SECDEF - Dissent Can Be a Sign of Health in an Organization

[mikeylikey]

I would like to see how many AF types have deployed overseas in the past 7 years as apposed to the Army and Marine Corps.  There is no reason AF types shouldn't be punding the ground.  Hell, Army cooks are stepping off on patrols, why can't the Air Force. 

[PHall]

I would like to see how many AF types have deployed overseas in the past 7 years as apposed to the Army and Marine Corps.  There is no reason AF types shouldn't be punding the ground.  Hell, Army cooks are stepping off on patrols, why can't the Air Force. 

Well, lets see. They're not trained for ground combat. They're not equipped for ground combat.

The Army has something like eight times the people the Air Force has. The number of people that the Air Force could provide, and still be able to perform it's assigned missions, wouldn't be that many.

[mikeylikey]

Well, lets see. They're not trained for ground combat. They're not equipped for ground combat.

1 Pair of boots, 1 uniform, 1 M4/M16, 1 helmet, 2 magazines and fall in line with 2nd Platoon.  Pounding the ground is not rocket science.  They can easily get the same refresher course that all National Guard and Reserve Soldiers get before heading off for Iraq. 

I think it is time more AF folks got some play time in the suck.  And I don't mean deploy to an airbase. 

 

[DNall]

All NG/Res troops had battle drills & IMT at basic. They qualified with a rifle & were familiarized with crew serve weps. The AF has no such training. You'd have to put all of them thru WTC just to make them into support troops & even then they'd be behind the curve.

How does that solve anything? Using AF personnel would just screw their recruiting & end up costing the govt lots more to keep both branches manned to need. Why can't you cut AF personnel & increase Army personnel - that's in fact what we've been doing.

The AF has an important mission, and it doesn't involve ground combat. The problem is they're too deeply rooted in their own little world & not serving the needs of the greater battlefield - namely a stronger focus on CAS.

The SecDef I think is talking more about their insistence on buying more F22s rather than embracing a conversion to UCAVs.

[davedove]

What we have here is a SecDEF who's hard up for "boots on the ground" type folks for the Army and the Marine Corps who sees a whole bunch of people in the Air Force that, from what he has been told by his Army and Marine Corps advisor's, are not sharing the burden with their ground pounding brethren.

Well duh!

Well said!!!  It is, after all, called the Air Force.  We're not supposed to be groundpounders.  That's not our job.  That's the Army and Marine Corps' job.  Nobody's hollering for the Navy to pick up M-16s and start a-shootin', are they?

Jack

Actually, the Navy is experiencing some of the same issues for the same reasons.  After all, how many large naval battles have we had recently?

[afgeo4]

Going back to the topic... What Sec Gates said rings funny to me. It's a speech that sounds wonderfully, but coming from an office rat and being aimed at a company/flight commander out in Iraq or Afgy... I wouldn't like what he's saying. Telling those folk that they're not doing enough to support themselves while in combat...

The truth is... in combat, on the level of the fighter = platoon/company/combat flight/squadron there's plenty out of the box thinking going on. It's just that that thinking doesn't make it all the way up to Pentagon for review and the SECDEF doesn't know about it. If all our company grade officers thought "in the box", we'd be speaking Arabic among ruins of NYC already.

[capchiro]

The problem is the same with the military as with CAP, if one doesn't want to mess with the IG and mess up a good career, one may think outside of the box, but one better not color outside of the lines.  A very wise Regional Commander told me that once..

[davedove]

The problem is the same with the military as with CAP, if one doesn't want to mess with the IG and mess up a good career, one may think outside of the box, but one better not color outside of the lines.  A very wise Regional Commander told me that once..

True, the secret is to learn how to think outside of the box, without violating any rules or regulations, a very delicate balancing act, to be sure.

[JohnKachenmeister]

I agree with DNall.  The SecDef is NOT advocating an Air Force infantry element.  He IS advocating that the AF adapt to the war we got, not the war we might have OR the war we used to have.

I am not convinced that UAV's are the ultimate answer to the current insurgent conflcict.  They are a part of the solution, however.  What the AF must do, in my humble (but combat-tested) experience is:

1.  Increase AF Security Forces so that the AF can defend its own assets on the ground.  The Navy does not rely on the Army to protect its ships, why should the AF rely on the Army to protect its planes and bases?

2.  Increase participation in combined force planning.  Right now, the AF is structured for a multifaceted air battle as was expected in Europe.  Some strategic bombing, some air supremacy operations, some ground support operations, some air logistic (theater and strategic) operations, with resources balanced by the Air Component Commander.  We need to have the AF in support of a supreme theater commander, with resources directed exclusively in support of the ground operations in theater.  Supreme commanders wear green, or I guess now, Army Blue.  Can't get around that. 

