Read Ahead Documents for Webinar

Started by JohnKachenmeister, January 02, 2007, 02:58:46 AM

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ELTHunter

Quote from: lordmonar on January 03, 2007, 08:16:47 PM
I whole heartedly agree that we should be selecting the best people for the jobs and it is a gread idea to have people expeinced with the CAP way of doing buisness to stand up and take the job.  But let's get down to brass tacks here.  What do you do if you have not "qualified" people who are willing to take the job?  What do you do in the case of new units where there are no experinced officers at all?

Making new rules is not going to fix this particual problem.  In fact it may make it worse.  Let's say you have a new member who has the abilities to run and manage a squadron but has only been in CAP for six months or so.  This rule will force you to either have a gap in command or it will force you to ignore your own rule.

Closing squadrons for lack of leadership is not the way to go.



Look at Iowa's plan of "CAP stations" and the like.  Besides finding a commander for new or reorganizing squadrons, there are many other pitfalls that usually lead to thier demise.  Putting a new CAP person in charge might do more harm than good.
Maj. Tim Waddell, CAP
SER-TN-170
Deputy Commander of Cadets
Emergency Services Officer

RiverAux

Just for clarification there are several SDFs with air components, but they fall into two different categories.  VA and the AK SDFs actually have flying units (AK has SDF-owned low-wing aircraft while VA uses civilian aircraft and their owners' fly them).  The second type of air unit is devoted to augmentation of the Air National Guard in that state.  TX is probably the most advanced in their area.  Their SDF members provide day-to-day augmentation of specific Air NG units.

I do not know of any SDF air unit whose members actually fly NG helicopters or aircraft. 

lordmonar

Quote from: ELTHunter on January 03, 2007, 09:22:56 PMThat is part of the problem.  Many times those willing to step up are not the ones with the CAP background to be in a command position.  I'm not saying you are/were one of them, but it does happen.  We need to get out of the mentality that we should put someone in a command or staff job just because they are willing.

I got to drop the BS flag on this one...because the first criteria for any position is to be willing to take it on.  We can't force anyone to take any position.  We can put pressure on the unit by threatening disolution....but is that what we really want?  It becomes a command decision at that time.  Is it better to have a squadron run by a willing amature ot to not have a squadron at all?  I don't think we are in the mentality of "hey you want this job...it's yours!"  It is more "God if someone does not step up soon DIPSY DOODLE Composite Squadron is going to fold".
PATRICK M. HARRIS, SMSgt, CAP

Major Carrales

#43
Quote from: lordmonar on January 03, 2007, 10:21:00 PM
Quote from: ELTHunter on January 03, 2007, 09:22:56 PMThat is part of the problem.  Many times those willing to step up are not the ones with the CAP background to be in a command position.  I'm not saying you are/were one of them, but it does happen.  We need to get out of the mentality that we should put someone in a command or staff job just because they are willing.

I got to drop the BS flag on this one...because the first criteria for any position is to be willing to take it on.  We can't force anyone to take any position.  We can put pressure on the unit by threatening disolution....but is that what we really want?  It becomes a command decision at that time.  Is it better to have a squadron run by a willing amature ot to not have a squadron at all?  I don't think we are in the mentality of "hey you want this job...it's yours!"  It is more "God if someone does not step up soon DIPSY DOODLE Composite Squadron is going to fold".

If I may be so bold, if one is going to put a rank amature in command of a unit, one had better give that person support from above and from below.

The Group, or WING, had better be willing and able to offer assistance more than just "its all in the regs."  In these days of instant communication via e-mail and telephone it should be easy.  Also, if no one in the unit wants the collar, they had best be supporters and not curmudgeonous obstacles.  Aviation and Cadet experts in the unit that is a Composite Squadron had better be the foundations of this person's command.

Lest, it will be a disaster.

My true impression is a unit needs a good staff.  That was the first thing I tried to get done when I took over my unit.  Without that "foundation" burnout is the only logical result.  No man alone is a UNIT.
"We have been given the power to change CAP, let's keep the momentum going!"

