SAR Accident Case Study

[Flying Pig]

http://flash.aopa.org/asf/acs_rescue/acs-rescue.cfm

Although its a helicopter, there are several lessons to be learned from this crash.  Many of the lessons arent even touched on in this presentation.   I would encourage anyone involved in SAR at any level or area of expertise to read the full NTSB report.  Sadly it is also a classic example of having all of the tools to survive at your finger tips but not knowing how to use them. 

[Flying Pig]

added...

If you read the full report, you will see there were tremendous pressures from the command staff to accomplish missions.  The previous Chief Pilot was releived for refusing to assign missions because the risk v reward wasnt there.  And pressures to accomplish these missions were coming from commanders with no aviation experience.  Pretty interesting read on the cultures inside that particular unit. 

[manfredvonrichthofen]

You find a lot of armchair decisions cause problems in the field if the one in the chair isn't experienced in the field. That's why I think that no one should be allowed in the chair unless they have good experience in the field.

[bosshawk]

That certainly is an excellent theory.  Unfortunately, I once served in a Wing where the Commander, Vice Commander, Chief of Staff and Director of Operations were not pilots, nor had they ever flown on a single CAP search mission.  Talk about a mess   Search missions were being run by ICs who had no actual search experience and who surrounded themselves with people with equal experience.  Wonder why I quit CAP?

[Spaceman3750]

Why should being a pilot be a prerequisite for being on wing command staff?

[Flying Pig]

He didnt say they had to be pilots.
However, I know personally exactly what he speaks of.  Something about IC's assigning search grids at 12ft + in the Sierras in the late afternoon and not understanding why pilots were refusing missions.

[SarDragon]

Why should being a pilot be a prerequisite for being on wing command staff?

It's all about BTDT. It gives you a lot of insight into what's going on out in the field. On my last SAREX, I saw how pilot skills were helpful in performing as an MO. As an aside, that's why aircraft carrier and aviation squadron CO billets are filled by pilots and NFOs.

[manfredvonrichthofen]

Sorry if that came across wrong.

Yes, I am talking about mission staff and IC, GBD, and ABD needing to have field experience. Even for a GTL it is necessary to have some cross training in the air. I am training on a bit of observer stuff so that I can better understand what the bird is talking about and so that I know how to ask questions and how to talk to the bird from the ground. I know how to ask questions and explain to them and I understand what they are telling me, because even when I am on the ground, boots in the field, there are barriers to communication when to people are seeing the earth from two very different points of view.

I have delt with a lot of problems arising because of command not having field experience and some times getting people killed.

[bosshawk]

Killion: what I didn't explain(I guess) is that I have over 3.000 hours of piloting light aircraft and had more than 300 hours of grid search at altitudes over 10,000 ft in the Sierras and I have had the experience of having  a 200 hour private pilot who happens to be an IC telling me how to fly a grid on a windy afternoon in the Sierras over snow-covered terrain in winds of over 50 kts. Oh, by the way, I have two distress finds at altitudes over 10,000 ft.  When I politely refused he got highly indignant and threatened to ban me from the mission.

I packed up my gear and went home, never to return to that mission.  I do know of several pilots who did launch that afternoon and who, fortunately, returned to base: never having reached the assigned grids due to weather. When I wrote up the whole deal and gave it to the DO, he simply trashed it and said something about uncooperative members.  I still have that memo on my computer.

[Flying Pig]

Killion: what I didn't explain(I guess) is that I have over 3.000 hours of piloting light aircraft and had more than 300 hours of grid search at altitudes over 10,000 ft in the Sierras and I have had the experience of having  a 200 hour private pilot who happens to be an IC telling me how to fly a grid on a windy afternoon in the Sierras over snow-covered terrain in winds of over 50 kts. Oh, by the way, I have two distress finds at altitudes over 10,000 ft.  When I politely refused he got highly indignant and threatened to ban me from the mission.

I packed up my gear and went home, never to return to that mission.  I do know of several pilots who did launch that afternoon and who, fortunately, returned to base: never having reached the assigned grids due to weather. When I wrote up the whole deal and gave it to the DO, he simply trashed it and said something about uncooperative members.  I still have that memo on my computer.