3.  A change in attitude among AF folks.  Killing Ali Babas on the deck must be honored as much as killing MiG's in the air.  The era of the "Ace" is over.  The Ace was killed by the F-22.  Nobody is coming up to fight anymore.  They will no longer be "Zooming to meet our thunder."  "Nobody comes close" is not just a recruiting slogan, it is the current state of air combat.

[FANBOY]

Hi Folks,

The SECDEF's comments have caused quite a stir amongst the defense community.

I posted my contribution to the conversation on my blog:

New Combat Role for CAP?

[Defense Secretary] Gates wants the services to think "beyond Predator and Reaper" and consider quick and dirty ideas like putting "sensors on a Cessna."

- Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell

http://capblog.typepad.com/capblog/2008/04/new-combat-role.html

In fact, USAF Gen. Clary (former Air Force Director of Homeland Security) once referred to CAP's single-engine fleet as being "manned UAVs."

It is time to think out of the box.

S/V,

Capt. Rod "DATA" Rakic
http://capblog.typepad.com

[RiverAux]

Hmm, wish I would have read that prior to basically saying the same thing earlier in this thread....

Its not actually thinking outside the box, its taking the old box out of the closet where it was hidden away after Vietnam...

[sardak]

Hopefully now we can steer this thread back to what the real intent was - which was clearly defined in the original post and title.  It was not intended to debate what weapons platforms are better or which service knows what it's doing - those aren't CAP issues.  It was to discuss the thinking process and that CAP leadership needs to start following Secretary Gates' advice to start crawling out of its cave.  There are numerous threads on CAP Talk that question the wisdom of what CAP does, and that the "old way" isn't necessarily the best or right way.  Leaders have to listen to the members.

As for Gates' direction to the Air Force, these are from his speech at Maxwell.  Everyone is focused on combat and the Middle East, but these also apply to domestic missions.

For those missions that still require manned missions, we need to think hard about whether we have the right platforms -- whether, for example, low-cost, low-tech alternatives exist to do basic reconnaissance and close air support in an environment where we have total control of the skies -- aircraft that our partners also can afford.

These new realities and missions should be reflected in our training and doctrine. The Air Force will be increasingly called upon to conduct civil-military or humanitarian operations with interagency and nongovernmental organizations and partners and deal directly with local populations.

CAP leadership needs to be pushing the USAF, and the members need to be pushing CAP leadership.  That was the message to CAP from the speeches at Maxwell and West Point.

Mike

[JohnKachenmeister]

We, or at least some of us have, been preaching for the same thing here on the net for a couple of years.  The re-bluing of CAP.  Bring CAP back into being a functional part of the Air Force.

In 1942-43, the CAP turned the tide of the coastal battle by suddenly placing hundreds more combat aircraft into action against U-Boats.  Right now, we are positioned to do a lot in the Homeland Battle:

1.  We have more than 500 light airplanes pre-positioned around the United States, able to operate from virtually any civilian airport.

2.  We have an extensive radio network, on AF frequencies, positioned in both homes and cars around the United States.

3.  We have a force of trained personnel, able to conduct extended air operations, maintain communications nets, conduct limited ground operations in concert with light scout aircraft, AND trained specifically to interface with civilian agencies.

Homeland Defense Missions we can do now or with minimal new equipment/training:

1.  Light cargo missions.  Moving ammunition from Ammunition Storage Points to National Guard units mobilized to perform HD missions.  Moving antibiotics to areas hit with biological agents.  Movement of key personnel to areas where needed, i.e.: movement of extra physicians/nurses to disaster areas; movement of key military personnel; movement of repair parts for vital military or civilian equipment.

2.  Surveillance missions.  With radiological sensors, scan major roads, ports, harbor entrances, etc. for traces of weapon-type radiation.  Assist in securing exclusion areas around high-value assets such as military facilities, nuclear power plants, etc. during peak threat periods.  Support convoy movements within CONUS for mobilizing and returning units.  Intel gathering on specific threat targets using advanced sensors.

3.  Combat missions.  I takes longer to train a UAV driver than to build a UAV.  CAP pilots with instrument ratings can be tasked to fly UAV's, which are controlled from within CONUS.  This can augment the AF pilots assigned to this duty, and possibly free up some pilots for other duty.  In the short term, we can add more UAV's to the force mix by using volunter pilots.

4.  Combat support missions.  CAP can produce a population of "Everyone from 8 to 80; blind, crippled and crazy."  What other military force can produce an authentic indigenous population for MOUT training?