Major Joe Ely "Sparky" Carrales, CAP
Commander
Coastal Bend Cadet Squadron
SWR-TX-454

ZigZag911

Quote from: lordmonar on January 03, 2007, 08:16:47 PM
I whole heartedly agree that we should be selecting the best people for the jobs and it is a gread idea to have people expeinced with the CAP way of doing buisness to stand up and take the job.  But let's get down to brass tacks here.  What do you do if you have not "qualified" people who are willing to take the job?  What do you do in the case of new units where there are no experinced officers at all?

Making new rules is not going to fix this particual problem.  In fact it may make it worse.  Let's say you have a new member who has the abilities to run and manage a squadron but has only been in CAP for six months or so.  This rule will force you to either have a gap in command or it will force you to ignore your own rule.

Closing squadrons for lack of leadership is not the way to go.


Who said anything about shutting down squadrons?

Regardng the new unit -- why can't it be a flight reporting to wing/group/another squadron until there is a qualified & sufficiently experienced officer avaialble to command?

Also, I thought we were discussing 're-stricturing' here.....by it's nature that is going to mean writing new rules (that will hopefully work) to replace the old ones that are broken.

What CAP really needs is a culture change to reduce politics and increase mission orientation (all three missions)....as I see it, one way to do that is to take away the tools that have enabled the 'good ol' boy' network.

The ironic thing is that in the eadtern part of the country, the GOB network presently consists mainly of people who are CAP members less than five years....many "legends in their own minds"!

In any event, I proposed possible one solution to this mess, I'd be most interested in hearing yours.

ZigZag911

Quote from: lordmonar on January 03, 2007, 10:21:00 PM

I got to drop the BS flag on this one...because the first criteria for any position is to be willing to take it on.  We can't force anyone to take any position. 

Willingness as "first" criterion is fine.....however I have seen firsthand the problems that occur when it is the SOLE criterion!

lordmonar

Quote from: ZigZag911 on January 03, 2007, 11:15:19 PM
Who said anything about shutting down squadrons?

Well what is the alternative?  If no one with the minimum qualifications is willing to take the job...the only recourse is to shut down the squadron.

Quote from: ZigZag911 on January 03, 2007, 11:15:19 PM
Regarding the new unit -- why can't it be a flight reporting to wing/group/another squadron until there is a qualified & sufficiently experienced officer available to command?

So are you going to ask some officer to commute 2-3 times a week over 150 miles to some remote Flight to run the meetings and train the new squadron commander for a year and a half?

Quote from: ZigZag911 on January 03, 2007, 11:15:19 PM
Also, I thought we were discussing 're-structuring' here.....by it's nature that is going to mean writing new rules (that will hopefully work) to replace the old ones that are broken.

The problem with that idea is that the new rules do not fix the problem.  The problem is that inexperienced officers are often thrust into command positions before they are ready.  The fix is move oversight by higher headquarters...timely and appropriate training BEFORE it is needed.

Quote from: ZigZag911 on January 03, 2007, 11:15:19 PM
What CAP really needs is a culture change to reduce politics and increase mission orientation (all three missions)....as I see it, one way to do that is to take away the tools that have enabled the 'good ol' boy' network.

The way to fix that is oversight.  Real oversight.  And that can only come from above.  National needs to know what the regional commanders are doing and fire them if the need to.  Regional needs to hold their wing commander accountable and fire them if they need to....and all the way down the line.

PAWG is a prime example (not to pick on them).  Their wing uniform policy is in clear violation of the written regulation....and yet Region and National have done nothing to stop it.  Making it necessary to have at least 18 months TIS before you can be a commander is not going to fix the fact that National, Regional and Wing commanders do not do their jobs.

Quote from: ZigZag911 on January 03, 2007, 11:15:19 PM
The ironic thing is that in the Eastern part of the country, the GOB network presently consists mainly of people who are CAP members less than five years....many "legends in their own minds"!

The GOB network is based on freindship...you don't have to be friends long to set up a network.

Quote from: ZigZag911 on January 03, 2007, 11:15:19 PM
In any event, I proposed possible one solution to this mess, I'd be most interested in hearing yours.

I have already posted it.  More oversight, more training, more group and wing supervision.  A group commander should be interacting with his squadron commanders in such a way that he know when they are ready for a break.  He should have his training team in the squadrons at a regular basis making sure that there is adequate leadership.  He needs to have already identified the next commander at least six month prior to a change of command.

