SECDEF - Dissent Can Be a Sign of Health in an Organization

[sardak]

Secretary of Defense Gates gave two talks today (4/21/08), one at Maxwell AFB and one at West Point.  Both talks encouraged officers to "think outside the box."  Sec. Gates even suggested dissent - within limits.  For the Maxwell talk he used USAF Colonel John Boyd as his example.  At West Point his example was Army General Fox Conner. Gates suggested that Army leadership is more open to new ideas than Air Force leadership. The Secretary's talks made several points which reflect some discussions here on CAP Talk and in the real world of CAP.

One was a rather lengthy quote from Boyd about coming to a fork in the road where your choices are to be someone or to do something.  Gates' comment: "For the kinds of challenges America faces and will face, the armed forces will need principled, creative, reform-minded leaders, men and women who, as Boyd put it, want to do something, not be somebody."

From Gates "...it is clear to me that the culture of any large organization takes a long time to change, and the really tough part is preserving those elements of the culture that strengthen the institution and motivate the people in it, while shedding those elements of the culture that are barriers to progress and achieving the mission.  All of the services must examine their cultures critically..."

These are his answers to questions from audience members - Air Force officers.
"So figuring out how to integrate into a big organization and promote and protect a group of people that are trying to think outside the box, whether it's technology or process, I think, is one of the challenges for every senior leader.  The key is leaders who understand the value of people who do think out of the box, and the reality is, they mostly have to be protected."

"And I would put in the same category—I'm going to talk about more at West Point later today—dissent. Dissent is a sign of health in an organization, and particularly if it's done in the right way and respectfully and so on. But people who dissent, who take a different view, who kind of are orthogonal to the conventional wisdom are always at risk in their careers, just like Boyd was. And so figuring out—Boyd couldn't have done what he did unless senior officers, at least one or two, were looking out for him.  And so I would say, in a generic answer to your question, the biggest challenge for out-of-the-box thinking is the wisdom of the senior leader who sees the value of that kind of thinking and protects it and the people who do it."

From Secretary Gates' West Point speech:

"More broadly, if as an officer you don't tell blunt truths – or create an environment where candor is encouraged – then you've done yourself and the institution a disservice."

"Your duties as an officer are: 1. To provide blunt, candid advice always;  2. To keep disagreements private; 3. To implement faithfully decisions that go against you."

"I have been impressed by the way the Army's professional journals allow some of our brightest and most innovative officers to critique – sometimes bluntly – the way the service does business, to include judgments about senior leadership, both military and civilian. I believe this is a sign of institutional strength and vitality. I encourage you to take on the mantle of fearless, thoughtful, but loyal dissent when the situation calls for it. And, agree with the articles or not, senior officers should embrace such dissent as a health dialogue and protect and advance those considerably more junior who are taking on that mantle."

"But if you follow the dictates of your conscience and the courage of your convictions, while being respectfully candid with your superiors while encouraging candor in others, you will be in good stead for the challenges you will face as officers and leaders in the years ahead. Defend your integrity as you would your life. If you do this, I am confident that when you face those tough dilemmas, you will, in fact, know the right thing to do."

Text of his Maxwell speech with a transcript of questions from the audience and his answers:
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4214
Text of the West Point speech:
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1232

Mike

[afgeo4]

What does he want the Air Force to do? Turn in their wings and pick up M-16s? Sounds like reality finally caught up with him. The current conflict we're in no longer requires a substantial Air Force commitment because air superiority has been won a long time ago and urban combat limits air capability severely. That's just the nature of the conflict. Changing the Air Force to fit this new "mold" will only yield its inability to establish air superiority in the next conflict.

I understand the utility and importance of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft in OEF and OIF, but that's just a part of the equation and actually, just a small part. I believe we cannot allow the USAF to be transformed into an army of unmanned vehicles capable only of taking pictures and limited, low strength engagement. We must sustain our true combat capabilities through air to air and air to ground weapons platforms so we are able to defend our skies, our space, and our cyberspace in the conflicts of the future.

Have we not learned anything from this conflict? We cannot plan for the future by adapting to the present. We must look ahead and understand the broad needs of warfare.

[DNall]

What does he want the Air Force to do? Turn in their wings and pick up M-16s? Sounds like reality finally caught up with him. The current conflict we're in no longer requires a substantial Air Force commitment because air superiority has been won a long time ago and urban combat limits air capability severely. That's just the nature of the conflict. Changing the Air Force to fit this new "mold" will only yield its inability to establish air superiority in the next conflict.

I understand the utility and importance of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft in OEF and OIF, but that's just a part of the equation and actually, just a small part. I believe we cannot allow the USAF to be transformed into an army of unmanned vehicles capable only of taking pictures and limited, low strength engagement. We must sustain our true combat capabilities through air to air and air to ground weapons platforms so we are able to defend our skies, our space, and our cyberspace in the conflicts of the future.

Have we not learned anything from this conflict? We cannot plan for the future by adapting to the present. We must look ahead and understand the broad needs of warfare.

Let me frame that for you. Do we need a bunch of F22s or rather F35s, or do we need more A10s?

The Air Force thinks like fighter pilots. They're looking for higher faster better air superiority platforms. Air Superiority is important, but we don't exactly have a massive challenger out there we need to race to stay in front of. Where we fall short is in the support role.