5.  Training support missions.  We have been training cadets for years.  Why not bring Iraqi/Afghan/other older teens to the US and have CAP folks run encampment type training to build a professional military cadre for the long-term?

That's just off the top of my head.  Ideas flow quickly, unemcumbered by long hair.

[afgeo4]

Bring this topic back to CAP? I don't think most members of CAP know what the box really is. The box was never well defined by our leadership, so working outside the box is easy. Following the books and doctrines (do we even have any?) is the hard part.

Here's something really outside the box though... where's the CAP UAV program? What better thing to work on with cadets than oversized radio controlled aircraft? You could use a flight sim from a laptop or a desktop to control a say... 4 to 8 foot wingspan light aircraft with a couple of basic cameras on it... great for low and slow work, UAV pilot training, and AE projects. Once built, quite inexpensive to maintain and operate.

The payoff? USAFA and ROTC would love cadets who are familiar with operating aircraft through a computer environment.

[Gunner C]

Bring this topic back to CAP? I don't think most members of CAP know what the box really is. The box was never well defined by our leadership, so working outside the box is easy. Following the books and doctrines (do we even have any?) is the hard part.

You are correct on several levels. 

First:  We have no doctrine.  Doctrine is the capstone of how we should do business.  It establishes the right and left limit stakes of what we do.  Regulations and manuals would support the doctrine, as would training.  But what we do is we make it up as we go.  The NEC and NB change things helter skelter without regard to how if affects the overall doctrine that ties everything together.

Second:  CAP/CC never goes to the Region/CCs with a list of missions/goals that they should be able to accomplish.  That list would be  analyzed by the region staff and the wings would be given their missions/goals, and on down the line.  Periodically, squadrons would brief group/CCs, group/CCs would brief wing/CCs, wing/CCs would brief region/CCs and region/CCs would brief CAP/CC what they had accomplished for the quarter and the plan for the next. This would drive budgets, schedules, exercises, etc.  But none of this is done (save a couple of wings - MDWG is one).

GC

[SARMedTech]

I have to respectfully disagree with a point made by Kach:

Do you really want to send uniformed civilians into bio-terror hot zones. The nightmare scenario where bio-agents are concerned is aircraft traffic.  I would encourage you to take a look at the book "Preparing for BioTerrorism" by Dr. George Buck. Are we going to uptrain CAP pilots and mission crews to operational HazMat status? Are we going to supply them with N-95 masks, respirators and glow worm suits?  Who is going to decon them when they return? Who is going to decon the a/c? When you have a hot zone in terms of bioterror, anyone that goes into it basically becomes a quarantine necessary patient. I am an EMT with a disaster response team. We are trained for this kind of thing and equipped with drugs to save our butts if we are exposed. Heck, the training to tell us how much training we need took three days.  If CAP did this, we could have yet another motto change: "CAP pilots fly in, but they don't fly out."

[JohnKachenmeister]

I have to respectfully disagree with a point made by Kach:

Do you really want to send uniformed civilians into bio-terror hot zones. The nightmare scenario where bio-agents are concerned is aircraft traffic.  I would encourage you to take a look at the book "Preparing for BioTerrorism" by Dr. George Buck. Are we going to uptrain CAP pilots and mission crews to operational HazMat status? Are we going to supply them with N-95 masks, respirators and glow worm suits?  Who is going to decon them when they return? Who is going to decon the a/c? When you have a hot zone in terms of bioterror, anyone that goes into it basically becomes a quarantine necessary patient. I am an EMT with a disaster response team. We are trained for this kind of thing and equipped with drugs to save our butts if we are exposed. Heck, the training to tell us how much training we need took three days.  If CAP did this, we could have yet another motto change: "CAP pilots fly in, but they don't fly out."

I did not explain the tactics of such a transport.  Obviously, we would identify a civilian airport OUTSIDE the identified hot zone, and use that as a logistics base for the receipt of antibiotics.  Then, people with the appropriate training would move the drugs into the hot zone and administer them to people they like.  ( )

[JohnKachenmeister]

Bring this topic back to CAP? I don't think most members of CAP know what the box really is. The box was never well defined by our leadership, so working outside the box is easy. Following the books and doctrines (do we even have any?) is the hard part.

You are correct on several levels. 

First:  We have no doctrine.  Doctrine is the capstone of how we should do business.  It establishes the right and left limit stakes of what we do.  Regulations and manuals would support the doctrine, as would training.  But what we do is we make it up as we go.  The NEC and NB change things helter skelter without regard to how if affects the overall doctrine that ties everything together.

