Quote from: THRAWN on September 02, 2019, 03:07:38 PM
Perception plays a big part in the development of an effective SMS and safety culture. Take a look at 2.6 here: https://www.icao.int/safety/SafetyManagement/Documents/Doc.9859.3rd%20Edition.alltext.en.pdf where it discusses how "perception", individual, organizational, and cultural, impacts how safety is viewed. The struggle is to balance that perception with the hard data to develop an effective and comprehensive RMS and SMS.

I have seen this before but it has been a very long time. I think it was the 2006 Edition. I like their definitions. I have had several students use the current version as a source.

My paper was Titled "Is it Common Sense to believe in Common Sense when it does not make Common Sense, Safely Speaking"

The struggle and balancing act are real!

Let me give you a great example of the difference between "risk perception," "actual risk" and "risk management."  And how "public perception" is different from "participant perception."

Patrick knew I was going to chime in here, and on this subject.

Some of you guys know that my part-time job is as a skydiving instructor.  I teach people how to jump out of perfectly good airplanes, repeatedly.

Now, most people's "perception" of the risk in skydiving is "extreme."

The actuality of that risk is "risky, but manageable."

The guy who walks onto the local drop zone doesn't know that. He perceives "extreme risk" as a layman without indoctrination or training. Those around him perceive "extreme risk" as well.  Especially mom & dad.

However, during the course of instruction toward becoming a skydiver, the student is taught about how to manage risk, and how to minimize unnecessary risk.

Initially, we mitigate the student risk by placing the student in a situation where he or she has almost every move covered by an instructor or other rating holder until they are ready to assume control. 

Example: First jump, we never let the student go. Two instructors with harness holds, all the student has to do is be flat and stable. We've drilled that into their head all day during the first jump course, along with emergency procedures.   We continue to mitigate that risk by not putting the student up in strong winds, weird upper winds, etc.

An outsider perceives "Holy crap, are you crazy!?"

The actuality is somewhat different.

Are there activity profiles that increase the actual risk? Sure: night jumps, wing suiting, etc.

Are they perceived as "more risky?"  You betcha, cuz they are.

Thats why people don't get to do those things until they have more experience (say, 100-200 jumps).

But most people would lump the risk perception into one big pool, nevermind the actuality of it.

Quote from: NIN on September 05, 2019, 02:56:28 AM
Let me give you a great example of the difference between "risk perception," "actual risk" and "risk management."  And how "public perception" is different from "participant perception."


But most people would lump the risk perception into one big pool, nevermind the actuality of it.

You have hit the nail on the head in the way you are describing the Risk.

I use the acronym PPE with my students and academic writing and research. PPE is generally used a Personal Protective Equipment and is the last in the hierarchy of controls for risk management. In my writing it has a different meaning.

People Process & Environment

People - Individuals are the ones with Risk Perception

Process - This means activity or how the event is done with respect to preparation and training.

Environment - How the individual or activity is managed by the group to ensure enough experience is achieved before engaging in the activity.

I like the example!

I also like to have "challenging" adult conversations as well. It keep me on my toes and helps to keep an open mind.

From an aerospace engineering perspective of risk:

Per DoD instruction, USAF (and Navy, and Army) programs require an RMP (Risk Management Plan) that can offer insights for operational risk as well. The AF RMP template breaks risk down into the following areas (obviously not all apply to CAP, but the process does - hear me out):
Operational
Security
Cost
Schedule
Performance
Technical
Test and Eval
Source selection
Intelligence support
etc.

DoD defines associated terms this way (note what it does to frame one's mind set):
•   Risk is a potential future event or condition that may have a negative effect on achieving program objectives for cost, schedule and performance.  Risks are defined by (1) the likelihood (0 < probability < 1) of an undesired event or condition, and (2) the consequences, impact or severity of the undesired event if it occurs.
•   Issue is an event or condition with negative effect that has occurred (such as a realized risk), or is certain to occur (probability = 1), and should be addressed.
•   Opportunity is a potential future event with benefits to the program's cost, schedule and/or performance baseline.

A solid RMP addresses risk analyses across all these areas that is evidence based, probabilistic (ideally), and which drives risk mitigation and contingency planning. Contingency plans are special measures that are taken if a risk becomes an issue (i.e. either high probability, severe consequences, or both!)  However, these are not handling plans because unlike a risk handling plan a contingency plan is not implemented until after the negative event has occurred.  In other words:
•   Risk handling = proactive planning, proactive implementation.
•   Contingency planning = proactive planning, reactive implementation.
•   Issue management = reactive planning, reactive implementation.