You need to put three hellfire on an A10 instead of one maverick. You need to put 3-4 150lbs bombs on in place of one 500lbs. You need to give me an airframe that's a legitimate follow on to the A10. Something that'll go low & slow, with high maneuverability & highly durable/survivable, carries tons of ordnance & has extremely long staying power. That's not the F35, it's not the F16/15/22, or anything else on the drawing board.

A B2 hitting strategic targets with penetrating precision bombs/cruise missiles is great. But, I also need the ability to carpet bomb the crap out of an emplaced armored division before I knife my troops through & gut them.

The F22 is an amazing airplane, that I'd absolutely love to fly. It's unmatched for air superiority, no question. How is it as a strike aircraft though? Can it do the mission that F117s were previously doing? I think so. Can it take over for F15Es? No. Can it take over for F16s? No. The 35 is pretty great too, and it can take over for F16s, maybe even for 15Es, but not remotely for A10s.

The Air Force has to look at what we need in the real world, not the glory seeking red barron world they'd like to think might be out there somewhere. They absolutely have to compromise & balance their force. I just think that balance too often lands on the side of shooting down airplanes rather than putting rounds on my targets.

From an Army Aviation perspective... we shoot snipers in a window with a hellfire. Use rockets & guns on the light weight, lower precision targets. We're looking to get precision guided rockets in the future. I hope there's a lot of other developments in our weapons options. I'd love to have the staying power & weps capacity of fixed wing. What the Air Force needs to do is ask themselves what the Army would field if they had fixed wing attack aircraft, and start building some of that.

Is the Air Force open minded to that way of thinking? Are they open to changing course to meet the needs on the modern battlefield? Or are they obsessed with the idea of blowing some dumb schmuck out of the sky?

The Army has some jacked up ideas too. I'm not so sure they're more open-minded than the Air Force, they can just change easier cause the stuff is cheaper per unit to produce & easier to gear up for quickly.

[mikeylikey]

What does he want the Air Force to do? Turn in their wings and pick up M-16s? Sounds like reality finally caught up with him.

Maybe it is about time they did just that. 

Speaking as an Artillery Officer, I was trained to work with AF, and spent months learning their capabilities to support ground forces.  The very first time when I went to engage their services in Afghanistan, they came up short and too late.  Disappointing me and my Command.  That is not the point though.

We are in the second longest Armed conflict in US history.  The military is changing to meet this new type of war.  If the AF continues to invest time and money and manhours on platforms that combat threats from 20 years ago, I would say that their future is very unclear.  Marine, Naval and Army forces can easily absorb the AF if the need arises.  A separate AF was needed, in the twentieth century, I am not so sure if still is though.   

[afgeo4]

What does he want the Air Force to do? Turn in their wings and pick up M-16s? Sounds like reality finally caught up with him.

Maybe it is about time they did just that. 

Speaking as an Artillery Officer, I was trained to work with AF, and spent months learning their capabilities to support ground forces.  The very first time when I went to engage their services in Afghanistan, they came up short and too late.  Disappointing me and my Command.  That is not the point though.

We are in the second longest Armed conflict in US history.  The military is changing to meet this new type of war.  If the AF continues to invest time and money and manhours on platforms that combat threats from 20 years ago, I would say that their future is very unclear.  Marine, Naval and Army forces can easily absorb the AF if the need arises.  A separate AF was needed, in the twentieth century, I am not so sure if still is though.   

That's the Army man in you talking. Now try taking a neutral stance and think strategically instead of tactically. Why does the Air Force exist?

Because ever since WWI, air supremacy has been a crucial part of winning a conflict/war. That's been so all through the 20th century as you've said, but that's been so in this century as well. You probably forget, being an Army FA officer that there was a prolonged air war with Iraq in the 90's that destroyed their air capabilities. You probably forget how during the opening days of OIF, our Air Force sent whatever was left of the Iraqi fighters scrambling for the Iranian border. You may even take it for granted that when you drive through the Iraqi countryside, there aren't cluster bombs raining down on you. That's ok though. We, the Airmen, don't forget that.

It was the Air Force's job to neutralize any possible threats coming from the air, space and now cyberspace. The Air Force has achieved that goal. That is no reason to scold it. It is no reason to change its role. Every branch has its role. The Air Force's role isn't to fight on the ground... that's what the Army is for.

I understand quite well that today's conflict is a complex, ground engagement that has left little room for the Air Force to do its normal work. That's not the fault of the Airmen or their doctrine. It's the fault of the conflict and our inability to achieve combat success.

Think of what will be the next conflict... who will it be? Iran? N. Korea? China? Venezuela?... all those nations have strong Air Forces that will make us pay for using a plethora of unmanned recon aircraft and few incapable fighter aircraft. And you know who'll pay the ultimate price? The grunts. When the enemy aircraft own the skies, ground forces are denied mobility and resupply chains dry up quickly. That leads to defeat.

I understand the frustrations with the current conflict, but just think... if a democrat is elected and they actually do exit the conflict... what good will those changes (that will cost billions of dollars) be?

[DNall]

Actually, they ran for the Iranian border after a protracted air campaign in Gulf War. None left the ground at any time during OIF, not for Iran or otherwise. They were destroyed in placed, burried in the sand, or otherwise just left to rot.

