SECDEF - Dissent Can Be a Sign of Health in an Organization

[sardak]

Secretary of Defense Gates gave two talks today (4/21/08), one at Maxwell AFB and one at West Point.  Both talks encouraged officers to "think outside the box."  Sec. Gates even suggested dissent - within limits.  For the Maxwell talk he used USAF Colonel John Boyd as his example.  At West Point his example was Army General Fox Conner. Gates suggested that Army leadership is more open to new ideas than Air Force leadership. The Secretary's talks made several points which reflect some discussions here on CAP Talk and in the real world of CAP.

One was a rather lengthy quote from Boyd about coming to a fork in the road where your choices are to be someone or to do something.  Gates' comment: "For the kinds of challenges America faces and will face, the armed forces will need principled, creative, reform-minded leaders, men and women who, as Boyd put it, want to do something, not be somebody."

From Gates "...it is clear to me that the culture of any large organization takes a long time to change, and the really tough part is preserving those elements of the culture that strengthen the institution and motivate the people in it, while shedding those elements of the culture that are barriers to progress and achieving the mission.  All of the services must examine their cultures critically..."

These are his answers to questions from audience members - Air Force officers.
"So figuring out how to integrate into a big organization and promote and protect a group of people that are trying to think outside the box, whether it's technology or process, I think, is one of the challenges for every senior leader.  The key is leaders who understand the value of people who do think out of the box, and the reality is, they mostly have to be protected."

"And I would put in the same category—I'm going to talk about more at West Point later today—dissent. Dissent is a sign of health in an organization, and particularly if it's done in the right way and respectfully and so on. But people who dissent, who take a different view, who kind of are orthogonal to the conventional wisdom are always at risk in their careers, just like Boyd was. And so figuring out—Boyd couldn't have done what he did unless senior officers, at least one or two, were looking out for him.  And so I would say, in a generic answer to your question, the biggest challenge for out-of-the-box thinking is the wisdom of the senior leader who sees the value of that kind of thinking and protects it and the people who do it."

From Secretary Gates' West Point speech:

"More broadly, if as an officer you don't tell blunt truths – or create an environment where candor is encouraged – then you've done yourself and the institution a disservice."

"Your duties as an officer are: 1. To provide blunt, candid advice always;  2. To keep disagreements private; 3. To implement faithfully decisions that go against you."

"I have been impressed by the way the Army's professional journals allow some of our brightest and most innovative officers to critique – sometimes bluntly – the way the service does business, to include judgments about senior leadership, both military and civilian. I believe this is a sign of institutional strength and vitality. I encourage you to take on the mantle of fearless, thoughtful, but loyal dissent when the situation calls for it. And, agree with the articles or not, senior officers should embrace such dissent as a health dialogue and protect and advance those considerably more junior who are taking on that mantle."

"But if you follow the dictates of your conscience and the courage of your convictions, while being respectfully candid with your superiors while encouraging candor in others, you will be in good stead for the challenges you will face as officers and leaders in the years ahead. Defend your integrity as you would your life. If you do this, I am confident that when you face those tough dilemmas, you will, in fact, know the right thing to do."

Text of his Maxwell speech with a transcript of questions from the audience and his answers:
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4214
Text of the West Point speech:
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1232

Mike

[afgeo4]

What does he want the Air Force to do? Turn in their wings and pick up M-16s? Sounds like reality finally caught up with him. The current conflict we're in no longer requires a substantial Air Force commitment because air superiority has been won a long time ago and urban combat limits air capability severely. That's just the nature of the conflict. Changing the Air Force to fit this new "mold" will only yield its inability to establish air superiority in the next conflict.

I understand the utility and importance of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft in OEF and OIF, but that's just a part of the equation and actually, just a small part. I believe we cannot allow the USAF to be transformed into an army of unmanned vehicles capable only of taking pictures and limited, low strength engagement. We must sustain our true combat capabilities through air to air and air to ground weapons platforms so we are able to defend our skies, our space, and our cyberspace in the conflicts of the future.

Have we not learned anything from this conflict? We cannot plan for the future by adapting to the present. We must look ahead and understand the broad needs of warfare.

[DNall]

What does he want the Air Force to do? Turn in their wings and pick up M-16s? Sounds like reality finally caught up with him. The current conflict we're in no longer requires a substantial Air Force commitment because air superiority has been won a long time ago and urban combat limits air capability severely. That's just the nature of the conflict. Changing the Air Force to fit this new "mold" will only yield its inability to establish air superiority in the next conflict.