We need to get more involvement at the wing and group level with roving training teams.  Guys who are out at least once a week somewhere providing training to the squadron levels.

I have been here in NV wing for six months...and I am still waiting for an SLS (which is bad). We have had one commander's course (which is good) and six SAREXs which is very good.

If a new squadron is formed...then the group should be there at each meeting for at least six months helping the new commander along.

I propose a "commissioner staff" similar to the BSA's program.  These are guys who work for the District Commission and District Executive (Equivalent to Group) who provide two things.  Oversight.  A unit commissioner may be responsible for 2-3 units.  He visits them every month or so to see how they are doing.  If they are following policy, if they need any extra training, if they are having a retention problem.  If they need help...the Unit Commissioner contacts the District Commissioner and they (with the rest of the commissioner staff) prepare and implement a plan to correct the problem.

CAP lacks leadership.  One of the first basics of leadership is observing your people.  Now a wing or group commander can't be everywhere, so he must have eyes and ears out there working for him.

BTW...the unit commissioner visits are NOT inspections.  The point is not to send a roving IG team every other month but to have a conduit to ask for help and catch problems before they get too big.
PATRICK M. HARRIS, SMSgt, CAP

lordmonar

Quote from: ZigZag911 on January 03, 2007, 11:20:48 PM
Quote from: lordmonar on January 03, 2007, 10:21:00 PM

I got to drop the BS flag on this one...because the first criteria for any position is to be willing to take it on.  We can't force anyone to take any position. 

Willingness as "first" criterion is fine.....however I have seen firsthand the problems that occur when it is the SOLE criterion!

Yes you are right....there are lots of leaders out there who are too lazy to look a little deeper, do some real recruiting and getting the best guy for the job.

But again....that is not the problem of the member with only six months TIG, or the leaders of a new unit.  As I said....by making a hard and fast, you must be this tall to ride this ride, rule you are only cutting yourself off, because the reality is that some units are so small that there may not be anyone qualified and willing to take the job.

I've spend my time in the hot seat.   A newly minted 1st Lt.  There was a Maj in my unit and a FO.  The Major being a full time USAF Cop did NOT have the time to commit to being there for the cadets every week.  So I had the ball.

If I had to have 1 year TIG before I could take the job...there would have been no CAP....and how would I have gotten my 1 year experience?  The next nearest unit was over 700Km away (a 10 hour drive if you speed!).

So I know first hand that this rule would have made CAP worse off than with it.

Now if you have the good luck to be in area where you have lots of units close together...sure....go to outside the squadron to look for a suitable candidate.  That is what a group or wing commander (of their staff) should be doing.
PATRICK M. HARRIS, SMSgt, CAP

Al Sayre

Fortunately for me I grew up in CAP, including a couple of Squadrons where we got somebody's mom to join and be the CC to keep things alive and as C/CC I learned the hard way how to get the paperwork done.  Also during my time in the Navy, I was usually the detachment Training PO, so I got a lot of practice making the Detachment float on a sea of paper.  All of this was pretty good training for the Commanders job.

One of the first things I started doing as Commander was to start looking for someone to train as my replacement.  I fall back to the old principle that a really good leader trains his subordinates so well that he won't be missed when he leaves.  Not training replacements is how the Squadron ended up with noobie me as CC.
Lt Col Al Sayre
MS Wing Staff Dude
Admiral, Great Navy of the State of Nebraska
GRW #2787

ZigZag911

Quote from: lordmonar on January 04, 2007, 12:29:11 AM
Quote from: ZigZag911 on January 03, 2007, 11:20:48 PM
Quote from: lordmonar on January 03, 2007, 10:21:00 PM

I got to drop the BS flag on this one...because the first criteria for any position is to be willing to take it on.  We can't force anyone to take any position. 

Willingness as "first" criterion is fine.....however I have seen firsthand the problems that occur when it is the SOLE criterion!

Yes you are right....there are lots of leaders out there who are too lazy to look a little deeper, do some real recruiting and getting the best guy for the job.

But again....that is not the problem of the member with only six months TIG, or the leaders of a new unit.  As I said....by making a hard and fast, you must be this tall to ride this ride, rule you are only cutting yourself off, because the reality is that some units are so small that there may not be anyone qualified and willing to take the job.