If you want to talk about the need for air superiority, you need to use China as your example. That's the only one that makes any sense. It's going to be a suicidal 1-2 week exercise for anyone else. The Air Force certainly needs to win that fight decisively, but the job dos NOT end there. The Air Force doesn't need a thousand fighters. And it doesn't need multi-role planes that are really fighters with some below average groud attack capability as an afterthought.

Let me put it to you this way. The Marine Corps is technically under the dept of Navy. Navy aviation places direct support of the marine force ashore above all else but protecting the carrier itself. Even at that, the Marines still have their own fixed wing attack force, who absolutely focus on CAS.

The Air Force is supposed to have that same relationship with the Army. It does also have a strategic & air superiority mission, but those are given far too much attention by comparison. At the same time, it by law restricts the Army from having fixed wing attack capability.

The Air Force broke away from the Army because the traditional Army didn't have the vision to see the developing need on the modern battlefield. Now those roles are reversed. The traditional Air Force is sticking to its roots & not recognizing the need on the modern battlefield that they must adapt to or lose relevance. For right now, it's making the Army less capable by not providing the kinds of attack capabilities we need, and restricting us from doing it ourselves. The AF needs to fix that.

[MIKE]

Well... The discussion started off somewhat relevant, but now we are into the whole USAF Field Division thing... a la the Luftwaffe, which as the title suggests was not the point of this thread.

[JoeTomasone]

I understand the utility and importance of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft in OEF and OIF, but that's just a part of the equation and actually, just a small part. I believe we cannot allow the USAF to be transformed into an army of unmanned vehicles capable only of taking pictures and limited, low strength engagement. We must sustain our true combat capabilities through air to air and air to ground weapons platforms so we are able to defend our skies, our space, and our cyberspace in the conflicts of the future.

The Air Force thinks like fighter pilots. They're looking for higher faster better air superiority platforms.

The Air Force has to look at what we need in the real world, not the glory seeking red barron world they'd like to think might be out there somewhere. They absolutely have to compromise & balance their force. I just think that balance too often lands on the side of shooting down airplanes rather than putting rounds on my targets.

Just look at the SR-71 as an example of the fighter jock USAF mentality.   The program was closed down not because it was a poor performer (it was anything but), or prone to losses (not one was ever shot down by the enemy), or even because it was replaced by superior technology (to date, nothing is known to have done so).   It was killed because certain of the USAF senior leadership didn't like it, and no one ever got noticed (and promoted) by running such a secretive command.     There wasn't a whole lot of thinking outside the box there; even after they realized they needed it post-retirement during Desert Storm they still were trying to bury it.   

Even as a customer, I saw a lot of the more progressively-thinking people getting flack from above.

[NEBoom]

There was an AP story about this today I saw in the Omaha paper.  http://tinyurl.com/525hd6  Secretary Gates mentions the dreaded UAVs as something he wants the AF to do more.

I was struck by this:  "Noting that they (AF officers at Maxwell he was addressing) represent the future of Air Force leadership, he urged them to think innovatively and worry less about their careers than about adapting to a changing world."

Good advice, and something that needed to be said, IMHO.

[RiverAux]

Part of his talk was about wanting the AF to do more UAV work.  Seems to me that quite a lot of this job could actually be done by traditional small aircraft used for this purpose for decades at much lower cost and which could be brought online very quickly.   Yes, the UAVs have more endurance on station and don't risk a pilot, but (and I admit I don't follow this too closely), it doesn't seem like a whole lot of them are being shot down in our current wars and wouldn't be all that much more dangerous than standard helicopter operations.  

They could mount a lot of the sensing gear and even weapons on these planes for a fraction of the cost.  

I think we're in a situation where we're gotten too focused on the high-tech solution than a perfectable workable traditional approach.  

Bring back the Bird dog!

[JohnKachenmeister]

I have to agree with Secretary Gates.

The Army, after Vietnam, did some soul-searching and decided that to survive as an armed force it HAD to be more flexible.  To fight a conventional war of combined arms maneuver, and/or fight an unconventional war involving Internal Defense and Development, working with Host Country Nationals, etc.  The Army fell behind in equipment to support that goal, but that was not entirely the Army's fault, part of the blame is on Congress that failed to fund requirements until after we were involved in an Iraq insurgent counteroffensive.

The Air Force has been resistant to change and has become more inflexible.  The A-10 is but one example.  The AF didn't want it because it was not a strategic bomber or a dual-purpose fighter.  It didn't fit in the AF boxes, therefore it must be bad.

Talking with AF officers on a regular basis, I can tell you that candor and innovative thinking are not encouraged.  I find that sad, since the AF of the 50's and 60's was a pretty high-speed organization, open to innovation.  I'm not sure how this changed.

[DNall]

^TQM is partly to blame. It created a bunch of rigidly structured scientific analysis to operate a blender. It talked about encouraging change, but it really didn't. There's a lot of other things to blame too I guess, I'm not a genius to tell you why it is the way it is, just that it's grown out of touch in its little world with the needs of the battlefield.

like I said before, the Army has massive problems too, and some of the changes they are making now are for the worse, but they are to a degree more adaptable. Some of that is circumstance, some of it is they've been popped in the nose & knocked down, got up & learned to dodge. The AF doesn't face that kind of opposition in the air, and doesn't feel the pain of the cost paid on the ground.