I understand the utility and importance of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft in OEF and OIF, but that's just a part of the equation and actually, just a small part. I believe we cannot allow the USAF to be transformed into an army of unmanned vehicles capable only of taking pictures and limited, low strength engagement. We must sustain our true combat capabilities through air to air and air to ground weapons platforms so we are able to defend our skies, our space, and our cyberspace in the conflicts of the future.

Have we not learned anything from this conflict? We cannot plan for the future by adapting to the present. We must look ahead and understand the broad needs of warfare.

Let me frame that for you. Do we need a bunch of F22s or rather F35s, or do we need more A10s?

The Air Force thinks like fighter pilots. They're looking for higher faster better air superiority platforms. Air Superiority is important, but we don't exactly have a massive challenger out there we need to race to stay in front of. Where we fall short is in the support role.

You need to put three hellfire on an A10 instead of one maverick. You need to put 3-4 150lbs bombs on in place of one 500lbs. You need to give me an airframe that's a legitimate follow on to the A10. Something that'll go low & slow, with high maneuverability & highly durable/survivable, carries tons of ordnance & has extremely long staying power. That's not the F35, it's not the F16/15/22, or anything else on the drawing board.

A B2 hitting strategic targets with penetrating precision bombs/cruise missiles is great. But, I also need the ability to carpet bomb the crap out of an emplaced armored division before I knife my troops through & gut them.

The F22 is an amazing airplane, that I'd absolutely love to fly. It's unmatched for air superiority, no question. How is it as a strike aircraft though? Can it do the mission that F117s were previously doing? I think so. Can it take over for F15Es? No. Can it take over for F16s? No. The 35 is pretty great too, and it can take over for F16s, maybe even for 15Es, but not remotely for A10s.

The Air Force has to look at what we need in the real world, not the glory seeking red barron world they'd like to think might be out there somewhere. They absolutely have to compromise & balance their force. I just think that balance too often lands on the side of shooting down airplanes rather than putting rounds on my targets.

From an Army Aviation perspective... we shoot snipers in a window with a hellfire. Use rockets & guns on the light weight, lower precision targets. We're looking to get precision guided rockets in the future. I hope there's a lot of other developments in our weapons options. I'd love to have the staying power & weps capacity of fixed wing. What the Air Force needs to do is ask themselves what the Army would field if they had fixed wing attack aircraft, and start building some of that.

Is the Air Force open minded to that way of thinking? Are they open to changing course to meet the needs on the modern battlefield? Or are they obsessed with the idea of blowing some dumb schmuck out of the sky?

The Army has some jacked up ideas too. I'm not so sure they're more open-minded than the Air Force, they can just change easier cause the stuff is cheaper per unit to produce & easier to gear up for quickly.

[mikeylikey]

What does he want the Air Force to do? Turn in their wings and pick up M-16s? Sounds like reality finally caught up with him.

Maybe it is about time they did just that. 

Speaking as an Artillery Officer, I was trained to work with AF, and spent months learning their capabilities to support ground forces.  The very first time when I went to engage their services in Afghanistan, they came up short and too late.  Disappointing me and my Command.  That is not the point though.

We are in the second longest Armed conflict in US history.  The military is changing to meet this new type of war.  If the AF continues to invest time and money and manhours on platforms that combat threats from 20 years ago, I would say that their future is very unclear.  Marine, Naval and Army forces can easily absorb the AF if the need arises.  A separate AF was needed, in the twentieth century, I am not so sure if still is though.   

[afgeo4]

What does he want the Air Force to do? Turn in their wings and pick up M-16s? Sounds like reality finally caught up with him.

Maybe it is about time they did just that. 

Speaking as an Artillery Officer, I was trained to work with AF, and spent months learning their capabilities to support ground forces.  The very first time when I went to engage their services in Afghanistan, they came up short and too late.  Disappointing me and my Command.  That is not the point though.

We are in the second longest Armed conflict in US history.  The military is changing to meet this new type of war.  If the AF continues to invest time and money and manhours on platforms that combat threats from 20 years ago, I would say that their future is very unclear.  Marine, Naval and Army forces can easily absorb the AF if the need arises.  A separate AF was needed, in the twentieth century, I am not so sure if still is though.   

