New CAP Governance Structure

[Dragoon]

It's possible that the idea of National CC having a bachelor's degree is simply to ensure that his/her educational background is comparable with that required of the commissioned USAF officers with whom Nat. CC is in contact...to see to it that they 'speak the same language', in effect.

Bingo - whether or not the degree actually helps with running the organization, it's important for "street cred" with the USAF leadership.  And never, ever, underestimate the importance of "street cred" in establishing trust.  It's their basement - their rules.

[Dragoon]

I think we can grow them....we start at the vice wing and wing commander level.  Find some sort of NGO/NFP corporate level training (online and in person) and start sending them to those courses.

But, as Ned pointed out, running a wing more operational than strategic - so even with a few weeks of courses (which I'm sure they'll be happy to do in their copious free time     ), they aren't going to exercise those CEO level skills in performance of their duties.  So atrophy sets it - if you don't use it, you lose.

Maybe Region CC's get a little of it - after all, you have to learn to lead indirectly, since your area is too big to cover personally.  That's at least SOME of the skills. 

And while CAP just loves online courses, I question their value in preparing a CEO. Or indeed, in imparting any practical, hands-on skill set.

Ya gotta do it, make mistakes, and learn from them, in order to master the skills.

[Critical AOA]

"Street cred"?  Really?  How about just using the word credibility? 

[Eclipse]

Bingo - whether or not the degree actually helps with running the organization, it's important for "street cred" with the USAF leadership.  And never, ever, underestimate the importance of "street cred" in establishing trust.  It's their basement - their rules.

Our "street cred" comes from wearing the uniform properly, obeying regulations to the letter, not being a huge PITA or small, trivial things, and
...

...

...

...properly accomplishing the mission.

The last thing is all that is important at the end of the fiscal year, with the PITA issues being #2.

[Dragoon]

Bingo - whether or not the degree actually helps with running the organization, it's important for "street cred" with the USAF leadership.  And never, ever, underestimate the importance of "street cred" in establishing trust.  It's their basement - their rules.

Our "street cred" comes from wearing the uniform properly, obeying regulations to the letter, not being a huge PITA or small, trivial things, and
...

...

...

...properly accomplishing the mission.

The last thing is all that is important at the end of the fiscal year, with the PITA issues being #2.

You've never worked at the Pentagon, have you?  :-)

For example, accomplishing the mission is one good way to get your resources cut.  As silly as that sounds, the bean counters figure if you can do it all, then you can certainly do almost all with less.....

Personal reputation, background resume/qualifications and interpersonal skills all play very heavily into getting what you want out of the five sided building.   But you are right about the PITA thing - that'll assure you of never getting the access you need in the first place.

As members, upholding standards, not being a PITA, looking (and acting) good in public are all critical to the preserving the reputation of the organization.  But our leader needs even more than that to build HIS credibility with a military culture that views civilians and potential wanna-bees (in their eyes) with a bit of suspicion.  The more our leader resembles his USAF counterparts, the easier it will be for him to interface with them, and advance the cause of CAP.

[Dragoon]

"Street cred"?  Really?  How about just using the word credibility?

Because I was implying a kind of club-like belonging that may or may not be justified objectively, but is critical to being accepted by the group and getting things done.  A flavor term, if you like.  Sorry if that meaning didn't come through for you in the posting.

[Mustang]

Sorry, but if someone rushes out to get a bachelor's degree just to be a wing commander, they're crazy.

I think SOS and possibly ACSC should be additional requirements for a wing commander.

So, you think someone is crazy when they get a BS for wing king, but you think they need SOS and ACSC?

I am all supportive for a BS for the Nat/CC but, let's take it easy on wing commander requirements here. We have to remember that some wings have no one who CURRENTLY wants to take the wing king chair, let alone after we heap more and more pre-reqs on it. Requiring SOS and ACSC would leave some wings high and dry on anyone ABLE to take command

Thought #1: SOS and ACSC have close to zero applicability to CAP. Requiring these of anyone in CAP is ridiculous. We already have CAP-specific PME, we should insist on that.

Thought #2: If a wing has no qualified applicants for the wing king job, rather than lowering the standards, an interim commander should be appointed--but without the perks: no promotion to colonel, no shiny Command Council badge, do not collect $200.