Hmmmmmm   reeeeeeeally

[Eclipse]

That certainly is an excellent theory.  Unfortunately, I once served in a Wing where the Commander, Vice Commander, Chief of Staff and Director of Operations were not pilots, nor had they ever flown on a single CAP search mission.  Talk about a mess   Search missions were being run by ICs who had no actual search experience and who surrounded themselves with people with equal experience.  Wonder why I quit CAP?

I understand the point I >think< you're trying to make, however being a pilot, even a CAP pilot, does not mean yo know anything about ES or searches.
The attitude that only pilots can understand "x" holds us back in any number of ways.

In your example, the IC should absolutely have had solid AOBD's advising him on the relevant issues, but I personally know plenty of pilots, AOBD's, and others who wouldn't have been any more help to you.  Frankly, an IC should not be involved in that level of tactical planning, anyway.  That's what the branch desks are for.

[Eclipse]

Why should being a pilot be a prerequisite for being on wing command staff?

It's all about BTDT. It gives you a lot of insight into what's going on out in the field. On my last SAREX, I saw how pilot skills were helpful in performing as an MO. As an aside, that's why aircraft carrier and aviation squadron CO billets are filled by pilots and NFOs.

That's an ES function, not a command staff function.  Being a staff officer is about management and delegation, not wrench turning.  Relevant experience
and good decision making is important, but I don't need to know the flying velocity of a european swallow myself, I just have to have a swallow wrangler that I trust who knows his stuff.

[lordmonar]

The problem with the concept of needing "real" experince to be able to do the job.....is that we just don't have enough opportunities to gain that experince.

So....the old lament about people who "don't know the score" making the decisions is just something we have to live with.

I have not read the report....so I don't know what it was about.

But bottom line is that a GTL or MP......it is your sortie.....you know your responsibilities and your capabilities.....and this is just CAP.

If it is not safe....don't do the sortie.

If you planning staff is giving you stupid assignments......kick them back when you get your prebreifing.

[Spaceman3750]

Why should being a pilot be a prerequisite for being on wing command staff?

It's all about BTDT. It gives you a lot of insight into what's going on out in the field. On my last SAREX, I saw how pilot skills were helpful in performing as an MO. As an aside, that's why aircraft carrier and aviation squadron CO billets are filled by pilots and NFOs.

I don't buy that for a second. Knowing how to plan an air sortie is totally separate from knowing how fast the aircraft has to be going to achieve lift. You don't need to be a pilot to understand an aircraft's capabilities or to say "fly here" - you just need the right training.

I guess the ground pounders like me who don't have the coin to join the sun god club can throw out any hope of doing more than being ground pounders then? That's too bad, I thought I had lots of potential.

And, as Eclipse said, there's lots of pilots who couldn't manage their way out of a paper bag.

Now, going back to your original comment about non-pilot cc, cv, and cs - that's still total bunk. Again, all they need is training on how the aircraft is managed; knowing how to turn it on is optional. Leave that to your DOO.

[manfredvonrichthofen]

I can understand not needing to know how to fly to an extent. No, you don't need to KNOW HOW TO FLY, but you do need to understand how things work in the air. I don't, so I'm not going to pretend to know anything about it. However, I know I don't want to be on the ground looking down a 100 ft cliff face and have someone telling me I HAVE to walk 20 meteres foreword.

[ol'fido]

http://flash.aopa.org/asf/acs_rescue/acs-rescue.cfm

Although its a helicopter, there are several lessons to be learned from this crash.  Many of the lessons arent even touched on in this presentation.   I would encourage anyone involved in SAR at any level or area of expertise to read the full NTSB report.  Sadly it is also a classic example of having all of the tools to survive at your finger tips but not knowing how to use them.

Dude, did you happen to read the NTSB report on the crash of the Missouri Highway Patrol copter that killed Trooper Schellenberger?