That's the Army man in you talking. Now try taking a neutral stance and think strategically instead of tactically. Why does the Air Force exist?

Because ever since WWI, air supremacy has been a crucial part of winning a conflict/war. That's been so all through the 20th century as you've said, but that's been so in this century as well. You probably forget, being an Army FA officer that there was a prolonged air war with Iraq in the 90's that destroyed their air capabilities. You probably forget how during the opening days of OIF, our Air Force sent whatever was left of the Iraqi fighters scrambling for the Iranian border. You may even take it for granted that when you drive through the Iraqi countryside, there aren't cluster bombs raining down on you. That's ok though. We, the Airmen, don't forget that.

It was the Air Force's job to neutralize any possible threats coming from the air, space and now cyberspace. The Air Force has achieved that goal. That is no reason to scold it. It is no reason to change its role. Every branch has its role. The Air Force's role isn't to fight on the ground... that's what the Army is for.

I understand quite well that today's conflict is a complex, ground engagement that has left little room for the Air Force to do its normal work. That's not the fault of the Airmen or their doctrine. It's the fault of the conflict and our inability to achieve combat success.

Think of what will be the next conflict... who will it be? Iran? N. Korea? China? Venezuela?... all those nations have strong Air Forces that will make us pay for using a plethora of unmanned recon aircraft and few incapable fighter aircraft. And you know who'll pay the ultimate price? The grunts. When the enemy aircraft own the skies, ground forces are denied mobility and resupply chains dry up quickly. That leads to defeat.

I understand the frustrations with the current conflict, but just think... if a democrat is elected and they actually do exit the conflict... what good will those changes (that will cost billions of dollars) be?

[DNall]

Actually, they ran for the Iranian border after a protracted air campaign in Gulf War. None left the ground at any time during OIF, not for Iran or otherwise. They were destroyed in placed, burried in the sand, or otherwise just left to rot.

If you want to talk about the need for air superiority, you need to use China as your example. That's the only one that makes any sense. It's going to be a suicidal 1-2 week exercise for anyone else. The Air Force certainly needs to win that fight decisively, but the job dos NOT end there. The Air Force doesn't need a thousand fighters. And it doesn't need multi-role planes that are really fighters with some below average groud attack capability as an afterthought.

Let me put it to you this way. The Marine Corps is technically under the dept of Navy. Navy aviation places direct support of the marine force ashore above all else but protecting the carrier itself. Even at that, the Marines still have their own fixed wing attack force, who absolutely focus on CAS.

The Air Force is supposed to have that same relationship with the Army. It does also have a strategic & air superiority mission, but those are given far too much attention by comparison. At the same time, it by law restricts the Army from having fixed wing attack capability.

The Air Force broke away from the Army because the traditional Army didn't have the vision to see the developing need on the modern battlefield. Now those roles are reversed. The traditional Air Force is sticking to its roots & not recognizing the need on the modern battlefield that they must adapt to or lose relevance. For right now, it's making the Army less capable by not providing the kinds of attack capabilities we need, and restricting us from doing it ourselves. The AF needs to fix that.

[MIKE]

Well... The discussion started off somewhat relevant, but now we are into the whole USAF Field Division thing... a la the Luftwaffe, which as the title suggests was not the point of this thread.

[JoeTomasone]

I understand the utility and importance of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft in OEF and OIF, but that's just a part of the equation and actually, just a small part. I believe we cannot allow the USAF to be transformed into an army of unmanned vehicles capable only of taking pictures and limited, low strength engagement. We must sustain our true combat capabilities through air to air and air to ground weapons platforms so we are able to defend our skies, our space, and our cyberspace in the conflicts of the future.

The Air Force thinks like fighter pilots. They're looking for higher faster better air superiority platforms.

The Air Force has to look at what we need in the real world, not the glory seeking red barron world they'd like to think might be out there somewhere. They absolutely have to compromise & balance their force. I just think that balance too often lands on the side of shooting down airplanes rather than putting rounds on my targets.

Just look at the SR-71 as an example of the fighter jock USAF mentality.   The program was closed down not because it was a poor performer (it was anything but), or prone to losses (not one was ever shot down by the enemy), or even because it was replaced by superior technology (to date, nothing is known to have done so).   It was killed because certain of the USAF senior leadership didn't like it, and no one ever got noticed (and promoted) by running such a secretive command.     There wasn't a whole lot of thinking outside the box there; even after they realized they needed it post-retirement during Desert Storm they still were trying to bury it.   