[Patterson]

Requiring the SOS and/ or ACSC is not about education at all.  Completing those courses demonstrates that the CAP member has invested the neccessary time and effort into "something greater".  Those courses are not strictly military in concept.  They equate to many different career fields.

Perhaps requiring a standard for Wing and Region Commanders other than being a "check-box Lt Col" is what the organization needs!!

[RRLE]

Thought #2: If a wing has no qualified applicants for the wing king job, rather than lowering the standards, an interim commander should be appointed--but without the perks: no promotion to colonel, no shiny Command Council badge, do not collect $200.

So you:

1. Start with a job no one wants.

2. Force reluctant member into the job.

3. Strip the job of its usual office insignia, badge and any other perk.

4. Wonder why the member 'phoned it in' and couldn't care less how the wing did.

That certainly reads like a recipe for success (NOT).

[PHall]

Thought #2: If a wing has no qualified applicants for the wing king job, rather than lowering the standards, an interim commander should be appointed--but without the perks: no promotion to colonel, no shiny Command Council badge, do not collect $200.

Or you could do something even more radical.

Can't find a qualified applicant? Then place the Wing under the control of the Wing next door until a qualified applicant can be found.

Of course the Region Commander should be getting some heat for allowing this to happen too.

[Eclipse]

They all come from the same pool, all volunteers, inconsistently trained and with divided attention spans.

Until something in that sentence changes, the paradigm will not.

Let's not kid ourselves, a wing with such poor leadership and management of transition is not going to grow a Patton or a Gates overnight if they didn't have one already.  Further, the membership isn't going to be more inclined towards excellence with someone no one knows who is brought in from outside to "lead".

This is certainly not true if the current reticence towards attrition is maintained.  This isn't a business or the military. At the end of the day we rely 100% on the benevolence and complicity of the members, and while the rank and file may well accept people they don't know, that "Golden 20%", the ones who actually do all the work, will not accept random management insertions they don't support.

We all know that we currently exist at the crossroads of "you can't make me" & "you're lucky I showed up at all".

"Too bad?" "Shut up and color?"

Fair enough, except we have people who whine and quit when you change the font on letterhead, or who will give themselves an aneurism with the mental gymnastics required to justify a bizzare stance for or against the wear of an individual badge or hat, rather then just STAC for the greater good.

Is this the time to start pressing the membership on expectations, and accept the likely 30-50% attrition?

Maybe.  Perhaps radical change of on that level would be and indicator to congress and the SECAF that we're willing to take the hard, necessary steps to maintain our value.

But it'll be a painful 3-5 years, with an uncertain outcome.

[LGM30GMCC]

This isn't a business or the military. At the end of the day we rely 100% on the benevolence and complicity of the members, and while the rank and file may well accept people they don't know, that "Golden 20%", the ones who actually do all the work, will not accept random management insertions they don't support.

I think that depends on the culture of the unit/wing where you are. The (current) last MTWG/CC was an outsider brought in and people accepted that there was someone with zero experience in MTWG now running it.

And at the unit level, if you build a culture (like the military) where the leadership changes every 2-4 years it doesn't cause the shock you describe. For one, people can accept that if you get stuck with a commander you don't like, you can wait it out for a couple years.

It's because the need to rotate leadership around (I truly believe it is best for a unit in the long run to develop more leaders) and staff groups, wings, and regions that our culture toward this needs to change a little anyway. Currently it's often seen as promotion to move up to wing staff or something, but somehow a squadron commander is a lesser position than a wing staff one. I believe this needs to change and is best done by simply moving people around. Sq/CCs can move up to higher levels (gp, wing, or region) and do staff work there to destress a bit, and staffers that have gotten a chance to see the big picture can move back down to the unit level.

I know 'We can't do this! People will quit!' but just sitting stagnant and saying oh we can't do that, only helps contribute to that problem. People get so entrenched that few truly grow and develop as volunteers in CAP.

[Eclipse]

And at the unit level, if you build a culture (like the military) where the leadership changes every 2-4 years it doesn't cause the shock you describe. For one, people can accept that if you get stuck with a commander you don't like, you can wait it out for a couple years.

I agree, and my region has this, but many don't, and it takes several cycles to get the cultural shift in place.
And when you suggest term limits, far too many people argue it's unnecessary, despite evidence to the contrary (i.e. 1 unit leader successful for 25 years doesn't a trend make).