[bflynn]

Killion: what I didn't explain(I guess) is that I have over 3.000 hours of piloting light aircraft and had more than 300 hours of grid search at altitudes over 10,000 ft in the Sierras and I have had the experience of having  a 200 hour private pilot who happens to be an IC telling me how to fly a grid on a windy afternoon in the Sierras over snow-covered terrain in winds of over 50 kts. Oh, by the way, I have two distress finds at altitudes over 10,000 ft.  When I politely refused he got highly indignant and threatened to ban me from the mission.

I packed up my gear and went home, never to return to that mission.  I do know of several pilots who did launch that afternoon and who, fortunately, returned to base: never having reached the assigned grids due to weather. When I wrote up the whole deal and gave it to the DO, he simply trashed it and said something about uncooperative members.  I still have that memo on my computer.

I can't say this surprises me, but I'm sorry you had to have that happen.  If you're not burned out on volunteering, you qualify to fly for the Coast Guard Auxillary.  It might please you to know the IC does not.

Based on what I've read here and how member relate to each other, I'd say that CAP has a serious cultural and leadership problem.

[Short Field]

I don't buy that for a second. Knowing how to plan an air sortie is totally separate from knowing how fast the aircraft has to be going to achieve lift. You don't need to be a pilot to understand an aircraft's capabilities or to say "fly here" - you just need the right training.

I guess the ground pounders like me who don't have the coin to join the sun god club can throw out any hope of doing more than being ground pounders then? That's too bad, I thought I had lots of potential.

I have flown with former USAF pilots who had thousands of hours but didn't know how to plan or fly a CAP search pattern.  So just having the right flavor of wings is not the answer. 

You do need to have time planning and flying searches in CAP - and you can do that as a Mission Observer.   An IC with two missions as a Mission Scanner is just too light in the knowledge and experience area.   We had a IC (MO with less than 10 flights) who mandated a crew swap with the engine running to save time.  When the crew members balked, they were told they could just go home instead of fly.   The plane still sat on the ramp with the engine running for over 10 minutes.  It doesn't take coin and you don't need to become a member of the sun god club but it does take experience.

[bosshawk]

+1.  At the time of the incident which I talked about, I probably had 17-18 years as a CAP Mission Pilot, a Mission Check Pilot, a mountain flying instructor, an AOBD and a PSC, so I wasn't exactly a neophyte.  In fact, I had been regarded as one of the better high altitude search pilots in CAWG. 

I had also been a Sq CC, taught CLC and SLS, been on Wing Staff for six years and had spent weeks being a liaison officer to LE agencies.  I simply had never wanted to be an IC: I have an aversion to phone calls in the middle of the night.  Bad attitude, guess so.  BTDT in lots of situations that many CTers will never experience.

Short Field has a good point: have flown with many higher time pilots from the various military branches who couldn't plan or fly a grid.

That is the end of my participation in this thread.

[NCRblues]

I'd say that CAP has a serious cultural and leadership problem.

CAP has a massive ingrained cultural problem. Simply look at the latest pictures of the winter NB to see it. Its plain and simple still a "good ol boy club" , and it just depends on which side of the isle you are on.

We have plenty of energetic and eager members that are waiting in the wings for a chance to take the flag and carry it on. Unfortunately more than not those people get ignored or are simply shown the door because they happen to hold ideas that could make CAP at all levels better, and it goes against the "good ol boy" club.

CC's, CV's, and other wing staff do not need wings or GT badges or even IC badges. What they do need is an understanding of modern technology, a willingness to learn from those that have the flight/ground ops knowledge and the hunger and drive to make CAP great again. I see that lacking from the vast majority of our leadership at the moment.

[Flying Pig]

http://flash.aopa.org/asf/acs_rescue/acs-rescue.cfm

Although its a helicopter, there are several lessons to be learned from this crash.  Many of the lessons arent even touched on in this presentation.   I would encourage anyone involved in SAR at any level or area of expertise to read the full NTSB report.  Sadly it is also a classic example of having all of the tools to survive at your finger tips but not knowing how to use them.