[afgeo4]

^TQM is partly to blame. It created a bunch of rigidly structured scientific analysis to operate a blender. It talked about encouraging change, but it really didn't. There's a lot of other things to blame too I guess, I'm not a genius to tell you why it is the way it is, just that it's grown out of touch in its little world with the needs of the battlefield.

like I said before, the Army has massive problems too, and some of the changes they are making now are for the worse, but they are to a degree more adaptable. Some of that is circumstance, some of it is they've been popped in the nose & knocked down, got up & learned to dodge. The AF doesn't face that kind of opposition in the air, and doesn't feel the pain of the cost paid on the ground.

I agree, to some degree with what the SECDEF is saying. AF leaders need to be more receptive to out of the box thinking. From experience, aviators tend to be very out of the box thinkers by nature. Nothing you can teach in a classroom or write in a book will make you a good pilot. A good pilot knows when the right thing to do is throw out the safety protocols and restrictions. The issue is in fact money. It is much more of an issue in USAF and Navy than other branches. Why?

Because weapons systems are so costly. Because training to operate those systems is so costly. Training a soldier to use infantry, artillery, armor or engineering weapons is relatively inexpensive compared to training airmen to fly and maintain super high tech air/space systems. These high expenses require greater restrictions on the priority to "change your mind". One cannot build a $300M system and then say... you know, I think I'm going to scrap that and use something else cuz I'm thinking "outside the box". No. That just won't fly with anyone.

My point: It's easy to say it, but doing it is much more difficult because of our system, not our leaders.

[ADCAPer]

Well... The discussion started off somewhat relevant, but now we are into the whole USAF Field Division thing... a la the Luftwaffe, which as the title suggests was not the point of this thread.

This thread went off topic at the second post.

[DNall]

^ I considered that, it's a popular notion, but I disagree. Yes certainly one F22 costs more than One Stryker. But, when we buy a vehicle we buy it by the the thousands. The ultimate expenditures are similar for a major combat system.

I think the Stryker, for instance, is an absolutely stupid idea. It's the size of a bus, too large turning radius for normal two-land roads, limited off-road capability, limited protection. The slat armor (if you can call it that) provides very limited protection. The structural armor is a sandwich of kevlar & ceramic molded together like fiberglass. It works great, till you shoot it, then like a bullet proof vest it's lost it's protection & needs to be replaced. They can replace sections, but that weakens the overall hull... we're talking about something here that costs 4mil a copy. Versus Bradleys, or the competitor update of the M113.

We're building standard HMMWVs, then sending them to another plant to be up-armored. They haven't been redesigned with a different engine, transmission, suspension, etc. They get some upgrades, but it's on a foundation not made to support them. So, they break down fast & often. How smart is that, and an up-armored HMMWV is the best you can come up with for a brigade to go to war in?  So now we got MRAPs, which is a bank armored car with a boat hull belly & the same armor as the stryker, better suspension, hadn't hear yet about the engine/trans performance or reliability. And of course they're expensive.

there's a whole lot about transformation I'm not wild about, but because we're in this interim period, we're able to use interim vehicles cause we know we're not committing to them long term. We do spend a boat load of money on them though, and burn them up fast. There's for sure some much better decisions that could be made in there.

[DNall]

Well... The discussion started off somewhat relevant, but now we are into the whole USAF Field Division thing... a la the Luftwaffe, which as the title suggests was not the point of this thread.

This thread went off topic at the second post.

No one once said anything about the AF creating field divisions or any such thing. The Nazis had their airborne under their AF, I don't see the 82nd coming over to the USAF, so hat's not on the board.

The secretary talked about the way in which the AF is not being responsive to the modern needs of the battlefield, the army either to a lesser extent. You have a bunch of people here who are in those services (or were) discussing the degree of truth to those statements & associated details.

I realize the original post mentioned something about linking organizational dissent to CAP, which was not well defined, and also not related to what the SECDEF was talking about. So, we're not discussing that. This discussion is very directly on topic of the SECDEF's statements & how they bear on the future of the armed forces.

[PHall]

What we have here is a SecDEF who's hard up for "boots on the ground" type folks for the Army and the Marine Corps who sees a whole bunch of people in the Air Force that, from what he has been told by his Army and Marine Corps advisor's, are not sharing the burden with their ground pounding brethren.

Well duh!

We can only work with what the SecDEF's predecessor's have given the Air Force to work with.

The Air Force, or just about any branch of the service is equipped to fight the last war.

The time it takes to design, build and procur new aircraft and systems usually guarantees that they will come on-line after the war they were designed for has ended.

[ColonelJack]

What we have here is a SecDEF who's hard up for "boots on the ground" type folks for the Army and the Marine Corps who sees a whole bunch of people in the Air Force that, from what he has been told by his Army and Marine Corps advisor's, are not sharing the burden with their ground pounding brethren.

Well duh!

Well said!!!  It is, after all, called the Air Force.  We're not supposed to be groundpounders.  That's not our job.  That's the Army and Marine Corps' job.  Nobody's hollering for the Navy to pick up M-16s and start a-shootin', are they?

Jack

[Al Sayre]

When the Navy starts shooting, the 16" beats the M-16 every time...

[DNall]

AF cops & Engineers at the very least are on the ground doing traditional Army unit jobs. A female AF Major got the Bronze star last year for ground action while running a convoy. I think certainly they AF can push more folks into those kinds of roles over the short run to aide the manpower shortage the Army & Marines are under, at the same time AF recruiters are turning people away.

However, no one here, nor the SecDef is talking about the AF taking on ground combat missions!!!

