat with an 88 AA gun armed with two small bombs at 70 knots, the U-Boat's mission was not to shoot down the CAP's little Gnat of a plane, but to sink ships.  Therefore, the risk reward of fighting with CAP was not there.  So the German commander submerged, and therefore CAP took him out of the fight.

[JohnKachenmeister]

Scott:

Welcome!

You are right.  DE-fensively, CAP planes, even unarmed, were a significant force multiplier.  They not only disrupted attacks, but forced the Germans to stay underwater longer, placing a strain on their batteries, and their crews. 

Once CAP was armed, however, the tactical situation changed.  Now there were suddenly hundreds of aircraft searching for U-Boats which were capable of initiating an attack.  Think about how we would be discussing the battle if, instead of arming CAP, the Navy had brought up a few hundred Dauntless dive bombers and spread them around to coastal bases.  Then over the next few months stepped up attacks on submarines, sinking two.

The Navy didn't have a few hundred Dauntlesses, but CAP was able to have the same effect.

[ZigZag911]

  Private flying was prohibited very early on in the war and an exception was given for CAP missions. Maybe there was another exception for CGAux, but I doubt it.   

My point is that, CG Temporary Reserve or not, such flights could well have been viewed as CG missions rather than instances of private flying.

[Skyray]

  Private flying was prohibited very early on in the war and an exception was given for CAP missions. Maybe there was another exception for CGAux, but I doubt it.   

My point is that, CG Temporary Reserve or not, such flights could well have been viewed as CG missions rather than instances of private flying.

I am sure that it has been fine tuned many times over the ensuing years, but today's auxiliary uses boats and airplanes that are "offered for use". Once accepted, they become Coast Guard assets.  I seem to remember from reading about Chapman that one of the first of these acceptances was Commodore Vanderbilt's yacht.  We were not as litigious back then, so the answer would have been, this is not private flying.

[JohnKachenmeister]

Skyray and Zig:

Both of you are correct.  The issue that was uppermost in the minds of the generals and admirals (Including Arnold, when he had his conversation with Gill Robb Wilson) was not American vs. Military lawsuits, but the reaction of Germans should they capture an American in civilian clothes acting as a combatant.

The Germans did not maintain a prison camp in a pleasant tropical paradise where the prisoners would be fed socially-appropriate meals and handed bibles literally with kid gloves.  The Germans usually shot or hanged partisans on the spot.

The formation of CAP as an "Auxiliary" of the Army Air Corps is another example of Arnold's "Outside-the-box" genius.  He was the most forward-thinking of all of the 5-star generals at the time, and exactly the kind of leader that the Air Force needed at the time.  He was as smart and committed as Mitchell, but easier to get along with. 

[RiverAux]

Kach,I'm away from home until next weekend and don't have access to my materials.  You said earlier that the arming didn't take place until 1943, now you're saying 1942.  Could you check your materials on that.  If it was May, 1942, there very well probably were un-uniformed pilots flying since as I mentioned in an earlier post CAP had not decided on any uniform until about 6 months after we were formed.  But, if it was in 1943 about the time we switched to the Army we had definetely been wearing uniforms for quite some time by then. 

[JohnKachenmeister]

Again, I didn't make myself clear.

The DECISION by Hap Arnold to arm CAP planes was made in May, 1942.  That decision was not immediately executed.  There were manufacturers representatives called in to design bomb racks for the small planes that would be consistent with the weight-and-balance restrictions.  Then these bomb racks had to be manufactured and installed.  This took time.

From the decision to arm CAP, however, sprang a contemporaneous decision to place CAP under the AAF, and to issue uniforms to CAP members. 

I am suggesting that once the decision was made to arm CAP and transfer CAP to the AAF, that the process of issuing uniforms would happen.  Uniforms are easier to design than bomb racks (unless you read OUR uniform threads!)  So that in late April, 1943, when CAP was transfered to the Army, all of the members were in proper uniform for the ceremony. 

Which may well mark the last time that all CAP members were in the same uniform, ever!

After the ceremony, they loaded their bombs, and went hunting!

[RiverAux]

You still haven't explained how your timeline squares with Flying Minute Men which has us in uniform well before we were transfered to the Army.  And don't forget, we were using military ranks and titles from day 1. 

By the way, I've seen a picture of CAP members in formation at one of the coastal patrol bases and there were just about as many uniform combinations being worn then as you might see at a CAP meeting today. 

[JohnKachenmeister]

I was only joking about the uniform combinations.  We've always been hard animals to tame.  During WWII CAP pilots didn't like the eagle pilot wings, since they looked a little like the Luftwaffe's Nazi party badge.  The CAP guys soldered a CAP seal from a set of wings onto an Air Corps observer badge, and created a new CAP insignia!

My hypothesis covers uniforms from the May-June 1942 time frame onward.  As of May, 1942, Arnold was concerned about CAP members being captured in civilian clothes, and voiced that concern to Gill Robb Wilson.  Wilson assured Arnold that, uniforms or no, CAP members were ready to fight.  As we know, a method was found to create an "Auxiliary" to the Army Air Corps, and the pilots did fly in modified Air Corps uniforms, so the issue was resolved.

Prior to May, 1942, when Arnold considered arming the CAP planes, I have no idea what they wore.  Obviously, if Arnold was concerned about CAP pilots flying as combatants in civilian clothes, then SOMEBODY was out there in civvies.

So, my question stands... is there evidence of some kind of uniform between December, 1941 and May, 1942?

[RiverAux]

Well, first clear something up -- Were CAP planes armed in April/May 1942 or April/May 1943 as you said earlier(about the time we were switched to the Army)? 

I've previously posted the information that we didn't have a uniform in CAP for about our first six months (which would have been about May, 1942).  So, no argument there.  But you had been saying that we didn't receive uniforms until we were armed and transfered to the Army.  I know the Army transfer didn't happen until 1943, so the argument that we weren't uniformed until we were part of the Army doesn't hold water.

As I said, I don't have my research materials to check on the arming date. 

[aveighter]

Excuse me!  Possible silly question here!

Why in the name of Honor, Glory is this such a matter of such extreme angst

Holy submarines BatAux, give it a rest.  We have a tremendous history thats pretty well documented, stop trying to minimize everything.  Be proud, its ok!

Want something to obsess over?  How about this...If we don't start doubling defense spending (at a minimum) the young Lt's. aveighter will be flying the same 15 year old platforms at the end of their careers as they are now and the Navy may well be sub 300 ships. Now there is something worthy of obsession.

Keeps me up at night.

