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How do you define a Safety Culture?

Started by James Shaw, December 01, 2016, 01:12:36 PM

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Is safety a Value or a Principle

Value
7 (58.3%)
Principle
5 (41.7%)

Total Members Voted: 12

Voting closed: December 31, 2016, 01:12:36 PM

James Shaw

Quote from: Live2Learn on December 01, 2016, 08:15:33 PM
Quote from: TheSkyHornet on December 01, 2016, 07:59:19 PM
... Someone said "Common sense would say they should know how to get it done." Common sense doesn't make up for a lack of education on the subject or the willingness to learn/improve.

I'd take it a step further.  "Common Sense" can get you, me, or someone else killed.  NTSB accident reports (all modes) are full of examples.

:clap: :clap: Well said
Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

James Shaw

Quote from: Spaceman3750 on December 01, 2016, 08:18:58 PM
Safety is a product of retention, not regulation. And as it happens, we suck at retention.

To this I would say...

I have to be the Safety Leader for the retention aspect and the Safety Manager for the regulatory aspect.

I have 2000 people in my main facility and about 200 more in my other supporting facilities (5 total).
Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

Eclipse

Quote from: TheSkyHornet on December 01, 2016, 07:55:52 PM
Do you think it's because of the people writing the Beacons being out of touch, ignorant to the more applicable subjects, or that the intent of the Safety Beacon is not as understood at the squadron level?

I don't think that's it, when you have these discussions in person the same concerns are raised by the folks at national
as we raise here and in outside discussions - relevance - but then what you hear in person doesn't get translated into
product downstream.

It's also a lot harder to put together an easily digestible analysis of a mishap then to link through to a fire extinguisher presentation.

With that said, I've never had any issues turning a 78 from SIMS SIRS into a reasonable discussion of
"How did they get there? How can it be avoided?"

You can't mandate a "safety culture" you have to lead people to and through it, which bring the conversation right back to
the lack of strategic leadership, evolving mentorship, current manning situation that seems to creep into everything.

NHQ keeps increasing the administrative "non-required requirements" every year while at the same time seemingly ignoring the
fact that fewer people are being asked to do more things in the same time period every year.  There's no other possible result then
the current "just check the box and move on mentality" which eventually saps the fun out of being a member and
therefore the spirit of the members.

If you look at what it takes just to meet the minimum requirements of keeping a squadron open week-to-week, it's virtually impossible to
do anything but station keeping with the charter minimums, so subjective things like "safety" fall by the wayside.

"That Others May Zoom"

Live2Learn

Quote from: Eclipse on December 01, 2016, 08:27:43 PM
...
If you look at what it takes just to meet the minimum requirements of keeping a squadron open week-to-week, it's virtually impossible to
do anything but station keeping with the charter minimums, so subjective things like "safety" fall by the wayside.

Looks like the "delete two for every one [new regulation]" the commander-in-chief "Elect" has said all agencies must submit to.  Happy days?   :)

James Shaw

Quote from: Live2Learn on December 01, 2016, 09:10:51 PM
Quote from: Eclipse on December 01, 2016, 08:27:43 PM
...
If you look at what it takes just to meet the minimum requirements of keeping a squadron open week-to-week, it's virtually impossible to
do anything but station keeping with the charter minimums, so subjective things like "safety" fall by the wayside.

Looks like the "delete two for every one [new regulation]" the commander-in-chief "Elect" has said all agencies must submit to.  Happy days?   :)

Yes this is easier said than done but will be interesting to see. Several years ago when I was doing Safety Consulting much more than now, I developed a program and formula for predicting Safety Success based on KSA's and Organizational Goals.
Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

Live2Learn

#25
So, moving right along.  How do we address ambiguity in our assessment of what is/is not "safe"??  Can we adhere to our safety principles and live our values if we have ambiguity?  How much ambiguity?

For example, let's look at the aviation ORM worksheet found in Tab 10 of the AIF for every Corporate Aircraft.   https://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/14_AIF_ORM_7476A83AE6A1D.pdf is a pseudo objective risk assessment tool.  Instructions for this form are not particularly useful:  https://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/13_AIF_ORM_INST_647D4060B6335.pdf 

Take a look at the first block on the ORM form:  "HUMAN". 

