What's Broken?

[davedove]

I see lots of ideas here on the board for changing organizational structure, rank structure, and many other things.  As a new member of CAP I have to ask one thing - What is broken in the current system?  More specifically, what in the current system is keeping us from completing our mission?

There are really only two legitimate reasons to change an organization:  something doesn't work, or it can be done more efficiently.  "I'd like to see it done this way" is not a valid reason unless the change actually improves operations.  And having worked for the Army for over twenty years, I know how frustrating "changing something so it looks like we're doing something" can be.

So, ideas about being more military or more corporate, higher officer standards, NCO corps, etc. should all address the basic question "How does this help CAP accomplish it's mission better?"

[Hawk200]

I see lots of ideas here on the board for changing organizational structure, rank structure, and many other things.  As a new member of CAP I have to ask one thing - What is broken in the current system?  More specifically, what in the current system is keeping us from completing our mission?

There are really only two legitimate reasons to change an organization:  something doesn't work, or it can be done more efficiently.  "I'd like to see it done this way" is not a valid reason unless the change actually improves operations.  And having worked for the Army for over twenty years, I know how frustrating "changing something so it looks like we're doing something" can be.

So, ideas about being more military or more corporate, higher officer standards, NCO corps, etc. should all address the basic question "How does this help CAP accomplish it's mission better?"

A good question. There are a number of problems.

For one, officer rank that isn't earned in anywhere near the same manner or quality as the military officers that we seek to emulate.

Two, the dual nature of CAP is seen as a detriment. Having corporate and military auxiliary status is seen as conflicting. No man can serve two masters and such.

Three, others view the limited training time as a detriment. Many think that time should be devoted to what they consider more important than other things, ignore the lesser item.

Four, NCO grades are a much debated issue. Some believe that they can drastically improve leadership, which in turn would improve mission ability.

There are many other issues that don't necessarily reflect improved mission ability, but simply mirroring our parent branch of service. Some would like the mirror a little bit clearer, others would prefer not looking in one at all.

The points you made concerning two valid reasons are good ones. Maybe we should consider the changes in those manners more than just changing for its own sake.

[Eclipse]

I agree.  Very little is actually broken with CAP.  Its not the program, its the people.

The problem is that we have too many people who don't know the program, or despite knowing it, choose to ignore it and go around wishing things were different.

In way too many cases, we have members, sometimes very NEW members, who rise quickly to positions with Wing authority or higher, who haven't a clue what the regs say, and go around spouting policy and initiatives that violate regs or common sense.

These same members are usually very defensive about their positions and ignorance, which just feeds the circle of love.

We also don't have the laser-focused, top-down leadership a volunteer organization like ours needs.  Our leadership, in some cases from the top to the unit is too busy hopping on the wish train, or trying to work their own, often hidden, agenda.

If there is a single thing weighing this organization down, it is the  "you're lucky I showed up at all..." attitude which is accepted in a lot of units and activities.

"Fixing" that would probably reduce our numbers by at least 1/3, and we'd be better off for it.

[lordmonar]

Hear! Hear!

What's broken?  Training, specifically Professional Development and squadron oversight.

These two areas are the things I think are really "bent" in CAP.

And it is not ususally at the squadron level where it is broken.

Squadrons out there doing their own thing is because they either don't know better (due to lack of training) or because there is no one taking the time to reel them back into the fold (squadron oversight).

Yesterday we had a squadron meeting.  It was a special meeting as we just lost three of our squadron members to two different incidents (on plane crash claimed 2 and IED in Iraq killed another).  Well we had a lot of people wearing their best uniforms.....and I am ashamed to say...there were a lot gross violations of uniform regulations.  I am proud to say that our squadron commander took the time to talk to each and everyone of the violators and explain what was wrong and how to fix it.  That is called commander's oversight.

It does not take a lot to keep people on the right path...but you have to be there to see it.  And that is where I thing CAP is falling down.

Group and Wing (if you don't have groups) needs to be at the squadrons.  They need to see how things are going, find out what the problems are and they need to make on the spot corrections.  They need to provide the training needed so squadrons know where the path is and how to stay on the path.

Everthing else is gravy.

Sure there are minor changes that could do some good.  We need to decide what "type" of mission asset we are going to bring to the SAR fight and get the training and equipment to insure those mission resources are in line with NIMS.  Sure we can make a better effort to standardise the uniforms so that we don't look like a bunch of yahoos at the mission base.  But those are all side issues.

[Skyray]

To answer your basic question, Nothing is Broken.

At the grass roots level the organization works as well as it ever has, and that is pretty good.

There is, however a minor glitch at the National level that allows Machiavellian manipulation of the structure, and a small cabal has seized control by using non renewal and termination to eliminate their competition.  Only occasionally has this affected the day to day operation of the organization, such as the elimination of Rex Glasgow for performing too well in the aftermath of Katrina and attracting negative attention from one of the Cabal.

Is there a simple fix?  I am sure there is, because it is a simple problem.  Perhaps simply making termination subject to Air Force review would work.  It certainly seems to have worked well for the Coast Guard Auxiliary.