We're talking about the Air Force making appropriate decisions to support the ground conflict, not continue to seek fighters & heavy penetrator bombers best suited for the cold war. That's been done with for a very long time now. The Air Force is a whole generation behind in it's thinking.

[mikeylikey]

I would like to see how many AF types have deployed overseas in the past 7 years as apposed to the Army and Marine Corps.  There is no reason AF types shouldn't be punding the ground.  Hell, Army cooks are stepping off on patrols, why can't the Air Force. 

[PHall]

I would like to see how many AF types have deployed overseas in the past 7 years as apposed to the Army and Marine Corps.  There is no reason AF types shouldn't be punding the ground.  Hell, Army cooks are stepping off on patrols, why can't the Air Force. 

Well, lets see. They're not trained for ground combat. They're not equipped for ground combat.

The Army has something like eight times the people the Air Force has. The number of people that the Air Force could provide, and still be able to perform it's assigned missions, wouldn't be that many.

[mikeylikey]

Well, lets see. They're not trained for ground combat. They're not equipped for ground combat.

1 Pair of boots, 1 uniform, 1 M4/M16, 1 helmet, 2 magazines and fall in line with 2nd Platoon.  Pounding the ground is not rocket science.  They can easily get the same refresher course that all National Guard and Reserve Soldiers get before heading off for Iraq. 

I think it is time more AF folks got some play time in the suck.  And I don't mean deploy to an airbase. 

 

[DNall]

All NG/Res troops had battle drills & IMT at basic. They qualified with a rifle & were familiarized with crew serve weps. The AF has no such training. You'd have to put all of them thru WTC just to make them into support troops & even then they'd be behind the curve.

How does that solve anything? Using AF personnel would just screw their recruiting & end up costing the govt lots more to keep both branches manned to need. Why can't you cut AF personnel & increase Army personnel - that's in fact what we've been doing.

The AF has an important mission, and it doesn't involve ground combat. The problem is they're too deeply rooted in their own little world & not serving the needs of the greater battlefield - namely a stronger focus on CAS.

The SecDef I think is talking more about their insistence on buying more F22s rather than embracing a conversion to UCAVs.

[davedove]

What we have here is a SecDEF who's hard up for "boots on the ground" type folks for the Army and the Marine Corps who sees a whole bunch of people in the Air Force that, from what he has been told by his Army and Marine Corps advisor's, are not sharing the burden with their ground pounding brethren.

Well duh!

Well said!!!  It is, after all, called the Air Force.  We're not supposed to be groundpounders.  That's not our job.  That's the Army and Marine Corps' job.  Nobody's hollering for the Navy to pick up M-16s and start a-shootin', are they?

Jack

Actually, the Navy is experiencing some of the same issues for the same reasons.  After all, how many large naval battles have we had recently?

[afgeo4]

Going back to the topic... What Sec Gates said rings funny to me. It's a speech that sounds wonderfully, but coming from an office rat and being aimed at a company/flight commander out in Iraq or Afgy... I wouldn't like what he's saying. Telling those folk that they're not doing enough to support themselves while in combat...

The truth is... in combat, on the level of the fighter = platoon/company/combat flight/squadron there's plenty out of the box thinking going on. It's just that that thinking doesn't make it all the way up to Pentagon for review and the SECDEF doesn't know about it. If all our company grade officers thought "in the box", we'd be speaking Arabic among ruins of NYC already.

[capchiro]

The problem is the same with the military as with CAP, if one doesn't want to mess with the IG and mess up a good career, one may think outside of the box, but one better not color outside of the lines.  A very wise Regional Commander told me that once..

[davedove]

The problem is the same with the military as with CAP, if one doesn't want to mess with the IG and mess up a good career, one may think outside of the box, but one better not color outside of the lines.  A very wise Regional Commander told me that once..

True, the secret is to learn how to think outside of the box, without violating any rules or regulations, a very delicate balancing act, to be sure.

[JohnKachenmeister]

I agree with DNall.  The SecDef is NOT advocating an Air Force infantry element.  He IS advocating that the AF adapt to the war we got, not the war we might have OR the war we used to have.

I am not convinced that UAV's are the ultimate answer to the current insurgent conflcict.  They are a part of the solution, however.  What the AF must do, in my humble (but combat-tested) experience is:

1.  Increase AF Security Forces so that the AF can defend its own assets on the ground.  The Navy does not rely on the Army to protect its ships, why should the AF rely on the Army to protect its planes and bases?

2.  Increase participation in combined force planning.  Right now, the AF is structured for a multifaceted air battle as was expected in Europe.  Some strategic bombing, some air supremacy operations, some ground support operations, some air logistic (theater and strategic) operations, with resources balanced by the Air Component Commander.  We need to have the AF in support of a supreme theater commander, with resources directed exclusively in support of the ground operations in theater.  Supreme commanders wear green, or I guess now, Army Blue.  Can't get around that. 

3.  A change in attitude among AF folks.  Killing Ali Babas on the deck must be honored as much as killing MiG's in the air.  The era of the "Ace" is over.  The Ace was killed by the F-22.  Nobody is coming up to fight anymore.  They will no longer be "Zooming to meet our thunder."  "Nobody comes close" is not just a recruiting slogan, it is the current state of air combat.

[FANBOY]

Hi Folks,

The SECDEF's comments have caused quite a stir amongst the defense community.