Dude, did you happen to read the NTSB report on the crash of the Missouri Highway Patrol copter that killed Trooper Schellenberger?

Yes. Not nearly the same scenario. The MHP troop simply ran out of gas on a clear VFR day and then obviously didnt auto correctly

[manfredvonrichthofen]

ICs And GBDs and AOBDs not having adequate field experience might work if they actually let those in the field with the experience make the calls without an or else threat.

Luckily, I haven't had that sort of issue around here. But I have had it elsewhere enough times to know it can be a problem anywhere.

[Flying Pig]

When I posted it I didnt realize you had to be an AOPA member to view it.  For those who dont have log-in for AOPA this was in regards to the NM State Police Agusta 109 that crashed in the mountains in 2009 in IMC conditions.  The full NTSB report is available on line. 

[bflynn]

ICs And GBDs and AOBDs not having adequate field experience might work if they actually let those in the field with the experience make the calls without an or else threat.

"I'm in charge, so I must know it all already. "  It's way too common in CAP.

Leadership should never be about the leader.

[manfredvonrichthofen]

Exactly, a chief cant be a chief if he doesn't have indians, or at least he won't be chief for long if he doesn't listen to his Indians... He may still be chief, but his Indians will walk away.

[ol'fido]

http://flash.aopa.org/asf/acs_rescue/acs-rescue.cfm

Although its a helicopter, there are several lessons to be learned from this crash.  Many of the lessons arent even touched on in this presentation.   I would encourage anyone involved in SAR at any level or area of expertise to read the full NTSB report.  Sadly it is also a classic example of having all of the tools to survive at your finger tips but not knowing how to use them.

Dude, did you happen to read the NTSB report on the crash of the Missouri Highway Patrol copter that killed Trooper Schellenberger?

Yes. Not nearly the same scenario. The MHP troop simply ran out of gas on a clear VFR day and then obviously didnt auto correctly

Wasn't trying to compare them. Just thought you might be interested. Sorry for the confusion.

[Flying Pig]

No problem.  Yeah I did read it.  Its about as cut and dry as it gets.  Experienced pilot literally runs out of gas and then fails at the auto.  Sad deal. 

[wuzafuzz]

When I posted it I didnt realize you had to be an AOPA member to view it.  For those who dont have log-in for AOPA this was in regards to the NM State Police Agusta 109 that crashed in the mountains in 2009 in IMC conditions.  The full NTSB report is available on line.

That video was part of the safety meeting at my squadron last night.  Good case study.  Thanks for sharing.

[sardak]

Here is a related incident in which a Maryland State Police helo crashed in IMC while transporting two patients from an MVA. Five POB and the only survivor was one of the two patients. The helo crashed 3.2 miles from the threshold of runway 19R at Andrews Air Force Base while on the ILS approach, being tracked by radar and ADS-B, and in voice contact with ATC. The controller had turned down the pilot's request for a radar (ASR) approach. It took two hours to find the crash site. The NTSB blasted pretty much everyone and everything including the SAR effort.

Two of the NTBS findings, particularly relevant to this thread:

- The incident commander's lack of aviation knowledge diminished the effectiveness of search and rescue activities.

- Had two Maryland State Police aviation employees not pursued their own search effort, locating the accident site would likely have taken several more hours than it did.

Here is the report on this incident: http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2009/AAR0907.pdf

and the docket, which includes the documents the NTSB reviewed, photos, analyses, pilot logs, interviews, etc: http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/projList.cfm?ntsbnum=MIA08MA203

The report for the incident Flying Pig started the thread with: http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2011/AAR1104.pdf

and its docket, which includes the AFRCC mission log: http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/projList.cfm?ntsbnum=CEN09PA348

Mike

[Radial Interceptor]

Why should being a pilot be a prerequisite for being on wing command staff?

It's all about BTDT. It gives you a lot of insight into what's going on out in the field. On my last SAREX, I saw how pilot skills were helpful in performing as an MO. As an aside, that's why aircraft carrier and aviation squadron CO billets are filled by pilots and NFOs.