I've spend my time in the hot seat.   A newly minted 1st Lt.  There was a Maj in my unit and a FO.  The Major being a full time USAF Cop did NOT have the time to commit to being there for the cadets every week.  So I had the ball.

If I had to have 1 year TIG before I could take the job...there would have been no CAP....and how would I have gotten my 1 year experience?  The next nearest unit was over 700Km away (a 10 hour drive if you speed!).

So I know first hand that this rule would have made CAP worse off than with it.

Now if you have the good luck to be in area where you have lots of units close together...sure....go to outside the squadron to look for a suitable candidate.  That is what a group or wing commander (of their staff) should be doing.

I agree completely that group/wing oversight, training & mentoring is the answer.

I still disagree about putting the inexperienced in command simply to have a squadron.

I think there are possibilities in the Iowa solution for some wings facing lack of personnel....it sort of addresses a problem I identified years ago -- that is, most CAP squadrons have a handful of officers to fill too many staff positions.

Part of the solution, I believe, is to move a lot of the administration to group 7 wing....kind of an expanded version of the 'wing banker' approach.

Squadrons & flights would be 'tactical' units, actually doing things, not shuffling papers.

Process could be as simple as squadron CC sending an email (or postcard, for the technologically challenged) to group/wing personnel recommending 2nd Lt Jones for promotion to 1 Lt.....personnel section then gets the ball rolling.

On another point, I am not suggesting that a flight be visited weekly by it s squadron CC from 150 miles away....but the same problem could apply also to wing/group staff, in terms of distance from the new unit.

I'm all for lots of interaction & support from higher echelons to the units in the field.

However, when higher echelons are being run by sparsely experienced cronies of equally inexperienced brass, then the problem is self-perpetuating....hence my proposal to make it darn difficult to get a command without thorough training and experience.

If someone knows what they are doing, I can live with them being the wing commander's 3rd cousin twice removed

DNall

Quote from: JohnKachenmeister on January 03, 2007, 12:31:16 PM
And, as we all know, rotary-wing aircraft are the work of the Devil.
:P

Well I'm trying to slam a document together now... as I'm sure you know, my position is focused on a federal CAP lined up better under AF. It's focused on putting OPCON on 1AF because that's where all our ES missions line up. And, staying ADCON under AETC, cause thats where our CP/AE missions line up.

While trying not to get too deeply into this... what happens on a disaster is a little complex. Once it is federally declared, the NG isn't in charge anymore. Governor can keep some NG on security jobs, but 1st/5th Army takes over military response (including dibs on NG assets). The 1st/5th Army Brigade CCs become the field level owners of all the resources.

Meanwhile in the AF. AFNSEP runs liaisons at FEMA & other agencies, takes requests for AF asistance, clears that thru 1st/5th Army in overall command of DoD assets (by following SOP more than actually getting clearance), then taks those resources thru 1AF.... On top of that, 1AF/CC is the automatically designated Air Component Commander for all civilian & military aviation in the disaster TFR/AO - owns the airspace & everything in it.

Key Point: 1) When a disaster goes federal then federal officers take over at the points that decide who gets what mission on the ground or in the air. !AF runs that show for AF & has a extra key role overall airspace owner.
2) There's no point. There's little space between someing getting out of hand locally & where 1AF/AFNSEP are authorized to step in. They have broad latitude (under known rules) to help BEFORE a federal declearation, and after they get one the gloves come off.

Plus he who makes the rules owes the money - goes both ways you know. If the states take CAP as an asset then they pay those bills in these emergency response situations, not the feds. Maybe tehy can work something out, I don't know, but woudn't it be easier the other way around?


That'd bring me to why are we just talking about disaster response? It's a nice side job here & there, but it's 1) and Army mission, 2) not that consistent a work, & 3) requires long far deployments for unpaid CAP members. Absolutely we should do the work, but you don't build your structure around a side-job.

You want to talk about getting in this fight? How about homeland defense... the guard does some of that right? Well not so fast. Yeah the personnel are operators on some of those missions, but they don't run the show. When you're talking about surveiling, controlling, & defending the US airspace, that's 1AF. They call up ANG units to fly those missions, along with ARNG aviation, & federal air resources. You hit the ground that belongs to the AD Army, the water belongs to CG. You want to fly chem/bio/nuke/rad detection & deterrance, that's a federal job run by federal forces. They may reach down to tap state resources, even have OPCON of some of those resources assigned directly to them for that purpose, but the show gets run by 1AF.