[JohnKachenmeister]

I frankly don't know.  This discussion started off as a discussion as to whether or not CAP combat patrols were decisive in the battle against U-Boats along the coasts.  I contend that the timeline of CAP armed patrols, together with the tempo of operations, forced the withdrawal of U-Boats from the coasts. 

Somehow, it degenerated into a discussion of when CAP dressed like soldiers.

[flyguync]

A very good book about CAP and the Atlantic, and gives a history on most of the CP Bases is "From Maine to Mexico".

[RRLE]

I've previously posted the information that we didn't have a uniform in CAP for about our first six months

Have you considered the possibility that the first CAP uniform may have been a Civil Defense uniform?

I submit for your consideration the 1941 Manaul A Handbook for Messengers from the US Office of Civilian Defense. The Manual itself only talks about an armband but look at the uniform shown on the inside front cover. Also see the graphics on pages 32, 33 and 37. The link is http://www.idaillinois.org/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/isl3&CISOPTR=15242&REC=12. Similar manuals are still extant for Air Raid Wardens http://www.idaillinois.org/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/isl3&CISOPTR=10981&REC=8 and a few of the other Citizens Defense Corps groups. Go to http://www.idaillinois.org/ and type 'civil defense' in the search field to find the rest of them.

The Messengers and Air Raid Wardens were just some of the services under the Citizens Defense Corps (see page 29) of the OCD. CAP prior to moving under Army command was also part of the OCD and may have worn the same uniform. And that could be where the current confusion is stemming from.

[JohnKachenmeister]

My mother was an Air Raid Warden back during the war, and never mentioned any uniform.  Everything I've ever seen about Civil Defense during World War II involves only a helmet and armband as identification.  Also, in the document that you linked to, the "Manual for Drill" pages, starting on page 31, appears to show a person in a civilian suit with helmet, armband, and bloused boots.

That being said, I remember in the 60's that CD volunteers wore a modified Army uniform.  I don't know when that practice started.

[West_Coast_Guy]

While I would not want to face off with a U-Boat with an 88 AA gun armed with two small bombs at 70 knots, the U-Boat's mission was not to shoot down the CAP's little Gnat of a plane, but to sink ships.

Speaking of gnat-sized airplanes, I always thought it was cool that an old biplane was essentially responsible for the destruction of the Bismarck. It certainly demonstrated that small planes like CAP's could not be ignored.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairey_Swordfish

[JohnKachenmeister]

The Swordfish was way bigger than most of the CAP planes.

[West_Coast_Guy]

That's certainly true in terms of payload, but the wingspan was only about ten feet more than a cub. It's also true that the Bismarck was a lot larger than any submarine. Since the sinking of the Bismarck occurred in 1941, it could have been on the minds of the sub captains who were said, earlier in the thread, to be very afraid of airplanes.

Wikipedia's article on CAP has some discussion of its anti-submarine activity, and links to other articles.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Air_Patrol

[SarDragon]

The Swordfish was way bigger than most of the CAP planes.

I'd say so:
C-182
Length: 29 ft 0 in (8.8 m)
Wingspan: 36 ft 0 in (11.0 m)
Height: 9 ft 4 in (2.8 m)
Wing area: 174 ft² (16.2 m²)
Empty weight: 1,970 lb (894 kg)

Fairey Swordfish
Length: 35 ft 8 in (10.87 m)
Wingspan: 45 ft 6 in (13.87 m)
Height: 12 ft 4 in (3.76 m)
Wing area: 542 ft² (50.4 m²) (it's a biplane; makes a huge difference)
Empty weight: 4,195 lb (1,900 kg)

[Steve Silverwood]

History is fun.  I can't figure out why kids hate it in school!

It takes a good teacher to make it fun for the kids.  I hated history ("social studies") until 10th grade, when a very good history teacher brought the subject alive for me.  After that, I couldn't get enough of it, and still can't.  (Long-time member of the History Book Club, ravenous patron of the local libraries, and so on.)

//Steve//

[RiverAux]

Okay, I'm back home and have access to my historical materials. 

Flying Minute Men definetely implies that CAP planes began to be armed shortly after the FL incident in May, 1942.  So, Kach and I are on the same page there.

However, in a local newspaper article that I have from mid-April 1942 it was reported that CAP uniforms were now available for purchase ($10 -- approximately $100 in today's dollars) by flying personnel and that the men's uniform was the same as the Army uniform except for "insignia" and that the women were to wear a "semi-military design" (the early TPU?).  So, if CAP members in my little backwater were wearing uniforms in April, 1942, I'm pretty sure that members on Coastal Patrol were in uniform in that time period as well.  So, I think we can put the nail in the coffin of the idea that this was some sort of gradual process that wasn't completed until we were transferred to the Army in the spring of 1943. 

Also, regarding the idea that we weren't armed until we were transferred to the Army.  Flying Minute Men p. 38 talks about 21 attacks made from a FL base and strongly implies that these were made in 1942.  This particular reference isn't conclusive, but overall I very much doubt they waited an entire year to arm our planes and that our sightings/attacks/sinkings were not done in a 3-4 month period near the end of the coastal patrol period since elsewhere in Flying Minute Men it says that there were actually very few sightings in 1943.

[RRLE]

An article in the April 1996, Vol. 79, No. 4   issue of Air Force magazine http://www.afa.org/magazine/valor/0496valor.asp gives a different perspective on why the U-boats dove on sighting any aircraft including a CAP plane. It wasn't the CAP plane per se but what was sure to follow:

German captains soon learned that the appearance of a light plane meant that heavy help was on the way and that a crash dive was in order. As time passed, the combination of CAP and military might drove the submarines further and further from shore with a drastic reduction in US and Allied shipping losses.

None of which diminishes the valor of the CAP pilots, some of which is recounted later in the article.

[NYWG Historian]

At least to the "arming" question....

from the official Base 17 history:

"By the end of the first week in August 1942, the Base began to emerge asa a reality.  Two ships, a Waco (NC 17717) and a Stinson Reliant (NC 15121), had been flown to Mitchel Field for installation of bomb-racks...."

As to the uniform question...according to Col Louisa Morse's Uniforms & Insignia, uniforms were under consideration for a number of months and various versions were approved for wear.  On June 30, 1942, the War Department finaly authorized CAP to wear the standard service uniforms and grades with distinctive US insignia (p6)

from Neprud's Flying Minute Men:

"The CAP uniform evolved during the first six months.  Several early suggestions for garb to be worn by members when on duty (and paid for by themselves) included a blue, single-breasted suit and special brown two-tone ensemble.  In the end, Army-style khakis and OD's--with distinctive CAP markings to distinguish them from the military--were officially authorized by the War Department."