Ideally then, you want to invest an appropriate amount of effort in analysis, awareness, and monitoring to make sure that you catch risks in the first two (risk handling, and contingency planning, rather than totally reactively trying to put out fires and clean up blood after the fact).

So (trying to summarize a massive program into a short post): USAF uses a structured life cycle risk management process to continuously monitor risk (not just operational/flying risk, but the risk of blundering into fielding unsupported systems, of failing to provide logistical support leaving troops unfed and aircraft unflyable, etc.).

Trying to adapt that to CAP - solid program managers and commanders should then include a RMP and plan for risk assessments as part of every new start acquisition program, and include an RMP in the climate and operational reviews for each level of command; not that every CAP squadron needs to have a risk plan for if their handheld batteries explode, but it should be tailored realistically to the type and level of activity and scope of authority. For example, at a national level, a good analysis of alternatives (AOA) and RMP analysis should be complete as part of a program plan before buying/fielding new gear (say, like ARCHER, sUASs, or FLIRs, just to use some fun/recent examples we've discussed here on CT). At a Wing level, an RMP analysis should look more at the operational and fielding risks such as aircraft basing requirements and training issues (e.g. here in Georgia, we have a HURREVAC plan to hurricane evac our coastal aircraft and vehicles before a strike - just like the Air Force does, with rare F-22 exceptions). At a local level you can get even more specific.

That, in my mind, is where CAP volunteers need to start to cage their perceptions of risk at both a strategic and tactical level, across not just immediate operational safety risk, but by starting at the strategic level where people are taking cash and making (or avoiding) decisions which could set volunteers up for risk in the field. One hopes that at a national level, we are actually doing some of this strategically, as opposed to stepping out with programs as if we were taking a five year old for a walk in the park... "SQUIRREL"!



References:
https://www.e-publishing.af.mil/
•   AFI 91-202, The USAF Mishap Prevention Program
•   AFI 90-802, Risk Management; and AFPAM 90-803, Risk Management Guidelines and Tools
https://www.ncca.navy.mil/tools/csruh/index.cfm
•   Joint Agency Cost Schedule Risk and Uncertainty Handbook (JA CSRUH)
•   MIL-STD-882E, System Safety
https://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/2017-RIO.pdf
The 2017 DoD Risk, Issue and Opportunity [RIO] Management Guide

V/r
Spam

Quote from: Spam on September 05, 2019, 04:47:27 PM

From an aerospace engineering perspective of risk:

Per DoD instruction, USAF (and Navy, and Army) programs require an RMP (Risk Management Plan) that can offer insights for operational risk as well. The AF RMP template breaks risk down into the following areas (obviously not all apply to CAP, but the process does - hear me out):
Operational
Security
Cost
Schedule
Performance
Technical
Test and Eval
Source selection
Intelligence support
etc.

DoD defines associated terms this way (note what it does to frame one's mind set):
•   Risk is a potential future event or condition that may have a negative effect on achieving program objectives for cost, schedule and performance.  Risks are defined by (1) the likelihood (0 < probability < 1) of an undesired event or condition, and (2) the consequences, impact or severity of the undesired event if it occurs.
•   Issue is an event or condition with negative effect that has occurred (such as a realized risk), or is certain to occur (probability = 1), and should be addressed.
•   Opportunity is a potential future event with benefits to the program's cost, schedule and/or performance baseline.

A solid RMP addresses risk analyses across all these areas that is evidence based, probabilistic (ideally), and which drives risk mitigation and contingency planning. Contingency plans are special measures that are taken if a risk becomes an issue (i.e. either high probability, severe consequences, or both!)  However, these are not handling plans because unlike a risk handling plan a contingency plan is not implemented until after the negative event has occurred.  In other words:
•   Risk handling = proactive planning, proactive implementation.
•   Contingency planning = proactive planning, reactive implementation.
•   Issue management = reactive planning, reactive implementation.

Ideally then, you want to invest an appropriate amount of effort in analysis, awareness, and monitoring to make sure that you catch risks in the first two (risk handling, and contingency planning, rather than totally reactively trying to put out fires and clean up blood after the fact).

So (trying to summarize a massive program into a short post): USAF uses a structured life cycle risk management process to continuously monitor risk (not just operational/flying risk, but the risk of blundering into fielding unsupported systems, of failing to provide logistical support leaving troops unfed and aircraft unflyable, etc.).