FYI- The AAGs are just administrators to make sure state resources flow to units so they can meet requirements set by 1st/5th Army. The TAG gets a little more juice standing next to the Governor, but when it comes down to it the feds are going to run the show, and most governors are smart enough not to argue since they know who's paying the bills at the end of the day.

What else you want to do... SAR, DR, HLD... oh CN, yeah 1AF is in charge of all airbone CN activity by all state & federal military assets. Again, you might see NG forces doing the work, but 1AF is calling the shots. What else am I missing? We could talk about how to run augmentation back up ther other way... there's not really a structure for that. It's been teh recieving agency (chaplain service) dealing with the details so far, but you want to take that big time then it'll get a little harder. While 1AF deals with this complex back & forth guard/reserve/active/multi-agency/joint-service BS constantly, I think they're best left using their time defesnding the country than figureing out what base needs some extra legal aid to dependants or some crap like that. AETC is in a good position for that one. I know it seems like we can help out ANG in a few roles, and there's no reason we can't have them tap into the same system. Oh yeah, and stepping up to back up the light aircraft transportation fleet that's mostly in Army fixed wing, little in AF. This is something we talked about if we had a few twins laying around & required CPL. That's going to be managed by active forces also.

Look the guard is good people they really are, and they've come a very long way from the old days belief that they were weekend soldiers. However, when the chips are down, the feds take charge. If I'm looking for important work, I want to find the place where the most things we need to be doing are flying around one point, and I want to stand inside the eye of that storm - That's 1AF! For an endless list of reasons that always ends back there despite my not planning it that way at all.. it just is 1AF.


Now, structural change? We can do anything we want internally. BoG controls the rules. If they want to create a rule that candidates for Wg/Reg/Nat CC be reviewed or even appointed by them, or confirmed after election, or if they want to pass that power to AETC/CC or SECAF's designee (probably some Amn waiting for tech school)... they can make our rules whatever they want w/o legislative change. I'd recommend they do so to the extent needed & if it needs to be backed up/enshrined in law after he system is proven, then that's a small matter.

Obviously the key issues are: accountability & personnel quality control (especially in leadership slots, but overall as well).

I can tell you the AF doesn't trust us with serious gear or missions critical to homeland defense, because we're "volunteers" - interchangable with idiots off the street incapable of long division, much less running a FLIR over the border like a pro. If we want to play their game we have to do it on their level.

PD: We have to up our memebrship standards & requirements for officership, and set training close to theirs. I won't get into my whole officer/enlisted PD concept, but you all know it by now (or can go find that thread). Up the quality from underneath.

Pair that with legit metrics & TQM of units on realistic partiicpation numbers, and roving Wg/Gp based recruiting/retention/Sq Mgmt Tiger teams to fix broke units & stoke the fires. That probably will require a lot of hard work & reorg on the Sq level when we see what people are really doing well or poorly & how small units really are - hence why they can't get the job done. Mere survival isn't good enough by the way - that's a failing grade. I have some ideas about pairing up some units to share staff so they're correctly manned, but you have to see that data first.

Standardization at Gp level thru quarterly training conferences. All tracks breakout. CP training at these things standardizes off the varrious problems that exist at Sq - notice I'm being nice.

Specialty track managers at Wg (coordinators at Gp) in addition to the guy doing that job for that echelon - in other words, the Wg Safety officer is running the Wg Safety program & advising the CC on the issue. Very little is left to directly manage the training of every safety officer in the Wg, and to build up comm channels between those personnel inside the track.

...follow thru on most of this & similar ideas, you get a MUCH better organized org & better quality people rising in grade & to leadership opportunities. In the long run that fixes your command problems, or it should anyway.


Governance... accountability is the issue. leadership isn't accountable to members, or to AF, not even to BoG or Congress.

BoG should restucture the consitution. With BoG in power there is no need of a NB or NEC. BoG hold those powers, below them is a military chain of command that can follow orders or be replaced. I suggest that all Col or above slots be appointed by BoG (they may take applications or recommendations from the field or varrious CCs as they see fit); I'd recommend BoG seek AF input in the selection process for at least the upper end of these slots.