I don't buy that for a second. Knowing how to plan an air sortie is totally separate from knowing how fast the aircraft has to be going to achieve lift. You don't need to be a pilot to understand an aircraft's capabilities or to say "fly here" - you just need the right training.

I guess the ground pounders like me who don't have the coin to join the sun god club can throw out any hope of doing more than being ground pounders then? That's too bad, I thought I had lots of potential.

And, as Eclipse said, there's lots of pilots who couldn't manage their way out of a paper bag.

Now, going back to your original comment about non-pilot cc, cv, and cs - that's still total bunk. Again, all they need is training on how the aircraft is managed; knowing how to turn it on is optional. Leave that to your DOO.

As an IC, I have (by requirement) held the ladder positions leading up to it (MP, followed by AOBD, followed by PSC, followed by OSC).  I hated it when an IC "told me how to do it."  This doesn't mean that I objected to guidance, commander's intent, or mentorship.  And if my plan or decision were overruled by the IC's experience, that happens, too.  But if you want me to be the AOBD, then trust me to assign pilots, planes, and tasks in the way that I see fit, which will accomplish the mission requirements which you laid out.  The IC doesn't need to be bothered with tactical assignments.  The IC even has an OSC to do his worrying for him, while the IC deals with the wing commander, other agencies, logistical issues, and generally holding everything together.

With all that said, I'm not a ground-pounder.  I used to be a Marine, but it's not the same--these are volunteers, not all in shape, some younger than 18, and not always ideally equipped.  As an IC, do I make the tactical decisions, to send which team where?  Tell them how to search?  No, I have a GBD to make those decisions.  And either he trusts the GTL (which he assigned!) or he doesn't.  And I'll let the OSC monitor their overall effectiveness--just as I let the OSC monitor the effectiveness of the air sorties as well.

It's the IC's job to ratchet DOWN the level of risk we're willing to accept ("No, John, I appreciate your enthusiasm and confidence, but..."), and it is certainly NOT the IC's job to order anyone (ground team, pilot in command, etc) to just "get it done anyway."  I will never question that single resource leader's decision to back down.

But then there's the issue of an IC not having the appropriate (or ANY) staff, and they must perform all the staff functions themselves.  I rarely have a GBD.  I have to trust that the GTL knows what he's talking about.  As a result, if anything, it makes me ratchet the risk even lower, because I'd rather be more conservative.  Spaceman says, "Knowing how to plan an air sortie is totally separate from knowing how fast the aircraft has to be going to achieve lift.  You don't need to be a pilot to say "fly here" - you just need the right training."  If that's so, the opposite must be true:  "Knowing how to plan a ground search is totally separate from knowing how to turn on a Little L-PER.  You don't need to be a GTL to say "search here."  You just need the right training."  The equivalent is me telling a GTL "just search the side of that mountain, okay?  Get it done," and ignore the fact that it's a high-angle search, middle of winter, with three hours of daylight left.  What, the GTL says no?  He refuses to take his team up today, when there's still daylight left?  NOT a team player.  I'll report him for this!

[manfredvonrichthofen]

You can tell the GTL to search the side of that mountain, no problem, but let him decide how it will be searched. If he isn't comfortable taking his team up, maybe let him get a good vantage point and. Heck the area for 20 minutes with his binoculars. The area is still searched, maybe not as good as if it had boots on it, but it isn't getting passed up completely. GTLs SHOULD be good at risk management as well. If not I wouldn't want them on the ground.

[Cliff_Chambliss]

IC, Mission Satff, Pilot/Observer/Scanner we all need to be on the same tem.  There are times when I wish those people I have to deal with were as perfect as I think I am, and at the same thime they were thinking the same of me.  The issue is one of communication, and (reaching back to classes many eons ago) for effective communications to take place there must be a common foundation.  In other words, we must speak the common language.
  I tell students there are two rules of aviation they must never forget:
1.  Don't do anything that will cause you to bust your butt.
2.  Don't let anyone tell you to do something that will cause you to bust your butt.
There is nothing wrong in saying unable, either to an ATC Facility or to a mission assignment, however I stress that anytime the "unable" is used, you must provide a reason why and as much as possible offer an alternative, and do this in a non confrontational way.