[JohnKachenmeister]

All of the references are undoubtedly accurate, and none of them are in opposition to my central thesis that armed attacks did not occur until CAP was officially transfered to the Army.

1.  The decision to put CAP into modified Army uniforms was made in or near April of 1942.  This would have been subsequent to Arnold's discussion with Wilson about the willingness of CAP volunteers to fight in civilian clothes.  This was of criticl importance in Arnold's mind, since if CAP members had been captured alive acting as combatants in civilian clothes, they would have had no protection under the Geneva Convention.  The Germans, by 1942, had a reputation of dealing with armed partisans very harshly.

2.  The authorization of special insignia for an Army unifrom in August, 1942 is about right, considering when the decision was probably made.

3.  The mix of aircraft types that CAP used was without a doubt a problem for Army aeronautical engineers.  Each type had different weight and balance issues, and a different bomb or depth charge rack would have to be designed and manufactured  for each type of plane.  This had to take time.  Also, the planes had to be ferried to, as we know, Mitchell Field, for installation of the racks.  This would have had to be done in increments, since it would not be a good idea to close a base to take all the planes up at once.  Given the number of planes, this process might not be complete until 1943.

4.  There was a legal issue involved.  As long as CAP was part of Civil Defense, I don't think that they could take armed action against an enemy force.  That is why, together with the scope of the problem of arming hundreds of light planes not originally designed for combat, I do not believe that any attacks by CAP took place until the actual transfer of CAP to the Army.

5.  AFTER the transfer, however, the attacks were frequent, and the level of activity intense.  Arnold's decision to arm CAP effectively put hundreds of combat aircraft out on patrol against the U-Boats, and this increased patrol and attack activity is what forced the U-Boats to retreat from the coasts and change tactics.

[RiverAux]

Final nail in the coffin:

From Maine to Mexico, page 15.  There is an excerpt from a CAP News article (which used as a source a letter about the incident from the WWII CAP national commander written at the time) describing the dropping of a depth charge by a CAP coastal patrol plane on July 11, 1942 by a crew from the Atlantic City, NJ base in which a submarine was at least damaged.

Combining the evidence NY and I have cited it is very clear that CAP members had access to Army uniforms as early as April, 1942 and certainly had them officially authorized and available by mid-1942 and that they were conducting armed patrols as early as early July, 1942, well before the transfer to the Army in April, 1943. 

So, it is very probable that for the first few months of the coastal patrol operation that CAP memberswere not wearing uniformed, but it defies credibility that after everyone else in CAP had uniforms that spring that the coastal patrol people were not wearing them.  I think the burden of proof is on you to show that this was the case. 

Now, I wouldn't doubt that even after CAP planes began to be armed that there were some that were not due to the type of plane and that there probably was a mixture of armed and unarmed planes at the bases throughout their entire service, but there is no evidence that there was any sort of backlog that prevented CAP planes from being armed.

[Tubacap]

So we are credited with two kills during this time period, does anyone have the U numbers of the boats that were sunk and credited?  This is an interesting thread and would like to get down to Rehobeth to see the memorial.  Anyone know where it is on the beach?

[RiverAux]

I don't know if we will ever get to that level of knowledge.  Finding out probable dates of sinkings from the German records is probably possible, but finding specific data on dates & locations when CAP planes performed attacks so as to try to match them would be the hard part.  Except for that find of what appears to be the complete records of one of the Coastal Patrol bases last year, who knows where most of that data is. 

For what its worth, this site http://uboat.net/index.html has extremely detailed information on all WWII uboat losses, including who exactly was responsible for sinking them.  I went through all the losses attributed to aircraft and none were made by CAP.  For comparison, the Australians Air Force sank 29 subs and the Czechoslovakian Air Force sank 3.  Heck, even the Brazlians got 1. 

Now, to go back to the original intent of the tread, some of the data on that site is interesting in that 1,154 uboats were sunk in the war, 250 were sunk solely by aircraft and 37 by aircraft and ships together.  Even if CAP's claim of sinking 1 or 2 is correct it shows that we were only a very tiny part of the war and do not deserve a major claim to fame. 

Did we scare the Germans away?  I don't see how.  The Germans suffered great losses attacking convoys but continued to do it because it was worth the risk. The small deterrent offerred by CAP would not have kept them away from the coasts if they had really wanted to be there.  In my opinion they took advantage of our general unpreparedness and struck near the coasts while they could.  It wasn't our planes operating near shore that kept them from coming back, it was the fact that they would have had to slip by a whole lot of other new defenses to get to that near shore area by mid to late 1942.  It was easier to stay nearer Germany and lie in wait for the convoys to come to them. 

[wingnut]

Gee Bud are you a Kill Joy

" but Did we scare the Germans away?  I don't see how"

Such a statement, remember we provided immense value as recon, and the oil company's were so grateful for helping save thousands of Merchant seaman  OK maybe hundreds. But common sense tells you that a submarine on the surface recharging its batteries is going to dive when an allied (CAP) aircraft appears. One can't tell if its a P-39 or a Waco from one mile. The point is we were a force of hundreds of Airplanes with 2 sets of Mark 4 eyeballs. I believe we did sink at least 2 subs, I would like to find out the lat long and see if they are on the sunken u-boat wreck location.

[JohnKachenmeister]

I don't know if we will ever get to that level of knowledge.  Finding out probable dates of sinkings from the German records is probably possible, but finding specific data on dates & locations when CAP planes performed attacks so as to try to match them would be the hard part.  Except for that find of what appears to be the complete records of one of the Coastal Patrol bases last year, who knows where most of that data is. 

For what its worth, this site http://uboat.net/index.html has extremely detailed information on all WWII uboat losses, including who exactly was responsible for sinking them.  I went through all the losses attributed to aircraft and none were made by CAP.  For comparison, the Australians Air Force sank 29 subs and the Czechoslovakian Air Force sank 3.  Heck, even the Brazlians got 1. 

Now, to go back to the original intent of the tread, some of the data on that site is interesting in that 1,154 uboats were sunk in the war, 250 were sunk solely by aircraft and 37 by aircraft and ships together.  Even if CAP's claim of sinking 1 or 2 is correct it shows that we were only a very tiny part of the war and do not deserve a major claim to fame. 