At some point out in the long term, when the world is spinning the right way again, I'd like title 36 corporate status to be abolished in favor of a fixed title 10 along the same lines as CGAux - basically making us a federal level SDF of the AF. If it can't get in before this, I'd like to see empoyment protections like Iowa & a couple other places have, as well as funded legit per diem as is already authorized. With that, BoG would transfer all power to AF & you can look to CGAux for how seamlessly they function.

BillB

DNall
It sure would be nice if the average CAP member reading your post knew what in the (censored) you were talking about. As mentioned in a Civil Air Portal thread, members who'se experience in in other areas of the program have no idea of the abbreviations used.  OPCON, ADCON, AETC, AFNSEP, what do those mean to the average member that may be in cadet programs or aerospace ed, or even a new member trying to understand thyge missions of CAP. YOU may be familiar with all those terms, but how many readers know what you refer to? Does it take that much time to spell it out the first time a name is abbreviated to allow the reader to see what you're talking about?
Gil Robb Wilson # 19
Gil Robb Wilson # 104

DNall

I'll spell them out just cause you asked, but yes it's a huge pain in the butt. This is not a conversation about how to teach leadership or AE or GTM tasks. This is highly advanced strategic study of CAP's make up & place in a future military structure. It's meant to be advanced for War College material, and will be published there when we get done. If a member can't follow from context, they can use their search engine - where besides the terms they'll also find a DoD guide to common abbreviations. If that doesn't work they CAN ask & we'll answer. All of which is more efficient then me writing out a glossary.

OPCON/ADCON = Operational/Administrative Control. ADCON is to command you report to for day-to-day mgmt, oversight, training, professional development, contracting, etc. OPCON is the command that activates you to come work for them on missions - ex 1AF owns AFRCC, who takes OPCON of CAP personnel during missions.

AETC is Air Education & Training Command. They are the major command that oversees all technical/specialty training & professional development in the Air Force. They are basically the top level in the chain of commmand befoer it goes to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force - Secretary of the AF - Sec Defense - President. AETC controls all the money Congress gives to CAP. They do the contracting & oversee CAP-USAF who watches over our shoulder.

AFNSEP - Air Force National Security Emergency Prepardness. This is a stand alone agency that direct reports to the Air Staff (they run the Air Force). AFNSEP provides liaison officers to all states, FEMA, & other lead emergency response agencies. These liaisons take requests for AF assistance of civial authorities, AFNSEP is there to simplify the process & get it thru the right channels so the right units can be activated. They are teh ones that give mission numbers for most of the disaster stuff that CAP (or any part of the AF) does.

SDF, that's State Defense Force. That's organizations in 35 states that are very much like CAP (not paid, in uniform, etc) that are meant to fill in for the national guard on their state jobs when the guard gets called to war, and to help out during disasters & civil unrest. The generally have to meet the same standards, or reasonably close, as the guard & regularlly fill in for them in just about every role.

1st & 5th US ARMIES. These are Active duty Army commands (like AETC) that each one covers half the country. They set teh standards & monitor teh training of all national guards for their federal (wartime) mission, and as we discussed, they take over in case of disasters so a bunch of differnt people aren't giving troops conflicting orders in the same area at the same time.

USNOTHCOM, AFNORTH, 1AF... go to the website already.

CN - Counter Narcotics;

HLD - homeland Defense = doesn't include law enforcement, is defesne of the US
HLS - Homeland Security = includes law enforcement

TFR - Temporary flight restriction. FAA imposed flight restriction around a special event or emergency situation. Control of Airspace is restricted & controlled in a different way by different people. In the case of a disaster, in order to keep people from running into each other, airspace is controlled by 1AF. If you try to go in it w/o permission they'll remove you one way or another.

AO - Aera of Operations. An official term (also used in slag at times) just meaning the defined area in which an operation is happening, usually determined by radius around an incident or map defined boundries, like county/state lines or streets.

TAG - The Adjutant General of a state. Usually a two star general appointed by a governor in change of a state's air & army national guard.
AAG - there is an Assistant Adjutant General under the TAG for Army & one for Air.

