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Looking Glass

Started by Nikos, November 10, 2016, 02:13:21 PM

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PHall

Quote from: goblin on November 16, 2016, 02:19:57 AM
Quote from: PHall on November 16, 2016, 01:19:48 AM
Quote from: goblin on November 15, 2016, 12:10:47 PM
Quote from: PHall on November 13, 2016, 09:43:51 PM
Quote from: Spam on November 13, 2016, 09:30:03 PM
Slightly off topic but related to the basic airframe and the KC-135 in specific:


Among many projects, my shop at work is designing a KC-135 Quick Reaction Handbook (QRH) app on the issued iPads to rehost all the flight pubs. The goal is to field something to enable the crew to quickly diagnose multiple failure combos without flipping through the 400 lbs of paperwork. Our MAJCOM customer initiated this after the Shell 77 Kyrgyzstan crash as one of the corrective actions. I'm working on it to help validate the revised, simplified procedures and ensure the linkages are correct.


http://aviationweek.com/awin/six-factors-named-manas-kc-135-crash:
"Emergency manuals for the KC-135R contain no fewer than 21 emergency procedures discussing rudder control difficulties, but they are spread out over 177 pages, the report points out".


Great, proven airframes, fantastic crew... and we're working to keep them flying safely for years to come with a "poor mans ICAWS" that can quickly provide validated, updated EPs. AMC is interested in eventually doing this for a number of platforms, as well.


V/r
Spam

PS, back in the day (90s) I did some of the testing on the E-6, at Pax River, with some updates to the reel operators station (on topic content, grin).  We were briefed never to wave or talk to the Marines guarding it!!!

It wasn't fact that there were 21 different Rudder malfunctions in the book. It's the fact that the crew did diagnose the problem correctly, the Series Yaw Damper (SYD) but then did not follow the checklist by not turning it OFF.
It wasn't Chapter III that killed them. It was a deliberate failure to follow the guidance given.

I'm a former Evaluator Boom Operator and this kind of stuff is just not acceptable. There was a totally different mindset in the crews when they belonged to SAC.

Current -135 IP here.

I'm not sure what report you are referencing, but using the words deliberate failure to describe the crew's actions doesn't accurately represent what happened.

I don't want to get into a forum argument here and I'm not sure of the last time you were in the jet but you phrased it as such that they consciously opted to not follow procedure, which wasn't the case.

I was referring to the Rudder Malfunction Analysis on page 3-82. Step 2d in particular. Seems pretty clear to me. You turn the Yaw Damper on and the malfunction returns. Turn the Yaw Damper off.

Have you read the AIB/SIB?

I have read the aviation week link above.

goblin

Quote from: PHall on November 16, 2016, 03:37:14 AM
Quote from: goblin on November 16, 2016, 02:19:57 AM
Quote from: PHall on November 16, 2016, 01:19:48 AM
Quote from: goblin on November 15, 2016, 12:10:47 PM
Quote from: PHall on November 13, 2016, 09:43:51 PM
Quote from: Spam on November 13, 2016, 09:30:03 PM
Slightly off topic but related to the basic airframe and the KC-135 in specific:


Among many projects, my shop at work is designing a KC-135 Quick Reaction Handbook (QRH) app on the issued iPads to rehost all the flight pubs. The goal is to field something to enable the crew to quickly diagnose multiple failure combos without flipping through the 400 lbs of paperwork. Our MAJCOM customer initiated this after the Shell 77 Kyrgyzstan crash as one of the corrective actions. I'm working on it to help validate the revised, simplified procedures and ensure the linkages are correct.


http://aviationweek.com/awin/six-factors-named-manas-kc-135-crash:
"Emergency manuals for the KC-135R contain no fewer than 21 emergency procedures discussing rudder control difficulties, but they are spread out over 177 pages, the report points out".


Great, proven airframes, fantastic crew... and we're working to keep them flying safely for years to come with a "poor mans ICAWS" that can quickly provide validated, updated EPs. AMC is interested in eventually doing this for a number of platforms, as well.


V/r
Spam

PS, back in the day (90s) I did some of the testing on the E-6, at Pax River, with some updates to the reel operators station (on topic content, grin).  We were briefed never to wave or talk to the Marines guarding it!!!

It wasn't fact that there were 21 different Rudder malfunctions in the book. It's the fact that the crew did diagnose the problem correctly, the Series Yaw Damper (SYD) but then did not follow the checklist by not turning it OFF.
It wasn't Chapter III that killed them. It was a deliberate failure to follow the guidance given.

I'm a former Evaluator Boom Operator and this kind of stuff is just not acceptable. There was a totally different mindset in the crews when they belonged to SAC.

Current -135 IP here.

I'm not sure what report you are referencing, but using the words deliberate failure to describe the crew's actions doesn't accurately represent what happened.

I don't want to get into a forum argument here and I'm not sure of the last time you were in the jet but you phrased it as such that they consciously opted to not follow procedure, which wasn't the case.

I was referring to the Rudder Malfunction Analysis on page 3-82. Step 2d in particular. Seems pretty clear to me. You turn the Yaw Damper on and the malfunction returns. Turn the Yaw Damper off.

Have you read the AIB/SIB?

I have read the aviation week link above.

Noted.

As a former crew dog I would have expected you to know that the AIB/SIB reports have more info than is typically released. That article is a summation and leaves out a lot of details to the whole story.

Until you have all the info, please refrain from second guessing the crew actions or saying what they did is "unacceptable".  I'm sure they'd appreciate it.


PHall

They're doing the one thing we were forbidden to do on the Looking Glass, fly a repeating and predictable flight path.