SDIS and ARCHER opinion

[wingnut55]

Interesting situation.

1. Parent (USAF)  insists we are US Government Entity during AFAM
2. CAP NHQ insists we are just a nonprofit volunteer group performing missions for the USAF, DOD, DHLS, DEA etc. USAF declares we as Volunteers, are covered as government employee's under FICA.

Volunteers sign a make believe Nondisclosure statement for NHQ CAP.

All other Federal Agency's require civilian contractors and military members to undergo a real 'SECURITY CLEARENCE". Costs of clearance absorbed by contractor as part of doing business with US Government (really included in contract costs)

CAP HQ insists we are a contractor to USAF. (as we are according to USAF procurement.

Conclusion:  CAP & CAP-USAF saves big money by not getting background security clearances. Most of costs for personnel (Training, pay, housing, food) is absorbed by members who are Volunteers.

I can say this 90% of what we do does not require a clearance, but 10% of what we do is stuff I in the past had a clearance for (Active duty and as a contractor). I see this as a failure in the system, this will bite us in the butt someday.

[FW]

Interesting situation.

I can say this 90% of what we do does not require a clearance, but 10% of what we do is stuff I in the past had a clearance for (Active duty and as a contractor). I see this as a failure in the system, this will bite us in the butt someday.

All our "customers" understand our status and systems before they ask us to perform for them.  Nothing we do is considered "classified" however, some of what we do is "confidential" or "sensitive".  Members who perform such missions are screened before they are allowed to participate and sign a "statement of understanding".  CAP will never start prosecution proceedings against a member who violates this however, the customer may.  I think, members who perform such missions take them seriously and wouldn't violate their agreements.  

Signing off on OPSEC training is a bit different.  Your signature is assurance of understanding the issue.  No one will ever go to jail if they give out information they get in Eservices or give out a CAP Freq.  However, they may be disqualified from future participation in missions until retrained or disciplined internally.  Your signature on OPSEC, IMHO,  is a validation of a trust given to you as a member of CAP.   Violating that trust is an integrity issue, an ethics issue and, more importantly a character issue.

[desertengineer1]

Interesting situation.

All our "customers" understand our status and systems before they ask us to perform for them.  Nothing we do is considered "classified" however, some of what we do is "confidential" or "sensitive".  Members who perform such missions are screened before they are allowed to participate and sign a "statement of understanding".  CAP will never start prosecution proceedings against a member who violates this however, the customer may.  I think, members who perform such missions take them seriously and wouldn't violate their agreements.  

Signing off on OPSEC training is a bit different.  Your signature is assurance of understanding the issue.  No one will ever go to jail if they give out information they get in Eservices or give out a CAP Freq.  However, they may be disqualified from future participation in missions until retrained or disciplined internally.  Your signature on OPSEC, IMHO,  is a validation of a trust given to you as a member of CAP.   Violating that trust is an integrity issue, an ethics issue and, more importantly a character issue.

Absolutely accurate words on the OPSEC category, FW.  Sadly, many members don't understand that completely, and lacking clear and concise rules with respect to frequencies and how we're to handle FOUO information, the bad information propagates.

My point on the frequencies is a plea to the people in charge (and ourselves) to come back to a common sense reality.  Part of that reality includes both an accurate understanding of OPSEC's implementation  (as you stated extremely well) - but more importantly reasonable, efficient, controls.

You cannot treat the frequency value of a 100 watt signal as "spooky classified".  The nanosecond it transmits - the cat is effectively out of the bag, and all the policy letters we've produced are irrelevent.  NHQ, IMHO, is wasting valuable time we don't have to apply rules that will be OBE 5 minutes after the first repeaters are installed.  The constrictions being placed are over-reaching, and complicating an already daunting task.  We're also taking a significant hit with respect to reputation among the military technical community.