December 08, 2022, 12:36:29 am

Risk Perception

Started by James Shaw, August 31, 2019, 02:00:24 pm

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James Shaw

Each of us has different "life experiences" that help define our perception of risk.

How can an organization help train its employees or members on the "Risk Perception" associated with their activities?

What is the first step?
Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

arajca

The organization needs to identify what it sees as risks.

I (and most of the folks I know) drive vehicles ranging from compact cars to 40ft trucks, so driving a full size van is a not a risk I usually consider. Other members driving experience is limited to their econo-box car, so driving a van is risky to them. That is usually something I have remember to consider at Encampments when assigning drivers to vehicles.

lordmonar

Quote from: MovingOnToOtherThings on August 31, 2019, 02:00:24 pm
Each of us has different "life experiences" that help define our perception of risk.

How can an organization help train its employees or members on the "Risk Perception" associated with their activities?

What is the first step?
Who cares about he Perception of risk.
I don't want our organization making operational decisions based on a perception of risk.   They need to be making the decision based on a objective measurement of the risk.


PATRICK M. HARRIS, SMSgt, CAP

James Shaw

Quote from: lordmonar on August 31, 2019, 03:29:43 pm
Quote from: MovingOnToOtherThings on August 31, 2019, 02:00:24 pm
Each of us has different "life experiences" that help define our perception of risk.

How can an organization help train its employees or members on the "Risk Perception" associated with their activities?

What is the first step?
Who cares about he Perception of risk.
I don't want our organization making operational decisions based on a perception of risk.   They need to be making the decision based on a objective measurement of the risk.


Do you think you can have an objective measurement of risk if the individuals perceptions of the risk are not there because they do not have the KSA's to support the objective approach?
Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

Luis R. Ramos

That message by Lord appears incomplete.

However wrong I may be by responding to an incomplete message, I feel that the entire CAP safety program does hinge on the perception of risk. What the individual members sees as a risk, which may be or not a real risk. In most cases, everyone will see a real risk. Ie, possibility of someone getting cut by a knife left haphazardly, and other situations will be different. The case presented by Arajca. Ie, some drivers are going to be so familiar with vehicles larger than vans, vs others who are not that familiar with vehicles larger than their cars. Safety risk on the first case, almost none, on the second, high.
Squadron Safety Officer
Squadron Communication Officer
Squadron Emergency Services Officer

MSG Mac

One of the reasons we have  Operational Risk Management training.
Michael P. McEleney
Lt Col CAP
MSG USA (Retired)
50 Year Member

Eclipse

Quote from: MSG Mac on September 01, 2019, 12:19:01 am
One of the reasons we have  Operational Risk Management training.


Effective 30 Sept ORM is no longer a part of the CAP lexicon.

"That Others May Zoom"

etodd

Quote from: Eclipse on September 01, 2019, 12:31:29 am
Quote from: MSG Mac on September 01, 2019, 12:19:01 am
One of the reasons we have  Operational Risk Management training.


Effective 30 Sept ORM is no longer a part of the CAP lexicon.


Is the ORM page in WMIRS, that pilots have to fill out, disappearing?
"Don't try to explain it, just bow your head
Breathe in, breathe out, move on ..."

James Shaw

The question is not specific to CAP but can relate to many organizations and individuals that are involved in safety. I appreciate conversations!
Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

lordmonar

Quote from: MovingOnToOtherThings on August 31, 2019, 03:44:02 pm
Quote from: lordmonar on August 31, 2019, 03:29:43 pm
Quote from: MovingOnToOtherThings on August 31, 2019, 02:00:24 pm
Each of us has different "life experiences" that help define our perception of risk.

How can an organization help train its employees or members on the "Risk Perception" associated with their activities?

What is the first step?
Who cares about he Perception of risk.
I don't want our organization making operational decisions based on a perception of risk.   They need to be making the decision based on a objective measurement of the risk.