Did we scare the Germans away?  I don't see how.  The Germans suffered great losses attacking convoys but continued to do it because it was worth the risk. The small deterrent offerred by CAP would not have kept them away from the coasts if they had really wanted to be there.  In my opinion they took advantage of our general unpreparedness and struck near the coasts while they could.  It wasn't our planes operating near shore that kept them from coming back, it was the fact that they would have had to slip by a whole lot of other new defenses to get to that near shore area by mid to late 1942.  It was easier to stay nearer Germany and lie in wait for the convoys to come to them. 

River, for a guy with nautical experience, you sure are willing to sell the CAP short.

There was a reason that the Germans liked raiding the U.S. coast.  The defense against U-Boats on the high seas was the convoy.  A lot of ships protected by some destroyers and sometimes what was called a "Jeep Carrier" or a small aircraft carrier.  These were tough to attack, and forced the Germans to attack in "Wolf Packs."

To attack in a wolf pack, the Germans had to break radio silence to coordinate the attack with other U-Boats.  They felt safe in doing this, since they had confidence in their Enigma coding devices.  They did not know that the British had already captured one, as did the Americans when the U-505 was captured.

It was far easier to attack merchant ships as they left port, before they could form up in convoy. CAP made that task so difficult that the Germans were forced to switch to the wolfpack tactic, and keep their operations out of range of land-based aircraft. 

That increased the casualties suffered by the U-Boats, by forcing them into tactics that were easier to defend against.  In the Army we call that forcing the enemy to fight on our terms and on our terrain. 

CAP is credted with sinking two subs.  The entire US Coast Guard, through the entire war, is credited with three.

I frankly don't understand your fascination with uniforms.  I have several times indicated that a decision was made in or around April, 1942 to have CAP members wear an Army Air Corps uniform with distinctive insignia.  They did not, evidently, wear uniforms prior to the 1942 meeting between Arnold and Wilson, where Arnold asked Wilson if CAP members were willing to bear arms in civilian clothes.

You have documentation of an attack in July, 1942.  That means that the level of intensity of attacks was significantly diminished than would have been the case under my theory. 

But...  Consider this:

CAP made 57 attacks against U-Boats in about 12 months (July 1942-July 1943, the Coastal Patrol ended in August of 1943 for want of targets).  Two subs were sunk during that time.  That still indicates an attack against a U-Boat at a rate of 4.75 attacks per month, or on average, an attack every week.  As additional planes were equipped with bomb racks, the frequency of attacks would have increased over time.

So, my central premise still stands.  CAP was a decisive force in the Coastal Defense phase of the Battle of the Atlantic.  CAP forced the Germans to switch to the riskier tactic of attacking convoys. 

CAP, and by extension, the Air Force, can lay claim to the fact that an irrgular force drove an armed and determined enemy from the shores of the United States, a feat that had not happened since the War of 1812, and has not happened since.

[alamrcn]

Thanks Kach and Aux for the read, I thought the discussion was well worth it!

While the books From Maine to Mexico and Flying Minuteman probably are not 100% accurate, there are also questions and facts that they do not cover. That's what I think was being discused here.

If you two ever want to calaborate on a dissertation tat expounds upon the logistical developement of Civil Air Patrol, that would be fantastic! Perhaps you could get a grant from National HQ? I'm pretty sure the HO Dept has some ching available that isn't being spent on eBay stuff.

- Ace

BTW, there are also several audio and video recordings owned by National HQ of former Patrol Base members telling stories that have never (to my knowledge) been published or used for any purpose.

[RiverAux]

I do not sell CAP short for a minute.  I just contend that there are no facts to back up an assertion that we were a decisive factor in the battle of the Atlantic.  I hold no fascination with uniforms and was just disproving Kach's early assertion that we didn't wear uniforms until we transferred to the Army. 

CAP is credted with sinking two subs. 

By who?  I know we CLAIM to have sunk two subs, but as I pointed out, we may or may not have actually done so.  As far as I am aware, no one has matched a specific CAP attack to the loss of a known German sub. 

So, my central premise still stands.  CAP was a decisive force in the Coastal Defense phase of the Battle of the Atlantic.  CAP forced the Germans to switch to the riskier tactic of attacking convoys. 

Please go ahead and find a reputable historical journal that would accept that as part of an article they would publish.  Given the lack of evidence to back it up, I don't think anyone would touch it with a ten foot pole.  You're just over-reaching. 

[aveighter]

John, your wasting your time.  This has become a pearls before swine discussion. 

Save your pearls.

[RiverAux]

I'm basically happy that we've got the facts regarding plane arming, uniform wear, and the Army takeover clear.  I enjoy being a mythbuster. 

Regarding the idea that CAP was significant in the battle of the Atlantic, we can agree to disagree until some actual evidence is presented. 

[Al Sayre]

I wish I still had my father's scrap books, he commanded the squadron at PB3 in Lantana FL shortly after the war.  I remember seeing some of the newspaper articles about the base and the sub that was sunk off Lantana beach.  If you can search the archives of the Palm Beach Post from '42-'44 (might be available on microfiche at the downtown library in West Palm Beach) you will probably find what you are looking for...

[NYWG Historian]

The Palm Beach Historical Society recently put out a DVD called Puddle Jumpers of Lantana about the Coastal Patrol Base 3.  I just bought my copy last week but haven't been able to view yet.  I would assume as part of their research for the film, they would have some archival materials that would include some documentation.

Here's the link for the video: http://www.historicalsocietypbc.org/publications.asp

I too have looked for concrete evidence of CAP's 2 kills but have been unable to find documentation.  Most of the CP bases don't appear to have published base histories as they were requested to do.

[JohnKachenmeister]

Confounding historical research is the fact that there were sunset dates on records, and the records were destroyed in accordance with the regulations at the time.

Credit for "Kills" is established through intelligence channels.

Also, I went back, because I don't remember claiming that CAP did not wear uniforms until 1943, and I did find an offhand comment that "Bomb racks and uniforms were all ready by 1943."  Sorry about that lack of clarity that led anyone to an erroneous conclusion.

Also, I have been careful to point out that I have never said that CAP was a decisive force in "The Battle of the Atlantic," but rather in the coastal phase of that battle, or as I have alternately described it, the battle along the coast.  CAP made a contribution to the overall battle by denying areas of easy targets to the Germans, but was decisive only in forcing the enemy from the coastal areas.

So... OK, you are watching an old western movie.  The Indians are attacking the wagon train full of settlers.  Suddenly, a bugle blowing "Charge" is heard, and the cavalry rides up.  The Indians run away.  From this, we can conclude:

A.  The marksmanship of the settlers was improving, forcing the Indians to retreat.

B.  The Indians were getting tired of attacking the settlers, and decided to go back and smoke some primo wampum in their wigwam.