Communiation:  After every sortee every event every mission, prepare an after action report of what went right, what went wrong, and what could be improved and how the improvements could be implemented.  Maybe no else cares, but these reports could be made into a Squadron Lessons Learned Book and in time as members become familiar with the book move up the food chain, spread to other units, the ideas will spread.  Not the magic bullet but a way.  And if several units had books and met to consolidate ideas,  well real change is possible from the worker bee up. 

[Cliff_Chambliss]

As an aside: 

Another chilling example,  read "Shades of Blue, A study in failed leadership" 

This is a report prepared by a student at the USAF Air War College examining in detail the personnel and leadership failures that led up to the B-52 Crash at Fairchild AFB (video available on utube) some years ago.  while the report deals with real events and real USAF People, you can readily see some disturbing parallels with the Civil Air Patrol.

[Flying Pig]

That is an EXCELLENT study.  In the CHP aircrew school we spend just about an entire day on that case.  There is also a book called Rogue Pilot that outlines several case studies.  There is a chapter in it on CAP also.  I still have not been able to find a copy.  All the ones Ie found online are almost $100!!!

Cliff, pretty wild.  The guy has loads of complaints, nobody will fly with him, etc etc, and in response they make him the unit Stan/Eval and safety officer!  Amazing huh.

[RADIOMAN015]

When I posted it I didnt realize you had to be an AOPA member to view it.  For those who dont have log-in for AOPA this was in regards to the NM State Police Agusta 109 that crashed in the mountains in 2009 in IMC conditions.  The full NTSB report is available on line.

You can find the report right here:
http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2011/AAR1104.pdf
RM

[sardak]

^^^The link was posted just a few posts before yours with a link to other NTSB documents for this accident and a similar one.

Mike

[NCRblues]

As an aside: 

Another chilling example,  read "Shades of Blue, A study in failed leadership" 

This is a report prepared by a student at the USAF Air War College examining in detail the personnel and leadership failures that led up to the B-52 Crash at Fairchild AFB (video available on utube) some years ago.  while the report deals with real events and real USAF People, you can readily see some disturbing parallels with the Civil Air Patrol.

So, I just was reading "darker shades of blue; A case study in failed leadership" and my god, does it nail on the head most of problems in my wing and most of the problems I see at the National level.

I highly recommend giving it a good read and thinking about it.

[Cliff_Chambliss]

That is an EXCELLENT study.  In the CHP aircrew school we spend just about an entire day on that case.  There is also a book called Rogue Pilot that outlines several case studies.  There is a chapter in it on CAP also.  I still have not been able to find a copy.  All the ones Ie found online are almost $100!!!

Cliff, pretty wild.  The guy has loads of complaints, nobody will fly with him, etc etc, and in response they make him the unit Stan/Eval and safety officer!  Amazing huh.

I searched for Rogue Pilot and could not find anything.  However, I did find several copies of Rogue Aviator on Amazon for less than $20.00. 

Also checked archive.org (which is a great site of non-copyrighted publications, films, radio, etc) and all I could find was a 1936 film "Death in the Air"  That wasted about 45 minutes.  A group of ex WWI Pilots are tasked with finding Pilot X, who is a physcopath out shooting down civilian airliners.  B&W, old Cliches, a pretty girl, playboy pilot, lots of flying, not a bad old film.

[Flying Pig]

http://www.amazon.com/Darker-Shades-Blue-Rogue-Pilot/dp/0070349274


I havnt searched for it in a while, I see the price has gone down a little.  I was off slightly on the title.  Darker Shades of Blue, Rogue Pilot

[NCRblues]

http://www.uscg.mil/safety/docs/CRM/Darker_Shades_of_Blue.pdf

This is what I just read, and with a lot less B-52s has some very real and very scary parallels with CAP "command" and "leadership".

[simon]

One only has to look at the trend in membership numbers and median age to see the future of CAP.