Ask if I missed something you don't know.

A.Member

#53
Quote from: lordmonar on January 03, 2007, 10:21:00 PM
Is it better to have a squadron run by a willing amature ot to not have a squadron at all? 
Those aren't the only the two choices.  However, if they were, without question it would be better to have no squadron at all.  A squadron in the wrong hands can do significantly more damage to the organization than no squadron at all.

Group commanders provide temporary oversight to the squadron.  It could be a flight under the command of another squadron until a suitable commander is found.  There are other options. 

The worst thing we can do is continue to put unqualified people in these positions - regardless of their desire to do so.  This is precisely one of the things that leads to so many of our issues.  It reflects poorly on the organization as a whole.  You can't tell me that you haven't come across some squadron commander - or worse yet, a group or wing CC (and probably on more than one occasion) - and said to yourself, "You've got to be kidding me.  This guy is the commander?" 

No one said it would be easy but this approach of having Joe Blow the New Guy do it because no one else is willing must stop.  We need to do a better job of grooming all officers to be just that - officers!  This is just one reason why AFAIDL (ECI)13 should be moved up as a requirement to obtain 2d LT rather than Capt. - with classroom instruction to supplement it.
"For once you have tasted flight you will walk the earth with your eyes turned skywards, for there you have been and there you will long to return."

JohnKachenmeister

Quote from: BillB on January 04, 2007, 10:24:24 AM
DNall
It sure would be nice if the average CAP member reading your post knew what in the (censored) you were talking about. As mentioned in a Civil Air Portal thread, members who'se experience in in other areas of the program have no idea of the abbreviations used.  OPCON, ADCON, AETC, AFNSEP, what do those mean to the average member that may be in cadet programs or aerospace ed, or even a new member trying to understand thyge missions of CAP. YOU may be familiar with all those terms, but how many readers know what you refer to? Does it take that much time to spell it out the first time a name is abbreviated to allow the reader to see what you're talking about?

Two comments, Bill:

1.  To the extent that a CAP member does NOT know what the (Freak) he's talking about, that alone serves as an illustration of the failure of our officer professional development.

2.  If you are among those who don't know what the (Freak) he's talking about, get with the (Freakin') program!  There's a WAR ON!
Another former CAP officer

fyrfitrmedic

Quote from: JohnKachenmeister on January 04, 2007, 03:09:06 PM
Quote from: BillB on January 04, 2007, 10:24:24 AM
DNall
It sure would be nice if the average CAP member reading your post knew what in the (censored) you were talking about. As mentioned in a Civil Air Portal thread, members who'se experience in in other areas of the program have no idea of the abbreviations used.  OPCON, ADCON, AETC, AFNSEP, what do those mean to the average member that may be in cadet programs or aerospace ed, or even a new member trying to understand thyge missions of CAP. YOU may be familiar with all those terms, but how many readers know what you refer to? Does it take that much time to spell it out the first time a name is abbreviated to allow the reader to see what you're talking about?

Two comments, Bill:

1.  To the extent that a CAP member does NOT know what the (Freak) he's talking about, that alone serves as an illustration of the failure of our officer professional development.

2.  If you are among those who don't know what the (Freak) he's talking about, get with the (Freakin') program!  There's a WAR ON!

I had much the same pair of thoughts initially. these were joined by a mixture of dismay, embarassment and frustration when I considered just how many folks within the organization I know personally who probably don't recognize those terms or acronyms.
MAJ Tony Rowley CAP
Lansdowne PA USA
"The passion of rescue reveals the highest dynamic of the human soul." -- Kurt Hahn

JohnKachenmeister

DNall:

As always, Dennis, you make good points, and present a valid argument.  I'm looking forward to discussing this with you tonight.

And as I said before, we have a 50-meter bracket on the problem.  Any shells landing at your position, or mine, or in between will have the desired effect on the target.

The plan I proposed, however, provides certain advantages that your plan does not offer.  For example:

1.  Yes, in a federal emergency or disaster, 1AF controls the show.  In disasters or emergencies less than those requiring a federal declaration of disaster, the NG is still the star of the show.  If we are under the OPCON of the ANG, we will be more flexible in responding to local-level emergencies requiring the assistance of light aircraft.  (Seasonal flooding, dam surveillance, missing persons searches, etc.)