C.  The cavalry attack changed the tactical situation, and the Indians fell back.

D.  The Indians returned to their camp to discuss how many additional feathers should be awarded for the attack, the cavalry had nothing to do with this withdrawal. 

I think it is obvious that CAP was a decisive force in the Coastal Battle.  Adding a couple of hundred combat planes changed the tactical situation, and can't be anything BUT a decisive action.

 

[James Shaw]

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King 1941-1945 (kind of hard not to take his words and feelings for truth) Official Reports to the Secretary of the Navy:

May 18th 1943 Admiral King wrote a letter that began - The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet appreciates the valuable contributions rendered by these civilian aircraft in Sea Frontier Operations. He ordered that CP bases be closed and reported as part of the Official War Diary:

**** Enemy Submarines Definitely Damaged or Destroyed 2 ****

Official US Navy Records taken from the book

U-Boat Commanders cursed the persistent presence of what they called the "yellow bees"

Operation Drumbeat by Michael Gannon / The Dramatic Story of Germany's First U-Boat attacks along the American Coast in WWII



Edwin P. Hoyt (Naval Author and Historian)

The civilian effort was far more important than most Americans ever knew. All up and down the East Coast, the inadequecy of military coastal defenses had led to the buildup of coastal patrols manned by civilian air pilots flying their own planes, at their own expense most of the time. They were unpaid volunteers.

U-Boats Offshore When Hitler Struck America

[RiverAux]

Well, I suppose what some of us are looking for is confirmation of CAP kills of specific submarines using records that would not have been available until after the war (the german ones).  Sub kill claims are a little like bomb damage assessments -- you don't know if your immediate after-action assessment was correct until after the war is over and the enemies records are available to you. 

In other words, I'm sure that all the relevant military authorities thought that CAP killed those submarines based on the intelligence available to them at the time of the "kill", but that doesn't mean that a sub was actually sunk, just that everyone thought one was sunk. 

[aveighter]

Major Shaw, I don't know how you can publish those claims and propose we should take them as anything other than wild speculation.

How do we know that the Admirals stateroom wasn't next to the engine room and he was breathing potentially lethal and hallucinatory quantities of diesel fumes while writing those letters and reports???

And how do we know that the good Admiral was not, in actual fact, John Kachenmeisters brother-in-laws cousins uncle, knowing full well that in 50 some years young John would be making wild-eyed claims of honor and glory about some organization of losers and malcontents so he set about creating a plausible historical cover story to save face for ol John to spread around a half century later???

Bet you fancy historical types can't explain that one!  Took the wind right out of your sails, HA! you uppity straight gig-line non belt-oozing over uniform wearing wannabees.

[SarDragon]

Is it time for a lock?

[jimmydeanno]

Well, I suppose what some of us are looking for is confirmation of CAP kills of specific submarines using records that would not have been available until after the war (the german ones).  Sub kill claims are a little like bomb damage assessments -- you don't know if your immediate after-action assessment was correct until after the war is over and the enemies records are available to you. 

In other words, I'm sure that all the relevant military authorities thought that CAP killed those submarines based on the intelligence available to them at the time of the "kill", but that doesn't mean that a sub was actually sunk, just that everyone thought one was sunk. 

Doesn't CAP have "historical documents" that provide a history on this topic?  Here is a blurb right from "History of CAP"  it gives peoples names, and specifically says where and gives details about oil slicks and all...

Quote from: http://level2.cap.gov/documents/u_082503081737.pdf
It was one of these larger planes armed with depth charges that made the first CAP "kill." Captain Johnny Haggins and Major Wynant Farr, flying out of Atlantic City, New Jersey, had just become airborne in a Grumman Widgeon (an amphibian, a plane that can land on land or water) when they received a message from another CAP patrol that "contact" had been made about 25 miles off the coast.

The other patrol was low on fuel and was being forced to return to base, so Haggins and Farr sped to the area, while flying a scant 300 feet above the ocean. When the Haggins-Farr patrol reached the area, no sub was in sight. Very shortly thereafter however, Major Farr spotted the U-boat as it cruised beneath the surface of the waves. After radioing to
shore, and knowing that they could not accurately estimate the depth of the sub, the crew decided to follow the sub until (they hoped) it rose to periscope depth, when they would have a better chance of hitting the sub with their depth charges.

For over three hours they shadowed the U-boat and eventually ran low on fuel. Just before they had to turn back, the U-boat rose back up to periscope depth. Captain Haggins swung the plane around quickly and aligned it with the sub. He then began a gentle dive to 100 feet where he leveled off behind the sub's periscope wake. Major Farr pulled the cable release and the first depth charge plummeted into the water just off the sub's bow.

Seconds later a large water and oil geyser erupted, the explosion literally blowing the sub's forward portion out of the water. Shock waves from the blast rocked the patrol plane.

As the sub sank below the surface, it left a huge oil slick as the target for the second run.
On the second run, the remaining depth charge was dropped squarely in the middle of the oil slick.

After the second geyser had settled, pieces of debris began to float to the surface. The CAP Coastal Patrol's first kill was confirmed!

[RiverAux]

As I said, I don't doubt that the CAP pilots and associated military members were sure they sunk a sub, but there were also plenty of pilots who thought they shot down planes or thought they sunk ships that didn't actually go down.  I don't think they were lying in those case, they just happened to be wrong.

Please tell me exactly which subs CAP sunk.  I provided a link to a page which listed all known German u-boat losses in WWII.  None were listed as being sunk by CAP.  Heck, show me a specific sub that CAP attacked that was listed as missing by the Germans at about the time CAP claimed to have sunk a sub where that one was supposed to be and that will be good enough for me. 

Again, I think it very possible that CAP did actually sink a sub or two, but I just don't think we should claim it unless we've got rock solid date and the name of the sub(s) that we sunk.  Maybe someone has that information, and if so, I'd be extremely happy to see it as I really do want for us to be able to make those claims and have them be true.

[JohnKachenmeister]

Is it time for a lock?

Not just for sarcasm!

Besides... everybody knows that Admiral King never went to sea.

[JohnKachenmeister]

So, River...

You want to challenge the claims that two submarines were sunk, and you demand documentation a full 65 years after the action?

The submarine described in the post above was attacked and sunk at periscope depth.  How could the aircrews have recorded its hull number?  It was under water!