Trying to adapt that to CAP - solid program managers and commanders should then include a RMP and plan for risk assessments as part of every new start acquisition program, and include an RMP in the climate and operational reviews for each level of command; not that every CAP squadron needs to have a risk plan for if their handheld batteries explode, but it should be tailored realistically to the type and level of activity and scope of authority. For example, at a national level, a good analysis of alternatives (AOA) and RMP analysis should be complete as part of a program plan before buying/fielding new gear (say, like ARCHER, sUASs, or FLIRs, just to use some fun/recent examples we've discussed here on CT). At a Wing level, an RMP analysis should look more at the operational and fielding risks such as aircraft basing requirements and training issues (e.g. here in Georgia, we have a HURREVAC plan to hurricane evac our coastal aircraft and vehicles before a strike - just like the Air Force does, with rare F-22 exceptions). At a local level you can get even more specific.

That, in my mind, is where CAP volunteers need to start to cage their perceptions of risk at both a strategic and tactical level, across not just immediate operational safety risk, but by starting at the strategic level where people are taking cash and making (or avoiding) decisions which could set volunteers up for risk in the field. One hopes that at a national level, we are actually doing some of this strategically, as opposed to stepping out with programs as if we were taking a five year old for a walk in the park... "SQUIRREL"!



References:
https://www.e-publishing.af.mil/
•   AFI 91-202, The USAF Mishap Prevention Program
•   AFI 90-802, Risk Management; and AFPAM 90-803, Risk Management Guidelines and Tools
https://www.ncca.navy.mil/tools/csruh/index.cfm
•   Joint Agency Cost Schedule Risk and Uncertainty Handbook (JA CSRUH)
•   MIL-STD-882E, System Safety
https://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/2017-RIO.pdf
The 2017 DoD Risk, Issue and Opportunity [RIO] Management Guide

V/r
Spam

Do you think it would do some good if we had "specific JHA's or JSA's or something of that sort for known activities or tasks?

I don't know how you train or legislate perceived risk, but the conversation reminds me of an article I sent to husker this spring that looks at the idea head-on: http://ojovolador.com/en/2016/10/28/a-very-special-flight-xc-denmark/

Enjoy!

Informally, I think CAP already has written enough material into approved flight procedures, qualification requirements, etc. to meet the intent of providing Job Hazard Analyses or Safety Analyses. I was pleased to work with several folks a couple of decades ago to write a GT skill task book in MD Wing based on the Army Manual of Common Tasks, and we did some very informal JHAs in doing so (that yellow book turned green and was adopted for National use). These sort of informal processes lead to things like the safety belt/vest drills, though, which go overboard when people start demanding risk control measures where, realistically, the odds vs. severity matrix doesn't call for the ass pain of compliance under all conditions.


So, formally, the JSA/HA process calls for things like a review of mishap history, as well as a stepwise task analysis to "game out" possible hazards, and then the analysis of severity and likelihood of mistakes. That's a good process. Done right, you make changes to equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures based on evidence and accident history, and don't end up with heavy handed "BUT BECAUSE SAFETY ... WE SHOULD ___x____" knee jerk reactions and program changes.


I don't think we'd want to ask local units to do that though (what a nightmare). I'd recommend that whatever the Curriculum Project is up to these days, they might want to consider it while revising the task books. Someone from on here asked me if I'd be willing to review/participate, but that was like two years ago and he never called back, so I'm not sanguine regarding seeing a work product soon, let alone one which dives deeper into hazard and risk analysis by task.


So, I'm a bit fatalistic that I'll keep seeing amateurish direction on this from the organization, purely via ignorance, not malice.

V/r
Spam

Quote from: Spaceman3750 on September 05, 2019, 09:11:43 PM
I don't know how you train or legislate perceived risk, but the conversation reminds me of an article I sent to husker this spring that looks at the idea head-on: http://ojovolador.com/en/2016/10/28/a-very-special-flight-xc-denmark/

Enjoy!

That's a great article. Directly on point, great post!

Thanks
Spam

Thanks everyone for the great discussion and challenge in this thread. It has been insightful, great, and fun.

I now realize that I've made the mandatory uniform input... safety belts.
I am humbly sorry; please forgive me.


Mea Maxima Culpa
Spam

Quote from: Spam on September 06, 2019, 04:19:04 PM

I now realize that I've made the mandatory uniform input... safety belts.
I am humbly sorry; please forgive me.


Mea Maxima Culpa
Spam

And steel toed, traction soled, ankle high, black leather boots.