2.  In the event of a major disaster, we still fall under 1AF, as do all NG units.

3.  You are correct in pointing out that some of the missions in a disaster are Army missions, but being under the TAG would put us in a position to also respond to Army requests for aviation support, (Route recon for convoys, rapid light cargo transport, movement of key personnel, etc.)

4.  Alignment under the Guard would open up assets to us in the form of use of armories, and access to the state military academies, which would assist us in the very vital mission of improving our officer corps.

I support you on the proposal for the BoG to hire and fire all colonels and higher, but I think the BoG only meets twice a year.  Will they be flexible and responsive enough to do that?    
Another former CAP officer

Dragoon

#57
I'm all for making us the Aux of the Guard, for the following functional, (not legal) reasons

1.  We do local work- most emergencies are confined to a one or two state area.  The Guard is the local presence.  CAP has not been called for many state or county-level  emergencies because unless there's a good MOU in place, we only do federal work (lost planes and presidential disasters).  If we were wired to directly to each state, we'd spend more time helping folks and less time waiting for the call.  While some would call DR work "a nice sideline" it's a growing line of business and definitely an "Emergency Service."  Defining Emergency Services as just SAR is a circular argument - it's mainly what we do not because it's the right thing to do in service to our nation, but rather because that's all USAF cares about most of the time.

2.  "Serving 2 masters" (1 for ES and one for CP/AE) is kind of an exaggeration, especially at the squadron level. 

            a.  As John K pointed out, we do this already whenever we take on a corporate mission.  And really, how often has USAF butted their nose into how a squadron runs the cadet program?

            b.  Also as John K pointed out.  It's also how the NG functions every day, and they do fine.

            c.  Most "serving 2 masters" issues would be at Wing level. Squadrons don't answer to USAF or Adjutant Generals anyway - they answer to a CAP chain of command.  It's at the Wing level where multiple commitments from multiple sources get hashed out.

            d.  The cadet program might change, but it also might not.  In our Wing, the NG is the biggest supporter of our cadet program, as it provides recruits into the ANG!  We get a heck of a lot more NG support than USAF support at the local unit level. 

           e.  (and yes, I'm being smarmy here) - the AE mission is basically complete.  Ask 10 Americans whether planes and satellites are good things, and you'll get a rather resounding yes.  Really, our AE mission is 90% internal.  This would not change no matter where we go, as long as we are aviation based.

3.  Being tied to the federal USAF means being tied to an organization whose major function is performed overseas where we don't play.  Being tied to the Guard means being tied to an organization whose major function is right where our members live and work.  (this, I think, is why CGAUX has closer ties to their service - most Coast Guard work is here at home.)

4.  Yup, there are already SDFs in some states, and laws might have to change.  The way I'd envision it is that CAP would be kind of an "unpaid National Guard" - with the same kind of joint Federal and State status and funding.

Without a law change, this ain't gonna happen.  With a law change, the rest is just details.

Now let me share the major reason it will never happen - years ago we had the Air Force Asssitant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs at the CAP National Board.  I asked him about the possibility of moving us to the Guard Bureau.  His answer was effectively "Yeah, we've thought about that and it makes sense, but there's no way the Air Force is going to give the Guard another $30 million."

Perhaps today's climate has changed that sentiment, but it's been around a very long time.

flyguy06

The Gurd and the USAF operate ff of two different budgets. The Guard gets money from indivisual tates. The USAF gets money from the Federal Government.

Be careful what you ask for wanting CAP to fall under the Guard. The good ol Boy system is rampant in the guard and you really dont want that feeding over into CAP

JohnKachenmeister

Flyguy:

Yes, and No.

The Guard is funded by the states, and unless called upon by the President, the Guard remains under the command of the Governor, providing the state with a military response force of its own.

But, since the Guard also has a "Federal mission," the training for and equipment used in that mission are provided by the United States government.  Tanks, guns, airplanes, uniforms, weekend training salaries, salaries and expenses for annual training, training ammunition, all are provided by Uncle Sam.

The state owns the armories, and pays salaries for troops called to active duty on state missions.

SDF's have NO federal mission, and as such are not funded by Uncle Sam.  They cannot even access DRMO's.
Another former CAP officer