Even as a customer, I saw a lot of the more progressively-thinking people getting flack from above.

[NEBoom]

There was an AP story about this today I saw in the Omaha paper.  http://tinyurl.com/525hd6  Secretary Gates mentions the dreaded UAVs as something he wants the AF to do more.

I was struck by this:  "Noting that they (AF officers at Maxwell he was addressing) represent the future of Air Force leadership, he urged them to think innovatively and worry less about their careers than about adapting to a changing world."

Good advice, and something that needed to be said, IMHO.

[RiverAux]

Part of his talk was about wanting the AF to do more UAV work.  Seems to me that quite a lot of this job could actually be done by traditional small aircraft used for this purpose for decades at much lower cost and which could be brought online very quickly.   Yes, the UAVs have more endurance on station and don't risk a pilot, but (and I admit I don't follow this too closely), it doesn't seem like a whole lot of them are being shot down in our current wars and wouldn't be all that much more dangerous than standard helicopter operations.  

They could mount a lot of the sensing gear and even weapons on these planes for a fraction of the cost.  

I think we're in a situation where we're gotten too focused on the high-tech solution than a perfectable workable traditional approach.  

Bring back the Bird dog!

[JohnKachenmeister]

I have to agree with Secretary Gates.

The Army, after Vietnam, did some soul-searching and decided that to survive as an armed force it HAD to be more flexible.  To fight a conventional war of combined arms maneuver, and/or fight an unconventional war involving Internal Defense and Development, working with Host Country Nationals, etc.  The Army fell behind in equipment to support that goal, but that was not entirely the Army's fault, part of the blame is on Congress that failed to fund requirements until after we were involved in an Iraq insurgent counteroffensive.

The Air Force has been resistant to change and has become more inflexible.  The A-10 is but one example.  The AF didn't want it because it was not a strategic bomber or a dual-purpose fighter.  It didn't fit in the AF boxes, therefore it must be bad.

Talking with AF officers on a regular basis, I can tell you that candor and innovative thinking are not encouraged.  I find that sad, since the AF of the 50's and 60's was a pretty high-speed organization, open to innovation.  I'm not sure how this changed.

[DNall]

^TQM is partly to blame. It created a bunch of rigidly structured scientific analysis to operate a blender. It talked about encouraging change, but it really didn't. There's a lot of other things to blame too I guess, I'm not a genius to tell you why it is the way it is, just that it's grown out of touch in its little world with the needs of the battlefield.

like I said before, the Army has massive problems too, and some of the changes they are making now are for the worse, but they are to a degree more adaptable. Some of that is circumstance, some of it is they've been popped in the nose & knocked down, got up & learned to dodge. The AF doesn't face that kind of opposition in the air, and doesn't feel the pain of the cost paid on the ground.

[afgeo4]

^TQM is partly to blame. It created a bunch of rigidly structured scientific analysis to operate a blender. It talked about encouraging change, but it really didn't. There's a lot of other things to blame too I guess, I'm not a genius to tell you why it is the way it is, just that it's grown out of touch in its little world with the needs of the battlefield.

like I said before, the Army has massive problems too, and some of the changes they are making now are for the worse, but they are to a degree more adaptable. Some of that is circumstance, some of it is they've been popped in the nose & knocked down, got up & learned to dodge. The AF doesn't face that kind of opposition in the air, and doesn't feel the pain of the cost paid on the ground.

I agree, to some degree with what the SECDEF is saying. AF leaders need to be more receptive to out of the box thinking. From experience, aviators tend to be very out of the box thinkers by nature. Nothing you can teach in a classroom or write in a book will make you a good pilot. A good pilot knows when the right thing to do is throw out the safety protocols and restrictions. The issue is in fact money. It is much more of an issue in USAF and Navy than other branches. Why?

Because weapons systems are so costly. Because training to operate those systems is so costly. Training a soldier to use infantry, artillery, armor or engineering weapons is relatively inexpensive compared to training airmen to fly and maintain super high tech air/space systems. These high expenses require greater restrictions on the priority to "change your mind". One cannot build a $300M system and then say... you know, I think I'm going to scrap that and use something else cuz I'm thinking "outside the box". No. That just won't fly with anyone.