[JohnKachenmeister]

I'm not sure "Broken" is the right word, except for the rather strange top-level management arreangement.  "Out of adjustment" might be more accurate.

As far as the upper management is concerned, here's our present situation:

The Board of Governors directly supervises the CAP paid staff, but not the National Commander.  The National Commander does not have control over the NHQ staff, they work for the BoG.  The National Commander does supervise the wing and region commanders, which together comprise the National Board, which elects the National Commander who supervises them.  We also have a National Executive Committee, but nobody seems to know why.  The BoG is supposed to exercise oversight of CAP, but they have no way to enforce their directives on the National Commander and National Board, except to fire the Executive Director.

Yeah.  That's broke.  If Donald Trump ran his organization like that, he'd have to borrow money from Rosie O'Donnell for lunch.  If General Eisenhower ran the Army like that, we'd all be speaking German.  (Except the people in Califonia, they'd still be speaking Spanish.)

What's out of adjustment is our officer programs, and our mission focus.  We are running a cadet program, but JROTC is kicking our butts in terms of both numbers and quality.  We essentially have no external AE program, and in fact are uncertain what kind of program we should have.  We are doing OK in SAR, but most CAP guys realize that our callout priority in disasters is somewhere behind the Girl Scouts.

We have the smartest guys in CAP here on the net.  We're putting our heads together and coming up with a coherent and comprehensive plan, which we will present at echelons above reality.  We will then sit back and hope for the best for our organization.

[DogCollar]

More or less as an observer to this fascinating process, it appears to me that what is "wrong" with CAP is that there are many members who are troubled with ambiguity.
Are we military or are we civilian?  Are we corporate or are we USAF?  Are we Officers, Senior Members, NCO's or something else to be invented?  It appears that the answer to each of these questions is "yes."  Thus the ambiguity.
Now, I personally live everyday of my life dealing with peoples uncertainty and ambiguity...My "real" job is serving as a hospital chaplain.  A lot of people want certainty with their diagnosis and their prognosis, but, despite the advertisements to the contrary, medicine is NOT an exact science!  I suspect that just as the answer to the above questions is indeed "yes," it is also "but not exactly."
I'm okay with that.  I happen to believe that most things in life are "messy" and "ambiguous," here in the 21st century.  It is out of the realization of "mess" and uncertainty that the best, and most creative ideas spring.  The questions about the organization being asked on this board are important and profound.  I admire anyone who is searching for new and creative ideas.

[JohnKachenmeister]

That is very true, Chaplain.

I come from an organization where ambiguity is a vice.  We summarize operations by saying things like "Take the hill," but in reality, you would be told what hill to take, when to take it, what you do with it once you take it, what forces to take it with, and where you will get your supplies that you will need to take the hill, including the "Class 6" supplies for the victory party.

[DogCollar]

The world's funny isn't it?

I don't necessarily think ambiguity is a "virtue," ...I've just learned to be at "home" with it and even use the tension it imbues as creatively as possible.

Everytime I hear the "hill order" reference, I wonder why it is that there are rarely battles fought on flat real estate?  I mean fighting AND having to go up hill just sounds like real hard work to me!!!

[Dragoon]

What's broken

1.  The organization requires more admin overhead form its members than actual work.  This results in many units not actually meeting the requirements set out by National, or just pencil whipping stuff to get by.

2.  Our professional development system does not significantly increase the skills of our members.

3.  In many places there is not adequate ES work (or training opportunities)  to sustain the skills of the large ES force we need every couple of years, like for Katrina.

4.  Standardization from unit to unit is extremely poor.  Oversight is difficult because of a lack of qualified leaders at group and wing willing to spend all their evenings driving long hours to visit geographically dispersed units.

5.  A basic disagreement of what the top priorities are for the average member (Customs and Courtesies, ES skills?  Squadron Staff skills) within a limited amount of training time.

6.  A system that holds Wing Commanders responsible for everything (do it or lose your Eagles), but doesn't hold anyone below that level to the same standard (I can do nothing and keep my Oak Leaves).

7. A schizophrenic culture creating tension between "civilian" and "military" members (what good is an "optional" rank structure?) that results in complaints, personality clashes, disciplinary actions and other distractions from the mission.  ("You can't do that to me - I'm a volunteer"  "Oh yes I can! - I'm your commander!"  "I can say whatever I want - I'm an American!"  "That's conduct unbecoming a CAP Officer - you're fired!")

8.  A relatively low retention rate, forcing us to retrain again and again as many members decide we're not what they thought we were, and quit.

9.  An external image that is not as high speed as some would hope, which may be having a detrimental effect on getting outside support and new missons.


All that said, we continue to muddle through.  Broke is too strong a word - the volunteer spirit keeps us going even when things are a bit.....confusing.

[Hawk200]

Everytime I hear the "hill order" reference, I wonder why it is that there are rarely battles fought on flat real estate?  I mean fighting AND having to go up hill just sounds like real hard work to me!!!

Hills are vantage points. Children play "King of the Hill" to this day. Even as children, we instinctively know that the high ground is preferable.

[Major_Chuck]

I wouldn't use the term broken, but more 'off track'.  Unless you are sitting at the NHQ or Region Level you don't see the disconnect that NHQ (as an entity) has with the vast majority of the organization.