I posted my contribution to the conversation on my blog:

New Combat Role for CAP?

[Defense Secretary] Gates wants the services to think "beyond Predator and Reaper" and consider quick and dirty ideas like putting "sensors on a Cessna."

- Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell

http://capblog.typepad.com/capblog/2008/04/new-combat-role.html

In fact, USAF Gen. Clary (former Air Force Director of Homeland Security) once referred to CAP's single-engine fleet as being "manned UAVs."

It is time to think out of the box.

S/V,

Capt. Rod "DATA" Rakic
http://capblog.typepad.com

[RiverAux]

Hmm, wish I would have read that prior to basically saying the same thing earlier in this thread....

Its not actually thinking outside the box, its taking the old box out of the closet where it was hidden away after Vietnam...

[sardak]

Hopefully now we can steer this thread back to what the real intent was - which was clearly defined in the original post and title.  It was not intended to debate what weapons platforms are better or which service knows what it's doing - those aren't CAP issues.  It was to discuss the thinking process and that CAP leadership needs to start following Secretary Gates' advice to start crawling out of its cave.  There are numerous threads on CAP Talk that question the wisdom of what CAP does, and that the "old way" isn't necessarily the best or right way.  Leaders have to listen to the members.

As for Gates' direction to the Air Force, these are from his speech at Maxwell.  Everyone is focused on combat and the Middle East, but these also apply to domestic missions.

For those missions that still require manned missions, we need to think hard about whether we have the right platforms -- whether, for example, low-cost, low-tech alternatives exist to do basic reconnaissance and close air support in an environment where we have total control of the skies -- aircraft that our partners also can afford.

These new realities and missions should be reflected in our training and doctrine. The Air Force will be increasingly called upon to conduct civil-military or humanitarian operations with interagency and nongovernmental organizations and partners and deal directly with local populations.

CAP leadership needs to be pushing the USAF, and the members need to be pushing CAP leadership.  That was the message to CAP from the speeches at Maxwell and West Point.

Mike

[JohnKachenmeister]

We, or at least some of us have, been preaching for the same thing here on the net for a couple of years.  The re-bluing of CAP.  Bring CAP back into being a functional part of the Air Force.

In 1942-43, the CAP turned the tide of the coastal battle by suddenly placing hundreds more combat aircraft into action against U-Boats.  Right now, we are positioned to do a lot in the Homeland Battle:

1.  We have more than 500 light airplanes pre-positioned around the United States, able to operate from virtually any civilian airport.

2.  We have an extensive radio network, on AF frequencies, positioned in both homes and cars around the United States.

3.  We have a force of trained personnel, able to conduct extended air operations, maintain communications nets, conduct limited ground operations in concert with light scout aircraft, AND trained specifically to interface with civilian agencies.

Homeland Defense Missions we can do now or with minimal new equipment/training:

1.  Light cargo missions.  Moving ammunition from Ammunition Storage Points to National Guard units mobilized to perform HD missions.  Moving antibiotics to areas hit with biological agents.  Movement of key personnel to areas where needed, i.e.: movement of extra physicians/nurses to disaster areas; movement of key military personnel; movement of repair parts for vital military or civilian equipment.

2.  Surveillance missions.  With radiological sensors, scan major roads, ports, harbor entrances, etc. for traces of weapon-type radiation.  Assist in securing exclusion areas around high-value assets such as military facilities, nuclear power plants, etc. during peak threat periods.  Support convoy movements within CONUS for mobilizing and returning units.  Intel gathering on specific threat targets using advanced sensors.

3.  Combat missions.  I takes longer to train a UAV driver than to build a UAV.  CAP pilots with instrument ratings can be tasked to fly UAV's, which are controlled from within CONUS.  This can augment the AF pilots assigned to this duty, and possibly free up some pilots for other duty.  In the short term, we can add more UAV's to the force mix by using volunter pilots.

4.  Combat support missions.  CAP can produce a population of "Everyone from 8 to 80; blind, crippled and crazy."  What other military force can produce an authentic indigenous population for MOUT training?

5.  Training support missions.  We have been training cadets for years.  Why not bring Iraqi/Afghan/other older teens to the US and have CAP folks run encampment type training to build a professional military cadre for the long-term?

That's just off the top of my head.  Ideas flow quickly, unemcumbered by long hair.

[afgeo4]

Bring this topic back to CAP? I don't think most members of CAP know what the box really is. The box was never well defined by our leadership, so working outside the box is easy. Following the books and doctrines (do we even have any?) is the hard part.

Here's something really outside the box though... where's the CAP UAV program? What better thing to work on with cadets than oversized radio controlled aircraft? You could use a flight sim from a laptop or a desktop to control a say... 4 to 8 foot wingspan light aircraft with a couple of basic cameras on it... great for low and slow work, UAV pilot training, and AE projects. Once built, quite inexpensive to maintain and operate.

The payoff? USAFA and ROTC would love cadets who are familiar with operating aircraft through a computer environment.

[Gunner C]

Bring this topic back to CAP? I don't think most members of CAP know what the box really is. The box was never well defined by our leadership, so working outside the box is easy. Following the books and doctrines (do we even have any?) is the hard part.

You are correct on several levels. 

First:  We have no doctrine.  Doctrine is the capstone of how we should do business.  It establishes the right and left limit stakes of what we do.  Regulations and manuals would support the doctrine, as would training.  But what we do is we make it up as we go.  The NEC and NB change things helter skelter without regard to how if affects the overall doctrine that ties everything together.