You are beginning to sound like those conspiracy theorists who don't believe that Neil Armstrong went to the moon... that it was all set up by Hollywood.

I am reminded of a scene from an old movie I saw as a cadet, "The Blue Max."  George Peppard beats the bushes looking for the wreckage of a plane he shot down, and never finds it.  He is counselled by his commander that "Unconfirmed by Army means unconfirmed."

The other side of the coin is that "Confirmed" means just that.  65 years later you can confirm a formerly unconfirmed kill, but not challenge a confirmed one simply because you are not satisfied with the level of proof.  That has already gone down in the battle history.

[RRLE]

Again, I think it very possible that CAP did actually sink a sub or two, but I just don't think we should claim it unless we've got rock solid date and the name of the sub(s) that we sunk.

I can't give you the date or the hull number but I can tell you who CAP says sank the first one and where.

According to Introduction to the Civil Air Patrol CAP Pamphlet 50-5 http://level2.cap.gov/documents/u_082503081737.pdf, pdf page 13-14, book page 9 - 10, the U-boat was sunk off Atlantic City, New Jersey by Haggins and Farr.

Now that is the CAP official version. Try checking it out further on the web. I didn't keep the URLs but several writers claim that in checking official records, no U-boat was sunk off Atlantic City. So although you have two names and a location - the fact still is in dispute.

In trying to prove the CAP claim, I ran into another interesting opinion. A German officer is often cited in CAP and other literature and on this thread as crediting CAP with driving the U-boats away. Some even give an exact quote involving 'red and yellow planes'. What the skeptics note is that the name of the German officer is either never given or the supposed source document is not given. Leading many to think the quote itself was made up.

The USCG Aux has a similar problem with some of its WWII exploits. John Tilley, a respected historian, wrote "The United States Coast Guard Auxiliary: A History 1939-1999". It was published by the US Government Printing Office for the Aux's 60th Anniversary. Tilley notes in the footnotes (fn 43, page 173):

Philip Wylie and Lawrence Schwab, "The Battle of Florida," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 216, no. 37, March 11, 1944, p.52 This article seems to be the original source for much of the lore associated with the Coastal Picket Force.

If you go back into the text. The paragraph to which that footnote is attached begins:

Actual encounters with U-boats attained a status in Coast Guard Auxiliary lore similar to sightings of the Loch Ness Monster.

Tilley also notes that the SEP had published in its January 15, 1944 issue (Vol 216, No 29) what he said is probably the only piece of fiction ever published about the Coast Guard Reserve or the Coast Guard Auxiliary. It was "Days of Glory" by Georgess Carousso. Given his skepticism about the sightings maybe he should have said it was the only intentional work of fiction.

[aveighter]

No, Dave,  it is time for men with an intellectual spine to say enough.  Our official historians have given relevant and documented information.  It is sufficient.  This constant need to decry and diminish our history, service, appearance, etc. is disturbing but seems to be a recurring theme.

Here's a thought experiment.  Try applying rivers historical and analytical approach to your own Naval service and unnumbered Mitchell award.

There should be an automatic lock for stupidity being passed off as intellectual inquiry.

[James Shaw]

I have spoken with the individual who has the original logs from Haggins patrol. They state that all of the patrols both prior to and after that day have specific information as to the patrol itself. The dates and times in question for the sinking are marked through as classified! These are the original logs sent to them from Haggins widow!

I personally feel that if these men who had been entrusted with protecting the lives of their fellow citizens say they saw and sunk a U-Boat than I would personally take their word as truth. I cannot in good conscious tell someone that volunteers their time and possibly their lives that they are liars or are being dishonest.

[mikeylikey]

^^  :clap: :clap: :clap:

[RiverAux]

Folks, if you pick just about any battle in history you will find major discrepancies between what one side thought they accomplished and what actually happened according to the records of the other.  One side will claim that they sunk 5 ships based on their best evaluation of their after action reports and after the war you might find out through examination of the enemy's records that they actually only lost 2 ships.  Does that mean the first side was lying or any less valorous?  No, it just means they got a fact wrong. 

So, for example, do the dates on which CAP claims to have sunk a sub match up with German records of when they lost subs? 

Apparently according to the web site I cited earlier, such records seem to be  available.   

[RRLE]

Just remeber:

When the facts don't fit the legend, print the legend.

Who Shot Liberty Valance?

[aveighter]

Folks, if you pick just about any battle in history you will find major discrepancies between what one side thought they accomplished and what actually happened according to the records of the other.  One side will claim that they sunk 5 ships based on their best evaluation of their after action reports and after the war you might find out through examination of the enemy's records that they actually only lost 2 ships.  Does that mean the first side was lying or any less valorous?  No, it just means they got a fact wrong. 

So, for example, do the dates on which CAP claims to have sunk a sub match up with German records of when they lost subs? 

Your right bud.  I think I'll stick with our historians and their records.  You stick with the Nazi enemy records and recollections.  I think our side had a lock on truth and valor in that particular contest.  You seem feverishly intent on giving the Nazi submariners considerably more than a fair shake on these questions.  

Perhaps you could explain that to us?

[RiverAux]

So, I'm being pro-Nazi by wondering if German records confirm the record of a loss of a sub on the same day CAP claims to have sunk one? 

I guess when I'm writing about Civil War battles that I should stick with Union reports even when they overestimate the size of southern forces by 2 or 3 times? 

Using this line of reasoning we can dump our ground team program since when an aircrew thinks they've spotted a wrecked plane, we can pretty much take that as gospel and send everyone home as there is no need to confirm that what they saw was a plane and if it was the plane, that it was the one we were looking for.   

[mikeylikey]

^ right on!  You beat me to it!!

[RRLE]

RiverAux:

You missed a much better example of why both sides of the dispute must be checked since the one you missed involves U-boats and the Americans and British lied while the Germans were proven right, many years later.

The thing you missed was the sinking of the RMS Lusitania on May 7, 1915 by U-20. The Germans insisted all along that the ship was carrying war material and a valid target. The Americans and the Brits denied that and since the Allies won and winners write history that is how it went into the history books. The Americans also used the sinking of the Luitania and the American lives lost on her as a Casus Bellum. It wouldn't be the first time, nor the last, that trumped up evidence would be used to get the US into a war. 

The wreck has been dove on since the 1960s and those dives confirm what the Germans said and what the Brits and Americans lied about - there was munitions, a lot of munitions, on board.

[RiverAux]

Well, that is getting more into propaganda issues rather than true battle damage assessments.  Tokyo Rose was always claiming that Japan sank way more US ships than they actually did.  I'd be willing to guess that the Japanese navy had more conservative (but probably still high) numbers that the public relations folks then dramatically inflated. 