So assuming we started this year, it's 6-8 years before it's commonplace.

[LGM30GMCC]

Depends. If you are a Wing/CC that wants to make a change...it's real easy.

'Hey SQ/CC Bob, I'd really like you to come work at the wing in this area of expertise, you're doing a good/decent/wonderful/whatever job at the SQ and I'd like to have you look at some things we're trying to accomplish. I'll help ya, but let's get a new CC in place in 6 months.'

'Hey Joe Staffer Awesome Sauce....you've been doing really well at X Y and Z and would like to give you an opportunity to bring your perspective and whatever to X Y and Z local squadron.'

Ya also focus on making sure people are either doing a wing staff job, or a squadron job, not both. And the reasoning is not that they can't, but it's better for them, and the organization as a whole, if they only have one thing to really worry about/focus on. If they have lots of spare time, an additional duty may not be out line. (an SLS or CLC directorship, or something)

[Eclipse]

I agree completely, but agreeing doesn't get it done.

Not everyone is interested, nor able to work at a level above the unit, and in some cases the logistics are daunting.  I understand these are excuses, not valid reasons, but in a culture of "do whatever you want, however you want, for as long as you want", people are caught unprepared to do "other".

The higher you go, the more indirect both the management and the rewards are, and there's a lot more
commanders who can blunder through the year at bare minimum then that same commander could function as a manager at group or wing.  At the unit you can still brute-force a 1-man show.

We need much better day-1 expectations, and much better pipe-lining of professional development.  IMHO, no one below Major should ever be considered for a job above group - you need the experience
that comes with the TIG, but if we did that, 1/2 the jobs would be vacant.

Seriously, slick-sleeves as wing officers just because they will take the job?

Again, the results of the "fix" is several years of pain, with uncertain outcomes on the farside.

[ZigZag911]

I feel one of the problems is that some wings have so few members.

Now, where it's large state/small population, not sure much can be done; however, some East Coast states have very few CAP members (would amount to a group in a larger wing) and one or more other wings close by.

It might be time to look at Coast Guard/CG Aux model of 'districts', stop tying our hands with the notion that each state must be a separate wing, where the demographics simply don't supply a large enough pool of leaders -- both commanders at all levels, and staff.

[Eclipse]

But those East Coast states are very densely populated, so if anything they should have more members then the fly-over-states.

I've said it before, if I were CAP king, the first thing I would do is address the major cities, where for whatever inexplicable reason we have next to no presence.

If we can't recruit in NY, ORD, and LA, how are we going to to it in the middle of SD?

[ZigZag911]

Some are densely populated, others less so (examples: NH, VT, DE, RI)

[RiverAux]

It might be time to look at Coast Guard/CG Aux model of 'districts', stop tying our hands with the notion that each state must be a separate wing, where the demographics simply don't supply a large enough pool of leaders -- both commanders at all levels, and staff.

While I generally think there are some good things that CAP could take from the CG Aux (as well as the other way around), I'm not sure that this is one of the.  For one thing CAP Wings are much more tied in with each state's emergency management agency (and often have funding given to them by the state) such that what CAP does in one state can be radically different than what is done in another (at least as far as ES goes) that it would make trying to manage a CAP wing divided by state lines quite difficult.  And untangling the money would become almost impossible. 

And this lesser degree of local authority works for CG Aux because the CG Aux leadership has very little direct control over the units in its area.  They don't appoint our leaders, control our budgets, approve our training events, approve our awards, issue qualifications, etc.  Almost all of that is done by the actual USCG folks at the District Director of Auxiliary office.  Actually with the cutbacks in CAP State Directors the AF is actually moving its oversight to a system much more like CG Aux.  However, CAP for just about all purposes is commanded by CAP which is not how it works in the Aux. 

So, in CAP terms we would basically need to strip Wing Commanders of pretty much all their authority and give it to the regional CAP-USAF folks in order to be more like the Aux.

[Eclipse]

Some are densely populated, others less so (examples: NH, VT, DE, RI)

All 4 of those states are in the midpoint or higher of population density per sq mile:

NH #21

VT #30

RI #2

DE #6

In fact all of the NE states rank higher in density then the largest states and CAP Wings.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._states_by_population_density

The NE states should be our membership mass.  They have more people in more consolidated areas,
while the bigger states have to cover more ground with less population density and / or centralized populations in one area.