Second:  CAP/CC never goes to the Region/CCs with a list of missions/goals that they should be able to accomplish.  That list would be  analyzed by the region staff and the wings would be given their missions/goals, and on down the line.  Periodically, squadrons would brief group/CCs, group/CCs would brief wing/CCs, wing/CCs would brief region/CCs and region/CCs would brief CAP/CC what they had accomplished for the quarter and the plan for the next. This would drive budgets, schedules, exercises, etc.  But none of this is done (save a couple of wings - MDWG is one).

GC

[SARMedTech]

I have to respectfully disagree with a point made by Kach:

Do you really want to send uniformed civilians into bio-terror hot zones. The nightmare scenario where bio-agents are concerned is aircraft traffic.  I would encourage you to take a look at the book "Preparing for BioTerrorism" by Dr. George Buck. Are we going to uptrain CAP pilots and mission crews to operational HazMat status? Are we going to supply them with N-95 masks, respirators and glow worm suits?  Who is going to decon them when they return? Who is going to decon the a/c? When you have a hot zone in terms of bioterror, anyone that goes into it basically becomes a quarantine necessary patient. I am an EMT with a disaster response team. We are trained for this kind of thing and equipped with drugs to save our butts if we are exposed. Heck, the training to tell us how much training we need took three days.  If CAP did this, we could have yet another motto change: "CAP pilots fly in, but they don't fly out."

[JohnKachenmeister]

I have to respectfully disagree with a point made by Kach:

Do you really want to send uniformed civilians into bio-terror hot zones. The nightmare scenario where bio-agents are concerned is aircraft traffic.  I would encourage you to take a look at the book "Preparing for BioTerrorism" by Dr. George Buck. Are we going to uptrain CAP pilots and mission crews to operational HazMat status? Are we going to supply them with N-95 masks, respirators and glow worm suits?  Who is going to decon them when they return? Who is going to decon the a/c? When you have a hot zone in terms of bioterror, anyone that goes into it basically becomes a quarantine necessary patient. I am an EMT with a disaster response team. We are trained for this kind of thing and equipped with drugs to save our butts if we are exposed. Heck, the training to tell us how much training we need took three days.  If CAP did this, we could have yet another motto change: "CAP pilots fly in, but they don't fly out."

I did not explain the tactics of such a transport.  Obviously, we would identify a civilian airport OUTSIDE the identified hot zone, and use that as a logistics base for the receipt of antibiotics.  Then, people with the appropriate training would move the drugs into the hot zone and administer them to people they like.  ( )

[JohnKachenmeister]

Bring this topic back to CAP? I don't think most members of CAP know what the box really is. The box was never well defined by our leadership, so working outside the box is easy. Following the books and doctrines (do we even have any?) is the hard part.

You are correct on several levels. 

First:  We have no doctrine.  Doctrine is the capstone of how we should do business.  It establishes the right and left limit stakes of what we do.  Regulations and manuals would support the doctrine, as would training.  But what we do is we make it up as we go.  The NEC and NB change things helter skelter without regard to how if affects the overall doctrine that ties everything together.

Second:  CAP/CC never goes to the Region/CCs with a list of missions/goals that they should be able to accomplish.  That list would be  analyzed by the region staff and the wings would be given their missions/goals, and on down the line.  Periodically, squadrons would brief group/CCs, group/CCs would brief wing/CCs, wing/CCs would brief region/CCs and region/CCs would brief CAP/CC what they had accomplished for the quarter and the plan for the next. This would drive budgets, schedules, exercises, etc.  But none of this is done (save a couple of wings - MDWG is one).

GC

You are correct, sort of.

We DO have a doctrine for SAR operations, developed over the past 60 or so years, but that is all.

We have always, since our inception, been a backwards organization from what military types are used to.  In the military, we say:  "Here is your mission.  Now train up to it and get the equipment you need to carry it out."  In CAP, since World War II, we have said:  "Here's what we got... hundreds of light planes and thousands of pilots.  What can we do with them?"

[DNall]

I have to respectfully disagree with a point made by Kach:

Do you really want to send uniformed civilians into bio-terror hot zones. The nightmare scenario where bio-agents are concerned is aircraft traffic.  I would encourage you to take a look at the book "Preparing for BioTerrorism" by Dr. George Buck. Are we going to uptrain CAP pilots and mission crews to operational HazMat status? Are we going to supply them with N-95 masks, respirators and glow worm suits?  Who is going to decon them when they return? Who is going to decon the a/c? When you have a hot zone in terms of bioterror, anyone that goes into it basically becomes a quarantine necessary patient. I am an EMT with a disaster response team. We are trained for this kind of thing and equipped with drugs to save our butts if we are exposed. Heck, the training to tell us how much training we need took three days.  If CAP did this, we could have yet another motto change: "CAP pilots fly in, but they don't fly out."

CAP has several times flown hazmat personnel around a chem release situation. They are able to assess winds, spread of the agent, detection of what the agent is, etc. There's no need to fly through the stuff, just close enough to get readings, get an overhead view, and for the passenger to conduct command & control.