Second:  CAP/CC never goes to the Region/CCs with a list of missions/goals that they should be able to accomplish.  That list would be  analyzed by the region staff and the wings would be given their missions/goals, and on down the line.  Periodically, squadrons would brief group/CCs, group/CCs would brief wing/CCs, wing/CCs would brief region/CCs and region/CCs would brief CAP/CC what they had accomplished for the quarter and the plan for the next. This would drive budgets, schedules, exercises, etc.  But none of this is done (save a couple of wings - MDWG is one).

GC

You are correct, sort of.

We DO have a doctrine for SAR operations, developed over the past 60 or so years, but that is all.

We have always, since our inception, been a backwards organization from what military types are used to.  In the military, we say:  "Here is your mission.  Now train up to it and get the equipment you need to carry it out."  In CAP, since World War II, we have said:  "Here's what we got... hundreds of light planes and thousands of pilots.  What can we do with them?"

[DNall]

I have to respectfully disagree with a point made by Kach:

Do you really want to send uniformed civilians into bio-terror hot zones. The nightmare scenario where bio-agents are concerned is aircraft traffic.  I would encourage you to take a look at the book "Preparing for BioTerrorism" by Dr. George Buck. Are we going to uptrain CAP pilots and mission crews to operational HazMat status? Are we going to supply them with N-95 masks, respirators and glow worm suits?  Who is going to decon them when they return? Who is going to decon the a/c? When you have a hot zone in terms of bioterror, anyone that goes into it basically becomes a quarantine necessary patient. I am an EMT with a disaster response team. We are trained for this kind of thing and equipped with drugs to save our butts if we are exposed. Heck, the training to tell us how much training we need took three days.  If CAP did this, we could have yet another motto change: "CAP pilots fly in, but they don't fly out."

CAP has several times flown hazmat personnel around a chem release situation. They are able to assess winds, spread of the agent, detection of what the agent is, etc. There's no need to fly through the stuff, just close enough to get readings, get an overhead view, and for the passenger to conduct command & control.

I'm tired of hearing we don't want to send uniformed civilians into XYZ. You as an EMT on a disaster response team are a uniformed civilian. CAP doesn't need to be on the sideline for three weeks after Katrina rolls though talking about we can't put these poor sweet innocent volunteers into this situation cause there might be bad things there. That's bull crap. A CAP member is supposed to be adequately trained, equipped, and prepared to go straight into the depths of situations like that right after the thing happens. The capability we have to provide is getting in first with air/grd assessment to tell first responders where to send their resources. It's useless weeks later when emergency services are back on line.


Anyway, the SecDEF comments have nothing to do with CAP. The problem with CAP is our structure & leadership. It's currently formulated with no discipline, & incentive to preserve power/influence/control of resources. There's politics everywhere, but ours rule the process. There isn't a merit based advancement system or quality internal leader/mgr training. All that stuff leads to ineffectual political folks at the top that are generally not competent for what they're trying to do, and no system around them to correct the issue.

The second part of the issue is CAP in general. Just take our active versus not membership. Say it's 40% active, of that how many are ES qual'd & active in the last quarter. Now look at the distribution of that geographically, cadets out of the mix cause they can't help us on major disasters. At this point can you legitimately meet the operational requirements in the comm TA? We have to face that situation head on with strong leadership & targeted resources/effort. We have to revitalize CAP where it needs it most.

Then finally we have to address technology. Mark I eyeball from a Cessna is about worthless. ARCHER may or may not be useful, apparently 1AF says not. I don't care if it were a miracle machine, we don't have good distribution of it. We need a lower cost higher fleet penetration system - like off-the-shelf day/night FLIR just like border patrol uses on their Cessnas. That doesn't take a high investment in equipment, but it does take some effort on the part of our aircrew to get & stay online. If we can't be something more than a bunch of common civilians walking/flying around looking for stuff, then we got no business taking the govt's money.

[SAR-EMT1]

What we have here is a SecDEF who's hard up for "boots on the ground" type folks for the Army and the Marine Corps who sees a whole bunch of people in the Air Force that, from what he has been told by his Army and Marine Corps advisor's, are not sharing the burden with their ground pounding brethren.

Well duh!

Well said!!!  It is, after all, called the Air Force.  We're not supposed to be groundpounders.  That's not our job.  That's the Army and Marine Corps' job.  Nobody's hollering for the Navy to pick up M-16s and start a-shootin', are they?

Jack

Actually, the Navy is experiencing some of the same issues for the same reasons.  After all, how many large naval battles have we had recently?

As soon as the Pacific Fleet gets smaller China will be all over Formosa like a fat kid on cake.