[Cecil DP]

Just remeber:

When the facts don't fit the legend, print the legend.

Who Shot Liberty Valance?

John Wayne, But Jimmy Stewart got the credit!

[Cecil DP]

Folks, if you pick just about any battle in history you will find major discrepancies between what one side thought they accomplished and what actually happened according to the records of the other.  One side will claim that they sunk 5 ships based on their best evaluation of their after action reports and after the war you might find out through examination of the enemy's records that they actually only lost 2 ships.  Does that mean the first side was lying or any less valorous?  No, it just means they got a fact wrong. 

So, for example, do the dates on which CAP claims to have sunk a sub match up with German records of when they lost subs? 

Apparently according to the web site I cited earlier, such records seem to be  available.   

The problem with the records is that the sinking date may not be the same date as shown in the records. Subs were generally out of communications for most of their voyage. So they would only be reported sunk after a regular report was expected and overdue by as much as a week. If we claimed a sinking on the first of the month, the ship maynot be listed as missing until thefirst of the next month. Same for planes shot down. If two or three pilots see a plane shot down they all reported it in their debriefing and one plane becomes 3. This happened on both sides of the war.

[JohnKachenmeister]

The German records are no more reliable than anyone else's.  Plus, there are something like more than 50 subs still unaccounted for.  Trying to apply audit principles to military intelligence simply doesn't work.  McNamara found that out in Vietnam.

That bring said, allow me to caution our good friend RRLE about stomping around in a political minefield.  While the Lusitania sinking was viewed as an atrocity at the time, what plunged the US into war were letters exchanged between Germany and Mexico in which the Germans sought to solicit the Mexicans to attack the US Southwest.  In exchange, Germany was to guarantee the return of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and Califonia to Mexico.

That was fact.

[RiverAux]

I'm more than happy to give some leeway as I mentioned earlier.  If there is a  german sub that was anywhere near where a CAP plane made an attack and went missing at that time, I'd be happy with that. 

The Germans are sort of well known for being detailed recordkeepers and Navies do tend to keep track of when one of their ships go missing. There are hundreds and hundreds of specific records of u-boats and the units that were credited with sinking each one of them.  I would think it be odd that both of CAP subs are among those for which "credit" has not been assigned.   It is possible, just unlikely.

[RRLE]

Subs were generally out of communications for most of their voyage.

You might want to check your German U-Boat communication protocol. Donitz, stupidly, had the U-Boats report every day. It is why the then new and secret High Frequency Direction Finding (nicknamed Huff-Duff) worked so well.

our good friend RRLE about stomping around in a political minefield

I appreciate the warning but you have the cause of the war wrong. Wilson speech to Congress asking for a declaration of war http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Woodrow_Wilson_declares_war_on_Germany begins by discussing unrestricted submarine warfare - by implication the Lusitania. The American battlecry was "Remember The Lusitania" not anything about the Zimmerman Telegram. The Telegram incident is mentioned toward the end of Wilson's speech.

And by the rules of war the sinking of the Lusitania was an atrocity - committed by the Americans and British. The Germans were in their rights to sink it. It was carrying munitions in an area the Germans had told the world community was a war zone. Sinking it was allowed by international law at the time (and now). The atrocity was that the American and British governments hide from the passengers that they were embarked on a military supply ship that was therefore a legitimate target of the enemy. Both governments failed to adaquately warn the the ship's crew and Britian failed to protect the ship in its home waters - and it knew there was at least 1 U-boat in the area.

[JohnKachenmeister]

Subs were generally out of communications for most of their voyage.

You might want to check your German U-Boat communication protocol. Donitz, stupidly, had the U-Boats report every day. It is why the then new and secret High Frequency Direction Finding (nicknamed Huff-Duff) worked so well.

our good friend RRLE about stomping around in a political minefield

I appreciate the warning but you have the cause of the war wrong. Wilson speech to Congress asking for a declaration of war http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Woodrow_Wilson_declares_war_on_Germany begins by discussing unrestricted submarine warfare - by implication the Lusitania. The American battlecry was "Remember The Lusitania" not anything about the Zimmerman Telegram. The Telegram incident is mentioned toward the end of Wilson's speech.

And by the rules of war the sinking of the Lusitania was an atrocity - committed by the Americans and British. The Germans were in their rights to sink it. It was carrying munitions in an area the Germans had told the world community was a war zone. Sinking it was allowed by international law at the time (and now). The atrocity was that the American and British governments hide from the passengers that they were embarked on a military supply ship that was therefore a legitimate target of the enemy. Both governments failed to adaquately warn the the ship's crew and Britian failed to protect the ship in its home waters - and it knew there was at least 1 U-boat in the area.

I do not know you, RRLE.  I suspect from your postings that you may be a cadet.

I am well aware that Wilson, in his declaration of war request, referenced what was, at the time, an atrocity.  I am also aware that the Lusitania would have been a legitimate target of war.  There had also been an advertisement in the New York newspapers  warning that all British-flag ships were subject to attack.

What I am also aware of, which you seem not to be aware of, there was no Anglo-American cooperation in 1916.  In fact, there was pretty much even money on whether the US would side with Germany or Great Britain in World War I.  Until the Zimmerman Letters, anyway.

[RiverAux]

While we have all seen the "d.....d little yellow airplanes" comment about CAP's coastal patrols (did we ever find the original source of this?), minutes ago I came across another, quite different view, of the threat posed by CAP to submarines in WWII as seen by a German submarine commander.

It is in "The United States Coast Guard Auxiliary: A History, 1939-1999" by John. A. Tilley on page 29.  It is actually a quote from "U Boat Commaner: A Periscope View of the Battle of the Atlantic" by Peter Cremer (A Kapitanleutnant in the German Navy). 

In referring to the Coast Guard's Coastal Picket Force (made up primarily of temporary Coast Guard Reservists) and CAP on page 79 he wrote: 

Though their value was precisely nil the participants had fun, besides receiving a boost to their morale, and had an opportunity to indulge their love of air and sea travel free of charge, with Uncle Sam providing the fuel and food

[JohnKachenmeister]

Subs were generally out of communications for most of their voyage.