I'm tired of hearing we don't want to send uniformed civilians into XYZ. You as an EMT on a disaster response team are a uniformed civilian. CAP doesn't need to be on the sideline for three weeks after Katrina rolls though talking about we can't put these poor sweet innocent volunteers into this situation cause there might be bad things there. That's bull crap. A CAP member is supposed to be adequately trained, equipped, and prepared to go straight into the depths of situations like that right after the thing happens. The capability we have to provide is getting in first with air/grd assessment to tell first responders where to send their resources. It's useless weeks later when emergency services are back on line.


Anyway, the SecDEF comments have nothing to do with CAP. The problem with CAP is our structure & leadership. It's currently formulated with no discipline, & incentive to preserve power/influence/control of resources. There's politics everywhere, but ours rule the process. There isn't a merit based advancement system or quality internal leader/mgr training. All that stuff leads to ineffectual political folks at the top that are generally not competent for what they're trying to do, and no system around them to correct the issue.

The second part of the issue is CAP in general. Just take our active versus not membership. Say it's 40% active, of that how many are ES qual'd & active in the last quarter. Now look at the distribution of that geographically, cadets out of the mix cause they can't help us on major disasters. At this point can you legitimately meet the operational requirements in the comm TA? We have to face that situation head on with strong leadership & targeted resources/effort. We have to revitalize CAP where it needs it most.

Then finally we have to address technology. Mark I eyeball from a Cessna is about worthless. ARCHER may or may not be useful, apparently 1AF says not. I don't care if it were a miracle machine, we don't have good distribution of it. We need a lower cost higher fleet penetration system - like off-the-shelf day/night FLIR just like border patrol uses on their Cessnas. That doesn't take a high investment in equipment, but it does take some effort on the part of our aircrew to get & stay online. If we can't be something more than a bunch of common civilians walking/flying around looking for stuff, then we got no business taking the govt's money.

[SAR-EMT1]

What we have here is a SecDEF who's hard up for "boots on the ground" type folks for the Army and the Marine Corps who sees a whole bunch of people in the Air Force that, from what he has been told by his Army and Marine Corps advisor's, are not sharing the burden with their ground pounding brethren.

Well duh!

Well said!!!  It is, after all, called the Air Force.  We're not supposed to be groundpounders.  That's not our job.  That's the Army and Marine Corps' job.  Nobody's hollering for the Navy to pick up M-16s and start a-shootin', are they?

Jack

Actually, the Navy is experiencing some of the same issues for the same reasons.  After all, how many large naval battles have we had recently?

As soon as the Pacific Fleet gets smaller China will be all over Formosa like a fat kid on cake.

[mikeylikey]

As soon as the Pacific Fleet gets smaller China will be all over Formosa like a fat kid on cake.

  I love CAKE!

[JohnKachenmeister]

I love fat kids!     

[ColonelJack]

I am a fat kid!

Jack

[mikeylikey]

I love fat kids who love cake!

[SAR-EMT1]

My point is: the only main reason China hasnt invaded is because of PACFLT specificallly the Kitty Hawk Group in Japan and the routine berthing of SSNs SSBNs and DDGs in Tipei Harbor > spelling? < and patrolling through the Strait of Tiawan.

-- How many others know that China has roughly 500 landing craft positioned for an invasion at any given time?

While many folks think its a matter of economics for China, I personally still think that it still revolves around the National Museum.


--- done with off topic musings

[SAR-EMT1]

Back to topic...

Im surprised that CAP didnt get the same speech at the last National Confrence/ Board Meeting.

[MIKE]

If topics continue to drift... the locking will in turn, continue.

[mikeylikey]

So is it any wonder that the secretary gives this speech to up and coming junior Officers?  Seems like someone or something is trying to change the culture of the military.  (or am I reading into it too much)

[DNall]

I love fat kids who love cake!

Amazing coincidence! So did my Drill Sgt. 

Back to topic...

Im surprised that CAP didnt get the same speech at the last National Confrence/ Board Meeting.

As I said, I really don't think this applies to CAP, not in the sense the Secretary meant it toward the services anyway. I think the fundamental problems with CAP are within our poorly designed structure & accountability chain. To a slightly lesser degree in our personnel development process.

There are technological issues that face CAP, but they aren't being addressed due to the nature of CAP itself, not due close-mindedness.

If topics continue to drift... the locking will in turn, continue.

Respectfully, chill out. The topic is covering BOTH the bearing of SecDef comments on the services at large, as well as any relation to CAP. In order to even comment on how they apply to CAP, one must first understand how they were meant in context to the services. All the discussion has been on topic to that point.

[ADCAPer]

If topics continue to drift... the locking will in turn, continue.

As I said earlier, this thread has been off-topic since it began.

For those of you that obviously didn't bother to read the entire transcript, the Secretary of Defense's speech, including the speech he referenced at Maxwell and made at West Point later that day, was about leadership. The point he was making concerning dissent was in an answer to a question, and in his answer he referred back to his illustration of Colonel John Boyd.

The other examples that Secretary Gates cited in his speech were to illustrate to a group of young new officers that they;

1) Need to recognize that the time will come where they will have to decide if they are going to compromise their principals to further their career, or if they will do what is right instead; and

2) To show them that they need to be prepared to protect the people that will work for them, especially the people who are capable of thinking outside the box. Because while these type of people may be difficult to work with, and while they may show signs of dissent, it doesn't mean they are not valuable to the organization.

[DNall]

And the voice of that dissent that hasn't been listed to is.... what we've been talking about.