Do you think you can have an objective measurement of risk if the individuals perceptions of the risk are not there because they do not have the KSA's to support the objective approach?

Yes.   You have subject matter experts develop the objective measurements.     
PATRICK M. HARRIS, SMSgt, CAP

Live2Learn

Quote from: lordmonar on September 01, 2019, 04:06:52 am
Yes.   You have subject matter experts develop the objective measurements.   


I have watched in awe and amazement as "subject matter experts" used the Delphi technique to conjure data from a cauldron of opinion spiced with perception.  Absent data from repeatable observations the black art of Delphi divination ("professional opinion" and experience) remains about as good as we'll get.

James Shaw

Quote from: Live2Learn on September 01, 2019, 05:49:27 am
Quote from: lordmonar on September 01, 2019, 04:06:52 am
Yes.   You have subject matter experts develop the objective measurements.   


I have watched in awe and amazement as "subject matter experts" used the Delphi technique to conjure data from a cauldron of opinion spiced with perception.  Absent data from repeatable observations the black art of Delphi divination ("professional opinion" and experience) remains about as good as we'll get.


The  Delphi Method is a great tool for those in many fields to use. From the Safety perspective it can be used for the identification of leading and lagging indicators to help mitigate future risk specific to the use of "numbers" involved. It would take more "statistical data identification" when trying to use it for a subjective prediction of individual actions associated with safe or unsafe acts. The consequences are going to be easier to calculate vs the causations of behavior. The variables would be easier to quantify once the attributes were qualified specific to the many behaviors a person or group of people have. Qualifying the individual behavior would be a very long and detailed approach.

As you have noted it is interesting when you inject opinion and perception as that is part of the original question. I have also noted over the years that many "SME's" remain biased by their own data and less open to challenge and others input.

How can those involved (in this example) use the individual's perception of risk to help mitigate risk?


Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

Live2Learn

Quote from: MovingOnToOtherThings on September 01, 2019, 10:58:27 am
Quote from: Live2Learn on September 01, 2019, 05:49:27 am
Quote from: lordmonar on September 01, 2019, 04:06:52 am
Yes.   You have subject matter experts develop the objective measurements.   


I have watched in awe and amazement as "subject matter experts" used the Delphi technique to conjure data from a cauldron of opinion spiced with perception.  Absent data from repeatable observations the black art of Delphi divination ("professional opinion" and experience) remains about as good as we'll get.


The  Delphi Method is a great tool for those in many fields to use. From the Safety perspective it can be used for the identification of leading and lagging indicators to help mitigate future risk specific to the use of "numbers" involved. It would take more "statistical data identification" when trying to use it for a subjective prediction of individual actions associated with safe or unsafe acts. The consequences are going to be easier to calculate vs the causations of behavior. The variables would be easier to quantify once the attributes were qualified specific to the many behaviors a person or group of people have. Qualifying the individual behavior would be a very long and detailed approach.

As you have noted it is interesting when you inject opinion and perception as that is part of the original question. I have also noted over the years that many "SME's" remain biased by their own data and less open to challenge and others input.


Here, in bold, is the underlying and mega sized flaw in Delphi...

and

Quote
How can those involved (in this example) use the individual's perception of risk to help mitigate risk?


Here in red is the unresolved problem.  Confirmation bias and intellectual inertia are alive and well.

lordmonar

Quote from: MovingOnToOtherThings on September 01, 2019, 10:58:27 am
How can those involved (in this example) use the individual's perception of risk to help mitigate risk?


Depends on the perception.

One may perceive a risk to be greater than it actually is.
Or one may perceive a risk to be less then it actually is.

Since we do (or at least used to) do ORM.    We ask the individual/leader/commander to make decisions based on the importance of the mission vs the risk (Real or Perceived) +/- any possible mitigation.

That is it.

You can't do any better other then educate people on the tools to evaluate risk, tools for mitigation and specific safety training on actual risks (i.e. This is the Ford F-150 Panel Van Mark II.   It has blind spots here, here, here, and here.   The Flux Capacitor may come unglued in wet moist conditions that could result in unexpected time travel.....)