This is not to judge age. With it can come wisdom and experience. But to ensure the success of any organization, one needs to appeal to new members.

It is natural for a prospective member to ask "Why am I doing this?" or "What can CAP do for me?". Let's not conjure up old JFK quotes. I guarantee new members are not thinking that way. Cronyism is a big red flag and every CAP member knows somebody valuable to the organization who has quit because of it.

Any organization with a future should stop and ask itself why it still exists, whether it is still relevant today, regardless of how it got there. Prospective members ask that question. So do the people that fund it. And rightfully so. When the image that an organization projects publicly diverges from how it really functions, its purpose comes into question.

[rustyjeeper]

I'd say that CAP has a serious cultural and leadership problem.

CAP has a massive ingrained cultural problem. Simply look at the latest pictures of the winter NB to see it. Its plain and simple still a "good ol boy club" , and it just depends on which side of the isle you are on.

We have plenty of energetic and eager members that are waiting in the wings for a chance to take the flag and carry it on. Unfortunately more than not those people get ignored or are simply shown the door because they happen to hold ideas that could make CAP at all levels better, and it goes against the "good ol boy" club.

+1 :clap:

[bflynn]

CAP has a massive ingrained cultural problem. Simply look at the latest pictures of the winter NB to see it. Its plain and simple still a "good ol boy club" , and it just depends on which side of the isle you are on.

I'm a believer that cultural problems are leadership problems.  Leader's actions are key in building culture.

[simon]

The problem with the concept of needing "real" experince [sic] to be able to do the job.....is that we just don't have enough opportunities to gain that experience [sic].

Agreed. Here in CA, a typical pilot hardly ever gets to fly a SAR mission. If you asked 100 pilots, many of them would have never flown a mission.

Since the 121.5 satellites were turned off, the need for missions is rare. CAP planes are used mostly for training, including O-Rides, followed by CD.

I can't think of the last time I read of a search where CAP actually found the target before the sheriff or the military.

[manfredvonrichthofen]

We don't have to be the first one to find the target, just being there to narrow down where the target is is a massive help.

[Eclipse]

We don't have to be the first one to find the target, just being there to narrow down where the target is is a massive help.

+1 In a SAR, establishing where the objective isn't is a huge part of the search, which is why it's so important to
be certain when you sign off an area as "checked".

[simon]

I understand. But it is interesting to think about CAP's effectiveness by what it doesn't find when time after time, the other agencies seem to doing the finding.

Is CAP being directed to eliminate the less likely areas, leaving other agencies to go to the most likely areas? Are CAP pilots sent to the "safer" areas? I'd be interested to see the grids from the search for the Bonanza pilot that went down last week in the mountains here in CA in weather.

[simon]

BTW, just to back up my statement about where CAP planes spend their time, here is a breakdown of the 2011 hours, nationwide.

Training	46,254	45%
Other Missions	15,334	15%
Cadets	14,891	15%
CD	8,393	8%
Maintenance	7,945	8%
Transport	3,579	3%
O-Rides	2,915	3%
SAR	2,073	2%
Glider	1,093	1%
Total	102,477	100%

[simon]

Also, the percentage of total CAP hours spent on SAR in 2005-2007 was between 5% and 6%.

The percentages since then (No more 121.5 satellites) were:

  2008: 3.8%
  2009: 3.7%
  2010: 2.2%
  2011: 2.0%

[manfredvonrichthofen]

I know here when CAP is sent out, we do most of the finding. I don't know about other areas though. Now there aren't very many calls at all.

[Short Field]

Is CAP being directed to eliminate the less likely areas, leaving other agencies to go to the most likely areas?

My experience in multiple roles in multiple SARs leads me to believe the problem is that most of the CAP ICs, OSCs, and PSCs have no clue how to plan and execute a search.   On my one Save, I almost had to fight the rest of the crew to get them to fly a standard CAP search pattern instead of just going to spots and circling...and I was the PIC.  Mission base was only concerned with launching the aircraft.

A planned search with all clues being collected and processed yields results.  Otherwise we are just counting on blind luck.