The first two rows (Experience/Training, and Pilot Currency) are nice and quantitative.  You are, or you aren't within these boxes.  Great!  Easy to do.  Just check your log book and away we go!

What about the 3rd row.  This one is arguably at least as important as the first two rows because it addresses both health and fatigue factors, i.e. fitness for flight.  Problems with either can result in incapacitation, cognitive deficiencies, or both.

We have three columns. 

Column 1: "Good Health and Proper Crew Rest" (for zero points);
Column 2:  "Fair Health with Adequate Crew Rest" (for 10 points); and
Column 3:  "Poor Health or Signs of Fatigue" (NO GO). 

If we have a 'value' that says we choose the most conservative assessment how do we differentiate between a slight headache with great rest, a "mild" yet uncomfortable headache with great rest, and a less-than-migraine but still very uncomfortable headache with great rest?  Are all three in column 2?  Where does potential progression due to rapid changes in altitude, piloting (which can be fatiguing in itself!), etc. come into play?  Is a "less-than-migraine" headache a show stopper?  Where does a cold fall into this exercise in ambiguity?  How about a "mild" case of the flu?  Unanswered is this:  How "poor" must health be, how tired must the pilot be to score a "No Go" and cancel a flight?

Now look at the second block on the form: MACHINE

Again, most of the rows are nice and quantitative.  But what about Row 1, Maintenance Factors?  As written the second of these three columns could be used to excuse flying the aircraft with equipment that would violate the TCDS, and arguably the FAR requirement that the aircraft be "Safe to fly".  In fact, I'm aware of a few instances when this was the case. 

Column 1 is pretty clear:  Equipment is "Fully Functional" (zero points).  Presumably this means ALL installed equipment is working.  Meets FARs, Safe to fly.  Slam dunk.

Column 2 is ambiguous.  Equipment is "Partially non-Functional" (15 points).  WHICH equipment is partially non-functional?  Flaps?  Auto-pilot?  Turn Coordinator?  Seat stops?  Rear seat intercom?  Does this mean we're into FAR 91.213 with placards, deactivation, removal, etc?  How often do we see THAT? 

Column 3 is equally ambiguous.  What equipment can be "Fully non-Functional" (No Go)?  TCDS looms large here.  I've seen aircraft fly with non-op CHT (required for engines with cowl flaps) and malfunctioning (still operating) auto pilots.  For some reason, "don't ask, don't tell" is still alive and well in some quarters - at least with maintenance.

Want to bet quite a few CAP pilots don't really know how to assess equipment maintenance status?  Or determine when an aircraft is both airworthy and 'safe to fly'?

How do we educate pilots to understand and consistently respond to these ambiguities?  Could CAP create a relatively simple framework that corrals this kind of ambiguity (it exists elsewhere, these are just a few glaring examples)?  Pickin' up on Eclipses' observations, with the size of our paid staff, and the limited resource called "volunteers" do safety 'values' run into the logistic reality of our organizational capability?

James Shaw

Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

James Shaw

Quote from: capmandone on December 05, 2016, 02:36:18 PM
Quote from: Live2Learn on December 01, 2016, 10:30:52 PM
So, moving right along.  Good idea!!

Thanks for all of the responses and expanded examples. I intend to come back to those at a later point in the thread. Since several have responded I will share the basis of the approach and the intent of the book overall. As full disclosure this is not a CAP book or project but a personal and professional work that I am gathering input for from multiple sources. I already have the foundation and draft of the work but publisher advised me to get broader input outside of safety field.

The name of the book is:

7 Actions 7 Values and the Principled Safety Culture

My statement based on "Principles/moral beliefs" and being theological in nature remain fixed and do not vary based on the variables or attributes at the time. They are absolute in that I believe that we should value the safety of the individual over the outcome of a business process or benefit.

My statement based on "Values/shifting priorities" and being cultural in nature change with the emphasis of societies needs and demands at a specific point in time.

So for example: No matter what the process is; if it is CAP, FAA, Scouts, School, or any other activity then the strength in the program is going to be in the "individual situation, activity or event".

So sticking strictly with the difference between principles and values which do you feel it is and why?
Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current