But as a leader.....I don't want to base our training program on leveraging PERCEPTIONS to enact safety.
I want to use FACTS Verifiable and Repeatable.

Yes....we all know "SME" who are worth their weight in dog poop.   Get better SMEs. 
PATRICK M. HARRIS, SMSgt, CAP

James Shaw

Quote from: Live2Learn on September 01, 2019, 03:52:01 pm
Quote from: MovingOnToOtherThings on September 01, 2019, 10:58:27 am
Quote from: Live2Learn on September 01, 2019, 05:49:27 am
Quote from: lordmonar on September 01, 2019, 04:06:52 am
Yes.   You have subject matter experts develop the objective measurements.   


I have watched in awe and amazement as "subject matter experts" used the Delphi technique to conjure data from a cauldron of opinion spiced with perception.  Absent data from repeatable observations the black art of Delphi divination ("professional opinion" and experience) remains about as good as we'll get.


The  Delphi Method is a great tool for those in many fields to use. From the Safety perspective it can be used for the identification of leading and lagging indicators to help mitigate future risk specific to the use of "numbers" involved. It would take more "statistical data identification" when trying to use it for a subjective prediction of individual actions associated with safe or unsafe acts. The consequences are going to be easier to calculate vs the causations of behavior. The variables would be easier to quantify once the attributes were qualified specific to the many behaviors a person or group of people have. Qualifying the individual behavior would be a very long and detailed approach.

As you have noted it is interesting when you inject opinion and perception as that is part of the original question. I have also noted over the years that many "SME's" remain biased by their own data and less open to challenge and others input.


Here, in bold, is the underlying and mega sized flaw in Delphi...

and

Quote
How can those involved (in this example) use the individual's perception of risk to help mitigate risk?


Here in red is the unresolved problem.  Confirmation bias and intellectual inertia are alive and well.


I believe the Delphi has its place in Safety but agree it cannot be the primary tool used. There does exist a confirmation bias in the field and intellectual inertia as well. Of course we can always find ways to challenge established practices and maintain an open mind.



Quote from: lordmonar on September 01, 2019, 04:03:01 pm
Quote from: MovingOnToOtherThings on September 01, 2019, 10:58:27 am
How can those involved (in this example) use the individual’s perception of risk to help mitigate risk?


Depends on the perception.

One may perceive a risk to be greater than it actually is.
Or one may perceive a risk to be less then it actually is.

Since we do (or at least used to) do ORM.    We ask the individual/leader/commander to make decisions based on the importance of the mission vs the risk (Real or Perceived) +/- any possible mitigation.

That is it.

You can't do any better other then educate people on the tools to evaluate risk, tools for mitigation and specific safety training on actual risks (i.e. This is the Ford F-150 Panel Van Mark II.   It has blind spots here, here, here, and here.   The Flux Capacitor may come unglued in wet moist conditions that could result in unexpected time travel.....)

But as a leader.....I don't want to base our training program on leveraging PERCEPTIONS to enact safety.
I want to use FACTS Verifiable and Repeatable.

Yes....we all know "SME" who are worth their weight in dog poop.   Get better SMEs. 



Can we leverage training combined with the individuals perception to help impact a safety program?

Would you agree that "better" SMEs would need to keep an open mind when it comes to safety or the individuals involved?

 
Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

lordmonar

Quote from: MovingOnToOtherThings on September 01, 2019, 04:55:34 pm
Can we leverage training combined with the individuals perception to help impact a safety program?

Well...that's a different question then the one originally asked.

Yes.  You can build a better training program to impact a safety program.

QuoteWould you agree that "better" SMEs would need to keep an open mind when it comes to safety or the individuals involved?

No.  You don't hire SME's to be open minded.   You hire them to provide you their opinions based on their experience and expertise. 