You might want to check your German U-Boat communication protocol. Donitz, stupidly, had the U-Boats report every day. It is why the then new and secret High Frequency Direction Finding (nicknamed Huff-Duff) worked so well.

our good friend RRLE about stomping around in a political minefield

I appreciate the warning but you have the cause of the war wrong. Wilson speech to Congress asking for a declaration of war http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Woodrow_Wilson_declares_war_on_Germany begins by discussing unrestricted submarine warfare - by implication the Lusitania. The American battlecry was "Remember The Lusitania" not anything about the Zimmerman Telegram. The Telegram incident is mentioned toward the end of Wilson's speech.

And by the rules of war the sinking of the Lusitania was an atrocity - committed by the Americans and British. The Germans were in their rights to sink it. It was carrying munitions in an area the Germans had told the world community was a war zone. Sinking it was allowed by international law at the time (and now). The atrocity was that the American and British governments hide from the passengers that they were embarked on a military supply ship that was therefore a legitimate target of the enemy. Both governments failed to adaquately warn the the ship's crew and Britian failed to protect the ship in its home waters - and it knew there was at least 1 U-boat in the area.

I do not know you, RRLE.  I suspect from your postings that you may be a cadet.

I am well aware that Wilson, in his declaration of war request, referenced what was, at the time, an atrocity.  I am also aware that the Lusitania would have been a legitimate target of war.  There had also been an advertisement in the New York newspapers  warning that all British-flag ships were subject to attack.

What I am also aware of, which you seem not to be aware of, there was no Anglo-American cooperation in 1916.  In fact, there was pretty much even money on whether the US would side with Germany or Great Britain in World War I.  Until the Zimmerman Letters, anyway.

That is true.  There was a "Propaganda War" by both Britain and Germany to get the US to join on one side or the other.  The Zimmerman telegrams sealed the deal.  The Luisitania was something that could rally the masses, however.

The evidence is inconclusive that the Lusitania was carrying munitions.  Repeated dives do show evidence of a secondary explosion, but the source of the explosion is unknown.  It could have been munitions, or it could have been coal dust in the nearly-empty coal bunkers.  The fact remains, however, that actual notice was placed that ALL British-flag ships would be subject to attack.  The sinking was considered an atrocity at the time, but subsequent events in subsequent wars have reduced this former atrocity to the level of a "Bad P.R. Problem."

[RRLE]

The evidence is inconclusive that the Lusitania was carrying munitions.

There is no doubt she was carrying munitions. Although British policy at the time made her a legitimate target, without warning, whether she was carrying munitions or not.

See the Wikeipedia article (which sources its statements) on the Luisitania:

Lusitania was carrying small arms ammunition, which would not have been explosive. Under the "cruiser rules", the Germans could sink a civilian vessel only after guaranteeing the safety of all the passengers. Since Lusitania (like all British merchantmen) was under instructions from the British Admiralty to report the sighting of a German submarine, and indeed to attempt to ram the ship if it surfaced to board and inspect her, she was acting as a naval auxiliary, and was thus exempt from this requirement and a legitimate military target. By international law, the presence (or absence) of military cargo was irrelevant.

[pixelwonk]

RRLE is not a cadet, John.  He's a Coast Guard Auxiliarist with even more time on his hands (if you can believe it) than RiverAux.

[RRLE]

He's a Coast Guard Auxiliarist

Not any more.  I guess that gives me even more time.

[RiverAux]

RRLE is not a cadet, John.  He's a Coast Guard Auxiliarist with even more time on his hands (if you can believe it) than RiverAux.

Hey, I resent that.  Judging by post count NO ONE has more free time than me. 

[JohnKachenmeister]

The evidence is inconclusive that the Lusitania was carrying munitions.

There is no doubt she was carrying munitions. Although British policy at the time made her a legitimate target, without warning, whether she was carrying munitions or not.

See the Wikeipedia article (which sources its statements) on the Luisitania:

Lusitania was carrying small arms ammunition, which would not have been explosive. Under the "cruiser rules", the Germans could sink a civilian vessel only after guaranteeing the safety of all the passengers. Since Lusitania (like all British merchantmen) was under instructions from the British Admiralty to report the sighting of a German submarine, and indeed to attempt to ram the ship if it surfaced to board and inspect her, she was acting as a naval auxiliary, and was thus exempt from this requirement and a legitimate military target. By international law, the presence (or absence) of military cargo was irrelevant.

I do not believe the "Cruiser Rules" were written until the 1920's, after WWI.  In any case, the evidence that the Lusitania was carrying "Munitions" is inconclusive as of the last study of which I am aware.  The belief that the ship was carrying munitions was based on a widely-reported second explosion.  At first, it was reported as a second torpedo hit, but later was reported as a secondary explosion from munitions in the hold.  It may well have been munitions, but it is equally likely that coal dust exploded.

If the Lusitania's orders was to intentionally ram a submarine, then she was a combatant vessel, and the "War Crime" would be on the British for intentionally endangering non-combatants.  Merely reporting sightings incidental to a transport mission would not be prohibited under the laws of war, and would not render the Lusitania liable to attack as a combatant ship.

[RRLE]

In any case, the evidence that the Lusitania was carrying "Munitions" is inconclusive as of the last study of which I am aware.  The belief that the ship was carrying munitions was based on a widely-reported second explosion.

See Lusitania Online: A Deadly Cargo and the falsified Manifests

See also: http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/snpwwi2.htm]Eyewitness to History: The Sinking of the Lusitania

On May 1, 1915, the ship departed New York City bound for Liverpool. Unknown to her passengers but probably no secret to the Germans, almost all her hidden cargo consisted of munitions and contraband destined for the British war effort. As the fastest ship afloat, the luxurious liner felt secure in the belief she could easily outdistance any submarine. Nonetheless, the menace of submarine attack reduced her passenger list to only half her capacity.

If you google "cruiser rules" you will find ample evidence the Cruiser Rules pre-date WWI and the British had acknowleged their existence. Wilson even insisted that the German's follow them.

[MIKE]

WWII to WWI? 

[FLWG Historian]

There is good documentation in many scholarly books that the reason Doenitz moved his U-boats around was going for the weakest point to attack. The defeat of the U-boats did not occur until well after the boats had been withdrawn from US coastal waters. I have tracked and accounted for every U-boat sent US coastal waters and they are 100% accounted for by either having survived or attacks by US military units NOT CAP aircraft. The quick read on this is ISBN 0 11 772603 6 and the laborious read is ISBN 0-87021-781-X.  There are many others but this is enough. With a very severe stretch we can claim that CAP produced a mission stalemate in us coastal waters. The facts cited  by others that no boats were present is an indisputable historic provable occurrence. the courage and patriotism of the crews is not reduced byn the fact that the enemy had already left.