Areas that we need to work on to bring us back on track such as Emergency Services, Professional Development, Safety, etc. seem to be side tracked by intense debate over the ethics charges at the command levels and an absurb amount of discussion about uniforms.

Our identity is so fractured depending upon what our particular mission is that we don't know who we are.  

In the simplist of terms we seek leadership and a vision of who we are and what our mission is.  We've sold thousands of people on the premise that we are active in Homeland Security but in reality we do very little.  We've strayed from our original missions to the point that others have stepped into fill the gap.

The reality of CAP life is that if something was 'broken' we wouldn't do it and it would fall to the wayside.  Our problem is that we are 'off track' and need a conductor to put us on the right path, share that vision or roadmap and become our greatest cheerleader.

[Hawk200]

What's broken

1.  The organization requires more admin overhead form its members than actual work.  This results in many units not actually meeting the requirements set out by National, or just pencil whipping stuff to get by.

2.  Our professional development system does not significantly increase the skills of our members.

3.  In many places there is not adequate ES work (or training opportunities)  to sustain the skills of the large ES force we need every couple of years, like for Katrina.

4.  Standardization from unit to unit is extremely poor.  Oversight is difficult because of a lack of qualified leaders at group and wing willing to spend all their evenings driving long hours to visit geographically dispersed units.

5.  A basic disagreement of what the top priorities are for the average member (Customs and Courtesies, ES skills?  Squadron Staff skills) within a limited amount of training time.

6.  A system that holds Wing Commanders responsible for everything (do it or lose your Eagles), but doesn't hold anyone below that level to the same standard (I can do nothing and keep my Oak Leaves).

7. A schizophrenic culture creating tension between "civilian" and "military" members (what good is an "optional" rank structure?) that results in complaints, personality clashes, disciplinary actions and other distractions from the mission.  ("You can't do that to me - I'm a volunteer"  "Oh yes I can! - I'm your commander!"  "I can say whatever I want - I'm an American!"  "That's conduct unbecoming a CAP Officer - you're fired!")

8.  A relatively low retention rate, forcing us to retrain again and again as many members decide we're not what they thought we were, and quit.

9.  An external image that is not as high speed as some would hope, which may be having a detrimental effect on getting outside support and new missons.


All that said, we continue to muddle through.  Broke is too strong a word - the volunteer spirit keeps us going even when things are a bit.....confusing.

After looking at it, I think this needs to be the initial list of things to address. Got to start somewhere, and this list seems to cover the main issues. Why don't we work on this to start?

[ZigZag911]

In way too many cases, we have members, sometimes very NEW members, who rise quickly to positions with Wing authority or higher, who haven't a clue what the regs say, and go around spouting policy and initiatives that violate regs or common sense.

These same members are usually very defensive about their positions and ignorance, which just feeds the circle of love.

Apparently we know some of the same people!!!

[afgeo4]

Responsibility usually follows oversight.
Oversight usually follows money.
Money doesn't come down from NHQ to Squadrons.
Oversight doesn't follow.
Responsibility doesn't either.

If national distributed funds to all levels of CAP down to the squadrons with each level having its budget, made the unit CCs responsible for spending the funding properly on tasked missions and then held the CCs accountable for the outcomes, things would be different. For now we have no one real to answer to and no budget to do it with anyway.  Every unit CC and every member does what they want/can to fulfill the mission the way they see fit and no one can tell them otherwise because they'll get to hear something like "well why don't you fund the training and equipment properly and then I can deliver what you want!"

I mean if the USAF one day said "hey, we're not gonna fund your SAR missions, but we still want you to do the work" we wouldn't really have to meet their standards and they wouldn't really be able to demand us to meet them, would they?  That's how CAP works though.  NHQ tells us what to do, but doesn't fund the mission. We carry out the mission the best way we know how and we don't care how NHQ wants it done (hey, they ain't paying for it anyway).

I think all that needs to change.

Everyday budgets for everyday activities, training, and equipment. Budgets (even if small ones) for recruiting, retention, vehicle/aircraft maintenance, uniforms, commo equipment, SAR equipment, professional development, etc. followed by accountance for these expenditures. CCs at all levels would be held accountable for programs like CP, ES, DDR, AE, and SPD because "hey, I gave you the money, so what'd you do with it?" That accountability would create stronger, better leaders. It's added responsibility which tends to bring out leadership (ask a cp officer or cadet about that). Every staff officer will spend time developing programs for his budget and those programs would get implemented.  The best ones will be adopted by higher headquarters because they're good.  CAP would improve. CAP officers would improve. CAP mission readiness and capability would definitely improve.

The system would encourage the DRMO to be made available for CAP (to save money) and many initiatives to save costs would be studied.

Instead we have GA-8 Airvans who no one can fly in places no one can get to with ARCHER equipment no one can operate that would be useful for very limited missions in very limited conditions while most units can't afford to keep their 1981 Dodge vans on the road safely while their cadets (and seniors) can't afford uniforms to come to meetings in. Do y'all see the differences in those and how that might affect the quality of people we recruit and retain?  I do.