This is where the safety and the safety culture runs afoul.
Safety wants to "make a change" but the SME's are never open minded enough to see that the change is "good".
The SME's are sitting there wondering why the safety guys are pushing yet another rule or change on them when they (The safety guys) don't even know the first thing about the job that they (the SMEs) are doing.

If you have a good idea about making the job safer.   Great.  Sell it to the SME and implement it.
If you can't sell it to SMEs....maybe it is not just inertia or stubbornness.   Maybe you have failed to explain to the SMEs how it will improve safety........oh....and don't forget Safety is almost NEVER the primary concern of the SME.....no matter how many times the plaster that on the wall. 

/rant



PATRICK M. HARRIS, SMSgt, CAP

James Shaw

Quote from: lordmonar on September 01, 2019, 09:09:43 pm
Quote from: MovingOnToOtherThings on September 01, 2019, 04:55:34 pm
Can we leverage training combined with the individuals perception to help impact a safety program?

Well...that's a different question then the one originally asked.

Yes.  You can build a better training program to impact a safety program.

QuoteWould you agree that "better" SMEs would need to keep an open mind when it comes to safety or the individuals involved?

No.  You don't hire SME's to be open minded.   You hire them to provide you their opinions based on their experience and expertise. 

This is where the safety and the safety culture runs afoul.
Safety wants to "make a change" but the SME's are never open minded enough to see that the change is "good".
The SME's are sitting there wondering why the safety guys are pushing yet another rule or change on them when they (The safety guys) don't even know the first thing about the job that they (the SMEs) are doing.

If you have a good idea about making the job safer.   Great.  Sell it to the SME and implement it.
If you can't sell it to SMEs....maybe it is not just inertia or stubbornness.   Maybe you have failed to explain to the SMEs how it will improve safety........oh....and don't forget Safety is almost NEVER the primary concern of the SME.....no matter how many times the plaster that on the wall. 

/rant


How can an organization help train its employees or members on the "Risk Perception" associated with their activities?

Can we leverage training combined with the individuals perception to help impact a safety program?

To bring it together: Can we bring the individuals experiences and expertise together to help train them on the concept of Risk that will make more sense if we can associate it with something they are already familiar with?

I would agree that the Safety person would need to understand the process more and be able to speak and talk the same language with the SME.

Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

lordmonar

I don't know why you are stuck on the term "Perception".

Yes you can of course use your training program to use known risks and experiences of the target audience  to help understand the ACTUAL risks of the new job/task/operation.

What you are actually trying to do is to destroy their perceptions and replace it with facts.

And that's what I was trying to say at the first.   

If people are don't know the real risks of something....you educate them on the risks.  It's that simple.
If people are too familiar with the task and are under estimating the risk.....again....you educate them on the real risks.

I'm a Skydiver....and I often talk to first time jumpers who thing sky diving is "dangerous" by showing them the statics of their everyday life in relation to the actual risks of skydiving.....i.e.  It is more dangerous to drive to the Drop Zone than it is to do the actual jump.

But....That is a case of an overstated perception of danger.   If they individual does not believe what they are doing is risky....through ignorance or complacency....that's a tougher nut to crack.   

But in either case.....the focus of the training should be mainly on the facts of the risks.   Not over stating nor under stating the risks.
PATRICK M. HARRIS, SMSgt, CAP

James Shaw

September 02, 2019, 02:29:38 pm #18 Last Edit: September 02, 2019, 02:33:12 pm by MovingOnToOtherThings
Quote from: lordmonar on September 01, 2019, 10:17:26 pm
I don't know why you are stuck on the term "Perception".

Yes you can of course use your training program to use known risks and experiences of the target audience  to help understand the ACTUAL risks of the new job/task/operation.

What you are actually trying to do is to destroy their perceptions and replace it with facts.

And that's what I was trying to say at the first.   

If people are don't know the real risks of something....you educate them on the risks.  It's that simple.
If people are too familiar with the task and are under estimating the risk.....again....you educate them on the real risks.