My point: It's easy to say it, but doing it is much more difficult because of our system, not our leaders.

[ADCAPer]

Well... The discussion started off somewhat relevant, but now we are into the whole USAF Field Division thing... a la the Luftwaffe, which as the title suggests was not the point of this thread.

This thread went off topic at the second post.

[DNall]

^ I considered that, it's a popular notion, but I disagree. Yes certainly one F22 costs more than One Stryker. But, when we buy a vehicle we buy it by the the thousands. The ultimate expenditures are similar for a major combat system.

I think the Stryker, for instance, is an absolutely stupid idea. It's the size of a bus, too large turning radius for normal two-land roads, limited off-road capability, limited protection. The slat armor (if you can call it that) provides very limited protection. The structural armor is a sandwich of kevlar & ceramic molded together like fiberglass. It works great, till you shoot it, then like a bullet proof vest it's lost it's protection & needs to be replaced. They can replace sections, but that weakens the overall hull... we're talking about something here that costs 4mil a copy. Versus Bradleys, or the competitor update of the M113.

We're building standard HMMWVs, then sending them to another plant to be up-armored. They haven't been redesigned with a different engine, transmission, suspension, etc. They get some upgrades, but it's on a foundation not made to support them. So, they break down fast & often. How smart is that, and an up-armored HMMWV is the best you can come up with for a brigade to go to war in?  So now we got MRAPs, which is a bank armored car with a boat hull belly & the same armor as the stryker, better suspension, hadn't hear yet about the engine/trans performance or reliability. And of course they're expensive.

there's a whole lot about transformation I'm not wild about, but because we're in this interim period, we're able to use interim vehicles cause we know we're not committing to them long term. We do spend a boat load of money on them though, and burn them up fast. There's for sure some much better decisions that could be made in there.

[DNall]

Well... The discussion started off somewhat relevant, but now we are into the whole USAF Field Division thing... a la the Luftwaffe, which as the title suggests was not the point of this thread.

This thread went off topic at the second post.

No one once said anything about the AF creating field divisions or any such thing. The Nazis had their airborne under their AF, I don't see the 82nd coming over to the USAF, so hat's not on the board.

The secretary talked about the way in which the AF is not being responsive to the modern needs of the battlefield, the army either to a lesser extent. You have a bunch of people here who are in those services (or were) discussing the degree of truth to those statements & associated details.

I realize the original post mentioned something about linking organizational dissent to CAP, which was not well defined, and also not related to what the SECDEF was talking about. So, we're not discussing that. This discussion is very directly on topic of the SECDEF's statements & how they bear on the future of the armed forces.

[PHall]

What we have here is a SecDEF who's hard up for "boots on the ground" type folks for the Army and the Marine Corps who sees a whole bunch of people in the Air Force that, from what he has been told by his Army and Marine Corps advisor's, are not sharing the burden with their ground pounding brethren.

Well duh!

We can only work with what the SecDEF's predecessor's have given the Air Force to work with.

The Air Force, or just about any branch of the service is equipped to fight the last war.

The time it takes to design, build and procur new aircraft and systems usually guarantees that they will come on-line after the war they were designed for has ended.

[ColonelJack]

What we have here is a SecDEF who's hard up for "boots on the ground" type folks for the Army and the Marine Corps who sees a whole bunch of people in the Air Force that, from what he has been told by his Army and Marine Corps advisor's, are not sharing the burden with their ground pounding brethren.

Well duh!

Well said!!!  It is, after all, called the Air Force.  We're not supposed to be groundpounders.  That's not our job.  That's the Army and Marine Corps' job.  Nobody's hollering for the Navy to pick up M-16s and start a-shootin', are they?

Jack

[Al Sayre]

When the Navy starts shooting, the 16" beats the M-16 every time...

[DNall]

AF cops & Engineers at the very least are on the ground doing traditional Army unit jobs. A female AF Major got the Bronze star last year for ground action while running a convoy. I think certainly they AF can push more folks into those kinds of roles over the short run to aide the manpower shortage the Army & Marines are under, at the same time AF recruiters are turning people away.

However, no one here, nor the SecDef is talking about the AF taking on ground combat missions!!!

We're talking about the Air Force making appropriate decisions to support the ground conflict, not continue to seek fighters & heavy penetrator bombers best suited for the cold war. That's been done with for a very long time now. The Air Force is a whole generation behind in it's thinking.