Report on The Guard and Reserve, and CAP?

[sardak]

The Commission on the Guard and Reserve issued its report today.  If one substituted CAP for Guard or Reserve, you'd think the report was prepared by CapTalk members discussing CAP.

The charter of the Committee, which has one more report due next year:

To identify and recommend changes in policy, law, regulation, and practice to ensure that the National Guard and Reserves are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the national security requirements of the United States.

The full report is available here:
http://www.cngr.gov/press-room.asp

Parts of the report that I think could potentially have an impact on CAP (though not anytime soon).

FINDINGS
The National Response Plan and related preparedness efforts have not been translated adequately into Department of Defense programming and budgeting requirements.

The Department of Homeland Security has not identified the requirements that the Department of Defense must meet to adequately perform domestic civil support missions.

CONCLUSION
Although the current Department of Defense Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support states that securing the U.S. homeland is "the first among many priorities," the Defense Department in fact has not accepted that this responsibility requires planning, programming, and budgeting for civil support missions.

RECOMMENDATION
The Department of Defense should include civil support requirements in its programming and budgeting.  In a new advisory role, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should advise the U.S. Northern Command commander, the Secretaries of the Air Force and Army, and, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense regarding gaps between federal and state emergency response capabilities.

The Commission believes that the responsibility for identifying and filling gaps in emergency response capabilities should remain in the Department of Homeland Security.  As part of this process, DHS should identify the specific gaps that can best be filled by Defense Department civil support activities.

FINDING
There is no established process whereby governors can have operational control over federal military assets within a state to respond to emergencies.

CONCLUSION
The priorities of the states and their governors are not adequately considered in the Department of Defense's policy and resourcing decisions related to the National Guard, even though governors are, and likely will continue to be, the leaders of most domestic emergency response efforts involving the National Guard.

RECOMMENDATION
The Department of Defense should develop protocols that allow governors to direct the efforts of federal military assets responding to an emergency such as a natural disaster.

If governors can be trusted to command National Guard soldiers from their own state or from other states, as customarily occurs in disaster response, then they can be trusted to command federal active and reserve component forces as well.

The guiding principle of emergency management doctrine in the United States is that problems should be solved at the lowest level possible. Therefore, unless their use would compromise national security, all military resources that may be needed to respond to a contingency—whether National Guard (in state active duty of Title 32) or active duty or reserve (in Title 10), and whether within the state or in another state—should be included in the state's emergency response planning.

In a temporary situation such as a disaster response, a military organization could be "attached" to another organization for "operational" or "tactical" purposes, with "administrative control," including disciplinary authority, being retained by the parent organization.

FINDING
The commander of U.S. Northern Command is responsible for the planning, exercising, and command and control of assigned and apportioned Title 10 forces in response to a domestic emergency. The National Guard Bureau coordinates the movement of nonfederalized National Guard forces. This arrangement can impair the coordination of the military response to disaster.

CONCLUSION
U.S. Northern Command does not adequately consider and utilize all military components—active and reserve, including the National Guard—in planning, training, and exercising and in the conduct of military operations while in support of a governor, in support of another lead federal agency, or in the defense of America.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Either the officer serving in the position of the commander or the officer serving in the position of deputy commander of U.S. Northern Command should be a National Guard or Reserve officer at all times.

Because U.S. Northern Command is a command with significant responsibility for domestic emergency response and civil support, a majority of U.S. Northern Command's billets, including those for its service components, should be filled by leaders and staff with reserve qualifications and credentials. Job descriptions for senior leaders and other key positions at U.S. Northern Command should contain the requirement of significant Reserve or National Guard experience or service.

Mike