I'm a Skydiver....and I often talk to first time jumpers who thing sky diving is "dangerous" by showing them the statics of their everyday life in relation to the actual risks of skydiving.....i.e.  It is more dangerous to drive to the Drop Zone than it is to do the actual jump.

But....That is a case of an overstated perception of danger.   If they individual does not believe what they are doing is risky....through ignorance or complacency....that's a tougher nut to crack.   

But in either case.....the focus of the training should be mainly on the facts of the risks.   Not over stating nor under stating the risks.


I use Perception for several reasons.

If you  look up the definition of "Common Sense" Merriam Webster states: "Sound and prudent judgement based on a simple perception of the situation or facts". This has been the base of part of my safety research and discussions over the last 22 years or so.

I agree that we can use the prior experiences of the individual to help them understand the needs and requirements of understanding risk in a job/task/operation.

For me the intent would be to help use their individual KSA's to help them understand more than just the regulatory and compliance side but the Human Factors involved in the process.

This is why I like to get others opinions and input from the safety perspective as it helps me understand the Human Factors better and challenge my way of thinking and keep an open mind.
Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

THRAWN

Perception plays a big part in the development of an effective SMS and safety culture. Take a look at 2.6 here: https://www.icao.int/safety/SafetyManagement/Documents/Doc.9859.3rd%20Edition.alltext.en.pdf where it discusses how "perception", individual, organizational, and cultural, impacts how safety is viewed. The struggle is to balance that perception with the hard data to develop an effective and comprehensive RMS and SMS.
Strup
"Belligerent....at times...."
AFRCC SMC 10-97
NSS ISC 05-00
USAF SOS 2000
USAF ACSC 2011
US NWC 2016

James Shaw

Quote from: THRAWN on September 02, 2019, 03:07:38 pm
Perception plays a big part in the development of an effective SMS and safety culture. Take a look at 2.6 here: https://www.icao.int/safety/SafetyManagement/Documents/Doc.9859.3rd%20Edition.alltext.en.pdf where it discusses how "perception", individual, organizational, and cultural, impacts how safety is viewed. The struggle is to balance that perception with the hard data to develop an effective and comprehensive RMS and SMS.


I have seen this before but it has been a very long time. I think it was the 2006 Edition. I like their definitions. I have had several students use the current version as a source.

My paper was Titled "Is it Common Sense to believe in Common Sense when it does not make Common Sense, Safely Speaking"

The struggle and balancing act are real!
Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

NIN

Let me give you a great example of the difference between "risk perception," "actual risk" and "risk management."  And how "public perception" is different from "participant perception."

Patrick knew I was going to chime in here, and on this subject.

Some of you guys know that my part-time job is as a skydiving instructor.  I teach people how to jump out of perfectly good airplanes, repeatedly.

Now, most people's "perception" of the risk in skydiving is "extreme."

The actuality of that risk is "risky, but manageable."

The guy who walks onto the local drop zone doesn't know that. He perceives "extreme risk" as a layman without indoctrination or training. Those around him perceive "extreme risk" as well.  Especially mom & dad.

However, during the course of instruction toward becoming a skydiver, the student is taught about how to manage risk, and how to minimize unnecessary risk.

Initially, we mitigate the student risk by placing the student in a situation where he or she has almost every move covered by an instructor or other rating holder until they are ready to assume control. 

Example: First jump, we never let the student go. Two instructors with harness holds, all the student has to do is be flat and stable. We've drilled that into their head all day during the first jump course, along with emergency procedures.   We continue to mitigate that risk by not putting the student up in strong winds, weird upper winds, etc.

An outsider perceives "Holy crap, are you crazy!?"

The actuality is somewhat different.

Are there activity profiles that increase the actual risk? Sure: night jumps, wing suiting, etc.

Are they perceived as "more risky?"  You betcha, cuz they are.

Thats why people don't get to do those things until they have more experience (say, 100-200 jumps).

But most people would lump the risk perception into one big pool, nevermind the actuality of it.

Darin Ninness, Col, CAP
Wing Dude
I like to have Difficult Adult Conversations™
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The contents of this post are Copyright © 2007-2021 by NIN. All rights are reserved. Specific permission is given to quote this post here on CAP-Talk only.

James Shaw

Quote from: NIN on September 05, 2019, 02:56:28 am
Let me give you a great example of the difference between "risk perception," "actual risk" and "risk management."  And how "public perception" is different from "participant perception."


But most people would lump the risk perception into one big pool, nevermind the actuality of it.


You have hit the nail on the head in the way you are describing the Risk.

I use the acronym PPE with my students and academic writing and research. PPE is generally used a Personal Protective Equipment and is the last in the hierarchy of controls for risk management. In my writing it has a different meaning.

People Process & Environment

People - Individuals are the ones with Risk Perception

Process - This means activity or how the event is done with respect to preparation and training.

Environment - How the individual or activity is managed by the group to ensure enough experience is achieved before engaging in the activity.

I like the example!

I also like to have "challenging" adult conversations as well. It keep me on my toes and helps to keep an open mind.

Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

Spam


From an aerospace engineering perspective of risk:

Per DoD instruction, USAF (and Navy, and Army) programs require an RMP (Risk Management Plan) that can offer insights for operational risk as well. The AF RMP template breaks risk down into the following areas (obviously not all apply to CAP, but the process does - hear me out):
Operational
Security
Cost
Schedule
Performance
Technical
Test and Eval
Source selection
Intelligence support
etc.

DoD defines associated terms this way (note what it does to frame one's mind set):
•   Risk is a potential future event or condition that may have a negative effect on achieving program objectives for cost, schedule and performance.  Risks are defined by (1) the likelihood (0 < probability < 1) of an undesired event or condition, and (2) the consequences, impact or severity of the undesired event if it occurs.
•   Issue is an event or condition with negative effect that has occurred (such as a realized risk), or is certain to occur (probability = 1), and should be addressed.
•   Opportunity is a potential future event with benefits to the program's cost, schedule and/or performance baseline.

A solid RMP addresses risk analyses across all these areas that is evidence based, probabilistic (ideally), and which drives risk mitigation and contingency planning. Contingency plans are special measures that are taken if a risk becomes an issue (i.e. either high probability, severe consequences, or both!)  However, these are not handling plans because unlike a risk handling plan a contingency plan is not implemented until after the negative event has occurred.  In other words:
•   Risk handling = proactive planning, proactive implementation.
•   Contingency planning = proactive planning, reactive implementation.
•   Issue management = reactive planning, reactive implementation.

Ideally then, you want to invest an appropriate amount of effort in analysis, awareness, and monitoring to make sure that you catch risks in the first two (risk handling, and contingency planning, rather than totally reactively trying to put out fires and clean up blood after the fact).

So (trying to summarize a massive program into a short post): USAF uses a structured life cycle risk management process to continuously monitor risk (not just operational/flying risk, but the risk of blundering into fielding unsupported systems, of failing to provide logistical support leaving troops unfed and aircraft unflyable, etc.).

Trying to adapt that to CAP - solid program managers and commanders should then include a RMP and plan for risk assessments as part of every new start acquisition program, and include an RMP in the climate and operational reviews for each level of command; not that every CAP squadron needs to have a risk plan for if their handheld batteries explode, but it should be tailored realistically to the type and level of activity and scope of authority. For example, at a national level, a good analysis of alternatives (AOA) and RMP analysis should be complete as part of a program plan before buying/fielding new gear (say, like ARCHER, sUASs, or FLIRs, just to use some fun/recent examples we've discussed here on CT). At a Wing level, an RMP analysis should look more at the operational and fielding risks such as aircraft basing requirements and training issues (e.g. here in Georgia, we have a HURREVAC plan to hurricane evac our coastal aircraft and vehicles before a strike - just like the Air Force does, with rare F-22 exceptions). At a local level you can get even more specific.

That, in my mind, is where CAP volunteers need to start to cage their perceptions of risk at both a strategic and tactical level, across not just immediate operational safety risk, but by starting at the strategic level where people are taking cash and making (or avoiding) decisions which could set volunteers up for risk in the field. One hopes that at a national level, we are actually doing some of this strategically, as opposed to stepping out with programs as if we were taking a five year old for a walk in the park... "SQUIRREL"!



References:
https://www.e-publishing.af.mil/
•   AFI 91-202, The USAF Mishap Prevention Program
•   AFI 90-802, Risk Management; and AFPAM 90-803, Risk Management Guidelines and Tools
https://www.ncca.navy.mil/tools/csruh/index.cfm
•   Joint Agency Cost Schedule Risk and Uncertainty Handbook (JA CSRUH)
•   MIL-STD-882E, System Safety
https://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/2017-RIO.pdf
The 2017 DoD Risk, Issue and Opportunity [RIO] Management Guide

V/r
Spam








James Shaw

Quote from: Spam on September 05, 2019, 04:47:27 pm

From an aerospace engineering perspective of risk:

Per DoD instruction, USAF (and Navy, and Army) programs require an RMP (Risk Management Plan) that can offer insights for operational risk as well. The AF RMP template breaks risk down into the following areas (obviously not all apply to CAP, but the process does - hear me out):
Operational
Security
Cost
Schedule
Performance
Technical
Test and Eval
Source selection
Intelligence support
etc.

DoD defines associated terms this way (note what it does to frame one's mind set):
•   Risk is a potential future event or condition that may have a negative effect on achieving program objectives for cost, schedule and performance.  Risks are defined by (1) the likelihood (0 < probability < 1) of an undesired event or condition, and (2) the consequences, impact or severity of the undesired event if it occurs.
•   Issue is an event or condition with negative effect that has occurred (such as a realized risk), or is certain to occur (probability = 1), and should be addressed.
•   Opportunity is a potential future event with benefits to the program's cost, schedule and/or performance baseline.

A solid RMP addresses risk analyses across all these areas that is evidence based, probabilistic (ideally), and which drives risk mitigation and contingency planning. Contingency plans are special measures that are taken if a risk becomes an issue (i.e. either high probability, severe consequences, or both!)  However, these are not handling plans because unlike a risk handling plan a contingency plan is not implemented until after the negative event has occurred.  In other words:
•   Risk handling = proactive planning, proactive implementation.
•   Contingency planning = proactive planning, reactive implementation.
•   Issue management = reactive planning, reactive implementation.

Ideally then, you want to invest an appropriate amount of effort in analysis, awareness, and monitoring to make sure that you catch risks in the first two (risk handling, and contingency planning, rather than totally reactively trying to put out fires and clean up blood after the fact).

So (trying to summarize a massive program into a short post): USAF uses a structured life cycle risk management process to continuously monitor risk (not just operational/flying risk, but the risk of blundering into fielding unsupported systems, of failing to provide logistical support leaving troops unfed and aircraft unflyable, etc.).

Trying to adapt that to CAP - solid program managers and commanders should then include a RMP and plan for risk assessments as part of every new start acquisition program, and include an RMP in the climate and operational reviews for each level of command; not that every CAP squadron needs to have a risk plan for if their handheld batteries explode, but it should be tailored realistically to the type and level of activity and scope of authority. For example, at a national level, a good analysis of alternatives (AOA) and RMP analysis should be complete as part of a program plan before buying/fielding new gear (say, like ARCHER, sUASs, or FLIRs, just to use some fun/recent examples we've discussed here on CT). At a Wing level, an RMP analysis should look more at the operational and fielding risks such as aircraft basing requirements and training issues (e.g. here in Georgia, we have a HURREVAC plan to hurricane evac our coastal aircraft and vehicles before a strike - just like the Air Force does, with rare F-22 exceptions). At a local level you can get even more specific.

That, in my mind, is where CAP volunteers need to start to cage their perceptions of risk at both a strategic and tactical level, across not just immediate operational safety risk, but by starting at the strategic level where people are taking cash and making (or avoiding) decisions which could set volunteers up for risk in the field. One hopes that at a national level, we are actually doing some of this strategically, as opposed to stepping out with programs as if we were taking a five year old for a walk in the park... "SQUIRREL"!



References:
https://www.e-publishing.af.mil/
•   AFI 91-202, The USAF Mishap Prevention Program
•   AFI 90-802, Risk Management; and AFPAM 90-803, Risk Management Guidelines and Tools
https://www.ncca.navy.mil/tools/csruh/index.cfm
•   Joint Agency Cost Schedule Risk and Uncertainty Handbook (JA CSRUH)
•   MIL-STD-882E, System Safety
https://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/2017-RIO.pdf
The 2017 DoD Risk, Issue and Opportunity [RIO] Management Guide

V/r
Spam


Do you think it would do some good if we had "specific JHA's or JSA's or something of that sort for known activities or tasks?
Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

Spaceman3750

I don't know how you train or legislate perceived risk, but the conversation reminds me of an article I sent to husker this spring that looks at the idea head-on: http://ojovolador.com/en/2016/10/28/a-very-special-flight-xc-denmark/

Enjoy!

Spam


Informally, I think CAP already has written enough material into approved flight procedures, qualification requirements, etc. to meet the intent of providing Job Hazard Analyses or Safety Analyses. I was pleased to work with several folks a couple of decades ago to write a GT skill task book in MD Wing based on the Army Manual of Common Tasks, and we did some very informal JHAs in doing so (that yellow book turned green and was adopted for National use). These sort of informal processes lead to things like the safety belt/vest drills, though, which go overboard when people start demanding risk control measures where, realistically, the odds vs. severity matrix doesn't call for the ass pain of compliance under all conditions.


So, formally, the JSA/HA process calls for things like a review of mishap history, as well as a stepwise task analysis to "game out" possible hazards, and then the analysis of severity and likelihood of mistakes. That's a good process. Done right, you make changes to equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures based on evidence and accident history, and don't end up with heavy handed "BUT BECAUSE SAFETY ... WE SHOULD ___x____" knee jerk reactions and program changes.


I don't think we'd want to ask local units to do that though (what a nightmare). I'd recommend that whatever the Curriculum Project is up to these days, they might want to consider it while revising the task books. Someone from on here asked me if I'd be willing to review/participate, but that was like two years ago and he never called back, so I'm not sanguine regarding seeing a work product soon, let alone one which dives deeper into hazard and risk analysis by task.


So, I'm a bit fatalistic that I'll keep seeing amateurish direction on this from the organization, purely via ignorance, not malice.

V/r
Spam


Spam

Quote from: Spaceman3750 on September 05, 2019, 09:11:43 pm
I don't know how you train or legislate perceived risk, but the conversation reminds me of an article I sent to husker this spring that looks at the idea head-on: http://ojovolador.com/en/2016/10/28/a-very-special-flight-xc-denmark/

Enjoy!


That's a great article. Directly on point, great post!

Thanks
Spam



James Shaw

Thanks everyone for the great discussion and challenge in this thread. It has been insightful, great, and fun.
Jim Shaw
USN: 1987-1992
GANG: 1996-1998
CAP:2000 - Current
USCGA:2018 - Current
SGAUS: 2017 - Current

Spam


I now realize that I've made the mandatory uniform input... safety belts.
I am humbly sorry; please forgive me.


Mea Maxima Culpa
Spam


Live2Learn

Quote from: Spam on September 06, 2019, 04:19:04 pm

I now realize that I've made the mandatory uniform input... safety belts.
I am humbly sorry; please forgive me.


Mea Maxima Culpa
Spam


And steel toed, traction soled, ankle high, black leather boots.